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

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A HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

VOLUME I

BETHEL TO SHARPSBURG

BETHEL TO SHARPSBURG

BY

DANIEL HARVEY HILL

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

RALEIGH
EDWARDS & BROUGHTON COMPANY
1926

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INTRODUCTION

THE preparation of these volumes dealing with the history of North Carolina troops in the civil war was made possible through the Ricks Fund, created in 1916 by the late Robert Henry Ricks of Rocky Mount, North Carolina.

Mr. Ricks was born in Nash County, North Carolina, in 1839. He was thus in the flush of early manhood when the civil war began. He enlisted three days after Lincoln's call for troops, in what became Company A of the First (later the Eleventh), or Bethel, Regiment. He served until the surrender at Appomattox. He was present at the battle of Bethel and was one of the six men who volunteered to charge upon the house held by the Federal troops. As they advanced, Henry L. Wyatt, who was immediately beside him, fell, the first Confederate soldier killed in action. Mr. Ricks remained in the same company throughout the war, taking part in the battles of Bristoe Station, Mine Run, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor—where he was wounded five times—and Petersburg. He was present at Appomattox, but when he found out that General Lee had at last accepted defeat, with two kindred spirits he, in his own words, "took to the mountains," and thus avoided the heartbreaking scene of surrender. For fourteen days, the larger part of them alone, he walked towards North Carolina and home. Crossing Dan River at Leaksville, he finally reached Nashville, sore of foot but unconquered, and prepared to begin life again. His assets for the undertaking were one dollar in cash, a strong body, a fighting spirit reinforced by untiring industry and determination, an excellent mind, and spotless integrity. Beginning

with these he secured a position as a farm laborer at ten dollars a month and steadily moved forward until he amassed a large fortune and became one of the most important figures in agriculture and industry in Eastern North Carolina.

While his interests were diverse and he had a part in almost every industrial undertaking in Rocky Mount, Mr. Ricks remained always essentially the farmer rather than the manufacturer or capitalist. He continued to live on his home farm in spite of the fact that his business undertakings in town grew always more important. But all of them combined did not rival in his mind his farming interests. Concerned in politics only as a good citizen he nevertheless twice consented to become a member of the legislature because he wanted to be useful in respect to agricultural legislation. He was, too, for years one of the most enthusiastic and valuable members of the board of trustees of the State College of Agriculture and Engineering.

The memory of his service in the Confederate Army was one of the deep pleasures in the life of Mr. Ricks. He cherished no vain regrets, had no room in his soul for sectional bitterness, but he loved the memories of the past, he rejoiced with great, if quiet, rejoicing to have been one of those who made up Lee's "thin gray line," and he was proud of the record of North Carolina in the struggle.

In deep sympathy with him in his pride in the state's record was the late J. Bryan Grimes, Secretary of State of North Carolina, and chairman of the North Carolina Historical Commission. So deep was his interest that he became convinced that the most important single historical service that could be rendered the state was the preparation of an accurate and detailed study of the part played by North Caro-

lina troops from Bethel to Appomattox, and having come to this conclusion he took steps to get a movement started for putting his idea into execution. Accordingly he drew up a resolution which Mr. A. H. Boyden of Salisbury, at his request, presented to a meeting of the North Carolina Division of the United Confederate Veterans, held at Raleigh in October, 1915. This was unanimously adopted, and was as follows:

Whereas, the history of the part taken by North Carolina in the War between the States has never been written; and

Whereas, it is important that such a history, complete in scope, accurate in statement, fair and just to all, should be prepared and published in order that future generations may not be left in ignorance of the courage displayed by North Carolina soldiers on the battlefield, the wisdom shown by her statesmen in the council chamber, and the heroic sacrifices and patriotism manifested by all her people during the great struggle; and

Whereas, the time and expense necessary for the preparation and publication of such a work are so great, and the returns reasonably to be expected so small as to preclude the probability of any single person ever undertaking the task upon his own initiative; therefore be it

Resolved by the North Carolina Division, United Confederate Veterans, That a committee consisting of James I. Metts, Julian S. Carr, R. H. Ricks, W. L. London, and A. H. Boyden, be appointed to raise a sum of not less than $25,000 to be known as "The North Carolina Confederate History Fund," which shall be devoted to the above mentioned purpose; and be it further

Resolved, That a record shall be kept of the contributors to this fund, whose names and war records shall be published in the said history on a page or pages to be dedicated as a memorial to them; and be it further

Resolved, That the North Carolina Historical Commission be requested to act for the North Carolina Division, United Confederate Veterans, in the selection of a suitable person for the proposed work, in making a contract with him, in supervising the work, and in otherwise managing the above-mentioned fund which shall be turned over to said North Carolina Historical Commission by the committee herein provided for, the said North

Carolina Historical Commission to make an annual report of all disbursements from this fund to the North Carolina Division, United Confederate Veterans.

When the committee met in December, Colonel Grimes had already interested Mr. Ricks in the project. The latter at first offered to contribute one thousand dollars towards the work. Very soon afterwards he agreed to be one of five men who would give five thousand dollars each. By the time the committee met, his imagination had been fired by the idea and he offered to guarantee the entire amount agreed upon, an offer which he soon changed so as to make an unconditional gift of the entire amount.

This gift to perpetuate the memory of North Carolina Confederate history has been approached only once—by the gift of the late Ashley Horne of the monument in the Capital Square to the Women of the Confederacy. It is interesting to recall that the address of the unveiling was delivered by Dr. Hill.

The committee passed a resolution requesting the North Carolina Historical Commission to select Dr. Daniel Harvey Hill to prepare the book, and in January, 1916, the Commission accepted the trust and requested Dr. Hill to undertake the work proposed. The Commission in addition passed the following resolution:

Resolved, That the members of the North Carolina Historical Commission, in common with all other patriotic citizens of the state, have heard with deep appreciation of the patriotic and unselfish generosity of Mr. R. H. Ricks, in making possible the writing of a complete, accurate, and just history of the part taken by North Carolina in the War between the States. His act gives assurance, for the first time, that the heroic deeds of the soldiers, the wisdom of the statesmen, and the noble sacrifices of the people of North Carolina, in behalf of Constitutional Government, will be properly recorded, so that future generations

may know and appreciate the virtues and greatness of our mother state in the days that tried men's souls. The unsolicited generosity of the act, the unselfishness of the object to be attained, and the quiet modesty of the guarantor are typical of the virtues of the men who wore the gray, whose heroism in war has never been surpassed unless it was by their devotion to the duties and responsibilities of peace. From this act will result a permanent memorial to North Carolina's soldiers of the Confederacy, whose descendants, to the remotest generations, will remember with gratitude the liberality of the man who has made it possible.

Dr. Hill, who was at the time president of the State College of Agriculture and Engineering, gave serious consideration to the proposal and finally agreed to undertake the work. He accordingly resigned and entered with enthusiasm upon a task which, while presenting many difficulties and entailing exhaustive research, endless labor, and close confinement, was to him grateful and congenial beyond any other.

Dr. Hill was an admirable choice for the author of the projected work. Born January 15, 1859, the son of General D. H. Hill, and the nephew by marriage of Stonewall Jackson, he grew up in the atmosphere of the war, and absorbed, as it were with his mother's milk, reverence and affection for all that touched the Confederacy. From his early environment he absorbed also a steadily deepening and developing interest in those four heroic years of the life of the Confederacy.

Nor was this all. By inheritance as well he was entitled to and duly acquired an interest in military affairs. Colonel Hill, of the battle of Kings Mountain, was his grandfather. His father, Lieutenant-General Daniel Harvey Hill, a veteran of the Mexican war, was a distinguished soldier of the civil war, who was himself absorbingly interested in Confederate military history. The son, therefore, even before he reached manhood had acquired knowledge of the subject sufficient to put to shame many a specialist in military history.

Educated at the Hillsboro Military Academy and at Davidson College, Dr. Hill followed in his father's footsteps and became a teacher. He was professor of English at the Georgia Military and Agricultural College from 1880 to 1889, which latter year he was elected to a similar position in the North Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical College (now the North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering), which he accepted and in which he served until 1908. From 1905 to 1908 he was also vice-president, and in the latter year he was elected president, a position in which he rendered distinguished service until his resignation in 1916.

While English was his professional subject, history, or rather, to be more exact, military history, was really closer to his heart, and he studied persistently and read omnivorously upon the subject during the years which elapsed before he undertook this latest task just as though he were consciously preparing himself for it. In 1899 he wrote for the Confederate Military History the volume on North Carolina, displaying in it the grasp he had of military history, and of North Carolina history as well. He was the author of a number of successful textbooks, the most notable of which is his Young People's History of North Carolina. He also wrote a considerable number of essays and studies in the field of North Carolina history. From 1904 to 1921 he was a member of the North Carolina Historical Commission, and in the latter year became its secretary, a post which he filled until his death on July 31, 1924. He was chairman of the state council of defense during the world war, was president at various times of the North Carolina Teachers Assembly, the North Carolina Folk Lore Society, and the North Carolina Literary and Historical Association, and was prominent in the business life of Raleigh. He was

active in church and social work, and in spite of a nature unusually modest and retiring, in spite of the fact that he was always a student, he won for himself an enviable place among men of affairs.

In 1885 Dr. Hill married Miss Pauline White of Milledgeville, Georgia, who survives him. Five children born of the marriage, all having reached maturity, also survive. They are: Pauline, Daniel Harvey, Elizabeth (Mrs. Max D. Abernethy), Samuel White, and Randolph Isabel.

In his historical work Dr. Hill was meticulously careful and thorough. Accuracy of statement to the last word was with him a passion. Able to generalize, he, nevertheless, exalted details as well. He was determined that the forest should never be obscured by the trees, but he was none the less determined that the trees should receive full attention. To secure these ends he gave himself completely to the most exhaustive reading and study. No available evidence escaped his attention and consideration. The narratives, reminiscences, and anecdotes of veterans, Federal and Confederate, the regimental histories of both sides, the contemporary accounts in the press, all these won from him careful examination, comparison and analysis, and all the while he steeped himself in the official records, the studies of military specialists, and the biographies of the military leaders in the struggle. In this work he brought together a collection of between five and six thousand volumes relating to the civil war which constitute an exceptionally fine working library on the subject. This is now in the possession of the North Carolina Historical Commission. He examined, document by document, book by book, a vast accumulation of manuscript material never published and, in fact, never before touched by an investigator, and drew from this source

much valuable material. He visited battlefields, and with maps carefully identified localities, objects, and positions until he was personally familiar with the terrain of every important struggle in which North Carolina troops were engaged. And so when he came to the writing of the book, he was possessed of a knowledge of military policies and movements, of the strategy of commanders, of the innumerable problems and difficulties, not only of the struggle as a whole, but as well those peculiar to every battleground. Along with this went a knowledge of the details of the fighting that seems in every instance first-hand—except that no participant in the struggle ever acquired such a wealth of information, such a detailed and exact knowledge as are everywhere apparent in Dr. Hill's completed chapters.

The beginnings of the project were naturally slow so far as actual writing was concerned. Dr. Hill was determined to say the final word as to the part of North Carolina in the civil war, and that took time. The world war intervened and he gave himself without limit to war work. In the service were two sons, who made complete the representation of his family in every major struggle in which the United States has been engaged. Dr. Hill chafed somewhat at the delay, but the time was not lost from his work completely. While the war lasted he learned each day more of military history and military matters, and he reflected deeply in a comparative way upon the civil war, and all the time his views and convictions ripened and became more sure.

When at last the war ended, the long investigation, study, and thought began to bear fruit, and he made rapid progress in writing, and joyfully told inquiring friends that the end of the task was in sight. Apparently it was. In his mind was the whole story and he

was writing it rapidly and easily when illness caused him to lay down his pen forever.

How tragic a loss his passing was, from the standpoint of the projected work, can best be discovered from the portion he completed. The rest of the story may some time be told, but it is scarcely likely to be told as he would have told it. Few investigators possess the limitless patience which was his, few have so tireless an industry, few would approach the subject with the passion of patriotism which animated him, and none with the background of knowledge of the subject with which he began his work. His loss, therefore, is irreparable.

Twenty chapters were in final form when the end came. One more had been partially written. These tell the story of North Carolina troops in battle from Bethel to Sharpsburg, and the further story of how these troops were armed and supplied by heroic efforts at home and by the blockade running operations of the state of North Carolina. In them is to be found a just pride in heroic achievement and sacrifice, but a striking absence of extreme claims, of efforts to exalt North Carolina at the expense of her sister states, or of partisanship of any sort. There is a striking absence, too, of sectional bitterness. Whatever of this Dr. Hill had in his heart—and he never laid claim to its complete elimination—he so scrupulously excluded from his work that it is not evident either in the open or between the lines.

It is to be noted that the opening chapter of the work dealing with the beginning of the war and its causes was never written by Dr. Hill. It had been completely thought out as is known from those with whom he had discussed it, but he had not come to the actual writing of it. There were two obvious reasons for the delay. One was the conscious feeling he had that

everything of importance was already known of the immediate causes of the war and the actual process of separation by secession. The other was the eagerness he felt to enter upon the larger aspect of the work—the actual military operations. To supply the omission a chapter by the editor dealing with the secession of North Carolina and its entering the Confederacy is inserted as introductory to the purely military history which began at Bethel. It is not an attempt to give Dr. Hill's findings nor to express his views. He was in no way responsible for it and its insertion is only made for the sake of completeness in the narrative.

The work as it stands is a memorial not alone to the gallant and heroic North Carolina soldiers, but one as well to the deep devotion felt by three men to the memory of the Confederacy, and to their pride in the part played by North Carolina in its defense. Those three are J. Bryan Grimes, who conceived the idea and started the movement; Robert Henry Ricks, whose patriotic generosity made the achievement possible; and Daniel Harvey Hill, who wrought into finished form the record here presented. All have passed on; Mr. Ricks on February 19, 1920; Colonel Grimes on January 11, 1923; and Dr. Hill on July 31, 1924. Their lives and work were worthy of the men they sought to honor by this history.

J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON.

CHAPEL HILL, N. C.
December 1, 1925.

CHAPTER I

SECESSION IN NORTH CAROLINA

BY J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON

WITH the outbreak of the troubles in 1774 which resulted in the breach with the mother country and ultimately in revolution and independence, the colony of North Carolina threw itself from the first into the close and intimate association with the other colonies which presently gave rise to the idea of a permanent union, an idea which found expression in the Declaration of Independence, when the United States of America, a term then used for the first time,[1] came into being. To the idea North Carolina gave hearty approval, but nowhere was to be found even a vague notion that the actual union formed by the meeting of the Continental Congress was in any sense sovereign. Quite the contrary was the view universally held. The union was one of convenience in such a crisis as the Revolution, but it had no authority, no sanction, save the willing coöperation of patriots everywhere, who felt the obligation of honor to support the Continental Congress and be guided by its conclusions respecting the prosecution of the war.[2] North Carolinians of 1776 were highly particularistic and, when once the bond which united them to Great Britain had been severed, they recognized no authority outside the borders of the state which might control or in any way limit their freedom of action. When, therefore, they came to the task of constitution making, it was of their own accord and not under the compulsion, instruction, or permission of the Continental Congress. The doctrine of Abraham Lincoln that "The Union is older than any of the States and, in

[1] *American Historical Review*, October, 1925, pp. 79-81.
[2] *Colonial Records of North Carolina*, IX, 1007.

fact, it created them as states," [1] was undreamed of by them. Equally they were unaware that "not one of them [the states] ever had a state constitution independent of the Union."

Quite the contrary was their view. The resolution of April 12, 1776, instructing the members of the Continental Congress to vote for independence, specifically reserved "to this colony the sole and exclusive power of forming a constitution and laws for this Colony," and when the constitution of 1776 was framed and put into effect they saw no relation to the Union in the act. They ratified the Articles of Confederation by their free choice without any sense of compulsion, feeling equally free to reject it should that seem a wiser course. [2] The provision of the Articles that "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled," [3] is a completely accurate statement of North Carolina's view of the proper and actual relationship of the state and the Union, and throughout the life of the Confederation indifference towards it was the characteristic attitude of the people of the state. Rarely paying the requisitions, and often failing of representation in Congress, the state was so uninterested in external affairs as to seem to have almost lost any consciousness of its part in the Union.

In the state a crass individualism and provincialism held full sway. This was due in part to the conditions of its settlement and the character of its settlers. It

[1] Special Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.

[2] Ratification of the Articles was delayed because certain articles were regarded as "containing matters highly important and interesting to the future people of this state, and involving what may very materially affect the internal interests and sovereign independence thereof, and . . . ought not to be ratified until there shall be full time and leisure for deliberately considering the same." *State Records*, XII, 229.

[3] Articles of Confederation, Article II.

was due also to geographical facts which served to isolate North Carolina from easy contacts with the world outside. Through the years this spirit grew and developed until it dominated political thought and action. It explains the influence of Willie Jones and the group of radical leaders associated with him in the period following the Revolution. It was the prevailing sentiment in the state and only in a small minority was there so strong a sense of national existence as to make them willing to place limits upon the state in behalf of greater power in the central government. For the mass, state considerations were of infinitely greater importance, and to the state was due the primary allegiance of every citizen.

And yet the people were not hostile to the idea of reform in the government of the Confederation. They adopted every suggestion for amending the Articles so as to give Congress larger powers in respect to taxation, the regulation of commerce,[1] and the western lands. But towards reforms so sweeping as to modify the character of the Articles they were at most lukewarm, and after 1784 a distinct reaction towards increased particularism was noticeable.

Still the state responded to the invitation of the Annapolis Convention and sent five delegates to represent her at the Federal Convention of 1787. These took a reasonably active part in the proceedings and all were advocates and defenders of the resulting Constitution when it was offered to the states for acceptance or rejection.

Their view, however, was not the popular one in North Carolina. The radical forces, headed by Willie Jones, now known as Anti-Federalists, in the election of delegates to the convention called to consider the Constitution won a sweeping victory and controlled the convention by a clear majority of one hundred.

[1] Boyd, *The Federal Period*, pp. 21-24.

It is scarcely to be questioned that the radicals constituted a large majority of the people of North Carolina.

When the convention met it did not reject the Constitution but it refused to ratify it. The Anti-Federalist objections were fear of consolidation, the lack of a bill of rights, dislike of even the idea of a federal judiciary, fear of federal taxation, and a general distrust of outside power, a government beyond their own control. In the debates the Federalists advanced in fullest definition the compact theory which was to be the foundation of the later States Rights doctrine. But they failed to convince the radical majority that their fears were groundless, and so, after suggesting a bill of rights and twenty-six amendments, the convention adjourned.

Before the new government went into operation a reaction had set in in North Carolina which was sufficiently strong to cause the legislature to call another convention to meet in November 1789. During the intervening period the state was in all respects a sovereign and independent republic.[1] The tariff laws of Congress operated upon it as on any other foreign power. In no respect did other federal laws affect it. Its dealings with the United States were those of a separate, though friendly power,[2] and it began negotiations with at least two European powers. No one at the time questioned this status.

In November, 1789, the Fayetteville convention ratified the Constitution, and North Carolina, next to the last of the original thirteen states, entered the new union. It can scarcely be maintained that

[1] Cf. Boyd, *The Federal Period*, p. 456, and Pierson, *The Sovereign State of North Carolina*, 1787-89, in Procs. State Literary and Historical Association of North Carolina, 1916, pp. 58-69.

[2] Illustrative of this is the correspondence between the North Carolina Council of State and George Washington on the occasion of his accession to the Presidency. See Records of the Council of State.

nationalism brought about this consummation. Particularism was still dominant in the community. Rather it was due to expediency, an enlightened self-interest which saw in union certain benefits to be gained. Nor was it accomplished by any surrender of States Rights ideas. The majority simply adopted the view of the Federalist leaders that the Constitution was a compact which did not destroy the ultimate sovereignty of the state nor, in fact, impose upon it any limits beyond those necessary to secure efficient government. In that spirit and belief the people of North Carolina, in convention assembled, ratified the Constitution, and in that belief they continued in the Union for more than seventy years, appealing to state sovereignty only when the logic of events convinced them that honor, duty, and safety required withdrawal from the Union they had entered with reluctance and distrust but which they had come to cherish and revere.

The acceptance of the compact theory by the people tended to strengthen it with the Federalist leaders and they did not abandon it. They were never Federalists of the Hamiltonian school, but were always touched with States Rights doctrine. From the beginning this was evident. The year after ratification the lower house of the General Assembly refused to take the oath to support the Constitution.[1] The same year the state judges refused to obey a writ of certiorari directing the bringing up of an equity case to the Supreme Court of the United States[2] for which they received a vote of thanks from the legislature.[3] Justice James Iredell, a North Carolina Federalist, wrote the dissenting opinion in *Chisholm v. Georgia*,[4] which in its assertion of state sovereignty served as the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. The early

[1] *State Records*, XXI, 1021.
[2] 2 Dallas, 412.
[3] *State Records*, XXI, 1054.
[4] 2 Dallas, 419.

members of Congress, both senators and representatives, in their attitude upon such questions as the assumption of the state debts, the excise tax, and the national bank,[1] reflected accurately state sentiment. So well recognized was this as the attitude of the state that Jefferson proposed that North Carolina join with Virginia in protesting against the Alien and Sedition Acts as violations of the Constitution; and only the triumph of the Federalists in the state that year and the election of William R. Davie as governor, carried to Kentucky the famous resolutions which he drew up. Towards the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, North Carolina, under the lead of Davie, was cool, not because of any lack of approval of the constitutional views there stated, but because those in power believed that the Union was in greater danger than the states or the liberties of any man. The rank and file, so far as can be discovered, were in sympathy with the movement.[2] How deeply rooted was the feeling is perhaps best shown by the general acknowledgment, even in the midst of war and of bitter partisan feeling of the legality of the purposes of the Hartford Convention, however un-American they might believe the movement to be.[3]

Not again until nullification was attempted in South Carolina was there any widespread or interested discussion of state sovereignty in North Carolina which by now was deeply and sincerely attached to the Union. In respect to the occasion of that attempt there was abundant sympathy, for the state had no love for a protective tariff and regarded it as a violation of the Constitution. Alone of all the Southern States it cast a solid vote in Congress against the tariff of

[1] Wagstaff, *States Rights and Political Parties in North Carolina*, p. 334; Boyd, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-49.
[2] Senate Journal, 1798, pp. 75-77; House Journal, 1798, p. 78.
[3] Wagstaff, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40; Raleigh *Register*, Dec. 8, 1814, and Jan. 27, 1815.

1816. This position was unchanged in 1824 and 1828. Just after the failure of the proposed tariff of 1827 the legislature went so far as to declare that "whenever a system is adopted by the General Government which does not equally conserve the interests of all, then the right rests with any state or states to question whether the benefits of the Union are not more than counterbalanced by its evils." [1] Some evidences of nullification sentiment were apparent in the western counties along the South Carolina line while the question was still in a purely theoretical stage, but elsewhere the prevailing sentiment was strongly opposed. In 1830 this was clearly the case. [2] In the legislature resolutions introduced in the House of Commons by Jonathan Worth to the effect "that although the tariff laws as they now exist are unwise, unequal in their operations, and oppressive to the Southern States, yet the legislature does not recognize the right of the individual States of this Union to nullify a law of the United States," [3] were adopted by a large majority. [4] The Senate never acted upon the resolution. The opponents in both houses were the more extreme States Rights group who feared that in the heat of an attack upon nullification injury might be done to the sovereignty of the states. It was better, they thought, to concede nothing than to run the risk of losing everything.

When 1832 came, however, a stand was necessary. The legislature was flooded with resolutions which ranged in tenor from advanced nationalism to the most extreme particularism. A compromise was agreed upon and adopted by both houses which condemned

[1] Journal of the legislature of 1827, p. 101.
[2] Raleigh *Register*, July 12, 1830; Wagstaff, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Boyd, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
[3] House Journal, 1830, p. 257.
[4] The vote stood 87-27.

the tariff as unconstitutional and nullification as revolutionary and subversive of the Constitution.[1]

The active discussion of the question during these years furnish no indication of any surrender of States Rights doctrine. The political creed of the state was still founded upon that. Two things, however, explain the position assumed towards the question by North Carolina. Both may best be expressed in the words of contemporary leaders. William Gaston said, "The people may disapprove of the tariff but they love the Union more."[2] In other words the Union was worth too much to destroy on the tariff issue. The second was dislike of the remedy and an utter disbelief in its constitutionality. Nathaniel Macon summed up this feeling admirably and completely in a letter to S. P. Carson in 1833.[3] "I have never believed a state could nullify and stay in the Union but have always believed that a state might secede when she pleased; provided she would pay her proportion of the public debt, and this right I have considered the best safeguard to public liberty and public justice that could be desired."

With nullification safely dead and buried North Carolina had no occasion to be conscious of state sovereignty until the rise of the question which finally led to the assertion of sovereignty in withdrawal from the Union. But because slavery was not of dominating importance in the state, and because the people were not easily excited, the early years of the anti-slavery movement caused comparatively little discussion in the state where, indeed, there was much unspoken, but nevertheless genuine, opposition to the institution. But the bringing of the question into politics in the period of the Mexican war aroused a new discussion

[1] Senate Journal, 1832, p. 99; House Journal, 1832, pp. 224-25.
[2] Quoted in Boyd, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
[3] The letter was dated Feb. 9, 1833. It is quoted in the *Standard*, Nov. 7, 1860, and in Dodd, *Life of Nathaniel Macon*, p. 385.

and once more brought States Rights to the surface of the popular consciousness.

During the period from 1836 to 1850 the Whig party was in control of the state government. In its membership was a strong States Rights element, but its more outstanding leaders were distinctly nationalistic in their leanings. George E. Badger and William A. Graham were notable among this group of "Federal" Whigs as they came to be called. Both again and again denied the existence of any right of secession. The leader of the States Rights group was Thomas L. Clingman, who grew increasingly discontented with the attitude of the Northern wing of the party. Unable to unite the party in the state in defense of slavery and States Rights, he finally went over to the Democrats and thus lent a mighty impulse to the secession from the Whig party of a large group who felt as he did. In spite of this, however, the Whig party in North Carolina, defeated in 1850, but preserving its identity until 1860, was a powerful influence in behalf of Union sentiment.

About 1840 the abolition movement began to make some impress upon public sentiment. Anti-slavery feeling in individuals and groups was, prior to this time, a familiar thing, and no one concealed it. But an increasing sensitiveness on the subject now became apparent, with an accompanying solidifying of conventional opinion. It was not any longer good form to dislike or criticise the peculiar institution. Politicians began to accuse their opponents of unsound, i.e. anti-slavery views, and presently freedom of speech, and even of opinion, on the subject began rapidly to disappear. Thus by the end of the Mexican War the state was ready to participate in the national discussion of slavery and its implications which ultimately flamed into civil war.

In the legislature of 1848 Walter L. Steele, of Rockingham, introduced into the House of Commons a series of resolutions on the subject of slavery, which declared the territories the common property of the states, denied to Congress any power to prohibit any citizen from carrying into them his property in slaves, a property guaranteed by the Constitution, and asserted that the only conditions which the Constitution imposed upon a state for admission into the Union was that its own constitution should be republican in form. They denied the principle of the Missouri Compromise, but offered to accept its extension as a compromise. The resolutions expressed devotion to the Union. After a long debate a substitute, differing but little in essentials but milder in tone, was adopted and later passed by the Senate also. [1]

The compromise measures of 1850 caused widespread discussion in the state which revealed the existence of considerable secession sentiment. But there was no movement for the application of so drastic a remedy at the time. The *Standard*, under the aggressive editorial conduct of William W. Holden, featured discussion of secession, upholding the abstract right and urging the possible necessity of its exercise. [2] For the next eight years he was the most powerful exponent and teacher of secession doctrine in the state, taking an extreme position and keeping the question always before the public in his paper which was the most influential molder of public opinion in North Carolina.

The legislature in 1850 by appointing, for the first time in its history a committee on federal relations, gave evidence of the importance of the question. It, furthermore, spent a large part of its time in dis-

[1] Laws of North Carolina, 1848-49, p. 237.
[2] *Standard*, October, November, and December, 1850.

cussion of slavery and inevitably of secession. But the tendency of the body was conservative and a series of radical resolutions, asserting the right of secession, was decisively defeated in the upper house and dropped in the Commons.

The matter would not down, however, and appeared quite prominently in the congressional campaigns of 1851. In three districts it was the main issue, of course as a more or less abstract matter. In the first Thomas L. Clingman, now a "Southern Rights" Whig and an avowed secessionist, was elected. In the third Alfred Dockery, breathing fire and brimstone against South Carolina, and promising, if she seceded, to vote men and money "to whip her back into the Union," defeated a secessionist Democrat. In the eighth, Edward Stanly expressing the same sentiments, was successful over a secessionist candidate. Clearly the state was in no mood for secession in practice whatever might be its theory. But out of the discussion emerged a compact, enthusiastic group of extreme States Rights advocates, aggressive in defense of slavery, with the *Standard* as an able and influential organ. "The story of secession in North Carolina is really the process by which this minority kept its idea before the public and by which the logic of events reinforced argument until an inevitable choice between the Union and the Confederacy was forced upon the people in 1861." [1]

Secession and pro-slavery sentiment made on the surface little progress during the following five years. The Kansas-Nebraska Act with its repeal of the Missouri Compromise won enthusiastic approval from Whigs as well as Democrats, but there was little controversial discussion of sectional questions. The rise of the Republican party and its appearance in the

[1] Boyd, *North Carolina on the Eve of Secession*, in Report of the American Historical Association, 1910, p. 172.

campaign of 1856, however, showed how much further advanced popular sentiment had really become. The struggle for Kansas kept the whole sectional issue forever before the public eye which presently, even in conservative North Carolina, began to see red on the subject.

During the campaign Holden, as secessionist leader, backed by Clingman and Reid, took advanced ground. Steadily he advocated secession in the event of Fremont's election. How intense public feeling had become is indicated by the case of Professor B. S. Hedrick who was dismissed from the University because of his preference for Fremont, expressed in a private conversation and later avowed and defended in a public statement. The public seethed with feeling and he was forced to leave the state. [1]

In the latter half of the 50's the leadership of the Democratic party fell increasingly into the hands of the advanced States Rights group. Governor Bragg was conservative, but Ellis who succeeded him was radical. The controlling group in the legislature belonged to the same division of the party. But towards the end of the decade there were strong indications of such reviving strength in the opposition on state issues as to threaten Democratic supremacy, and since the leadership was still clearly nationalistic, this would mean a check to States Rights sentiment. This movement, however, was interrupted by John Brown's raid.

In this tragic happening, the radical States Rights men found justification for the most extreme of their gloomy forebodings and prophecy, a forcible, even unanswerable, argument to prove the character of Northern designs upon the South. Judged by its results no man was ever more evilly inspired than

[1] A documentary history of the matter is Hamilton, ed., *Benjamin Sherwood Hedrick*, in James Sprunt Historical Publications, Vol. 10, No. 1.

John Brown. Conservative men, such as were left when the reverberating echoes of the affair at Harpers Ferry finally died away, were at a loss to find any answer to the triumphant prophets of sectional strife. Sectionalism attained a strength it had never before reached in North Carolina and the Union cause was permanently and fatally injured. Secession became, for the first time in the minds of many, a right which was not merely a legal and constitutional abstraction, but rather one to be invoked, possibly at no distant day in behalf of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Here the real secession movement in North Carolina may be said to start.

The immediate reaction of the state to the Harpers Ferry affair took the form of preparation to suppress insurrection and repel aggression. North Carolina, like the other slave states, was profoundly influenced, sub-consciously for the most part, by fear of a slave insurrection. A large number of new military organizations were formed, and Governor Ellis asked the War Department for two thousand long range rifles with bayonets, with which to equip them. His request was refused on the ground that the state's quota was exhausted.[1] There was a widespread popular demand for systematic military preparation by the state. The advantage of military education was emphasized, and suggestions were made of the advisability of establishing powder factories. There was discussion, too, of the best way to secure economic and industrial independence from the North.

The legislature did not meet in the fall of 1859 so the governor called a session of the Council of State to advise him in the crisis and to voice officially the opinion of the state government. It passed resolutions expressing sympathy for Virginia, commending Governor

[1] *Standard*, Jan. 4, 1860.

Wise, and assuring him of the support of North Carolina in all efforts to maintain the vital interests of the slaveholding states which could never be surrendered without dishonor. They furthermore adopted in the form of resolutions a solemn warning to the people of the North that the continuance of the existing Union depended upon their aiding in the preservation of the constitutional rights of the slaveholding states.[1]

Close on the heels of the John Brown excitement came the revelation that abolitionists were circulating anti-slavery literature in the state, chiefly Helper's *Impending Crisis*. Some of these were tarred and feathered or otherwise summarily punished, but a number were arrested, tried, and convicted. Sentence, however, was never carried out in any of the cases.[2] The emphasis placed upon Helper's book in the long drawn out contest for the speakership of the House of Representatives in 1859 served to intensify feeling in North Carolina where Helper had been born and where he had grown to manhood. Public safety, it was felt, required that such dangerous doctrine must

[1] The most significant portion of the resolutions follow:

"That the union of the states can only be perpetuated so long as it continues to be a union of equals.

"We are devoted to it and would behold its dissolution with profound regret; yet, if we cannot hold our slave property, and at the same time enjoy repose and tranquillity in the Union, we will be constrained, in justice to ourselves and to our posterity, to establish new forms and to establish new guards for our security and well-being; relying for success in so doing in the righteousness of our cause and on the support of that Providence who so signally guided and secured our ancestors in times of danger.

"That, while declaring our sincere devotion to the Union according to the Constitution as it was established by our forefathers, and while we are ready to uphold and maintain it as a Union of equals, we are not unmindful of the fact that the disturbers of our peace have received and are receiving the active sympathy and the substantial support of large portions of the people of the non-slaveholding states, and that it behooves the people of the non-slaveholding states, if they would restore domestic tranquillity and perpetuate the Union, to rouse themselves from the condition of indifference and lethargy which seems to prevail among them, and to take such action and adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent a continuance of assaults upon the people of the South, and may assure our people that they are still faithful as Confederate States to the common Union which still unites us.

[2] See Hamilton, ed., *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, Vol. I, pp. 110-13, 115; Hamilton, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin*, III, pp. 74-75; and Boyd, *The Federal Period*, pp. 323-24.

be rigorously suppressed, and in connection with John Brown's raid the book aided powerfully in the creation of a public sentiment for the protection of slavery and for protection against slave insurrection which at last made withdrawal from the Union a possibility.

When Holden, on January 7, 1860, said editorially in commenting upon the possibility of a Republican President, "the very act of electing such a President would be a declaration of deadly hostility to the slaveholding states," there were few who disagreed with him. And when he went further and proclaimed secession as the inevitable result of Republican success few openly dissented. [1]

And so was ushered in the fateful national campaign of 1860.

The state campaign was opened by the Whig convention in February which nominated John Pool for governor on a platform advocating ad valorem taxation of slave property, proclaiming the devotion of the party to the Union, and demanding its preservation. In March the Democrats renominated Governor Ellis on a platform which endorsed the principle of the Dred Scott decision, and contained a distinct threat of secession, [2] and a declaration that the Union could not endure under such aggressions as the John Brown raid. [3] Governor Ellis, in his acceptance speech declared the battle in the nation to be between the Democratic and Republican parties alone on the

[1] "After Seward's Rochester speech, after the Harpers Ferry outrage, and after Helper's book, endorsed as it is by all the leaders of Black Republicanism, the people of the South will not submit to Black Republican rule. They will sunder the bonds in 1860, in 1864, in 1868, or in 1872, before they will do it. We mean precisely what we say, and ninety-nine hundredths of those who may read this article agree with us." *Standard*, Dec. 14, 1859.

[2] "That while we make no threat, and throw out no menace, we solemnly declare that the people of this state will resist aggression upon their constitutional rights whenever the emergency arises."

[3] The platform is in the *Standard*, March 10, 1860.

single issue of the abolition of slavery wherever it existed.[1]

The following month saw the fatal division of the National Democratic party in the Charleston convention. The North Carolina delegation was prominent in the discussion prior to the withdrawal of the delegates from the cotton states. W. W. Avery was chairman of the platform committee and presented the majority report. With Bedford Brown and W. S. Ashe he warned the convention of the result of adopting the Douglas platform. The vote of the delegation, however, was cast for neither of these, but for the platform presented by B. F. Butler, which was a simple affirmation of the platform of 1856. W. W. Holden also addressed the convention in a strongly Union speech.[2] When the Southern delegates marched out the North Carolina group refused to go, and it was said at the time thus prevented the withdrawal of the delegates from Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri. But when the secession from the Baltimore convention took place all but three of the delegates[3] took part in it and, joining the seceders in Richmond, assisted in the nomination of Breckinridge and Lane, for whom North Carolina Democrats were enthusiastic.

Most of the delegates were profoundly influenced by the experience, chiefly in the direction of cotton states sentiment. The chief exceptions to this were R. P. Dick and W. W. Holden. Dick was an enthusiastic follower of Douglas and presently engineered the nomination of a Douglas electoral ticket in the state. Holden returned convinced of the paramount necessity of preserving the Union and announced that he was "for the Constitution and the Union and

[1] The speech appears in full in the *Standard*, March 21, 1860.
[2] *Memoirs of W. W. Holden*, pp. 13-14.
[3] These were R. P. Dick, W. W. Holden, and J. W. B. Watson.

against all who would trample on one or dissolve the other." [1] But the habit of years was strong upon him, and within a month he was again arguing in favor of secession. [2]

In the state campaign the national situation played little noticeable part. All candidates, Democratic and Whig, professed their devotion to the Union and their desire for its preservation. No public speaker advocated secession and many denied the right. [3] But undoubtedly the national situation aided greatly in saving the Democratic state ticket from defeat. As it was Ellis was elected with a loss of ten thousand votes from his majority of two years before, and the General Assembly had a working majority of Democrats.

After the state campaign was over national matters of course played a larger part. The nomination of the Douglas electoral ticket alarmed the Democrats who were increasingly uneasy over the strength which the Bell and Everett ticket was clearly developing in the state. In early October the radical Wilmington *Journal* advocated secession in the event of Breckinridge's defeat and a few Democratic speakers echoed the sentiment, but the demand was unpopular and they were soon silenced. In the same month and in

[1] *Standard*, May 9, 1860.

[2] One of the editorials is in part as follows: "But it is said that the Supreme Court may be in the future an unsafe tribunal for the South; that the Black Republicans will obtain control of it and turn its decisions against the slaveholding states. That may be so. At present it is certainly a safe tribunal for the South. It may be changed and no doubt will be, if the Black Republicans should obtain possession of the government. But what of that? Must we wait until this change is made? Shall we permit Lincoln to pervert the whole power of the Government, and in addition to turn the Supreme Court against us? We are for meeting the enemy at the threshold—for vanquishing him or being vanquished long before his law, his adjudications against us are made. If the people of the South are true to themselves they will never be troubled by the decisions of Black Republican judges. But if they submit to the inauguration and rule of Black Republicans, they will bind themselves to submit to the decisions of an abolition court." *Standard*, June 2, 1860.

[3] Hamilton, ed., *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, p. 125; Letter of Governor Ellis to Governor Gist of South Carolina, dated October 19, 1860.

part as an answer, a great mass meeting was held at Salisbury, attended by Whigs and Democrats from all over the state. Here, in the words of a newspaper reporter, "but one sentiment prevailed, and that was we will fight for the Constitution, the Union, and the laws, within the Union and the laws. We will not be influenced by seceders in the South or Black Republicans in the North, and we will never give up our institutions until stern necessity compels us to believe that they, being no longer adequate to our protection, we must resort to that right of revolution which is inherent in every people."

The campaign was notably more moderate in tone than that of 1856. Probably this was due to a realization of the real gravity of the national situation. Conservatism for the time being prevailed. In January, Holden, as a result of the John Brown raid, was advocating in the *Standard* war preparations and telling B. S. Hedrick, who had written him a letter, that he would not publish it, but that if he came South with the abolition invaders that the State would welcome him and them "with bloody hands to hospitable graves," but in the autumn this sort of talk was chiefly notable for its absence. Rather there was a sort of stillness, a tenseness, of waiting, of hoping against hope that the impending calamity of Republican success with its undesired consequences might be averted.

The election resulted in the selection of Breckinridge electors by a plurality over Bell of less than four thousand, and a majority of less than a thousand votes.

The news of Lincoln's election came as a distinct shock to the state. The people had feared it but had never fully believed that it could happen. There was, of course, much speculation and much discussion of its possible results, but as a whole the press indicated

an intention on the part of the people to accept it with as much philosophy as was possible under the circumstances,[1] and there is every evidence that this would have been the case had not the cotton states precipitately forced the issue of state sovereignty. The older political leaders were advising moderation and caution in reaching conclusions, William A. Graham voicing the view of the Whigs and of a majority of Democrats when he declared the election of Lincoln a calamity to be deplored and a cause for watchfulness, but no ground for a dissolution of the Union.[2] Later he said "a state cannot secede and the ground for revolution does not exist," and George E. Badger and the old Federal Whigs generally took the same position. But this did not represent the position of the state. W. W. Holden did this, saying "Let us watch and wait. North Carolina will never permit Mr. Lincoln or his party to touch the institution of slavery. Her people are a unit on that point. They may not advise or approve of secession, but they will not submit to indignities or encroachments."[3]

There were strong indications, however, that the younger leaders would not be content to watch and wait. Governor Ellis was a radical in his views and he was not lacking in supporters. But there was apparently a general tacit agreement to wait until the meeting of the legislature and the governor's message before beginning any serious and final discussion of what should be the part played by North Carolina in the crisis which all saw to surpass in gravity all those which had preceded it.

The legislature, which met on November 19, was during its entire session, dominated by the crisis

[1] The Whig newspapers without exception took this view as did the *Standard*. The Wilmington *Journal* was the only secessionist paper in the state at this time.

[2] *Standard*, Nov. 10, 1860.

[3] *Ibid.*

psychology of what was at first a minority, although a very influential one. In activity and aggressiveness this secessionist element was, however, far superior to the other wing which, while overwhelmingly States Rights in theory was split up into many groups of varying opinions. It is always difficult, too, to be aggressive in watching and waiting and the conservatives now found it hard to hold their lines intact against the assaults of those who proposed action.

The governor's message was calculated, by forcing the issue, to aid the minority. Discussing the conflicting views on the subject of slavery held by the North and South, he described the violations of Constitution and laws by the former and declared that little hope could be felt for Southern rights under the incoming Republican administration. He, therefore, recommended that the Southern states be invited to a conference on the condition of the country; that a convention of the people be called; that the state militia be reorganized; and that a corps of ten thousand volunteers be formed and armed. The message was in reality an earnest plea for secession.[1]

Immediately after the two houses organized a joint committee on federal relations was formed,[2] to which was referred the governor's recommendations and the flood of memorials and resolutions which now came pouring in from the public and from members. These, of course, represented every shade of opinion. The trend of the memorials was distinctly nationalistic at first, secession meetings not yet having begun, but the majority of the resolutions asserted a States

[1] Senate Journal, 1860-61, pp. 11-43. The message was prepared in consultation with Thomas Bragg, Thomas L. Clingman, W. W. Avery, R. R. Bridgers, John F. Hoke, and R. O. Burton. Bragg and Clingman were United States senators and the other four were members of the legislature. Ellis's Diary, Nov. 17, 1861, *et seq.*

[2] The committee consisted of, Senate: Bedford Brown, W. W. Avery, David Outlaw, V. C. Barringer, and J. Stowe; House: Samuel Person, John F. Hoke, Nathan Newby, William F. Green, and Giles Mebane.

Rights doctrine even when they opposed secession on the ground of expediency.

The following resolutions introduced into the House of Commons early in the session, indicate the fundamental divisions of sentiment to be found in the state. The first series, sponsored by Dennis D. Ferebee, of Camden County, represents the views of the extreme Unionist group who denied the constitutional, or the reserved, right of secession. This was at once branded by the secessionists as abolitionist doctrine. The second, introduced by John F. Hoke, of Lincoln County, states the views of the secessionists. The third, offered by Augustus S. Merrimon, of Buncombe County, accurately indicates the opinion of the States Rights group who, while admitting the right of secession, denied its expediency under existing circumstances.

The Ferebee resolutions were:

Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States is not a league, confederacy or compact between the people of the several states in their sovereign capacities, but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating direct relations between itself and individuals.

Resolved, That no state authority has power to dissolve these relations, that nothing can dissolve them but revolution; and that, consequently, there can be no such thing as secession without revolution.

Resolved, That it is the duty of the state of North Carolina, under all circumstances, and at all hazards, to protect, maintain and defend, *in the Union*, all the rights guaranteed to her citizens by the Constitution of the United States.

Resolved, That the election of Abraham Lincoln, and Hannibal Hamlin to the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the United States, by a sectional vote, however much to be deplored, is not a sufficient cause for a dissolution of the Union.

The Hoke series was:

Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States is a compact between sovereign and independent states, and all powers

not therein delegated are reserved to the States respectively; that among the attributes of sovereignty retained by the several states, is that of watching over the operations of the General Government, and protecting her citizens from unconstitutional abuse on the one hand, and securing to them, on the other, a strict fulfillment of the obligations imposed by the Constitution upon the General Government.

Resolved, That the people of North Carolina, as an organized political community, have the right to withdraw from the Union, whenever a majority of the people, in Convention assembled, shall decide a withdrawal necessary to protect their property or persons from unconditional and oppressive legislation by the General Government, or whenever, by the failure of the General Government to fulfill her constitutional obligations, the people of the State may deem such a step necessary, in order to secure the enjoyment of the rights, privileges and protection guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States; and in such an emergency, a majority of the people of North Carolina acting through the organized authorities of the State, would be entitled to the sole and undivided allegiance of all her citizens.

The Merrimon resolves ran thus:

Be it Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina, That the result of the late presidential election, in the election of a purely sectional President and Vice President of the United States, gives rise to serious fears for the political safety of the rights of the people of this State under the Federal Constitution, and that this body condemns the fanatical, unwarranted and dangerous policy of the Black Republican party, which tends directly to bring about a dissolution of the Federal Union and to produce civil war.

Be it Resolved, That it is the sense of this General Assembly, that the rights of the people of this state under the Constitution of the United States, shall be observed and enforced *in the Union*, at all hazards and regardless of consequences, and that the state should be placed in such condition as to enable her to resist every encroachment upon the constitutional rights of her citizens.

Be it Resolved, That this General Assembly deplores the result of the late presidential election, but much as it is to be regretted and condemned, nevertheless, the election of a President and Vice President according to the Federal Constitution and the forms of law, is not of itself cause for a dissolution of the Union.

Be it further Resolved, That in view of the present political condition of the country, the General Assembly recognizes no cause which renders it wise, politic or necessary for this state now to send a delegate or delegates, to confer with the other Southern States in reference to any line of policy that looks to a dissolution of the Union or the continuance of this state in the same.

On December 10, Bedford Brown, a Union Democrat, introduced into the Senate a resolution to send Thomas Ruffin, Weldon N. Edwards, William A. Graham, and William N. H. Smith, as commissioners to Columbia to express to South Carolina the confidence and good will of North Carolina, and to urge that secession be postponed until a convention of all the slaveholding states could be held. The commissioners were to be further authorized to proceed to any other states that had called conventions to make the same appeal.[1] These resolutions were discussed for four days and met with the opposition of the secessionists and of some of the Unionists. When first introduced, however, there was every indication that they would pass, but the delay killed them and they were withdrawn. A similar resolution, introduced in the House of Commons, proposing to send Ruffin and Graham as commissioners to Virginia, never came to a vote.

In the meantime the committee on federal relations submitted its report. The majority, declaring the existing crisis one of grave peril to the rights and equality of the states in the Union, and that only the sovereign people had the right to determine the mode, measure, and time of redress, recommended the call of a convention and submitted a bill for the purpose. It also recommended the reorganization of the militia and the formation of a volunteer corps in accordance with the governor's suggestion.[2]

[1] Senate Journal, 1860-61, pp. 98-100.
[2] House Journal, 1860-61, pp. 163-64.

The minority report signed by three members,[1] declared the call of a convention premature. Professing ignorance of any recent grievances, they expressed the belief that the personal liberty laws were of too long standing to justify such hasty and drastic action apart from the fact that they were acts of particular states and not of the federal government. The election of Lincoln, they declared inadequate as a justification. In addition they emphasized the view that the proposed convention bill was not in accordance with the provisions of the state constitution. In conclusion they urged the call of a convention of all the states of the Union "with a view to final settlement of all subjects in controversy between the Northern and Southern states; and if such final settlement cannot be satisfactorily made, that a peaceable separation of the states and an equitable distribution of the property of the Federal government among all the states may be brought about."[2] No more enlightening document for revealing the real though subconscious hopelessness of the Unionists can be imagined.

The convention bill offered by the majority directed the governor to call an election of delegates to a convention, on February 7, 1861, the session to begin on February 18. The convention was specifically charged with the consideration of "all grievances impairing or affecting the equality and rights of the state of North Carolina as a member of the United States." The bill further provided that no ordinance of separation or one connecting the state with another government should be valid until ratified by a majority of the voters of the state.[3] As soon as the bill was introduced its consideration was postponed until January 3, 1861.

[1] Mebane, Newby, and Outlaw.
[2] House Journal, 1860-61, pp. 164-66.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-69.

At this time a large majority of the members of each house were opposed to secession for existing causes. But the fact that an overwhelming majority believed implicitly in the right of secession played directly into the hands of the secessionists who were also the leaders of the Democratic party. Headed by W. W. Avery, Eli W. Hall, Marcus Erwin, Samuel J. Person, John F. Hoke, and Robert R. Bridgers they were able finally to control not only the Union Democrats, but even a considerable number of the Whigs who had been at the beginning of the session outspoken for the preservation of the Union.[1]

The proposed convention continued to be the chief subject of discussion, but the legislature busied itself with other matters. Commissioners from other states appeared and urged the coöperation of North Carolina. Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, still Secretary of the Interior of the United States, Samuel Hall, of Georgia, and I. W. Garrott and R. H. Smith, of Alabama, all natives of North Carolina, received a friendly hearing from the legislature. A bill to appropriate $300,000 for the purchase of arms and munitions of war and constituting D. H. Hill and C. C. Tew a military commission to advise the governor in its expenditure, speedily passed the Senate with but three dissenting votes.[2] In the House, however, it received much more opposition and did not finally pass into law until January 8, 1861.[3]

As a matter of fact the legislature was so completely engaged in political discussion that not a single act or resolution was passed in the month which preceded the Christmas holidays.

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[1] A biased but interesting view of this is presented in the letters of Jonathan Worth, of Randolph, written during the session. Hamilton, ed., *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, pp. 125-27.

[2] Senate Journal, 1860-61, p. 126. The dissenting votes were cast by J. G. Ramsey, L. Q. Sharpe, and Jonathan Worth.

[3] House Journal, 1860-61, p. 262. The vote was 73-26.

By the time the legislature reassembled in January, the whole state was aroused to the threatening aspect of national affairs. Public interest expressed itself widely in county and town meetings. These began with a secession meeting in Cleveland County early in November, and a largely attended meeting in Wilmington on November 19 began a campaign,[1] conducted by similar meetings, that did not cease until secession was a certainty. By January such meetings had been held in more than thirty counties, and the number was more than doubled by the following April. Union meetings began as early as the others and while they were held in fewer counties, they were in greater number. Counties where Union sentiment was particularly strong, such as Wake, Rowan, and Orange, had many such meetings.

So far as public sentiment can be guaged by the resolutions adopted at these meetings, it was opposed to secession for existing causes. All shades of opinion are expressed and the predominant note was clearly one of acceptance of the doctrine of States Rights. A considerable number, however, denied the constitutionality of secession, and comparatively few advocated immediate secession. But it was increasingly evident that sentiment for a convention was growing rapidly, and many staunch advocates of Union were among those who urged that one be called. To these it seemed the best way to check the ever-active and aggressive secession minority. They felt, too, that if a convention were called at once it would undoubtedly have a substantial Union majority. They

[1] Wilmington *Journal*, Nov. 20, 1860.

believed also that better terms could be gained if the states were in convention. [1]

The attitude of the state's delegation in Congress aided the secessionists. The address of the Southern members of Congress was signed by Ruffin and Craige. [2] Both senators and four of the representatives joined in an appeal to the legislature to call a convention, and two others were known to favor it. [3] The two remaining members were not actively hostile to the idea. [4]

The presence in the state of four United States army posts, from the Unionist standpoint, was a disturbing factor in the situation. These were Forts Johnston, Caswell, and Macon, and the Fayetteville Arsenal. The forts had for years been occupied only by ordnance sergeants who had charge of the property, but early in November troops were sent to the arsenal at the request of the mayor and citizens of Fayetteville who feared an insurrection. [5] Excitable people became convinced that all were likely to be regularly garrisoned, and a movement to take possession of them began to develop. Early in January Governor Ellis was approached in regard to the matter, and was urged to order their seizure, but he refused even to consider the proposal. Whereupon a group of citizens of Wilmington, organized as a committee of safety under the name of "Cape Fear Minute Men," on the tenth took possession of Forts Johnston and Caswell. The following

[1] As an illustration of this feeling see a letter of Z. B. Vance to G. N. Folk, dated Jan. 9, 1861. "I do not regard the call of a convention as a disunion movement, but as the conducting steel to the lightning-freighted cloud. Firm, temperate, and decided action may save the rights of the states and the Union as well. Non-action will precipitate us into disunion. A convention, while demanding terms of the Northern people, can also make our voices heard among the Southern States whose course is rapidly inoculating the people with dogmas which we cannot approve." *Register*, Jan. 16, 1861.

[2] *Standard*, Dec. 18, 1860.

[3] Senators Bragg and Clingman, and Representatives Branch, Craige, Ruffin, and Winslow. Vance and Smith were known to favor it.

[4] John A. Gilmer and James M. Leach.

[5] *Official Records*, 1, pp. 480-84.

day Governor Ellis, who had heard unofficially of the seizure, ordered the forts to be evacuated. He also had inquiries made in Washington as to the intentions of the War Department in respect to the forts. Reporting the matter to the President, he asked if they were to be garrisoned and was assured by Secretary Holt, who conveyed him the thanks of the President, that the administration regarded the forts as safe in "law-abiding North Carolina," but that in the event of their being threatened, they would be protected.

When the legislature reassembled on January 7, the secession of South Carolina was an accomplished fact, and the withdrawal of Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana was impending. The growing activity of the secession advocates was having its effect and it soon became evident that the call of a convention was inevitable. The bill as presented by committee on federal relations omitted any mention of the two-thirds vote of each house which the constitution required for the call. Attention was, of course directed to this and it developed that the committee, seeing clearly at the time the report was prepared that a two-thirds vote was unlikely, if indeed not impossible, had concluded that it was required only for a constitutional convention and was not necessary for a convention limited to the discussion of national affairs and the relation of the state to the Union. The bill, therefore, provided for imposing such a limitation upon the delegates by means of a prescribed oath. It further provided for submitting the work of the convention to the people for approval. [1]

Even before the report of the committee was presented this feature of the bill became known and was at once criticised by the opposition. The committee itself was doubtful. The House of Commons passed a resolution asking the opinion of the Supreme Court

[1] Convention bill, secs. 5-6; House Journal, 1860-61, p. 168.

on the question, [1] but this was postponed in the Senate. [2] In the meantime the opinion of Judge Ruffin, which was adverse to the legislative power became known. [3] And so when the matter was taken up in the Senate on January 9, W. W. Avery introduced a substitute providing for the call by the required two-thirds vote of an unrestricted convention, but with no provision for submitting its work to the people. The same bill was introduced simultaneously into the House of Commons by Samuel J. Person, chairman of the committee and leader of the secessionist group in the House.

The debate on the bill ran on for weeks. So much opposition developed to the omission of a referendum that Avery finally offered an amendment to correct the defect. This, however, did not satisfy the opposition which began to demand that the call be made contingent upon the approval of the people, to be ascertained when the delegates were chosen, and finally, as a result, substitutes were introduced in each house and accepted which provided for the submission of the question. The Senate bill also restricted the convention to the consideration of federal relations. Finally on January 30 the House adopted the Senate bill and it was provided that the election should be held on February 28, the convention, if called, to assemble at the summons of the governor, on a date not earlier than March 11.

Tremendous heat developed in the debates and this was not confined to the legislature. The whole state argued the question. The press naturally devoted much attention to it. At this time the sentiment was still overwhelmingly for the preservation of the Union, [4] but from now on the secessionist element, in

[1] House Journal, 1860-61, pp. 156-58.
[2] Senate Journal, 1860-61, pp. 105-06.
[3] Hamilton, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin*, III, pp. 106-07; *Standard*, Jan. 24, 1861.
[4] Only the Charlotte *Bulletin*, Goldsboro *Rough Notes*, Wilmington *Journal*, and Raleigh *State Journal* favored secession.

and out of the legislature, which had at first been submerged, grew steadily in strength, and influence, partly because of the logic of events, partly because of the prevailing excitement and partly because of the aggressive tactics of the leaders who branded Union men as craven submissionists and were actually able to persuade many people that it was truth.

In spite of their success, the bill as passed was the work of the group opposed to secession, and but for the fact that a considerable number of these, including some of the strongest Union men, favored a convention, the bill could not have mustered the necessary two-thirds vote which, as it was, was barely gained. [1]

In the meantime, in response to the invitation of Virginia, the legislature elected Thomas Ruffin, D. M. Barringer, David S. Reid, John M. Morehead, and George Davis as commissioners to the Peace Conference. David L. Swain, M. W. Ransom, and John L. Bridgers were at the same time chosen as commissioners to visit Montgomery at the time of the meeting of the delegates of the seceded states "for the purpose of effecting an honorable and amicable adjustment of all the difficulties that distract the country upon the basis of the Crittenden resolutions as modified by the legislature of Virginia, and for the purpose of consulting for our common peace, honor, and safety." [2] On both these commissions, Union men were in the majority. [3]

[1] The vote stood: Senate, 35-9; House, 81-24. In the Senate Dockery, Morehead, Outlaw, Ramsey, Sharpe, Slaughter, Spencer, Turner, and Worth, voted nay. In the House the opponents were Barringer, Carson, Clarke of Davidson, Cowles, Crumpler, Dickson, Farrow, Ferebee, Foust, Gorrell, Green of Chatham, Green of Stanly, Guthrie, Henry, Howard, Horton, Latham, McCleese, Martin, Mendenhall, Patterson, Poindexter, Shober, and Winslow.

[2] Resolutions, 1860-61, p. 78.

[3] Of the Peace Conference Commissioners Ruffin and Reid were Democrats, and Barringer, Morehead and Davis, Whigs. Reid was a moderate secessionist and Davis was inclining in the same direction, since he began to believe separation inevitable. Of the other commissioners, Swain was a Union Whig and Ransom a Union Democrat. Bridgers was a secession Democrat.

The commissioners to Montgomery attended the sessions of the Confederate Congress, but declined to take any part in their deliberations. The delegation to Washington, soon after the Peace Conference met, came to the conclusion that there was no hope of peace. Barringer, Reid, and Davis voted against the Conference's proposition with the exception of the third and fourth sections. Ruffin and Morehead, while not satisfied, were unwilling to reject anything that might prevent the war on honorable terms, and voted for the entire proposition. This recommended a number of amendments to the Constitution, the substance of which was as follows: By the first, slavery was to be prohibited in the territories north of latitude 36 degrees and 30 minutes. South of that line the institution was to remain as it was at the time, and no law could be passed abridging the right of a citizen to take a slave thither. The status of new states was to be determined by their constitutions. The second provided that no further acquisition of territory should be made without the consent of a majority of the senators from both the free states and the slave states. The third declared that no amendment to the Constitution should be made interfering with slavery in the states, nor should Congress prohibit it in the District of Columbia, nor interfere with the domestic slave trade between slave states, nor tax slaves at a higher rate than land. The slave trade in the District of Columbia was abolished, but Congress was prohibited from assuming any power to prevent slaves from being taken into the District and then brought away. The fourth provided that the Constitution should not be so construed as to prevent any of the states from aiding in the arrest and delivery of fugitive slaves. The fifth prohibited forever the foreign slave trade. The sixth provided that the amendments to the Constitution so proposed

should not be abolished or changed without the consent of all the states. Finally, the seventh provided for payment by the United States for all slaves released by violence from federal officials, or whose recapture should be prevented by violence. All these amendments were included in one proposed article. It was adopted with nothing like unanimity among the delegates to the conference, and was doomed to failure before it ever reached Congress.

The convention bill out of the way, the legislature turned to other matters. It passed a new militia law making all white males between eighteen and forty-five years of age liable to service. A volunteer corps of ten thousand men was provided for, and authority was granted the governor to enroll twenty thousand more men in case of invasion.[1] A new law on the subject of incendiary literature imposed the penalty of death on any one convicted of circulating any publication "the evident tendency whereof is to cause slaves to become discontented with the bondage in which they are held by their masters, and the laws regulating the same, and free negroes to be dissatisfied with their social condition." The same act also imposed the death penalty for inciting in slaves or free negroes "a spirit of insurrection, conspiracy, or rebellion."[2] Acts were passed prohibiting free negroes from owning arms,[3] and having control of, or hiring, slaves.[4] The emancipation of slaves by will was forbidden.[5]

The convention campaign was carried on actively. In spite of the fact that the call was favored by so many Union men, the issue was made quite definitely "Union or Disunion," and the people were not ready

[1] Laws, 1860-61, Chap. 24.
[2] *Ibid.*, Chap. 23.
[3] *Ibid.*, Chap. 34.
[4] *Ibid.*, Chap. 36.
[5] *Ibid.*, Chap. 37.

as yet to face the latter alternative and preferred to run no risks. The Union leaders who favored a convention encouraged the people, assuring them that it really did not mean disunion, the entire press of the state with a single exception[1] favored the call, but the popular sentiment was opposed. Not that it seemed so at the time. The secessionists, elated by their victory in the legislature, were entirely confident of a result favorable to their hopes. The fact that the opponents of a convention based their appeal on grounds of expediency rather than of constitutionality[2] contributed to this. The reception by the governor of resolutions from the legislatures of New York and Ohio, denouncing the action of South Carolina as treasonable and insurgent fretted politicians and may have irritated others, but to the mass of the people they furnished no great cause for excitement. The taunts of the South Carolina press[3] which apparently were more than secessionists could endure with equability of temper, disturbed them not at all. To many of them the fact that South Carolina had seceded was a strong argument why North Carolina should not.[4] So long as Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maryland were in the Union they could not feel very unsafe, and as companions they seemed, particularly Virginia, far more suitable than the cotton states.

[1] The Greensboro *Patriot.*

[2] William W. Holden who was a candidate in Wake County, was an exception. Speaking on February 14 he denied the existence of any right of secession, declared it the duty of the federal government to reinforce and defend Fort Sumter, and argued that the passage of troops for the purpose across North Carolina ought not to be resisted. *State Journal*, Feb. 20, 1861.

[3] The following extract from the Charleston *Mercury* is characteristic: "Old Rip, although not quite awake, is making very strong preparatory grunts. He'll feel *the foot* after a while."

[4] Dr. Kemp P. Battle told the story of a North Carolina mountaineer who attended a secession meeting where each speaker in turn laid emphasis upon the action or the opinion of South Carolina. Finally when a fresh orator began with a similar allusion, the mountaineer could restrain himself no longer, and rising to his full height, with arms upraised, he shouted "For God's sake! Let South Carolina nullify, revolute, secess, and BE DAMNED!"

And so when the election was finally held the call of the convention was defeated by a majority of 651 in a total vote of 93,995. A plurality of the delegates chosen at the same time were Unionists—"submissionists" in secessionist parlance—and a clear majority were opposed to secession for existing causes.[1] The vote for candidates so far as it could be ascertained showed a much more pronounced Unionist trend than that indicated by the convention vote.[2]

The result was not, in the mind of any one, a final triumph for the Union. It was merely a temporary success of those who advocated a policy of "watch and wait." The truth was that the people still relied on compromise, still hoped that the Peace Conference would result in some arrangement for peace and reunion with the seceded states.[3] The hope was of course a vain one, since the day of compromise was past. When the Conference was over, the commissioners brought back no hope of peace. Judge Ruffin, who had gone to Washington an intense Union man, returned to North Carolina an advanced secessionist, or, to be more exact, an advocate of revolution. Davis, Barringer, and Reid were equally convinced. The press reflected the changing view, all the papers advocating military preparations as a matter of necessity. Many of them began to advocate secession. Lincoln's inaugural satisfied no one and there was widespread distrust and dislike of the new administration. John A. Gilmer refused a place in the cabinet and the most extreme Unionist in the state agreed with his point of view.

[1] The exact figures were: Unionists, 52; "conditional Unionists, 22; "Southern Rights" men, 46.

[2] Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, II, p. 262.

[3] Report of S. Hall to Georgia Convention. Journal, p. 330. Mr. Hall said that the great obstacle "to the immediate coöperation of North Carolina with the Confederate States is the belief entertained by a large number of citizens that the Peace Conference will compose the dissensions between the sections."

Attention has been called to the advantage possessed by the secessionists in being more coherent than their adversaries. They had the further advantage of advocating a definite and aggressive policy in behalf of rights, even of safety, which all agreed were threatened. The Unionists, on the other hand, could arouse but little enthusiasm in advocating standing still while the ship was going to pieces. The secessionists now commenced systematic organization, and beginning in Wilmington the most radically secessionist community in the state, a new series of "States Rights" meetings were held, culminating in a great state meeting in Goldsboro in March at which about a thousand persons were in attendance. Weldon N. Edwards presided. Formal organization of a party was undertaken, and plans were laid for a statewide campaign. Franklin J. Moses, appointed by South Carolina as commissioner to North Carolina, was present and spoke as did Edmund Ruffin of Virginia who had come up from Charleston to attend. The meeting adjourned with a call for a second meeting in Charlotte on May 20.

The course of events soon rendered unnecessary any further activity. The attack on Fort Sumter and the President's call for troops resolved all doubts as to the course of the state. When Governor Ellis was notified by the secretary of war that two regiments were wanted from North Carolina, he replied:

> Your dispatch is received, and if genuine (which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt), I have to say in reply that I regard a levy of troops for the purpose of subjugating the states of the South, as in violation of the Constitution and a usurpation of power.
>
> I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.

On April 17 he issued a call for a special session of the legislature to begin on May 1. Fort Macon had already been taken and he now ordered the seizure of the others, which was accomplished at once.[1] Promising to send a regiment to Virginia within a few days,[2] the governor called for thirty thousand volunteers and established a camp of instruction at Raleigh.[3] His action was approved by the Council of State which met on April 23,[4] and as a result of these indications of North Carolina's intentions, President Lincoln on April 27 declared its ports blockaded.[5]

The Unionists now gave up the fight[6] and began to advocate separation and war, should war be forced upon them. The Unionist press gave up the fight also,[7] the *Register* voicing their feeling "It is the part of prudence and of common sense to look at things as they are and not as we would wish them to be.

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[1] *Official Records*, 1, pp. 476-79.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Senate Journal, Extra Session of 1861, pp. 6-14.

[4] Records of the Council of State, p. 81.

[5] McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 149.

[6] The letters of such men as William A. Graham, George E. Badger, and Jonathan Worth, are enlightening. Striking in its vivid portrayal of the effect produced upon Union men by Lincoln's call for troops are the words of Z. B. Vance, speaking in Boston before the Andrew Post, No. 15, of the Grand Army of the Republic, on December 8, 1886. He said: "For myself I will say that I was canvassing for the Union with all my strength; I was addressing a large and excited crowd, large numbers of whom were armed, and literally had my arm extended upward in pleading for peace and the Union of our Fathers, when the telegraphic news was announced of the firing on Sumter and the President's call for seventy-five thousand volunteers. When my hand came down from that impassioned gesticulation, it fell slowly and sadly by the side of a secessionist. I immediately, with altered voice and manner, called upon the assembled multitude to volunteer, not to fight against, but for South Carolina. I said: If war must come I preferred to be with my own people. If we had to shed blood I preferred to shed Northern rather than Southern blood. If we had to slay I had rather slay strangers than my own kindred, and neighbors; and that it was better, whether right or wrong, that communities and states should go together and face the horrors of war in a body—sharing a common fate, rather than endure the unspeakable calamities of internecine strife. . . . I went with and shared the fate of the people of my native state, having first done all I could to avert as much as possible the calamities of war." Dowd, *Life of Vance*, pp. 441-42.

[7] Until the call for troops, the position of the newspapers of the state on the question of secession was as follows: For secession, Raleigh *State Journal*, Wilmington *Journal*, Fayetteville *Carolinian*, Murfreesboro *Citizen*, Elizabeth City *Pioneer*, Asheville *News*, Salisbury *Banner*, Charlotte *Bulletin*, Charlotte

We believe that Abraham Lincoln is about to wage a war of coercion against these states. We believe that in this war the remaining slave-holding states will be involved, and we shall be found on the side of the section in which we were born and bred and in which live our kindred, connections, and friends. If this makes us secessionists, then let us be so called." [1] The *Standard*, also, yielded.

The legislature met on May 1. The governor's message, after dealing at some length with the constitutional aspects of coercion, and assuming without discussion that a convention would be called, urged upon the legislature adequate preparations for war. The House, after passing the bill authorizing military aid to Virginia, turned to consideration of a convention bill. After various amendments looking to the submission of the work of the convention to the people, had been voted down, the bill was passed unanimously, [2] all opposition having finally yielded to the overwhelming force of circumstances. The bill went at once to the Senate which abandoned its own bill and passed the House measure through its three readings with but three dissenting votes. [3]

The act provided for the election of delegates on May 13 to an unrestricted convention which should

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Democrat, Goldsboro *Tribune*, Goldsboro *Rough Notes*, Shelby *Eagle*, Warrenton *News*, Washington *Times*, Tarboro *Mercury*, Winston *Western Sentinel*, Wilson *Ledger*, Tarboro *Southerner*, and Hillsboro *Plaindealer*, all Democratic; The Wilmington *Herald*, Albemarle *Southron*, Charlotte *Whig*, Milton *Chronicle*, *Western Carolinian*, all Whig, and the New Bern *Progress*, Concord *Flag*, Raleigh *Leisure Hour*, all independent. Against secession, the Raleigh *Standard* and Raleigh *Banner*, Democratic, and the following Whig papers: Raleigh *Register*, Fayetteville *Observer*, Salisbury *Watchman*, Greensboro *Patriot*, Iredell *Express*, Washington *Dispatch*, Kinston *Advocate*, Hendersonville *Times*, Salem *Press*, Ashe *Spectator*, Wadesboro *Argus*, and the Hillsboro *Recorder*. After the call for troops, all were for war.

[1] Issue of April 17, 1861.

[2] P. T. Henry voted affirmatively with a protest.

[3] L. Q. Sharpe, Josiah Turner, and Jonathan Worth. They based their opposition on the short time given for the canvass and the refusal to require the action of the convention to be submitted to the people. *State Journal*, May 8, 1861.

assemble on May 20. The failure to restrict it or require submission of its work was due to the fact that there was general and complete knowledge in advance of the action it would take and complete approval. In other words it was summoned and elected to secede. Whatever may have been the hold of Union sentiment upon the mind of the state, there was practically no dissent to separation from the Union now. The secession of Virginia, of course, made this decision inevitable, but it is fair to say that this aspect of the case was given little if any conscious consideration. The majority of the people of North Carolina believed in state sovereignty, and while to them Lincoln's election furnished in itself no ground or justification for secession, his call for troops to coerce states which had chosen to exercise the right was in their minds nothing less than an act of war. At once they were controlled by the most compelling of motives—the necessity of defending homes and hearthstones from invasion—which ruled them utterly, and with complete conviction they rushed to arms. The General Assembly in summoning a convention to secede took but the first of the steps to make legal the separation which the people had already decreed and put into practical effect.

Having passed the convention bill, the legislature turned to war preparations. A vote of thanks to Governor Ellis for his promptness in preparing for war was passed, receiving only two negative votes.[1] Acts were passed making it unlawful to administer the oath to support the Constitution of the United States; providing for the manufacture of arms at the Fayetteville arsenal and appropriating $200,000 for the purpose; authorizing the governor to appoint a commissioner near the government of the Confederate states;[2]

[1] Josiah Turner and Alfred Dockery in the Senate voted against this resolution.

[2] Thomas L. Clingman was appointed commissioner and visited the Confederate Congress.

authorizing the governor to enroll 10,000 state troops; declaring North Carolina free from liability for the federal debt incurred after March 4, 1861; authorizing the governor to accept 20,000 twelve-months volunteers and to arm and equip them and to offer a bounty of $10 to each; authorizing the governor to commission with equal rank officers of the army and navy of the United States, who resigned to enter the service of the state; appropriating $5,000,000 for public defense; defining and providing for the punishment of treason against the state; and providing for a stay in the execution of judgments in civil suits.[1]

The election was duly held after a brief campaign devoid of any particular interest. There was no issue; all were agreed upon separation and all were conscious that separation meant war. The only underlying question was how technically separation should be accomplished. Should it be by secession, or should it be by revolution?

The convention which assembled on May 20 was probably the ablest group of men who had ever met in North Carolina. The gravity of the situation had made the people turn to their best and most trusted leaders, without regard to political differences. Democratic as North Carolina was, the Whigs were in a majority in the convention. Most of these were former Unionists, and of the Democrats a majority had opposed secession until the call for troops. Evidently the people were determined to accomplish secession through the agency of Union men.

Probably the most influential of the leaders in the convention were George E. Badger, Thomas Ruffin, William A. Graham, and Weldon N. Edwards. Among the other prominent men were Asa Biggs, David S. Reid, William Johnston, Warren Winslow, Bedford Brown, W. W. Holden, Kenneth Rayner, R. P. Dick,

[1] These acts are to be found in the laws, First Extra Session, 1861.

Burton Craige, George Howard, and John A. Gilmer.[1] Five members of the convention, Edwards, Biggs, Rayner, E. T. Brodnax, and W. F. Leak, had been delegates to the convention of 1835.

The convention organized by electing Weldon N. Edwards as President over William A. Graham.[2] This was in a sense a test of the strength of the secessionists and Unionists. As soon as he took his seat, George E. Badger presented a paper for consideration which was, however, not read until complete organization had been secured and the convention had listened to an insolent and patronizing speech from the ubiquitous Franklin J. Moses of South Carolina. Judge Badger's proposed ordinance was then read. It was:

AN ORDINANCE DECLARING THE SEPARATION OF NORTH CAROLINA FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Whereas, Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, and Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, were chosen President and Vice President of the United

[1] An idea of the prominence of the group above named can be gained from the positions they had filled. George E. Badger had been a member of the House of Commons, Superior Court judge, United States senator, and secretary of the navy. He was nominated for the United States Supreme Court, but failed of confirmation. Thomas Ruffin had been a member and speaker of the Commons, Superior Court judge, president of the State Bank, chief justice of the Supreme Court, and a member of the Peace Conference. W. A. Graham had been member and speaker of the Commons, state senator, United States senator, governor, and secretary of the navy. He was the Whig candidate for Vice President in 1852. Weldon N. Edwards had been a member of Congress, state senator, and for many terms speaker, a member of the convention of 1835. Asa Biggs had been a member of the Commons and Senate, and a member of the convention of 1835, member of Congress, United States senator, and United States district judge. David S. Reid had been state senator, member of Congress, governor, and United States senator. William Johnston was prominent as a railroad president and business man. He received every vote in Mecklenburg County as a delegate. Warren Winslow had been speaker of the Senate, governor *ex officio*, and a member of Congress. Bedford Brown had been a member of the Commons, speaker of the Senate, and United States senator. W. W. Holden, had been a member of the Commons. Kenneth Rayner had been a member of the convention of 1835, member of the Commons and of the Senate, and member of Congress. R. P. Dick had been United States district attorney. Burton Craige had been a member of the Commons and of Congress. George Howard had been prominent as an editor and was a Superior Court judge. John A. Gilmer had been state senator and a member of Congress. He was the Whig candidate for governor in 1854, but was defeated. He declined the treasury portfolio in President Lincoln's cabinet.

[2] The vote was 65-48.

States by a party in fact and avowedly entirely sectional in its organization, and hostile in its declared principles to the institutions of the Southern States of the Union, and thereupon, certain Southern States did separate themselves from the Union, and form another and independent government, under the name of "The Confederate States of America"; and

Whereas, the people of North Carolina, though justly aggrieved by the evident tendency of this election, and of these principles, did, nevertheless, abstain from adopting any such measure of separation, and on the contrary, influenced by an ardent, attachment to the Union and Constitution which their fathers had transmitted to them, did remain in the said Union, loyally discharging all their duties under the Constitution, in the hope that what was threatening in public affairs might yield to the united efforts of patriotic men from every part of the nation, and by these efforts such guarantees for the security of our rights might be obtained as should restore confidence, renew alienated ties, and finally reunite all the states in a common bond of fraternal Union; meantime, cheerfully and faithfully exerting whatever influence they possessed for the accomplishment of this most desirable end; and,

Whereas, things being in this condition, and the people of this state indulging this hope, the said Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, did, on the sixteenth day of April, by his proclamation, call upon the states of the Union to furnish large bodies of troops to enable him, under the false pretense of executing the laws, to march an army into the seceded states with a view to their subjugation under an arbitrary and military authority, there being no law of Congress authorizing such calling out of troops, and no constitutional right to use them, if called out, for the purpose intended by him; and,

Whereas, this call for troops has been answered throughout the northern, northwestern and middle non-slaveholding states with enthusiastic readiness, and it is evident from the tone of the entire press of those states, and the open avowal of their public men, that it is the fixed purpose of the government and people of those states to wage a cruel war against the seceded states, to destroy utterly the fairest portion of this continent, and reduce its inhabitants to absolute subjection and abject slavery; and,

Whereas, in aid of these detestable plans and wicked measures, the said Lincoln, without any shadow of rightful authority, and in plain violation of the Constitution of the United States, has, by other proclamations declared the ports of North Carolina, as well as all the other Atlantic and Gulf States, under blockade;

thus seeking to cut off our trade with all parts of the world; and

Whereas, since his accession to power, the whole conduct of the said Lincoln has been marked by a succession of false, disingenuous and treacherous acts and declarations, proving incontestibly that he is, at least in his dealings with Southern States and Southern men, void of faith and honor; and

Whereas, he is now governing by military rule alone, enlarging by new enlistments of men, both the military and naval force, without any authority of law, having set aside all constitutional and legal restraints, and made all constitutional and legal rights dependent upon his mere pleasure, and that of his military subordinates; and

Whereas, in all his unconstitutional, illegal and oppressive acts, in all his wicked and diabolical purposes, and, in his present position of usurper and military dictator, he has been and is encouraged and supported by the great body of the people of the non-slaveholding states:

Therefore, this Convention, now here assembled, in the name and with the sovereign power of the people of North Carolina, doth, for the reasons aforesaid, and others, and in order to preserve the undoubted rights and liberties of the said people, hereby declare all connection of government between this state and the United States of America dissolved and abrogated, and this State to be a free, sovereign and independent state, owing no subordination, obedience, support or other duty to the said United States, their Constitution or authorities, anything in her ratification of said Constitution, or of any amendment or amendments thereto to the contrary notwithstanding; and having full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do: and appealing to the Supreme Governor of the world for the justice of our cause, and beseeching Him for his gracious help and blessing, we will, to the uttermost of our power, and to the last extremity, maintain, defend and uphold this declaration.

At once Burton Craige offered as a substitute an ordinance written by Judah P. Benjamin and sent by

him to Governor Ellis who asked Craige to introduce it.[1] It was as follows:

AN ORDINANCE DISSOLVING THE UNION BETWEEN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA AND THE OTHER STATES UNITED WITH HER UNDER THE COMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ENTITLED "THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES"

We, the people of the state of North Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by the state of North Carolina in the convention of 1789, whereby the Constitution of the United States was ratified and adopted, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly, ratifying and adopting amendments to the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, rescinded, and abrogated.

We do further declare and ordain that the union now subsisting between the state of North Carolina and the other states, under the title of "The United States of America," is hereby dissolved, and that the state of North Carolina is in full possession and exercise of all those rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state.[2]

Judge Ruffin then, in the interest of harmony among conflicting factions, moved to postpone the matter until a committee could prepare and report an ordinance of separation.[3] This was defeated by a close vote and a motion to strike out Judge Badger's ordinance was then passed 72-40.[4] Judge Ruffin moved as a substitute for the Craige ordinance the following:

We, the people of the state of North Carolina in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, that the Union now subsisting between the state of North Carolina and the other states, under the title of "The United States of America," is hereby dissolved,

[1] The ordinance, which was prepared by Judah P. Benjamin, was brought to Raleigh from Montgomery by James Hines, a North Carolinian, and delivered to Governor Ellis, who asked Burton Craige, the member from his county, to introduce it.

[2] *Journal of the Convention of 1861*, p. 13.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

and that the state of North Carolina is in full possession and exercise of all those rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state.

This was defeated, 49-66, and the Craige ordinance was then adopted unanimously.[1] William A. Graham in voting said that for the future he waived all question of the constitutional right of secession. Judge Ruffin said that if a halter were about his neck he would still vote aye.[2] North Carolina, next to last of the states to join the Union, was now the last to leave it, and next to last to join the Confederacy.[3]

The Convention then passed unanimously an ordinance ratifying the Provisional Constitution of the Confederate States,[4] declined to adopt a provision for submitting this question to the people,[5] referred an ordinance ratifying the permanent Constitution of the Confederacy to a committee and adjourned for the day. On the following day the engrossed ordinance of secession was signed by the one hundred and twenty delegates who composed the convention.[6]

Copies of the ordinance of secession and the ratifying ordinance were sent to President Davis, and on May 27 he proclaimed North Carolina a member of the Confederacy.[7]

The ratification of the permanent Constitution was delayed for almost three weeks while the convention

[1] *Journal of the Convention of 1861*, pp. 14-16. Upon the defeat of his ordinance Judge Badger left the hall and went home. A member of his family relates that after his return home he was seated at the dinner table when the ringing of the Capitol bell announced secession. Judge Badger raised his hand and said, "The death knell of slavery."

[2] *State Journal*, May 22, 1861.

[3] Tennessee adopted the ordinance of secession in May but submitted it to the people and did not join the Confederacy until this ratification was completed.

[4] *Journal of the Convention of 1861*, p. 18.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] When Judge Badger returned to the Convention he asked that he be recorded as voting aye, and added, "And I hereby utterly repudiate all belief in any right of secession." *State Journal*, May 29, 1861.

[7] *Standard*, June 5, 1861. This proclamation does not appear in the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy.

debated the question. William A. Graham, assisted by Kenneth Rayner and R. P. Dick, led the fight against ratification. Graham desired the state to act alone in its sovereign capacity and not join any confederacy. Dick desired the question submitted to the people, while Rayner urged delay. Judge Ruffin and Judge Badger led the fight for ratification and finally, on June 6, this was accomplished by a unanimous vote, the opposition yielding at the last. [1]

And with these things completed and North Carolina's separation from the Union placed upon a legal basis, the convention and the state turned their attention to the war now imminent.

[1] *Journal of the Convention of 1861*, pp. 72-73. *Ordinances of the Convention of 1861*, No. 11.

CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF BETHEL

The troops answering President Lincoln's first call for seventy-five thousand men were soon so dispersed as to indicate an invasion of Virginia, the gateway to the Eastern South, from four directions.[1] The first of these was from Washington towards Gordonsville and Richmond; the second, from Fort Monroe towards Richmond; the third, from Harrisburg into the Shenandoah Valley, including the rich grain section of Northwest Virginia; the fourth, from the Kanawha Valley towards Staunton.

The army of the last mentioned invasion was the first to begin hostilities. Under General George B. McClellan it achieved during June and July several victories in the country around Beverly and along the Kanawha rivers. These easily won victories against very much smaller forces had far-reaching consequences. The western counties of Virginia had seceded from Virginia, and set up a state government with Wheeling as a capital. McClellan's success enabled this government to maintain itself and left West Virginia practically in the Union after June. From this newly formed State 32,068 men were recruited for the Union army. Moreover, the winning of this territory permitted the Federal army to threaten at all times through the Valley of Virginia the interior lines of communication of the Confederate army and forced its commanders to divert needed forces in order to guard these lines, and to protect the salt mines, coal mines, blast furnaces, lead mines, foundries, and other industries adjacent to the Valley. So magnificent a territory has seldom been won by such insignificent battles.

[1] *Confederate Military History*, III, 43.

This campaign waged by McClellan with skill and self confidence impressed the North greatly, and led to his selection as commander-in-chief of the Union Armies after General Scott's retirement.

The second of these invasions, the one from Fort Monroe, was not so successful. It was repulsed in its initial enterprise at Bethel where the first considerable battle of the war was fought.

Bethel is about ten miles from Yorktown where Cornwallis surrendered and virtually ended the Revolutionary War. Thus, curiously enough, the Civil War began almost where the Revolutionary War ended.

On April 27, although North Carolina had not at that time formally seceded, President Lincoln ordered a blockade of the coasts of both North Carolina and Virginia, and the Federals hastened to occupy in force as many strategic ports as possible. General B. F. Butler, who, in the words of Greely, had just "completed the taming of Baltimore," [1] was sent to command at Fort Monroe, his duties there being specifically defined. Among others he was directed by General Scott "to capture any batteries the enemy may have within a half day's march." [2] Hence in Butler's formal report of the affair at Bethel, he several times spoke of the battle as an attack on a battery. "Troops poured rapidly into Butler's department," [3] and camps were formed outside of the fort and one organized as far south as Newport News.

General Butler found his position "so cramped by the proximity and audacity of the Rebels, whose cavalry and scouts almost looked into the mouth of his guns," [4] that he determined "to send up a force to drive them back and destroy their camps." [5] He

[1] The *American Conflict*, 1, 528.
[2] *Official Records*, 2, 641.
[3] Victor, *Southern Rebellion*, II, 197.
[4] Greely, *The American Conflict*, 1, 529.
[5] *Official Records*, 2, 79.

had learned that the nearest Confederate outpost was at Little Bethel Church, almost eight miles from Hampton and an equal distance from Newport News, and that further north at Big Bethel Church the Confederates had works of more or less strength.

He therefore organized an expedition to surprise and rout the active forces at the two Bethels. The expedition was placed under the command of General Ebenezer W. Pierce, a militia officer from Massachusetts. Pierce's force consisted of the Fifth New York Regiment (Zouaves) Colonel Duryea, the Third New York, Colonel Townsend, and a detachment of two field pieces from Carr's Second New York Regiment. This force was to march from Hampton and be joined about a mile and a half from Little Bethel Church by a supplementary force marching from Newport News. This consisted of the Seventh New York, Colonel Bendix, five companies of the Fourth Massachusetts and five companies of the First Vermont, under Lieutenant Colonel Washburn, and two field pieces under Lieutenant John F. Greble of the regular army. In addition the regiments of Colonels Carr, Allen, and McChesney at Hampton were directed to be held ready to move at a moment's notice,[1] and Carr and Allen later took part in the battle. The total force, according to Colonel (later General)[2] Carr was about 3,500.

The plan of battle was drawn by Major Theodore Winthrop, Butler's military secretary, who had been directed to obtain all available information as to the situation at the two Bethels.[3] It was in the form of a memorandum and was read to all the regimental commanders. Hough comments, "This crude memorandum formed the basis of the official plan for the

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 83.
[2] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 148.
[3] Bendix, *Vermont in the Civil War*, 43.

first battle for the maintenance of the Republic." [1] The object of the expedition was stated in these unconventional words: "If we bag the Little Bethel men, push on to Great Bethel, and simultaneously bag them. Burn both Bethels or blow up if brick." [2] Most of the work, it was further directed, was to be done with the bayonet.

On the night of June 9, 1861, both forces left their camps with their movements so timed that they should unite and attack the Confederates at daybreak on the 10th. In spite of the minute instructions [3] that had been given to keep the divisions converging from Hampton and Newport News from mistaking each other for enemies, Bendix's German regiment fired, at the point of junction, on Townsend's men, who drew back as they returned the fire. Before the mistake could be corrected two men had been killed and nineteen wounded.

After this unexpected blunder, Pierce, although several of his regimental commanders advised a return, moved on to Little Bethel. There he found no enemy, but in accord with Butler's instructions, burned the church, and moved forward to Big Bethel, where the Confederates awaited him. As Pierce approached the Confederates his sources of information, civil and military, as to their numbers were surprisingly inaccurate. He was excited because from a white woman and a negro man he "obtained testimony that Big Bethel was garrisoned by 4,000 men." [4] Captain Judson Kilpatrick of the Zouaves made a reconnoissance and found the enemy with about from three to five thousand men posted in a strong position on the opposite side of the bridge, three earthworks and a masked battery in the right and left, in advance

[1] *History of Duryea's Brigade, 22.*
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Official Records*, 2, 78.
[4] *Ibid.*, 84.

of the stream thirty pieces of artillery and a large force of cavalry." [1] These reports alarmed General Pierce and he sent to Bethel for reinforcement.

What was the strength of the Confederate forces that loomed so large in the eyes of Captain Kilpatrick? On May 21, 1861, Colonel John B. Magruder was assigned charge of the military operations on the line to Hampton with headquarters at Yorktown. [2] Three regiments of infantry recently arrived at Richmond were ordered to report to him there. One of these was the First North Carolina Volunteers under Colonel D. H. Hill, which had completed its trip to Richmond on May 21, 1861.

On June 6, Magruder learned that the Federals were arranging to press inland from Hampton in some force. He at once ordered Colonel Hill with his regiment and three companies of the Third Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Stuart to move forward to Bethel church to meet the invaders. On his arrival at the church Hill determined to throw up an enclosed work with the front and right protected by Back River (Marsh Creek branch) and the left by a dense woods. In the early period of the war, troops were averse to fortifying themselves: later on they hardly waited for a command to protect their front. Hence it speaks well for the discipline of this regiment to learn from Hill's report [3] that his men most cheerfully plied picks and spades during the 7th and 8th. "On Sunday" (the 9th) says Major Hotchkiss, "a fresh supply of tools enabled Hill to put more men to work on the intrenchment, but worship was not omitted, as Hill was a Presbyterian elder of the 'Stonewall' Jackson type, who mingled faith and works." [4] By the morning of the tenth, the date of Pierce's arrival,

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 89.
[2] *Ibid.*, 865.
[3] *Ibid.*, 93.
[4] *Confederate Military History*, III, 137.

the works[1] were completed and occupied. Colonel Stuart's companies, it will be noted, were posted in some hastily constructed works on the high land across the river to the right and front of the enclosed works. On the morning of the tenth Major E. B. Montague with three companies of the Virginia battalion reached Bethel and was assigned post on the right of the First Regiment. This was the total infantry present. Three small troops of Virginia Cavalry covered the rear. The seven pieces of the Virginia Howitzer Battalion, under Major Geo. W. Randolph (afterwards the Confederate Secretary of War) were posted as follows: a Parrott gun and one howitzer in a battery immediately on the right of the road to Hampton; a howitzer to the left of Stuart's command: a howitzer near the bridge; a rifled howitzer within the front of the North Carolina redoubt;[2] two howitzers in the rear. Company A, Captain J. L. Bridgers of the North Carolina Regiment, was deployed as skirmishers on the left of the road across Back River; Company G, Captain C. M. Avery, was also thrown across the river and stationed between Stuart and Randolph's two pieces. The total strength of the Confederates, as given by Colonel Magruder, who assumed command on the eighth, was 1,200 engaged; 1,400 in all.[3]

The Federal attacks were not coördinated. First Duryea's Zouaves with two companies of the First Vermont, then Townsend's Third New York, both supported by Greble's bravely served guns, were thrown against the Confederate right.[4] But these attacks, made under cover of woods, fences, and houses,

[1] A correspondent of the Fayetteville *Observer* thus describes life in the regiment at that time: "Today we have more tough work, drill at 4:30 o'clock; breakfast; work at digging ditches and throwing up fortifications till dinner. At five o'clock we shall either drill or ditch again.

[2] *Official Records*, 2, 99.

[3] *Ibid.*, 91.

[4] Bendix, *Vermont in the Civil War*, 57.

were repulsed by the steady fire of Randolph's pieces and Hill's and Stuart's infantry. "Soon" says General Carr, "our troops were seeking the shelter of the woods, after a vain attempt to drive the enemy from his works." [1] Only once during the attacks on this flank did the Federals gain ground. On the breaking in the vent of the priming wire of the howitzer on Stuart's left, the piece was spiked and abandoned. Without the fire of this gun, Stuart thought his right flank in danger and by Colonel Magruder's order withdrew his force to the church and the Federals seized the redoubt of the disabled gun. At this critical moment, Colonel Hill ordered Captain Bridgers of Company A to reoccupy this redoubt and directed Captain Ross, Company C, [2] to support Stuart. "These two captains," reports Colonel Hill, "with their companies, crossed over to Randolph's battery under a most heavy fire, in a most gallant manner. As Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart had withdrawn, Captain Ross was detained at the church near Randolph's battery. Captain Bridgers, however, crossed over and drove the Zouaves out of the advanced howitzer battery and reoccupied it. It is impossible to overestimate this service. It decided the action in our favor." [3]

An attempt by General Pierce to cross the river at a ford below the works was easily repulsed. Colonel Hill had stationed Lieutenant Roberts of Company F with a small force at this ford. During the attack Werth's Virginia company and a howitzer were sent to the threatened point.

On the failure of these two attacks Colonel Washburn with the Massachusetts and Vermont troops and a portion of Bendix's New York regiment, made a long detour through the woods, crossed the river and

[1] *Battles and Leaders*, II, 149.
[2] It is said that not a single member of Ross's company was 21 years old.
[3] *Official Records*, 2, 95.

opened fire on the Confederate left. Major Theodore Winthrop, who outlined the plan of the entire expedition, accompanied these troops. Companies B and C of the North Carolina Regiment, reinforced by Companies G and H of the same regiment, broke this advance, and Winthrop, while courageously urging his men forward, was killed. When Washburn retreated to his former position, he found that "a general retreat had been ordered. The Zouaves were already out of sight, and Townsend's regiment was following them on the double quick." [1] Although Pierce had been reinforced by Allen's First New York and Carr's Second New York regiments, Washburn complained that no support had been afforded him. [2]

During the attack on the right, Colonel Hill asked for volunteers from Captain Bridgers's company, the Edgecombe Guards, to burn a house that was sheltering Federals. Promptly Corporal George F. Williams, Thomas Fallon, John H. Thorpe, R. H. Ricks, R. H. Bradley, and Henry L. Wyatt offered themselves for the dangerous service. In the attempt to do what a shell afterwards accomplished young Wyatt was killed. In speaking of his death, Colonel Magruder says, "Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the brave soldier whom we lost." Henry L. Wyatt was the only Southern soldier who was killed at Bethel, and was thus the initial sacrifice in the long list of North Carolinians, who willingly died for the Confederate cause.

The total Confederate loss was one killed and seven wounded: total Union loss 18 killed, 53 wounded, 5 missing. [3]

Two statements made by Swinton, and repeated by others on his authority, need correction. He says,

[1] Bendix, *Vermont in the Civil War*, 52.
[2] *Ibid.*, 57.
[3] *Official Records*, 2, 82.

"General Pierce then ordered a retreat, and the regiments marched off as on parade. Colonel Warren, who alone protested against the retreat, remained on the ground, and together with Doctor Winslow of his regiment, brought out the wounded. While he yet remained on the ground, the Confederates abandoned the position." [1] Rarely of trained soldiers can it be said that they retired from a stricken field "as on parade." Swinton's assertion differs materially from Bendix's account, already quoted, of the retirement of the Zouaves and of Townsend's regiment. It differs too from the statement of Colonel Carr, who arrived on the field in time to cover the Federal retreat, and who says: "On approaching (the battle field) we were surprised and puzzled at the condition of the troops. For at least one mile from the scene of action the officers and men were scattered singly in groups, without form or organization." [2] It is at variance with the contents of a private letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, the commander of the attack on the left, who declares, that there was "no reconnoissance, no plan of attack, no concert of action." [3] It disagrees even with the report of the commanding General, who says that on account of exhaustion from thirst "some difficulty was experienced in keeping the men in proper order during the retreat." [4]

Swinton's other assertion that, while the Federals yet remained on the ground the Confederates abandoned Bethel, is not in consonance with the facts. It is clear from both Northern and Southern testimony that there was pursuit of Pierce's forces, not abandonment while the Federals were still on the field. The official historian of the Vermont troops writes, "Upon

[1] Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, 33.
[2] *Battles and Leaders*, II, 149.
[3] Quoted by Bendix, *Vermont in the Civil War*, 57.
[4] *Official Records*, 2, 85.

the retreat from Big Bethel three companies of Confederate Cavalry followed the rear of the Federal column, at a safe distance, as far as New Market Bridge." [1] Colonel Carr writes, "The pursuit made by the Confederates was easily checked by the Second New York." [2] Tinsley one of the editors of the Richmond *Dispatch*, who visited the field at the close of the encounter, says, "Our Cavalry, numbering three companies, went in pursuit . . . the whole road to Hampton was strewn with haversacks, overcoats, canteens, muskets, etc., which the men had thrown off in their retreat." [3] Schmucker says, "as the beaten troops retreated they were pursued by the cavalry of the enemy." [4]

By the retreat and retirement of the Federals before two o'clock, the Confederate infantry was left free to return to its exposed headquarters at Yorktown and moved at nightfall. Magruder was so anxious about this important seaport on the route to Richmond, garrisoned feebly as Yorktown was in his absence, that he wrote the War Department, "The Louisiana regiment arrived after the battle was over, making a most extraordinary march. They returned to Yorktown the same night, making a distance (for the day) of twenty-eight miles. It was not thought prudent to leave Yorktown exposed any longer. I therefore occupied the ground with cavalry and marched the remainder of my forces to Yorktown." [5]

As this is the initial battle of the four years of war, it is an appropriate place to mention the difficulties which a writer encounters in trying to determine from the official reports, either the number engaged or the losses incurred in any battle of the Civil War. There

[1] Bendix, *Vermont in the Civil War*, 55.
[2] *Battles and Leaders*, II, 150.
[3] Quoted in Fayetteville *Observer*, June 17, 1861.
[4] Victor, *Southern Rebellion*.
[5] *Official Records*, 2, 93.

are many reasons for the difficulty. Commanders assuming that their strength is known at headquarters often neglect to mention their numbers. Sometimes as a precaution for future actions it is prudent not to reveal numbers. It is even alleged that in the latter part of the War Confederate commanders were forbidden to enumerate their forces. Frequently detachments are withdrawn from regiments, brigades, or divisions and it does not appear whether their absentees are in place during the next engagement. At times reports are written before casualties have been checked. This is especially true after a retreat in which the dead and wounded have been left on the field or in the hands of the enemy. Not rarely different bases of enumeration are used: one officer giving his field return strength, another his effective strength on the day of battle; and still another only the number actually engaged. Obviously too in the case of defeat or disaster a commander is naturally disposed to think his own number small and his adversary's large.

This minor engagement at Bethel illustrates some of these difficulties. It would seem that in a battle involving only a few regiments the number of men engaged could be determined accurately. But an examination, both of the official reports and of the accounts given by participants, proves the contrary. The Federal reports will be first examined. General Butler made two reports of the affair: in neither does he mention numbers.[1] Colonel Phelps, who was ordered by Butler "to send out from Newport News a battalion of such companies of the regiments under his command as he thought best,"[2] makes no report. General Pierce, the commander of the expedition, stops for such a detail as "George Scott is to have a revolver,"[3] but he fails to give his total force. He

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 77.
[2] *Ibid.*, 78.
[3] *Ibid.*, 83.

does help to fix the strength of two regiments. He says, Colonel Duryea passed the remainder of his command over the river at Hampton, and pushed on for Little Bethel, having now on that side of the river some 850 men. He was followed by the Third Regiment New York State Volunteers, Colonel Townsend, with 650 men, and a detachment from Colonel Carr's regiment, with two mountain howitzers, under the direction of a non-commissioned officer and five privates of the U. S. army."[1] This fixes Duryea's and Townsend's forces, but leaves uncertain the size of Carr's detachment. Duryea makes no report, but Townsend does. He, however, ignores numbers. Colonel Bendix makes the only report from the Newport News regiments. He says, "On the evening of the 10th instant I proceeded according to instructions to the cross-roads and took my position as reserve with one field piece. The advance, consisting of 300 men of the Vermont, 300 of the Massachusetts, and 150 belonging to my regiment . . . had gone on with one field piece."[2] Waiving the suspicion always attaching to a series of round numbers, this sentence fixes the number of men in the advance party, but leaves uncertain how many were in the reserve with Bendix himself. Did he have the remainder of his regiment or only a part? Then Lieutenant Greble of the Second U. S. Artillery accompanied Bendix and directed all the pieces. What number of artillerists did he have? Only one more report remains. Captain Kilpatrick of Duryea's regiment commanded the advance, and hence made a separate report. He states that his company, H, had 50 men, one lieutenant, four sergeants and four corporals. Company I, Captain Bartlett, was with him, but its numbers are not specified further than that it had one lieutenant,

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 83.
[2] *Ibid.*, 88.

four sergeants and two corporals. Two more regiments, Allen's First and Carr's Second New York, arrived during the battle; each lost three men. They must have been engaged, but no statement as to their numbers is made. We can thus summarize the official reports:

Duryea's Fifth New York	850	
Townsend's Third New York	650	
Fourth Massachusetts	300	
First Vermont	300	
Bendix's advance	150	
		2,250
Bendix's reserve (unknown)		0
Allen's First New York (unknown, say same as Townsend)		650
Carr's Second New York (unknown, say same as Townsend)		650
Artillery from Carr's regiment (unknown)		0
Greble's Artillerists (unknown)		0
		3,550

Thus without counting the small detachments and without knowing whether the remainder of Bendix's regiment was present, it seems fair to estimate that the Federals numbered at least 3,555, and it speaks well for Magruder's intelligence department that he on the day of battle estimated it as accurately as we can with all the reports before us.

There is in this battle, as is usual, the same divergence among the participants. Colonel Carr, who commanded the Second New York, says, "Reports credit us with 2,500 men: I believe we had not less than 3,500." [1] On the other hand Benedict, writing with all these reports before him, says, queerly enough, that the Union forces "numbered less than two thousand." [2] Major Williams, who says he "carried a

[1] *Battles and Leaders*, II, 148.
[2] Bendix, *Vermont in the Civil War*, 49.

musket at Big Bethel," puts Pierce's forces at "fully 3,000." [1]

On the Southern side there is not in this battle so much uncertainty, for Colonel Magruder announces that he had "1,200 men engaged: 1,400 in all." But there is the usual difficulty in checking the units with the total. Colonel Hill reports his regiment at 800. Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart gives his three companies, rank and file, at 208 men. One other company (Atkinson's) joined him during the battle: its number is not stated. Major Randolph makes no report as to numbers. However, Colonel Hill incidentally helps to estimate Randolph's strength. He, in commending the gunners of Lieutenant Hudnall's piece, names each man at the gun—12 in all, and also mentions that one of the guns was supported by 15 cadets from the North Carolina Military Institute at Charlotte. Randolph had seven guns present. Assuming that they were served by the same number as Hudnall's, this would give Randolph 84 men. [2] Major Montague is his report is silent as to numbers. It is fair presumably to give his three companies as many men as Stuart's three—namely, 208, although we know that battalion companies were usually smaller than regimental ones. There is no report from the cavalry commanders. As it was almost impossible to get cavalry equipment in the Confederacy at that time, the three companies present would be fortunate if they numbered 35 men to the company. The fairest compilation we can then make from official records will possibly amount to the following:

Hill's First North Carolina	800	
Stuart's three Virginia Companies	208	
Cadets from North Carolina Military Institute	15	
		1,023

[1] *Memorial War Books*, 48.

[2] Victor, *Southern Rebellion*, 200 (authority not stated), says, "the battery was worked by 100 chosen men under Major Randolph."

Randolph's Virginia Howitzers (estimated)	84	
Montague's Virginia Battalion (estimated)	208	
Cary's Virginia Cavalry (estimated)	105	
Stuart's Company (arriving during the battle)	70	
		467
		1,490

The discrepancy of 90 men between these figures and Colonel Magruder's may be in an overestimate of Montague's companies.

The conduct of the officers and men of the First Regiment met the commanding officer's hearty approval. He says: "I cannot omit to again bring to the notice of the General Commanding-in-Chief the valuable services and gallant conduct of the First North Carolina Regiment and Major Randolph of the howitzer batteries. These officers were not only prompt and daring in the execution of their duties, but most industrious and energetic in the preparations for the conflict. The firing of the howitzer batteries was as perfect as the bearing of the men, which was entirely what it ought to have been. Captain Bridgers of the North Carolina regiment retook in the most daring manner and at a critical period of the fight, the works from which Captain Brown of the artillery had withdrawn a disabled gun, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy and which works had been subsequently occupied by the enemy. Captain Bridgers deserves the highest praise for this timely act of gallantry." [1]

Of the commander of the regiment Colonel Magruder says, "Colonel Hill's judicious and determined action was worthy of his ancient glory." [2] Major Randolph adds, "I am happy at having an opportunity to render my acknowledgment to Colonel Hill, the commander

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 92.
[2] *Ibid.*, 91.

of the North Carolina regiment, for the useful suggestions which his experience as an artillery officer enabled him to make to me during the action, and to bear testimony to the gallantry and discipline of that portion of his command with which I was associated. The untiring industry of his regiment in intrenching our position enabled us to defeat the enemy with a nominal loss on our side." [1] On September 1, Colonel Hill was promoted to be a brigader-general. "Once in the national arena," writes the regimental historian, "General Hill rose to great distinction. He became a major-general in the course of a few months and a lieutenant-general in July, 1863." [2] This promotion separated Colonel Hill from the regiment which he and his accomplished associates, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, and Major Lane, had trained with unwavering solicitude. The highest tribute that can be paid to the skill and knowledge of these officers and to the ability and character of these earliest volunteers is that this one regiment of six months men furnished to the Confederate army five general officers, seven officers of the general staff, fourteen colonels, ten lieutenant-colonels, eight majors, twelve adjutants, ten other staff officers, fifty-seven captains, and eighty lieutenants. [3]

This combat, as the earliest encounters between newly formed armies always do, aroused emotion out of all proportion to its importance. The people of the North were unduly depressed. Many of the leading papers were bitter in their comments on Butler and Pierce. [4] The people of the South found in this initial

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 101.
[2] Clarke, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 112.
[3] *Ibid.*, 121.
[4] For example, the New York *Times* thus expressed itself: "Our leaders seem to have had neither sense nor science. If the facts be as they appear upon a first presentation, the sooner the brace of Massachusetts barristers (Butler and Pierce) are dismissed to their special pleading, replications and demurrers—the petty warfare of the bar—the better it will be for the country."

success a presage of ultimate triumph and a confirmation of their belief that their soldiers were matchless. In North Carolina there was great rejoicing that in twenty days after the ordinance of secession had been passed the sons of the state had largely contributed to a Confederate victory. Soldiers in the state's training camps petitioned to be allowed to hurry to Virginia. The usually unmoved state convention adopted, "amid almost unrestrained enthusiasm," [1] Governor Ellis's recommendation to tender "to the gallant commander of the regiment and the brave officers and men under his command, these testimonials of approbation most grateful to a soldier's feeling." [2] The convention ordered the State House and grounds to be illuminated and authorized the First Regiment to inscribe "Bethel" on its flag.

There were, however, more permanent results than these from the victory. "The war spirit," says Sloan, "received an immense accession of strength. Everything that could be asked for a vigorous prosecution of the war was granted by the Convention and sanctioned by the people. Volunteers swarmed to the standards in greater numbers than they could be organized and armed." [3] In a little over a month after Bethel, six regiments were organized and transferred to the Confederacy, and additional regiments were in process of organization.

[1] *Journal of the Convention of 1861*, July 17.
[2] Governor Ellis's message.
[3] Sloan, *North Carolina in the War Between the States*, 138.

CHAPTER III

FIRST MANASSAS

In North Carolina the days following the Battle of Bethel were filled with continued efforts to augment the state's war power. Recruiting officers were active in every county. Companies hurried to concentration camps for instruction and regimental organization. To provide for the increasing number of troops additional camps of instruction were established at Garysburg, Weldon, Warrenton, Ridgeway, Kittrell, Halifax, Carolina Beach, Smithville (now Southport), Fort Caswell, Company Shops (now Burlington), High Point, Asheville, Danville in Virginia, and other points. Officers of the Commissary and Quartermaster departments moved in and out of the state in desperate straits to collect food and equipment for the rapidly assembling men. Engineers, newly turned from peaceful industries, were preparing plans for fortifying the coasts, and drafts were made for slaves to join the soldiers in carrying out the plans. Inspectors hastened from camp to camp in efforts to see where equipment was needed and to report defects in discipline and organization. Warehouses were built and hospitals improvised. Manufacturing plants were being projected and built. Difficulties of transportation were exceedingly vexatious. The railroads did not have engines and cars in sufficient number to move soldiers and supplies at the same time. So densely were the cars crowded that soldiers frequently had to stand during an entire day's journey. Often the tops of cars were crowded with soldiers. The state had been slow to sever its ties to the Union, but now that invasion of its territory was imminent, its people were throbbing

with excitement, bustling with energy, and overflowing with patriotic ardor. Within three months twenty-four regiments were organized [1] and directed to fields of action.

There was need of haste. Richmond had been, since May 21, 1861, the official home of the new Confederacy. It was threatened by the four armies moving on the strategic lines of invasion already mentioned. The Confederates naturally supposed that these armies would strike towards Richmond in a coincident campaign, and were rushing their raw levies to Virginia as rapidly as the difficulties of arming and transporting them permitted. As fast as the Southern regiments reached Virginia, they were hurried either to General J. E. Johnston's little army in the Valley of Virginia or concentrated around Manassas where General P. T. Beauregard was in command.

Such a combined movement of the Northern armies as the Southerners anticipated seems to have been entirely feasible. There were apparently enough troops available and the strategic position of these troops in June was admirable. General McClellan reports that on July 27, six days after the battle of Manassas, the Army of the Potomac numbered, present for duty, 147,695. From this number he deducted 13,410 as incompletely armed or imperfectly equipped. This would leave the total effective strength of the Army of the Potomac as 134,285. Add to this number the strength of the other three armies then in the field, namely, Butler's forces at Fort Monroe, 11,000, Patterson's in the Valley, and McClellan's recent command in Western Virginia, aggregating together 30,000, and the total strength of the Union army six days after the battle of Manassas, was, according to its commander-in-chief, 175,285 men. [2] It could not have been much

[1] Military Secretary's Report.
[2] *Official Records*, 5, 10.

smaller just before the battle. The total number of Confederate troops then in Virginia could apparently not have exceeded 56,933 [1]—giving a Federal available ratio of over three to one. The disposition of the four Union armies was excellent for a crushing blow.

The Federal troops at Fort Monroe, with its water connection unassailable, were on the line by which Richmond, after four years of blood was captured. A reinforcement of a few thousand men and the assignment of an able leader would have enabled this army to brush Magruder out of its way in a movement on Richmond. McClellan, after a loss of only 80 men, had finished his Western Virginia campaign with the announcement that he had "annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers." [2] His force was, therefore, free to unite with Patterson in the Valley. Such a junction would have thrown an army of 30,000 men in rear of the Confederate armies of Johnston and Beauregard. If, then, the idle troops at Fort Monroe and in Western Virginia could have been pushed towards Richmond coincidently with the movement of a strong force from Washington on Manassas, all under a united command, there seems little doubt that the war would have been practically ended in the thirty days prophesied by many editors and politicians.

Instead of this concerted attack, Butler struggled only with his increasing number of contrabands;

[1] Using the reports and field returns nearest in time, the following seems fairly correct:

Peninsula, Magruder, (*Official Records*, 2, 931)	5,500
Norfolk, Huger, 6 regiments of infantry, 8 companies of cavalry (say)	5,200
Western Virginia, Wise (*Official Records*, 2, 293)	2,705
Western Virginia, Garrett, (*Ibid.*)	4,585
Manassas, Beauregard, (*Ibid.*, 568)	21,863
Winchester, Johnston, (*Ibid.*, 187)	10,654
Fredericksburg, Holmes, (*Ibid.*, 929)	4,600
Detached regiments and artillery unattached	1,826
	56,933

[2] *Ibid.*, 237.

McClellan rested on his laurels, and Patterson allowed Johnston to elude him and join Beauregard at Manassas. The only active movement was made by McDowell from Washington, and he gave battle with 35,000 instead of a crushing force.

At the opening of hostilities General Winfield Scott, the most distinguished soldier of America at that time, was commander-in-chief of the Union armies. When war was assured, his first thought, of course, had been to secure the safety of the national capital by massing all available troops in that city. After the safety of Washington was secured, Scott's second thought was to organize, drill, discipline, and equip an army of longer term men and with this army subdue the South.[1] The aged general, who knew from his experiences in the Mexican War the fighting qualities of Southern soldiers, estimated that it would take 300,000 men and three years of time to subdue the withdrawn states. Not to allow the Confederacy to gain too much headway while he was organizing a central army, Scott had, as already noted, dispatched McClellan to foster Union sentiment in Western Virginia, lodged an army on Virginia's strongest sea defense, started an army under General Patterson to work its way into the Valley of Virginia, and throw a heavy force across the Potomac at Alexandria.

Scott's plan of mobilizing a strong army before marching South, however, was not in harmony with the ideas of the administration. In answer to President Lincoln's first call, 91,816 men[2] had responded for a three months' term of service. "Having got the three months volunteers, they must be made to complete the announced program of putting down the Confederacy. But how? Scott, replying in military terms, declared that there was no answer, that the thing could

[1] Steele, *American Campaigns*, 131.
[2] Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, 3.

not be done at all, that it required 300,000 men and three years at the minimum. The President, retorting in political terms, declared that it must be done by the 75,000 or less men, and within three months from the 15th of April. Scott bowed his head, accepted the impossible . . . and attempted to carry the hopeless burden thus thrust on his aged shoulders." [1] The cry, "On to Richmond!" had been raised by press, pulpit, and people. The administration felt impelled to heed the cry, and orders were issued for an advance on Manassas. [2]

General Scott was too aged and obese to take the field in person, and the command of the army that was to start on the long way to Richmond was conferred on General Irvin McDowell. His field returns for July 16 and 17 show a strength of 35,732. [3] One of the divisions enumerated, Runyon's, was not moved to the front. At Centreville the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment and the Eighth New York Battery quit the field, as their terms of enlistment had expired. He reached Centreville with probably 30,000 men and 55 guns. His batteries were made up of about one-half rifled pieces, and the officers and men were nearly all regulars of the old army. McDowell's force set out on July 16, and reached Centreville on the afternoon of the 18th. There two days of inestimable value to the Confederates were lost by McDowell. In these two days Johnston's army, as will presently be seen, had completed its evasion of Patterson, and, when McDowell again set his army in motion, Jackson's entire brigade and portions of the brigades of Bee and Barlow of Johnston's Valley forces were already on the field of Manassas.

[1] Johnston, *Bull Run*, 18.

[2] "Popular opinion demanded that some bold stroke should be attempted before the three months men were disbanded." Wood and Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States*, 32. "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on July 20." New York *Tribune*, June 26.

[3] *Official Records*, 2, 309.

Around that insignificant hamlet, the only strategic value of which lay in its situation on the two main highways between Washington and Richmond, the Confederates had been for some time assembling their green regiments in anticipation of a Federal advance from Washington. Beauregard had been called from Charleston to head and organize the gathering forces. His total strength on the day the Federals left Alexandria was 22,885. Holmes's brigade of two regiments and a battery did not arrive until the 19th. Beauregard's only hope, then, to contend with his adversaries with anything approximating a parity of numbers was to secure the transferral of Johnston's army from Winchester to Manassas, a distance of 57 miles, in time for the impending battle. In answer to Beauregard's appeal for aid, Johnston telegraphed that if he could escape from Patterson, he would be at Manassas in the hour of need. Johnston was confronted in the Valley of Virginia by a Federal army, under General Robert Patterson, a captain of the War of 1812, and a major-general in the Mexican War. With an army estimated by Steele [1] at 18,000, Patterson made his way into Virginia with infinite caution. He was expected to destroy or "contain" Johnston so that he could not mar McDowell's plans. On the very day, however, that McDowell halted at Centreville, Johnston, in Scott's words, "amused Patterson and set out to reinforce Beauregard." [2]

He accomplished this movement by leaving Stuart's cavalry to mask his withdrawal and hurrying his army to Piedmont. There he entrained his infantry for Manassas. His cavalry and artillery, however, completed the journey over the hot and dusty county

[1] Steele, *American Campaigns*, 131. Patterson's field returns on June 28, (*Official Records*, 2, 187) give 14,344. On July 4 and on July 9, however, he writes the adjutant-general of the arrival of five regiments and one battery. *Ibid.*, 157, 162.

[2] *Ibid.*, 746.

roads. So inadequate was the railroad to transport Johnston's men with facility that only Jackson's brigade and one-half of the brigades of Bee and Bartow arrived in time for the opening of the battle. Some of the others, including Fisher's Sixth North Carolina Regiment, arrived on the field during the battle, and some not until the day after the fierce conflict. It seemed from its position in the line of march that the Sixth North Carolina would be one of the last regiments to be entrained. Colonel Fisher, however, heard that a train had been wrecked and that all troops would be delayed. He sought the senior commanding officer and said, "I am a railroad president. The men of my regiment are largely practical railroad workers. If you will order the Sixth forward to the wreck I think we can soon have trains moving." [1] His offer was accepted, the track repaired, and as a reward for the service Fisher and his men were assigned place on one of the first trains to pass forward. His energy and knowledge were instrumental in securing for his own and other regiments a part in the conflict which cost him his life.

When Johnston's tired and hungry men arrived at Manassas, they found Beauregard's troops stretched out for seven miles along Bull Run Creek. As there was no divisional organization, each of the principal fords along the sluggish stream was guarded by a brigade, the commander of which was responsible only to the commander-in-chief. The banks of the stream formed a fairly good defensive line, but, strange to say, Beauregard, an engineer officer, had erected no defensive works along its banks. Expecting an attack on his right (the original Federal plan) Beauregard was holding the lower fords in strength; the upper ones and Stone Bridge on the Warrenton turnpike only lightly.

[1] Avery in Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 341.

After reconnoitering the ground and after an unfortunate skirmish with Bonham and Longstreet at Blackburn's Ford, the Federal commander decided that a frontal attack on the Confederates would entail too serious a loss. He therefore disposed his brigades to turn the Confederate left. The division of General Miles, with Richardson's brigade and a heavy force of artillery, was left around Centreville to hold the Federal base and to menace the Confederate right wing. General Tyler, with the three brigades of Keyes, Sherman, and Schenck, was ordered to demonstrate in front of the Stone Bridge and divert attention from the flanking movement. Tyler was directed to cross and join in the battle as soon as the main attack swept down the banks of the run to the bridge. The divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman, moving by a circuitous road, well to the Confederate left, were to cross at Sudley's Ford and turn down the run at right angles with Tyler's and Richardson's fronts.

Thus on Sunday, a day beneficently set apart for man's recreation, not barbarous destruction, two "armies vastly greater than had ever before fought on this continent," [1] were ready to spring at each other's throats. To add to the physical distresses of ordinary war—discomforts, sickness, mangling, death—there was the mental stab that the two armies were not naturally or hereditarily antagonistic. The people whom they represented were separated by no racial differences, no immemorial rivalries, no religious intolerances, no desperate need. They were sprung from the same stock, they spoke the same tongue, engaged in the same kinds of business, mingled in the same social relations, rejoiced in the same traditions, gloried in the same history, and differed only in an inherited geographical construction of the Constitution.

[1] Beauregard in *Battles and Leaders*, I, 219.

Nowhere were previous relations more disrupted than among the officers of the regular army. Here, on this July Sabbath, officers who had been classmates at West Point, garrison chums in Northern and Southern towns, tent-sharers in Mexico, fellow-sufferers in Indian campaigns, and whose families were as devoted as they themselves, were unexpectedly directing the engines of death against one another with all the skill and science jointly acquired in times of delightful intimacy. Beauregard and McDowell, the opposing field commanders, were classmates at West Point; Longstreet and Richardson, who on the 18th fought each other at Blackburn's ford, had spent three years together at the Academy, as had Evans and Burnside, whose opposing infantry opened the conflict of the 21st on the Sudley road; Stuart and Howard, who faced each other in the afternoon, were graduated in the same year; Jackson and Bee, who held the Henry plateau with such pertinacity, were confronted by three West Point comrades—Franklin, Willcox, and Sykes. Pemberton and Barry, whose artillery was directed against each other all day, learned to handle guns on the same drill-field together; Cocke and Keyes, whose forces collided near Stone Bridge, sat with each other in the same classrooms for four years—indeed, with few exceptions, the officers of both contesting forces who most distinguished themselves at Manassas had been associated in the ordinarily enduring ties of college or early professional friendships.

The Confederates were awakened about five o'clock on July 21 by the guns of Tyler in his assigned demonstration against Stone Bridge. The Confederate commander at that point, General Nathan G. Evans, unlike Patterson in the Valley, was not readily "amused" by a show of force. Tyler's failure to press home his attack soon convinced Evans that the main blow was to fall elsewhere. A report from his scouts

and a wigwag message, "You are turned," from Captain E. P. Alexander's signal station, confirmed his judgment. It was soon clear that a heavy force was crossing at Sudley's Ford to fall on the undefended left wing of the Confederates. Promptly Evans, without waiting for orders, decided on a step that saved the Confederates from disaster. Leaving a force of four companies at the bridge, he threw his remaining eleven companies and two guns under Lieutenant George S. Davidson of Latham's battery squarely across McDowell's path. With placid courage Evans's South Carolinians and Louisianians and Davidson's two guns met the oncoming of the entire brigade of Burnside, reinforced by Porter and supported by fourteen guns, and for an hour fought them to a standstill. Luckily for Evans the Federal commanders threw their men in by regiments instead of making a combined attack, which, of course, would have brushed him aside. Fortunately for him, too, while the Federal artillery came into action with efficiency, the infantry advance was not made with hearty determination.[1] The hour saved by Evans's stubborn resistance enabled General Bernard Bee, with two of his own regiments and two of Colonel F. S. Bartow's, to reach the battle front and go into action on Evans's right and left. The Federals, too, were strengthened by the arrival of Franklin's and then of Wilcox's brigade. Sherman's and Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division found an unguarded ford, crossed the Run, and marched for Bee's flank. "The roar of the young battle now swelled in volume. There came crashes of musketry which told that whole brigades were coming in, and the fire of the guns increased."[2]

For almost another hour after his arrival Bee, with Evans's men still fighting steadily in his center, main-

[1] Johnston, *Bull Run*, 190; Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 38.
[2] *Ibid.*, 33.

tained his ground. The odds against him then swept him back over Young's Branch. Raw troops had seldom stood to their arms more sturdily. The retreat of Bee and Evans was partly covered by Hampton's South Carolina Legion, which formed on their rear at the Warrenton turnpike. Hampton's organized forces proved a fair target for all the Federal artillery in line, and he lost heavily. His men, however, kept up the struggle as they were pressed back to the Robinson house plateau. Toward that elevation Jackson's brigade had been hurried, and its commander came into battle formation most advantageously on the eastern rim of the plateau on which stood the Robinson and the Henry houses. As the retreating Confederates neared his brigade, Jackson rode his front exclaiming repeatedly, "Steady, men. All's well!" At that moment his brigade of 2,611 men and the severely shaken Legion of Hampton were the only organized bodies barring McDowell's progress. Up to this time success had attended the Federal commander. He had completed his flanking march to Sudley unmolested. Then, though slowly, he had gained enough ground to uncover the upper fords and to make way for Tyler's division to cross. Sherman and Keyes of that division joined him promptly, and Schenck ought to have followed them. McDowell's brigades, however, were not advancing with alacrity and were relying largely on his excellent artillery for gaining ground.

Just as the discomfited regiments of Bee and Evans reached the Robinson house ridge, about 11:30 a.m., Johnston and Beauregard galloped into the fighting. Early in the morning these officers, expecting to take the offensive, had ordered their right brigades on Bull Run to strike the Federal left in advance of Centreville—the very stroke that McDowell dreaded during

his flanking march,[1] and one that must have proved disastrous if it had been vigorously pressed. The two Confederate generals, who were yet unaware of the gravity of the situation on their left, had been waiting on a hill near Mitchell's ford for the expected advance of the brigades lying along the run. Orders, however, had miscarried or been misconstrued, and the stroke that almost accidentally had unlimited possibilities remained undelivered. As a result five Confederate brigades chafed in vain during the morning hours for an opportunity to use their muskets.

When the two Confederate commanders, called by the increasing roar on their left, spurred among the disordered fighters, the Confederate situation was critical. "The blue masses of the Federals, the dust rolling high above them, were already ascending the opposite slopes. The guns flashed fiercely through the yellow cloud; and the Confederate force was but a handful. Three brigades had been summoned from the fords, but the nearest was four miles distant, and many of the troops upon the plateau were already half demoralized by retreat."[2] The activity and personal coolness of Johnston and Beauregard soon restored confidence and presently order. A new line of battle was arranged on Jackson's brigade, which unmoved by the disaster on its flank, stood sturdily behind the batteries[3] of eleven guns. Hampton's Legion, "the mangled remnants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands," with several batteries and the Eighth Virginia Regiment as a reserve, constituted the right.[4] Then came Jackson's five regiments,

[1] "General McDowell left that brigade at Centreville as a reserve at a central point, as he was afraid that while we were operating on the enemy's left, making this long detour to do so, the enemy would pass Blackburn's ford and maneuver up by Centreville on our left flank." Barnard in Committee on Conduct of the War, III, 2, 161.

[2] Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 146.

[3] Imboden's battery was soon withdrawn as its ammunition was exhausted from its earlier combat.

[4] Beauregard's Report.

facing slightly southwest toward the Henry house. Jackson's left regiment, the Thirty-third Virginia under Colonel Cummings, was in a strip of woods a "little to the left and front of the Henry house," [1] and about three or four hundred yards from the Manassas-Sudley road.

As the Federals were advancing on this road in force, there was immediate danger of Jackson's flank being enveloped. Beauregard, who had personal charge of the troops on the field, began, as soon as the right wing was restored, to set the nearest regiments in motion to protect Jackson's exposed flank. Colonel Gartrell, "with the remains of the Seventh Georgia Regiment," was the first regimental commander in sight, and he was posted next to Cummings. [2] Colonel William Smith's Forty-ninth Virginia Regiment (three companies only being present) of Cocke's brigade was assigned place on Gartrell's left, and formed for a brief time the extreme Confederate left. A little later Falkner's Second Mississippi Regiment from the right, and Fisher's Sixth North Carolina, just arrived on the battlefield from Manassas, formed on Smith's flank. [3] These two regiments, it is important to remember, did not prolong the Confederate front in a straight line. The Confederate battle front on the left was swinging westward and the Federal right front eastward.

The formation of this new line was materially aided by a lull in the Federal attack. McDowell's men were crossing Young's branch, and with "flags borne somewhat wearily" advancing in much confusion. This

[1] Cummings in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 34, 368.

[2] Beauregard's Report.

[3] Smith reports how opportunely these regiments relieved his flank. He says: "My left had scarcely opened its fire before a heavy column of the enemy advanced from my left on the crest of the ridge or hill on a line parallel with our line of battle, with every prospect of having my flank turned with difficulty. At this critical time two regiments came up, posted themselves on my left, protected my flank, and opened upon the enemy at a distance of about eighty yards, with admirable effect." *Official Records*, 2, 552.

failure to press the broken Confederates, while unavoidable under the circumstances, gave Beauregard time to complete his alignment. Staff officers were rushed off to hasten the march of Kershaw, Early, Holmes, and Kirby Smith, who were under way to his relief. "Beauregard's task, therefore, was to hold his line of battle until some of these six bodies of reinforcements could reach him. It was his last chance. And to do it he had about 3,000 fresh infantry and about as many more who had been engaged and driven back, and he had about 16 guns, mostly 6-pounders. His great advantage was that he had a fairly good position and was on the defensive." [1]

McDowell, on the other hand, had to capture that hill speedily or his day was lost. Many of his regiments, between the fighting and the fatigue of their long march, were already showing signs of disintegration. He should have had eight brigades for his assault, but four of the eight were now not within reach. Burnside, after his opening effort, pleaded that his men were out of ammunition and practically lay still the rest of the day. Keyes's brigade had followed Sherman across the run, but was diverted by a few well aimed cannon shots and hugged the banks of Bull Run as the battle flared. Schenck remained fixed across the run, and Howard, stopped by an anticipated attack on the Confederate right, did not reach the fighting line until about 3 o'clock.

McDowell, therefore, seeing the need of quick action, essayed the assault with the four brigades of Franklin, Porter, Sherman, and Willcox—in all between ten and eleven thousand men. Indeed "he had little choice but to strike as quickly as he could at the Confederate forces on the Henry house hill, and this he set about doing after a pause made inevitable by the fatigue and disorder of his troops. But the infantry had

[1] Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 26.

already revealed its lack of offensive power, while the disorder of the men made it difficult to handle them. McDowell, therefore, decided to continue the attack by throwing his artillery on the plateau and by edging around the enemy's position towards the right." [1] His batteries of regulars had been showing the effectiveness of training by steady and successful fighting. To their accurate fire he owed most of his gains. His order to them to press ahead of the infantry, Imboden thinks, proved "the fatal blunder of the day." [2]

In compliance with McDowell's order, his two strongest batteries toiled up the wooded slope to go into action near the Henry house. Their commanders, Griffin and Ricketts, both of whom subsequently rose to be major-generals, distrusted the wisdom of the order that sent their pieces ahead of a sluggish infantry line. Griffin, too, had little confidence in the Eleventh New York Regiment (Zouaves) which had been designated as his immediate support. [3] Ricketts's battery consisted of six 10-pound Parrott rifled guns; Griffin's of 4 rifled Parrotts and two 12-pound howitzers. [4] One of Griffin's Parrotts had been fouled and only five of his pieces were taken forward.

When the two batteries reached their designated sites, Griffin—and to understand later events this must be borne in mind—went into battery on the left of Ricketts, [5] and also on the Federal left of the

[1] Johnston, *Bull Run*, 211.

[2] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 234.

[3] In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of War Griffin says: "When I countermarched my pieces . . . and moved up the hill, my last words were, 'These Zouaves will never support us.'" He gave the following reason for his belief: "I do not think that any troops that will go through the country in a disorganized state, thieving and robbing, are brave men." III, 2, 174.

[4] *Official Records*, 2, 345-46. In the tabulation of artillery lost at Manassas (*Ibid.*, 2, 328) Griffin's guns are described as two 10-pound Parrotts; two 6-pounders (old); two howitzers.

[5] "We got on the hill and fired about half an hour, when I moved two of my pieces to the right of Ricketts's battery." Griffin in Committee on Conduct of the War, III, 2, 169.

Henry house.[1] About a half hour later[2] he moved his two howitzers to the right of Ricketts. Two of his guns were temporarily disabled and could not be moved at the time.[3] This change put Griffin nearest to the Sudley road woods.

As these batteries took their exposed position on the crest of the Henry house hill within, says Griffin, 300 yards of the Confederate artillery,[4] the Eleventh New York Fire Zouaves of Willcox's brigade and the Fourteenth New York and a battalion of United States Marines, both of Porter's brigade, followed them as supports. The Zouaves and the marines were drawn up in the rear of the guns. When the Fourteenth New York arrived it was posted in the woods to the right of the guns.[5] The remembrance that this regiment was last seen in these woods led later to a fatal Union mistake. Behind these advanced guns every Federal organization in sight began to converge. Thirteen regiments were soon ranged in a space of less than one mile along the angle formed by

[1] "We found that was not where we had been ordered and we then went up upon a hill and came in battery for the fourth time. That was on the left of the house there. We then came in battery on the right of the house." Testimony of Lieutenant H. B. Reed of Griffin's battery before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 2, 220.

"I do not think there was any order to move the battery around to the right of the little house on the hill." Testimony of Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett of Griffin's battery before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 2, 219.

[2] Griffin, Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 2, 169.

[3] "And then it is my impression that I asked him (Griffin) if we had better not move the whole battery from there, as they had got our range so well. And then we started to move. Lieutenant Kensel and myself stayed back to get away the two guns I spoke of." Hazlett in Committee on Conduct of War, III, 2, 219.

[4] Committee on Conduct of the War, III, 2, 169.

[5] This regiment apparently drew back to the foot of the hill, and was succeeded on Ricketts's right for a time by the First Minnesota. It went forward after the Minnesota and Michigan regiments were routed. *Official Records*, 2, 369.

Colonel Averell says, "The 14th went down into the hollow and there waited." Testimony before Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 2, 216.

the intersection of the Warrenton and Sudley roads.[1] These regiments, however, came panting into the firing zone without brigade cohesion, and, as in the morning battle, they were pitted almost by regiments against the Confederates. The reports of the Federal officers covering this hour in the battle are but the chronicles of regimental failures.[2]

As soon as the two batteries and their accompanying infantry appeared, they were subjected to a hot artillery and musketry fire from Jackson's line. Men and horses began to go down. "The evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled."[3] Two companies of Stuart's cavalry heightened their discomfiture by recklessly charging through them. Heintzelman then "led up" the First Minnesota Regiment to the right of the guns. After that regiment had battled single-handed for a time, the First Michigan, followed after an interval by the Fourteenth New York, was pushed against the Confederate left. On the Federal left, the four regiments of Sherman were in turn assailing the flaming crest. In the center "Franklin, with the Fifth and Eleventh Massachusetts, was doing his best to drive these regiments up to the enemy."[4]

[1] Including the Marines, these were the Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh New York of Porter's brigade; the First Michigan and Eleventh and Thirty-eighth New York of Willcox's brigade; the First Minnesota and Fifth and Eleventh Massachusetts of Franklin's brigade; and the four regiments of Sherman's brigade.

[2] Heintzelman, who was senior officer just around the batteries, reports: "As soon as they (the Fire Zouaves) came up, I led them forward. . . . At the first fire they broke and the greater part fled to the rear. . . . I then led up the Minnesota, which was also repulsed. . . . Next was led forward the First Michigan, which was also repulsed and retired in considerable confusion. The Brooklyn Fourteenth then appeared on the ground, coming forward in gallant style. I led them forward to the left. . . . Soon after the firing commenced, the regiment broke and ran." *Official Records*, 2, 403.

Sherman reports the successive attack and retreat of each of his regiments. *Ibid.*, 369.

[3] Porter in *Ibid.*, 385.

[4] Johnston, *Bull Run*, 222.

When Griffin and Ricketts went into battery on the Henry hill, the Thirty-third Virginia Regiment was in their immediate front. This regiment, which had taken position between twelve and one o'clock [1] was lying concealed in the pines "a little to the (Confederate) left and front of the Henry house." [2] Colonel Cummings states positively that his regiment constituted, at that time, the extreme left of the Confederate battle line. [3]

Cummings, an experienced soldier of the Mexican War, seeing "men dressed in red" [4] about to double up his flank, felt impelled to disregard his instructions, and ordered his regiment to advance. [5] His men, "restless from doing nothing and receiving the enemy's fire without returning it," sprang forward with a will, drove back the threatening flankers, and ran over a section of Ricketts's battery, then the right battery of the Federals [6] and just coming into action. A gamer regiment than the Zouaves—the First Minnesota, uniformed in red shirts—was, however, soon joining its fire to that of the broken Zouaves, and Cummings

[1] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 34, 367.
[2] *Ibid.*, 368.
[3] *Ibid.*, 370.
[4] The "men dressed in red" were no doubt the Eleventh New York (Fire Zouaves). Heintzelman testifies (Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 2, 30) that this was the first Federal regiment ordered forward. Lieutenant A. S. Pendleton of Jackson's staff, in a letter written July 23, 1861, says: "I attached myself to Colonel Cummings's regiment, and, as they charged a battery of rifled cannon, went right into the front. They ran the Fire Zouaves clear off the field. . . . The battery came up on the left of the regiment, supported by the regiment (Ellsworth's) of Fire Zouaves." *Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton*, 151.
[5] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 34, 368.
[6] This statement as to the position of Ricketts's battery at this hour is made after hesitancy, as it is hard to determine exactly when Griffin moved his two guns, but a comparison of all the official documents leads me to this conclusion. The determination of the chronological sequence in this battle is very difficult. Men under fire, as Ricketts says, "never look at their watches." In more modern wars observers fix the time.

was driven back after severe loss.[1] As Cummings was beaten back, the First Minnesota Regiment, which

[1] Losing sight of the time at which the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts were permanently disabled, many writers have ascribed their loss to this charge of Cummings's men. This error makes necessary an examination of (1) the time at which these handsomely served batteries were shot to pieces and (2) the time at which Cummings advanced.

(1) The testimony of the Federal officers before the Committee on the Conduct of the War fixes the hour of their destruction right around three o'clock. Captain Griffin, after describing how the eleven guns then in action were lost through a mistake of the chief of artillery, Major Barry, in taking Confederate for Federal troops, was asked at what time the loss of his guns occurred. He answered, "About three o'clock, earlier or later—later if anything" (p. 170). Captain Ricketts, commander of the other battery, testified that he continued to operate his guns "somewhere between a half hour and an hour" after reaching the summit of the hill (p. 243). Major Barry who was in charge of both batteries, although saying that he did not look at his watch all day, gave it as his opinion that the Zouaves and the Fourteenth New York, the regiments first called to accompany the batteries, were ordered in support about half past two o'clock (p. 143) and that the destructive Confederate fire was poured on them about "twenty minutes or a half hour" after that order. General Willcox, brigade commander of the Zouaves, officially reports that he left Sudley Springs with the Zouaves and the Thirty-eighth New York at one o'clock; that he then marched two miles to the Warrenton road formed the Thirty-eighth in line of battle; moved the Zouaves another quarter of a mile to join Ricketts near the Dogan house; then followed Ricketts to the Henry hill. (*Official Records*, 2, 408.) Evidently, therefore, the Zouaves, arriving on the plateau almost coincidently with Ricketts, and arriving after a twice interrupted march of 2¼ miles, could not have gotten into action much sooner than Barry states. Captain Averell, of Porter's staff, testifies that "just at the time the batteries were lost" General Johnston's forces came on the field. This was about three o'clock. General Heintzelman reports: "In consequence of the wounding and capture of Captain Ricketts, I have no report of his battery. His First Lieutenant, Douglas Ramsay, I saw later in the day, doing his duty faithfully and well. A few minutes later he was shot dead, and soon after we lost the battery." *Ibid.*, 410.

(2) At what hour did Cummings advance? Fortunately, Cummings helps to determine the time. He says in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* (34, 370): "There are two things, however, about which there can be no doubt—one that the Thirty-third, being at the time on the extreme left of our army, charged alone and took the enemy's battery or section thereof on our left." If Cummings is correct in his statement—and there is no reason to doubt his accuracy—that his regiment was the extreme left of the Confederate line at the time of his advance, his men could not have demolished the batteries in this charge; for, when the batteries were dismantled at three o'clock, there were at least four Confederate regiments on Cummings's left. Of these the Seventh Georgia was posted by Beauregard just as General Johnston left for the Lewis house.(*a*) This hour is uncertain. The second regiment to prolong the line was Colonel William Smith's Forty-ninth Virginia Regiment. Colonel Smith reports that he moved for his station on the Confederate right at 1:30 p.m.(*b*) and came in line "in front of Ricketts's battery, which had just taken position."(*c*) As the distance was short and Smith says he moved promptly, he could hardly have failed to be in position by 2:15 p.m. The accuracy of this is confirmed by Smith's report that the Sixth North Carolina and Second Mississippi appeared on his flank just after he aligned his men. General Johnston states that the Sixth North Carolina reached the field at 2:30 p.m.(*d*) Hence, Cummings's charge must have been made before 2:30, at which hour all these regiments were on his left, and the batteries were firing until after or about three.

had been firing heavily as it climbed the crest, formed line of battle, says Colonel Gorman, with "our right resting within a few feet of the woods and the left at and around Ricketts's battery." [1] This regiment, uniformed in red shirts, and stationed, as its colonel says, on the immediate right of the batteries, with such of the Zouaves as could be rallied below the crest on its left, [2] was facing not only Jackson's brigade but the newly extended Confederate left. This, as already noted, was now composed of four regiments in the first line. Of these Beauregard had personally posted Gartrell's Seventh Georgia on Cummings's left, and he, too, conducted Smith's Forty-ninth Virginia almost to its position. The Mississippians and North Carolinians, however, after an order to get into the fighting on the left, had been compelled by a scarcity of staff officers to seek their own places. The Mississippians, Stuart reports, came into position just after his cavalry charge, [3] and, therefore, almost coincident with Cummings's attack. The North Carolinians, marching without guidance from the Lewis house, passed behind the line of the Mississippians and up a sheltering wooded ravine. The density of the woods concealed the approach of both the Mississippians and the North Carolinians, and Colonel Smith declares that "the enemy nearly covered their fronts without seeming to have discovered them." [4]

As Fisher's men emerged from the woods on the left of the Mississippians and as the companies without orders swung into battle formation, they found themselves, as Shotwell says, by "sheer accident precisely

a Beauregard's Report.
b Official Records, 2, 552.
c Southern Historical Society Papers, 10, 438. The battery which Smith saw just taking position was no doubt Griffin's two guns moving into their new position, for as it afterwards turned out, these two guns were howitzers, and Ricketts had only rifled Parrotts.
d Johnston's Narrative, 51.
[1] *Official Records*, 107, 21.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, 2, 483.
[4] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 439.

in the right position" to do damage. Their front, owing to the western inclination of the Confederate and the eastward warp of the Federal line, was almost at right angles to both lines. [1] On account of the curves in the two lines they, as left regiment, were nearest the Federals and within close range of Griffin's two guns which had just been moved into their new position on the Federal right.

Inasmuch as the three Confederate regiments on the left had advanced to the edge of the woods under excellent cover and the Federals had deployed over a crest, the two combatants on coming into battle lines were so unexpectedly near to each other that each was dubious about the identity of the other, and for a few moments hesitated to fire. [2] Moreover, the left of the Confederates had come from a wood into which the officers of the batteries had seen the Fourteenth New York disappear. To still further add to the uncertainty, many regiments in the two armies were at this time similarly uniformed. [3]

[1] Captain York's address in *Brief Sketches of North Carolina Troops*, 166.

[2] On the Federal side Colonel Gorman of the Minnesota Regiment says: "Immediately on Ricketts's battery coming into position and we into line, Colonel Heintzelman rode up between our lines and that of the enemy, within pistol shot of each, which circumstance staggered my judgment whether those in front were friends or enemies, it being equally manifest that the enemy were in the same dilemma as to our identity. *Official Records*, 107, 21. Colonel Franklin adds, "The First Minnesota Regiment moved from its position on the left of the field to the support of Ricketts's battery, and gallantly engaged the enemy at that point. It was so near the enemy's lines that friends and foes were for a time confounded." *Ibid.*, 2, 406.

Colonel Smith, of the Forty-ninth Virginia, expresses the same doubt on the Confederate side. He says: "Being on my extreme left, one of the North Carolinians, recognizing me, called to me from his ranks: 'That is the enemy; shall we fire?' I replied: 'Don't be in a hurry; don't fire upon friends.' At that instant a puff of wind spread out the Federal flag, and I added, 'There is no mistake; give them h——l, boys!' thus giving orders most strangely to a regiment which was not under my command to begin the fight." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 439.

[3] "There was as yet no system of uniforming troops. In fact, regiments and different companies of the same regiment followed their own fancies in many instances in the matter of uniforms. This perhaps was more especially so among the Confederates. But on the Union side there were all sorts of costumes from the plain United States style of the regulars to the gaudy, but not neat, outfit of the Zouaves, and the striking and stylish dress of the Brooklyn Fourteenth. The colors ran through the several shades in red, blue, and gray, and for headgear, hats and caps were worn indifferently, and of every pattern and material." Gates, *The Ulster Guard*, 131.

Under these uncertainties Major Barry, chief of the Federal artillery, restrained Griffin, who was turning his pieces to meet what he took to be a Confederate onset, from firing. While Barry and the left of the Minnesota regiment were still in this state of uncertainty, the sight of the batteries and the waving of a regimental flag undeceived the Confederates. The three regiments poured a destructive fire on the batteries and on the center and left of the Minnesota regiment and on such of the Zouaves and Marines as remained. The first fire, says Colonel Gorman, "was followed by volley after volley in regular and irregular order as to time, until Ricketts's battery was disabled and cut to pieces and a large portion of its officers and men had fallen, and until companies, H, I, K, C, and G, and those immediately surrounding my regimental flag were so desperately cut to pieces as to make it more of a slaughter than an equal combat." [1]

The North Carolinians were, on account of their position, nearest to the Federals and just to the right front of two howitzers which Griffin says had been in this position only about five minutes. [2] The fire of the North Carolinians, "a strong regiment of 634 bayonets" [3] and clearly visible, was so disastrous at the close range that Griffin and Barry naturally attributed to one regiment the destruction wrought by all. [4] Ricketts rather emphatically disclaims that he mistook

[1] *Official Records*, 107, 21.
[2] Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 169.
[3] Johnston, *Bull Run*, 208.
[4] In the testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Captain Griffin answered in this way the questions of the Committee about the force that shot to pieces his remaining guns: Question. I do not suppose that you know certainly, but do you suppose now that that could have been one of Johnston's regiments—part of Johnston's reserves? Answer. From what I have learned since it was a North Carolina regiment. Question. Are they supposed to have been in Johnston's reserves? Answer. My impression is that that regiment was in Johnston's force. III, 2, 172. Major Barry testified (*Ibid.*, 146): "There were a great many men killed and wounded and a large number of horses knocked over by that single discharge of that one regiment, which was to our front and right—not really in front. It came out of this piece of woods."

any Confederate for Federal forces, but ascribes his disaster to the general fire of the Confederate line from the first setting up of his pieces.[1] Following their fire with a charge, the Confederate regiments rushed up to the dismantled guns[2]—the North Carolinians overrunning Griffin's two howitzers, which were on their immediate front.[3] After a pause at the guns, the Confederates were about to resume fire at the Federal right when a cry went up that the men in the woods were friends. While the Confederates, now in turn bewildered by uncertainty of location, hesitated, a blinding volley delivered by the Minne-

[1] Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 245. The division commanders, Heintzelman, who was on the spot, and Porter, who was near by, recount as follows: Heintzelman says of Ricketts's battery, "Here it was exposed to a heavy fire of musketry, which soon desolated the battery." *Official Records*, 2, 402. Porter says: "Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries were ordered by the commanding general to the top of the hill on our right . . . but so soon as they were in position and before the flanking supports had reached theirs, a murderous fire of musketry and rifles, opened at pistol range, cut down every cannoneer and a large number of horses. The fire came from some infantry of the enemy which had been mistaken for our own forces." *Ibid.*, 385.

[2] "We saw distinctly three sets of colors—stars and bars—at the guns," writes General William Calvill, then a captain in the Minnesota Regiment. *Minnesota in the War*, 10. Antecedent to this he writes: "There was in fact, coming down the wood to meet us, . . . a brigade of the enemy, which on discovering the batteries had pushed the Fourth Alabama to our front to cover that flank, and formed the other three regiments in close column and advanced on the guns. Their advance from the woods was deliberate and quiet, and though perceived from the batteries, they were senselessly held by Griffin and Major Barry, the Chief of Artillery, as friends; and so coming close up, our regiment withholding its fire on account of the Griffin-Barry statement, delivered the first volley which took effect in the center of our regiment as well as the batteries." *Ibid.*, 9.

[3] As Colonel Fisher was killed in this battle, evidence other than an official report of the Sixth Regiment's part in the struggle will have to be cited. Major R. F. Webb, afterwards colonel of the regiment, wrote in a letter to Colonel S. D. Pool: "We soon came to an opening with hills in our front and woods on our left. . . . When the right had reached the crest we heard musketry firing. The only order I heard was to double-quick. I leaned upon the wheel of one of the captured guns and young Mangum was kneeling near the trail when he was struck." Two days after the battle Captain James A. Craige of the Rowan Company wrote to his mother: "We arrived on the battlefield from Winchester about 1 o'clock [arrival at the Lewis house]. We remained in action about an hour against tremendous odds—the enemy firing into us from two directions, front and flank. We finally repulsed them and took the battery with the loss to the regiment of 23 killed and 46 wounded. Our colonel fell gallantly leading his men." Captain John A. Ramsay wrote: "He (Fisher) dismounting from his horse, divested himself of his watch, sword, and coat, and swinging a carbine across his shoulder, called to his men to follow him, which they did with great enthusiasm. They descended a little slope, crossed a branch, and started up the hill to the

sotians and other approaching regiments swept through the North Carolina ranks. The men, under fire yet forbidden to return it, quickly drew back into the woods, but not before Colonel Fisher and 23 of them were killed and 50 wounded. [1]

scene of conflict; . . . but onward they went and arrived at the crisis of the afternoon, and poured a destructive volley upon the batteries of Sherman and Ricketts, killing many of the men and most of the horses." Colonel Thomas L. Clingman, afterwards brigadier-general, volunteer aide to General Beauregard on the field, says: "Colonel Fisher at the head of his regiment passed just inside the wood, below the crest of the ridge, along ground that was rising a little. Thus he did not see the battery until he with some companions had rather passed it. Captain Isaac Avery's company was just opposite the battery. Finding themselves in this dangerous proximity, his company and others near them fired suddenly into the battery, only 60 yards distant. This fire killed most of the cannoneers, as well as their horses." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 5, 31. Lieutenant B. F. White, using his diary as a basis for his narrative, says: "About this time the charge was made on the battery. On reaching the battery I found all the horses killed. The two guns, 40-pounder brass howitzers, were unlimbered, but not trained upon our regiment." Lieutenant A. C. Avery, afterwards a justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, says: "The soldiers delivered a well aimed and fearfully destructive fire into the line of the enemy's infantry, but especially into the artillerists. After firing a number of rounds, every soldier loading and firing at will, the enemy's guns were silenced. . . . When we reached Ricketts's (*a*) guns we found every horse killed and the ground covered with the bodies of the dead and wounded artillerists, and of the Brooklyn Zouaves, who were distinguished by their loose red pants. The writer distinctly recalls the fact that he saw upon the hill after the charge Major Webb, Lieutenant (afterwards Captain) White, Captain Avery and his lieutenants, Burns and McPherson, Captain Craige, Lieutenants Smith and Roseboro, Captain Parrish, Lieutenant Lockhart, and more distinctly his old college friend, Lieutenant Willie P. Mangum, who about five minutes later received a wound which proved fatal. . . . The fact is recalled that Lieutenant Mangum, whose company (B) was next in line to his (E), remarked to the writer that he was tired, and sat down beside or under the shadow of one of the deserted guns." *Ibid.*, 1, 344-45.

a It will be noted that in these accounts, which were written before the official reports revealed what organizations were present, the two batteries are referred to as Sherman's or as Ricketts's. As already pointed out, Ricketts had no howitzers, and the two howitzers referred to by Judge Avery and Captain White were Griffin's. They were only 10-pounders, but no doubt to a man charging them at close quarters their muzzles looked large.

[1] "At this juncture a number of the officers ordered the men to cease firing, telling them that they were firing on their friends, and called to the soldiers in the woods to cease firing, but the firing became heavier, and when no longer allowed to return it, the soldiers of the Sixth fell back and reformed in the open field from which Colonel Fisher had led them into the ravine." *Avery's Narrative.*

"The men of our regiment (First Minnesota), at the center and on the left, dropped on the slope and returned the fire, and we on the right engaged in front, now for the first time discovering the enemy, turned our fire on his left rear at close range. But they pushed over the batteries pretty well jammed up and finally faced about toward us, and we expected their volley. Instead came a frantic waving of arms and fearful yells, of which we could not distinguish the words because of our fire, which was kept up until the enemy faced to the rear." *General Calvill's Narrative*, 10.

These troops fell back [1] just as General Beauregard gave the order for "the right of his line, except the reserves, to advance to recover the plateau." Jackson's left regiments, with Bee's Alabamians, Georgians, and South Carolinians, pushed over the disabled guns, and the open space of the plateau was regained by the Confederates.

McDowell at once set his face to regain his guns and the strong hill. "Before the loss of his artillery he was the Samson of the field; now he was not only shorn of his power, but some of his mighty strength was transferred to his adversaries." [2] His efforts to regain his pieces caused the battle lines to surge backwards and forwards across the plateau for about an hour. On the left Sherman's four strong regiments reeled back one after another under the deadly fire. In the center Franklin once or twice got his two Massachusetts regiments up to the coveted guns, but they would not stay to draw them back. On the right Heintzelman had "used up his regiments one by one in an unavailing effort" to find permanent lodging on that storm swept plateau. McDowell began to feel that victory was doubtful. Howard's fresh brigade was summoned from the reserve to stiffen the Federal contention, and it panted across the Warrenton turnpike a little after 3 o'clock. While Federal officers strove bravely to rally broken regiments to brace his charge, Howard drove straight at the hill "where the disabled guns fatally drew every effort."

[1] Although falling back under this misapprehension, the Sixth Regiment did not, as Colonel Smith says (*Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 43), "incontinently leave the field." On the other hand, as soon as the regiment was reformed in the woods, it joined in the general advance with Elzey's brigade about 3:30, followed the retreating Federals, and bivouacked in the field. Of the regiments engaged only in the afternoon fighting, its losses were by far the most severe. These were as follows: 6th North Carolina, 73; 2d South Carolina, 48; 7th Virginia, 47; 49th Virginia, 40; 8th South Carolina, 28; 7th Louisiana, 26; 18th Virginia, 19; 10th Virginia, 9; 13th Mississippi, 6; 1st Maryland, 6; 3d Tennessee, 4.

[2] Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 51.

At this time the Confederate lines were dangerously shaken. Although Jackson's right regiments as yet were not much damaged, his two left regiments (Cummings's and Allen's) had been severely punished. Bee's and Bartow's demi-brigades, pelted since morning, were worn to attenuation. Hampton's Legion was roughly mangled. The Sixth North Carolina, its colonel dead, was for the time nursing its wounds. Smith with his small Forty-ninth Virginia was pertinaciously gathering strength for another blow. The Confederate leaders, too, were paying with their lives for their exposure. Bee, Bartow, Fisher, Thomas, Jones, were already fatally stricken. Hampton and Gardner were borne wounded from the field. Jackson was slightly wounded.

In spite, however, of this opportune time for a vigorous Federal attack on the Confederate troops already engaged, Howard came too late to sway the fortune of the battle. The Confederate reinforcements ordered up were coming into action Cash and Kershaw were pressing in on Howard's flank, and Stuart was settling Beckham's battery into a dangerous enfilade position. Cocke's regiments from the Bull Run fords began to take a turn in the fighting. Kirby Smith's brigade under Elzey, just arrived from Manassas, was bringing in 1900 fresh bayonets, and Early's three regiments had found the extreme right flank of the Federals. As these fresh troops rushed largely on the Federal flank, General Beauregard ordered a front attack by his entire line. The Federals gave way before the general onslaught, and an apparent victory was turned into a most decisive defeat. The condition of the Federal army at this hour, between 3:45 and 4:30 p.m., is thus described by General Porter, one of its brigade commanders: "Soon the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces, whilst riderless horses and

artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. All further efforts were futile; the words, gestures, and threats of officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind and longed only for absence of body." [1]

"There was no panic, in the ordinary sense and meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, guns, wagons, Congressmen and carriages, were fired upon on the road east of Bull Run." [2] The Federals, not knowing the country, retreated on the circuitous routes along which they had approached the field. Hence, as in the morning, McDowell's men were stretched out for miles, and this time after passing Cub Run in a state of panic—a panic so appalling that General Sherman, a participant in it, says: "I had read of panics before, have seen the noise and confusion of crowds of men at fires and shipwrecks, but nothing like this. It was as disgraceful as words can portray." [3] The panic was simply the loss by a big organization of its cohesion, which in the case of disciplined soldiers is the knowledge that safety lies in the maintenance, not disruption, of the organization—a knowledge slowly acquired by raw volunteers.

After the rout of the main army the handling of the Federal reserves at Centreville blunderingly opened opportunity for further disaster. Tyler did nothing to cover the Warrenton turnpike. Richardson and Davies were withdrawn from the front of Blackburn's Ford, where the Confederate brigades of Bonham and Longstreet lay. From Stone Bridge to Centreville the confusion grew as converging masses pressed excitedly for Washington.

With the Federals thus demoralized, a vigorous Confederate pursuit in force would apparently have

[1] *Official Records*,2, 385.
[2] General Sry in *Battles and Leaders*, I, 191.
[3] Sherman, *Home Le ters*, 299.

wrought havoc. Every effort at pursuit in force seemed destined to go awry. The Confederate cavalry, perhaps, did as much as its numbers would permit, but before night was so cluttered with prisoners as to hamper its power. Kershaw, with two regiments and Beckham's battery, was early across Bull Run at the Stone Bridge. Elzey's brigade, which had suffered little, had followed Kershaw to the bridge, and his men were well in hand. The brigades of Ewell and Holmes had now reached Confederate headquarters and were eager to have a hand in the day's success. All these troops were, however, held back from pursuit by a senseless rumor that a heavy Federal force was about to fall on the Confederate right wing.

At Blackburn's ford, Longstreet with four fresh regiments and Barham with three were ordered to cross and drive at Centreville. This was just at the time at which Miles invited disaster by withdrawing from the ford the brigades of Davies and Richardson. Barham claimed the command of the two advancing brigades, but after a hesitating forward movement, returned with nothing but a rare opportunity wasted. If either Generals Johnston or Beauregard had gone to the Stone Bridge and personally directed the fighting with even an approach to the pertinacity shown on the Henry hill, the disaster to McDowell's forces would, it seems, have been appallingly augmented. "Never," comments General E. P. Alexander, "did an enemy make a cleaner escape out of such an exposed position after such an utter rout."

The official reports of casualties on both sides are in the light of the individual official reports too low, but the variation is not very great. The official tables are as follows:

For the Confederates,[1] killed 387, wounded 1,582, missing 13—total 1,982.

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 327.

For the Federals,[1] killed 481, wounded 1,011, missing 1,216—total 2,708

The war material taken in the field was, of course, of immense value to the Confederates, who were always in want of such supplies. The captures included 17 rifled and 10 smoothbore cannon with 27,000 rounds of artillery ammunition; 41,000 muskets, with 4,500 sets of accoutrements and 500,000 rounds of ammunition; 37 caissons; 4 battery-wagons; 64 artillery horses with harness; a varied assortment of quartermaster stores, consisting among other things of 1,650 cooking utensils, 2,700 mess utensils, clothes, blankets, tools, etc.[2]

This five-day incursion into their territory gave to the Southern people a foretaste of the suffering that was to result from a four year invasion. In a highly rhetorical proclamation issued by General Beauregard a short time before the battle, he naturally gave great offense to the North by saying of the conduct of the Federal troops: "All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is Beauty and Booty."[3] This characterization from a foe was, however, no more severe than was General W. T. Sherman's delineation after the battle of the conduct of his troops on their way to Manassas. He says:

> Each private thinks for himself. If he wants to go for water, he asks leave of no one. If he thinks right, he takes the oats and corn and even burns the house of his enemy. . . . No curse could be greater than invasion by a volunteer army. No Goths or Vandals ever had less respect for the lives and property of friends and foes, and henceforth we ought never to hope for any friends in Virginia.[4]

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[1] *Official Records*, 2, 570.
[2] *Ibid.*, 328 (But add two howitzers of the Seventy-first New York); also 571.
[3] *Ibid.*, 907.
[4] Sherman, *Home Letters*, 209.

One of the mooted questions ever since this battle has been, could the Confederates by a concentrated pursuit on the night of the battle and by continuous pressure on the next day, have captured Washington? Sherman, who shared in the rout, thought so. On July 28 he wrote, "Beauregard has committed a sad mistake in not pursuing us promptly. Had he done so, he could have stampeded us again, and gone into Washington." [1]

Edwin M. Stanton, later secretary of war, who saw conditions inside of Washington, concurred in this opinion. He wrote to Ex-President Buchanan on July 26: "The dreadful disaster of Sunday can scarcely be mentioned. The imbecility of this administration culminated in that catastrophe. . . . The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable; during Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without any resistance." [2]

General McClellan, who arrived in Washington to take command of the Union army on July 26, was of the same opinion He thus describes conditions when he took over the command:

> I found no preparations whatever for defense, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military positions. Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels, and bar-rooms were filled with drunken officers and men absent from their regiments without leave—a perfect pandemonium. Many had even gone to their homes, their flight from Bull Run often terminating in New York, or even New Hampshire and Maine. There was really nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city. . . . If the secessionists attached any value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the Bull Run victory. [3]

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[1] Sherman, *Home Letters*, 210.
[2] *McClellan's Own Story*, 67.
[3] *Ibid.*, 66.

These opinions of the defenseless condition of the city, it should be remarked, were not shared by all the Federal officers. Secretary Cameron telegraphed a New York committee on July 22: "We are making most vigorous efforts to concentrate a large and irresistible army at this point. Regiments are arriving, and many have left for the capital. Our works on the south bank of the Potomac are impregnablel being well manned with reinforcements. The capita, is safe." [1] General Mansfield, in charge of the Washington defenses, assures General Scott on July 23, that "we are amply able to whip the enemy if he will give us a chance here." [2]

Ropes, after a judicial examination of the contending views, concludes that, "Decisive as was the victory of Manassas which was the name given to the field by the conquerors, it is not likely that they could have advanced on Washington with success. The Federal divisions of Runyon and Miles and the brigade of Richardson—not to mention other troops—were in perfectly good condition, and probably could not have been driven out of the works which commanded more or less completely the approaches to the city." [3] Colonel Henderson, the English military critic, on the contrary, is confident that "it was not a long supply train that was lacking, nor an experienced staff, nor even well-disciplined battalions; but a general who grasped the full meaning of victory, who understood how a defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields at a touch and who above all saw the necessity of giving the North no leisure to develop her enormous resources." [4]

General Joseph E. Johnston the Confederate commander-in-chief, was never convinced that he erred

[1] *Official Records*, 2, 756.
[2] *Ibid.*, 757.
[3] Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War*, I, 161.
[4] Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 154.

in not throwing his raw troops on Washington. Writing in 1874 he says: "I have never doubted the correctness of my course on that occasion";[1] writing again of the battle in 1887 he was still confident that his decision then was not erroneous. He based the wisdom of his conclusion on his knowledge of the condition of his army at the close of the day, of the unfitness of raw troops for marching or assailing intrenchments, of the want of supplies, ammunition, and transportation, of the strong and well-manned fortifications around the city, and of the exposure of the wooden bridges across the mile-wide Potomac to the fire of Federal gunboats.[2] The controversy cannot better be dismissed than by concluding with President Davis, "What discoveries would have been made and what results would have ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter."[3]

North Carolina had fewer troops at Manassas than in any of the other great battles in Virginia. The Fifth, the Sixth, and the Eleventh (afterwards the Twenty-first) were the state's representatives.

The Fifth Regiment was organized as one of the ten regiments of state troops, as they were called to distinguish them from the short term volunteers. It was formed at its training camp in Halifax in July, and almost immediately thereafter was forwarded to Manassas. It reached the junction on July 19 and was assigned to Longstreet's brigade. During the battle of the 21st it was not actively engaged, but was subjected to a shell fire in which it lost four men.[4] Its field officers were Duncan K. MacRae, colonel;

[1] *Johnston's Narrative*, 62.
[2] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 252.
[3] Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 361.
[4] These were: James Manning, killed; Corporal Blake H. Wiggins and Privates Wiley, Garner, and Richardson wounded.

Joseph P. Jones, lieutenant-colonel; John C. Badham, major. Owing to Colonel MacRae's sickness, the regiment was commanded at Manassas by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones.

The Sixth Regiment, the service of which has already been told, was organized largely through the efforts of Charles F. Fisher, who at the opening of the war was president of the North Carolina Railroad. A large per cent of its members were railroad men who followed their president into service. The men were first assembled at Charlotte in the rooms vacated by the cadets of the North Carolina Military Institute. Most of the cadets had gone to Raleigh for duty with their superintendent, then Major D. H. Hill. Some of the cadets remaining became drill-masters and officers in the regiment. As the size of the regiment grew, the men were removed to more commodious quarters at Company Shops (now Burlington). Many of the expenses of organization and equipment were borne personally by President Fisher. When the election of field officers took place, Fisher was selected colonel, W. T. Dortch as lieutenant-colonel, and C. E. Lightfoot as major. Mr. Dortch resigned on becoming speaker of the House of Representatives. Thereupon Lightfoot was promoted to be lieutenant-colonel and R. F. Webb, major.

On reaching Richmond the regiment, after being reviewed by President Davis, was assigned to Bee's Brigade at Winchester. After a stay of only two days at Winchester, the regiment accompanied Johnston's army to Manassas. After the death of the gallant and accomplished Fisher, Colonel W. D. Pender was assigned to the command.

The Eleventh Regiment, which subsequently had its number changed to the Twenty-first, was organized at Danville, Virginia. At its original organization the men elected W. W. Kirkland, colonel, J. M. Leach,

lieutenant-colonel, and J. M. Richardson, major. The regiment left Danville July 15, and arrived at Manassas on the morning of July 18. On its arrival it was moved at double-time to Barham's brigade at Mitchell's ford. Although under fire on the morning of July 21, the regiment was not called into actual strife.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING AFTER MANASSAS

The stubbornness of the contest at Manassas, where first on a field of magnitude "the blood-red flower of war was brought to bloom," convinced even the most sanguine peace advocates in the North and in the South that carnage was now to become the chief occupation of the American people. Hitherto many on each side had talked rather lightly of war. Thousands were still believing that somehow deadly strife would be averted. Other thousands were confident that if war did come, their army would quickly crush its opponent.[1] The fierceness of the conflict on that sultry Sabbath, the 861 dead Americans, and the 2,576 wounded crying for water along the crooked Bull Run, dispelled all these illusions. The "irrepressible conflict," the beginnings of which were felt in 1789, was at last to be settled in blood.

To the North the panic-striken flight of its army to Washington was astonishing and humiliating, but the disaster served to harden resolution and quicken immensity of preparation. In this preparatory work the advantages derived from an established government at once became apparent. Its organized departments functioned with a skill that can be acquired only through experience. Its financial credit was unimpeachable. Its customs duties yielded a large income. It had consular agents in every considerable foreign

[1] How prevalent was the belief that the war was to be brief is shown by the records of two opposing regiments at Manassas. The historian of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment records that young officers of his regiment often expressed to Colonel Fisher their fears that the war would be over before they could show their prowess. Todd, in his *History of the New York Highlanders*, says of the march to Manassas: "We did not believe that the enemy would seriously retard our progress, and the campaign was looked upon more in the nature of a pleasant excursion, with just that amount of danger which seemed to make it interesting, than a military advance against an enemy. We were soon to be undeceived, however." p. 21.

port to quote prices, to collect information about commodities, and to mould sentiment. Its merchant ships were so protected by a competently commanded navy that its agents could buy without danger or delay in the markets of the world. Its small standing army furnished enough officers and drill-masters to set standards for the volunteers. To these governmental advantages must be added those resulting from the North's far greater population and wealth, from diversified manufactures with skilled artisans, from transportation systems reaching in many directions, and from access to every sort of raw material.

All these advantages were now turned to account in an endeavor to make, as President Lincoln urged, "this contest a short and decisive one." [1] On the day after McDowell's defeated soldiers dismayed Washington by crowding its streets in abject demoralization, Congress approved a bill already introduced to accept 500,000 volunteers. [2] In the remaining fourteen days of the special session statutes were adopted to increase the regular army by eleven regiments; to add to the number of men in the navy, the engineering, the marine, and medical corps; to appropriate $13,786,439.82 to repair the vessels of the navy and to complete vessels already under contract and for ordnance stores for them; to expend three million dollars for the acquisition by "hire, purchase or contract" of such additional vessels as were needed and to man, arm, and equip them; to design and contract for armored vessels; to buy arms to the amount of twenty millions of dollars; to encourage, arm and support in seceded states such companies or regiments as might volunteer for the Federal armies. In all, this session of Congress, sitting only from July 4 to August 6, voted for war expenditures, exclusive of

[1] Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.
[2] United States Statutes at Large, July 22, 1861.

clerical and executive services in the various departments, the total sum of $244,776,740.09.[1]

To raise this enormous sum, Congress authorized loans to the extent of $250,000,000; levied a direct tax of $20,000,000 on the states and territories; ordered an income tax of three per centum on all incomes over $800; and increased tariff duties with a view to bringing in $22,500,000 additional customs money.

Congress, in the midst of these financial considerations, found time for two political measures. To curb the radicals in all sections and at the same time to conciliate the border states, the Crittenden-Johnson resolution of July 22 was adopted with almost no dissent. This resolution declared "that this war is not waged on our part in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of these states, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and the rights of the several states unimpaired, and that as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war should end."[2] The other was adopted on the last day of the session and provided for the confiscation of all slaves who were required "to work or to be employed in or upon any fort, navy yard, dock, armory, ship, entrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever."[3]

To President Lincoln's calls for troops there was an immediate response. The army and the people "took up, a shade less buoyantly, but with deeper energy the determined prosecution of the war. . . . The war governors tendered more troops and hurried forward their equipped regiments; the administration pushed the organization of the long-term volunteers;

[1] United States Statutes at Large, July 4 to August 6.
[2] *Globe*, 37th Cong., 1 Sess., 56, 222.
[3] United States Statutes at Large, August 6, 1861.

and out of the scattered debris of the Bull Run forces there sprang that magnificent Army of the Potomac." [1] So rapid was the mobilization that Victor says: "Regiments seemed to spring from the ground. The tireless engine rushed from the North and the West with the burden of human freight seeking the ranks at the point of danger." [2]

Ropes thus contrasts the two armies at this period:

> Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than 110 regiments and thirty batteries were added to the forces in Washington and its neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the immense resources at the disposal of the United States government, that there was every reason to expect in the spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities on the part of the soldiers. The (Confederate) army, at Manassas, on the other hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate government, was barely comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter, as certain to reduce perceptibly the health and the spirits of the men, and even to relax the bands of discipline, and to render the army in every way less efficient. It was easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have learned "the trade of the soldier,"—should have acquired familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust in their officers and superiors, discipline—the Federal general would enter on the next campaign with all those chances of success which attend superior numbers, better armies and equipment, and a sound and thorough organization of his army. [3]

President Lincoln summoned General George B. McClellan from West Virginia on the day after the battle of Manassas to take command of the troops at Washington. If the President had been seeking

[1] Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, 4, 367.
[2] *The Southern Rebellion*, II, 432.
[3] Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War*, I, 167.

merely a popular appointment, his choice could not have won more general approval. Although only thirty-five years old, McClellan had so far distinguished himself more than any of his fellow commanders. "At the time of his appointment to command the troops at Washington, the eyes of the whole country were centered on him. He was the only Union general that had as yet scored complete success." [1] For the development of his native ability McClellan had enjoyed opportunities superior to those that had fallen to the lot of most of the inexperienced commanders of his day. He was graduated with second rank in the West Point class of 1846—a class that furnished nine major-generals to the Federal army, and five general officers to the Confederates. He had served with distinction as an engineer in Scott's Mexican army, and was brevetted first lieutenant for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and captain for daring at Chapultepec. He was a member of a commission of officers, selected on merit, to study military operations in Europe during the Crimean War in 1855. By a singular trick of fate, the elaborate instructions given to the commission—instructions directing a study of the organization of European armies, their systems of transportation, hospitals, sanitation, arms, artillery, ammunition, and other essentials—were written by the man against whose administration he was afterwards to turn the information acquired under his order, for Jefferson Davis was then secretary of war, and he selected and instructed the commissioners. McClellan resigned from the army in 1857, but as chief engineer of the Illinois Central and as president of the Ohio and Mississippi railroads acquired further skill in methods of organization. If McClellan, before assuming the awesome responsibilities of supreme command, could have had some of the rough reverses

[1] Steele, *American Campaigns*, I, 190.

of a brigade commander and, like Grant, learned to forget his apprehensions in the enjoyment of his trade, he, with his undeniable military gifts, would have more nearly measured up to his great opponent.

The new commander took up his duties with ability and self-confidence. Never were the wishes of a commanding officer more fully carried out. Whatever was lacking in the generous equipment furnished to their soldiers by their respective states was at once supplied.[1] Rhodes does not overstate the case when he says: "While McClellan was working with diligence, every one was coöperating with him in a way to give his talent for organization the widest scope. The President, the Treasury, and the War Departments the governors of the Northern States assisted him faithfully with their full powers. The officers under him displayed zeal and devotion. He had the sway of a monarch."[2]

The coöperation of the government and the people,[3] supplemented by the energy and knowledge of the commander and his officers, soon enabled McClellan

[1] Up to June 1, 1861, the states and their cities had expended in the equipment of their soldiers these sums:

Connecticut	$ 2,160,000	New Hampshire	$ 40,000
Indiana	280,000	New Jersey	2,224,000
Illinois	3,553,000	Ohio	3,348,000
Iowa	100,000	Pennsylvania	3,930,000
Maine	1,355,000	Rhode Island	500,000
Massachusetts	10,625,000	Vermont	1,027,000
Michigan	1,100,000	Wisconsin	362,000
New York	40,000		
Total			$ 37,123,000

Annual Cyclopedia, 1861, 309.

Victor writing from a contemporary point of view, is of the opinion that "the amount of contributions in 1861-62 throughout the land to the outfit of the regiments, to the sick and wounded, to bounties, if it could be obtained, would be found to exceed one hundred millions of dollars. *The Southern Rebellion*, III, 492.

[2] *History of the United States*, III, 492.

[3] "Everybody set to work; patriotic donations flowed in; subscription funds were opened for the benefit of the soldiers; women manifested as much zeal to induce men to enlist as in the South; the largest iron mills in the United States were turned into cannon factories; finally, enlistments became more and more numerous. The Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, I, 262. Hereafter this will be referred to under Comte de Paris.

to reinvigorate McDowell's demoralized brigades, and out of the constantly arriving regiments to build a most formidable army. "The new levies of infantry on arriving in Washington were formed into provisional brigades, and placed in camp in the suburbs of the city, for equipment, instruction, and discipline. As soon as regiments were in a fit condition for transfer to the forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades serving there." [1] "Drill and organize" was the watchword on every lip. [2] By October 15, 1861, the number of Federal troops on the Potomac, from Cumberland to the environs of Alexandria, was stated by General McClellan to be as follows:

Total present for duty	133,201
Total sick	9,290
Total in confinement	1,156
Aggregate present	143,647
Aggregate absent	8,404
Grand aggregate	152,051 [3]

By January 1, 1862, this number, inclusive of the troops in Maryland and Delaware, had risen to a total of present and absent of 219,707. [4] On December 1, 1862, the total number of Union soldiers in all fields was estimated at 660,971. [5]

Nor was complete, even elaborate, material long lacking. The ingenuity of the most inventive of races was diverted to the effective equipment of this hastily mobilized host. It is safe to say that to that date no other army had ever been so elaborately and so expensively outfitted. The manufacturers of the North converted their establishments into war-supply

[1] *Official Records*, 5, 12.
[2] Comte de Paris.
[3] *Official Records*, 5, 12.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.* Also Report of Secretary of War for 1861.

plants so quickly that they almost kept pace in their output with the expanding needs of their armies. During the first fourteen months of the war the administrative departments furnished to the soldiers three million uniforms and two and one-half million blankets.[1] Before the coming of the first winter 40,000 encampment tents had been provided, and during the first year 300,000 shelter tents were ready for distribution. The rubber poncho, a rain-coat by day and a damp-proof sheet by night, was found so serviceable that from 40,000 furnished to the men in 1861, the number rose to 1,500,000 in 1864—an extent of covering which, it was estimated, would spread over 960 acres. During this same twelve months 40,000 wagons, 84,000 mules, and 110,000 horses were bought. Hospitals for the treatment of sick animals were opened, and before the coming of the second summer 57,000 equine patients had been nursed back to health. The troops had an ample and nutritive ration.[2]

Ordnance stores were the most difficult to provide, for few munitions of war were made in America. However, by purchases in Europe, by an enlargement of the government armory at Springfield,[3] and by awards to private contractors, the ordnance department managed to furnish, during the first year, 1,276,686 small arms, 1,926 heavy guns, 1,200 field pieces, and 14,000,000 rounds of ammunition. At the suggestion of the chief of artillery, whose observations

[1] Comte de Paris, I, 293.

[2] As illustrative of the variety furnished the soldiers, the warehouses in Washington alone received for the single week ending October 12, 1861, the following stores: Pork, 3,000 barrels; beef, 6,000 barrels; beef tongues, 200 barrels; bacon, 300,000 pounds; beans, 4,000 bushels; hams, 50,000 pounds; flour, 11,000 barrels; hard bread, 3,000,000 pounds; rice, 1,000 pounds; hominy, 10,000 pounds; riced barley, 20,000 pounds; green coffee, 20,000 pounds; ground coffee, 40,000 pounds; tea, 1,000 pounds; sugar, 2,000,000 pounds; vinegar, 70,000 gallons; candles, 40,000 pounds; soap, 200,000 pounds; salt, 40,000 bushels; desiccated potatoes, 2,000 pounds; desiccated vegetables, 17,000 pounds; pickles, 278 kegs; dried apples, 50,000 pounds; split peas, 4,000 bushels; molasses, 6,000 gallons; potatoes, 4,000 bushels. *Annual Cyclopedia*, 1861.

[3] In 1862 this armory delivered 200,000 rifles; in 1863, 250,000.

at the battle of Manassas convinced him of the invaluable moral effect on green troops of artillery fire, a general ratio of two and a half and then of three guns to each 1,000 infantry was finally adopted.[1] This was a high ratio at that time.

The fighting men of the army were complemented by specific auxilliary corps of noncombatants. These at first consisted of three corps. First, the medical corps, with its hospital and improvised ambulance divisions. Second, the engineer and topographic corps, with a complete equipment for map-making and for building roads, bridges, and fortifications.[2] Third, the signal corps, of which its chief said: "It was a work of no ordinary toil to originate and to put in the field during such a war a corps before unknown."[3] This service was such a novelty that newspaper correspondents were moved to ridicule it until the "wig-waggers," as its members were called, demonstrated the usefulness of their operations. In addition to their flags for daylight transmission of messages and to their torch or lamp code for night signals, the corps developed telegraph wagons for field communication, and as early as the siege of Yorktown used ballons in which telegraphic apparatus was installed for both observation and the control of artillery fire.

The organization and systematic equipment of this army, vast for that day, and the military, economic, and industrial steps to maintain and add to its efficiency constituted the answer of the North to its Manassas defeat.

What effect did the victory have on the South? The exultation natural to so signal a triumph of its men at arms was tempered by thoughts of the sorrow

[1] *Official Records*, 5, 67.

[2] Illustrative of the efficiency of these men, it is recorded that two regiments built a bridge over the 300 yard wide Potomac at Harpers Ferry in 1862 in one day.

[3] *Official Records*, 5, 70.

which it brought to so many homes and by anxiety as to the South's preparation for the bitter war that it foreshadowed. Rhodes, a Northern historian, says of the feelings of the South: "The manifestation of sentiment was that of a deeply religious people who felt that they had a cause hallowed by duty and honor." [1]

The battle had a marked effect on three convictions held by the advocates of secession. The first of these convictions was that the commercial nations of Europe would be so desirous of keeping their spindles supplied with the cotton of which the South had a practical monopoly [2] that these nations would seize the first opportunity to recognize the independence of the Confederate government and give it all the advantages arising from taking its place in the sisterhood of nations. The holders of this belief were greatly cheered by the outcome of the battle, for they thought that Southern success would prove an immediate road to recognition or at least to the raising of what was called the "paper blockade." [3]

[1] Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 456.

[2] In 1859 the total cotton crop of the South was 1,606,800,000 pounds; of this amount 1,208,561,000 pounds was exported. England took most of this amount.

[3] Southern views on this question were succinctly stated in a letter from B. G. Lamar to the Confederate secretary of war: "I beg leave to suggest reasons why I think Great Britain and France will remove the blockade: First each derives $20,000,000 to $30,000,000 revenue from tobacco. Second, Great Britain has 3,500,000 population directly dependent on cotton, and 2,500,000 more directly connected with it. Third, she has $200,000,000 capital invested in factories for cotton, which would be idle, involving 1,200 mills, besides coal mines. Fourth, that the failure to export largely of cotton goods to India and China would cause a ruinous drain of silver and gold to those regions to procure many necessaries now obtained from them. Sixth, France and Germany are equally dependent on Great Britain for like causes, and especially as the Continent gets much of its yarn from England—the export last year (was) 1,142,000,000 yards of cotton goods and 28,000,000 pounds of yarn to China and India, all of which prevented, so far, the export of coin." *Official Records*, 127, 563.

A contrary view was, however, not infrequently heard; for instance, R. M. Davis, a banker of New Orleans, writes, in January 1862: "While in Europe during the last summer and autumn, I had good opportunities of judging of the feelings of the English and French toward our Confederacy and came to the conclusion that our people should not look to any foreign power for relief from the evils of the blockade." *Ibid.*, 892.

The second conviction held by many secessionists was that the North would not fight. The men of the South were skilled from their youth up in the handling of firearms; their farming operations made them at home in the saddle; their love of the forest and the stream accustomed them to the discomforts of camp; their constant outdoor life gave them vigor and endurance. Contrasting their manner of life with that of their acquaintances in the North, the advocates of separation felt assured that the Northern men were so enervated by confinement in offices and counting-rooms, and that their hearts were so set on gain, that they could not and would not long endure the hardships of war. They made the same mistake that the Germans did before the United States entered the World War. They forgot that all men when mechanized by drill and discipline become good soldiers. They also failed to take into account that a few months' practice in riding and firing would give requisite killing skill and that hardihood would be acquired during the practice. They also underestimated the steadiness with which an aroused American abides by his convictions. This battle, which came at one time so near to a Federal victory, dispelled the belief that Northern men could no longer be fitted for excellent field service.

A third conviction of many urgers of secession was that there existed in the North, particularly among the Democrats, large numbers of men who would stand firm against a sectional war. They were persuaded that these men, whether because they were in accord with the constitutional views of the South or because of their indifference to slavery or because of their desire to retain the lucrative trade of the Southern people, would have influence enough to let "the erring sisters depart in peace." The same error prevailed in the North as to the goodly throng of "loyalists" to be

found in the South after President Lincoln's call for coercive troops.[1] In order to make it appear that the secession of the Southern States was merely a rebellion of a few slave-holders and not a revolution of the entire population,[2] this error as to the widespread prevalence of Union sentiment in the South was fostered in government circles. It was sedulously stated in official utterances that the object of the war was not conquest, not subjugation of a people, not interference with slavery, but merely to prevent the physical dismemberment of the Union.[3] Rhodes frankly says:

> It is impossible to escape the conviction that the action of the North was based largely on a misconception of the strength of the disunion sentiment in the Confederate States. The Northern people accepted the gage of war and came to the support of the President on the theory that a majority in all of the Southern States except South Carolina were at heart for the Union, and

[1] It is odd to find the two opposing commanders, even after Manassas, sharing these views. General J. E. Johnston, in stating his reasons for not pursuing McDowell on the day after the battle, says: "At that time, too, defensive war was regarded by the Southern leaders as our best policy, as it was apprehended that invasion by us would unite all the people of the North, Democrats and Republicans, in defense of their country." *Johnston's Narrative*, 64. As late as July 7, General McClellan, in his celebrated Harrison's Bar letter to President Lincoln, says: "Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present army." *McClellan's Own Story*, 488.

[2] Even President Lincoln, in spite of his opportunities to know public sentiment in the South, was apparently under the spell of this error, for in his message to Congress on July 4, he wrote: "It may well be questioned whether there is today a majority of the legally qualified voters of any state, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every other one, of the so-called seceded states." Yet Russell, who was traveling in the South to gauge the sentiment of the people and whose articles in the *London Times* were read throughout the United States, wrote from New Orleans on May 24: "The South will fall, if at all, as a nation prostrate at the feet of a victorious enemy. There is no doubt of the unanimity of the people. If words mean anything, they are animated by only one sentiment, and they will resist the North as long as they can command a man or a dollar."

[3] "He desires to preserve the government that it may be administered for all as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their government; and the government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that in giving it, there is any coercion, conquest or any subjugation, in the just sense of those terms." President Lincoln, in message of July 4, 1861.

that if these loyal men were encouraged and protected they would make themselves felt in a movement looking towards allegiance to the national government.[1]

Antecedently Rhodes says:

> Had the North thoroughly understood the problem; had it known that the people in the cotton states were practically unanimous, that the action of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee was backed by a large and genuine majority, it might have refused to undertake the seemingly unachievable task. For while hardly a man at the North assented to the constitutional right of secession, all acknowledged the right of revolution; and had they been convinced that the action of the Southern States represented the free and untrammeled will of the Southern people, many would have objected to combating that right, arguing that even if the action of the men of the South was unjust and founded upon a wrong, it was not incumbent on the North to war upon them because they would not see the light and walk in it. In such a case the national idea, the feeling that the country must not physically be dismembered, would have lost much of its force.[2]

The erroneous conception that the North would be fatally divided in the event of secession was practically dissipated by the events immediately following the July battle. The hearty answer to Lincoln's call for more troops, and the liberality and the unanimity with which the Federal Congress, apparently supported by all the people, voted startlingly large sums to wage war, revealed to all classes in the South that there was a desperate struggle coming and that in this conflict they could count only on their own inferior numbers and undeveloped resources.

Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith, the senior officers of the Confederate army at Manassas, were all educated soldiers. They were as familiar as any men of their generation with the cost and waste

[1] *History of the United States*, III, 405.
[2] *Ibid.*, 404.

of war. They knew from their experience in the Mexican War how readily Americans can be converted by a short period of drill and discipline into effective soldiers, and hence how greatly the initial superiority of their men as soldiers would be lessened if time were given to the Federal officers to train their recruits. They were receiving from secret friends in Washington fairly complete details of how the Federal Government was replacing its three months volunteers by a vast army of men enlisted "For the war"; and of how expensively and elaborately the Federal army and navy were being equipped to carry out President Lincoln's wishes to make "the contest short and decisive." They were also aware how rapidly the spirit and the physique of an army of ardent volunteers deteriorate in times of inaction, and they dreaded an idle fall and winter for their troops. They were in addition faced by the fact that the enlistment periods of most of their regiments would expire in the spring.

These officers, therefore, felt that hope of Confederate success depended on prompt action. They concluded that, while the roads permitted operations, they ought to strike hard and rapidly at the commercial cities of the North before General McClellan could mold the raw men pouring on every train to Washington into a capable fighting machine; that it would be wiser to dare all on the venture rather than wait on the defensive until the people of the North, assured by the possession of an overwhelmingly large army, would be less disposed to accede to a separation, and that their own army, if it could be reinforced by such soldiers as were then with them, was equal to the task. They, of course, did not hope, indeed did not wish, to subjugate the Northern States, but they did believe that by defeating such troops as could be sent against them, they could convince the people of the North of the impossibility of coercing the South into submission.

In order to present their views, General Johnston asked for a conference with President Davis. Mr. Davis met the three officers at Fairfax Court House early in October. The officers advised an immediate advance into Maryland, but stated that they would need 20,000 additional seasoned troops [1] for the movement. The Confederate President readily conceded the advantages of an active campaign across the Potomac, [2] but sadly admitted that, owing to insistent demands for protection from states stretching 3,000 miles along the Atlantic coast, he could not transfer to Manassas the number of seasoned troops needed, and that, moreover, he did not have arms for the men then so enthusiastically volunteering. [3] He suggested, however, that in order to keep alert the aggressive spirit of the men and also to give them practice in marches and field movements, Johnston should undertake some minor operations against the Federals. [4] These suggestions were not acted on, perhaps could not have been to advantage, and the army remained in camp doing nothing more aggressive than wishing for a Federal advance.

[1] They explained that by "seasoned troops" they meant such men as were at Manassas.

[2] In a letter to a critic Mr. Davis says: "You seem to have fallen into the most uncommon mistake of supposing that I have chosen to carry on the war upon a 'purely defensive system.' The advantage of selecting the time and place of attack was too apparent to have been overlooked, but the means have been wanting. Without military stores, without the workshops to create them, without the power to import them, necessity, not choice, has compelled us to occupy strong positions and everywhere to confront the enemy without reserve." *Official Records*, 127, 998.

[3] *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 449.

[4] He wrote to Smith, on October 10: "As I there suggested (at the conference), though you may not be able to advance into Maryland and expel the enemy, it may be possible to keep up the spirits of your troops by expeditions such as that particularly spoken of against Sickles's brigade on the Lower Potomac, or Banks's above. *Ibid.*, 453.

Acting Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, had the same views. In writing to General Johnston on October 13, he says: "I had hoped almost against hope that the condition of the army would justify you in coming to the conclusion that some forward movement could be made, and that the roofs to shelter the troops during the approaching winter would be found on the other side of the Potomac, but our destitute condition so far as arms are concerned renders it impossible to increase of our strength." *Official Records*, 5, 896.

Nothing could have been worse for the Confederate cause and for its army than the idle fall and winter spent in the cheerless camp at Manassas. The enforced inactivity depressed the minds of officers and soldiers, who believed that the war could be ended by quick, hard fighting before the North was ready, and who felt that each day lost added to the difficulty of their task; sickness, always attendant on a volunteer army, especially an army drawn largely from farm homes in which comparatively few members had experienced the ordinary communicable diseases of childhood, prostrated large numbers;[1] the lack of the usual camp comforts supplied to soldiers by regularly organized governments, the scarcity of medicines, and the inexperience of the surgeons just drawn from civil life, combined to produce a high death rate; idleness begat vices and impaired discipline and morale.[2]

The Confederate soldiers realized, too, that this virtual cessation of hostilities, while thus injuring the South, inured to the benefit of the North. It gave the leaders of that section time to unite their people, to convert their peace-time factories into war plants, to build cars and engines, to buy foreign arms, to send out army and navy expeditions, and to mould into shape an army which so impressed Horace Greeley, the greatest editor of his day, that he declared it to be "an army superior in numbers, in intelligence, and in the essential quality of its material to any ever led by Napoleon. . . . It was not only far better

[1] On October 1, 1861, General Johnston reported that one third of his army was sick.

[2] "But there came, soon after the first battle of Manassas, and during the long inactivity which followed it, a period of demoralization which was unequaled by any witnessed during the war. . . . The vices common to most armies ran riot through our camps. Drunkenness became so common as to scarcely excite remark, and many who were temperate, and some who were even total abstinence leaders at home, fell into the delusion that drinking was excusable, if not necessary, in the army." Jones, *Christ in the Camp*, 268. The chaplain of the Twenty-third North Carolina regiment wrote: "I fear that while Lincoln may slay his thousands, the liquor maker at home will slay his tens of thousands."

drilled and fitted for service than that which McDowell had advanced to Centreville and Bull Run, but it was better constituted in that its members—not one of them a conscript—had entered for a term of years after all 60 day hallucinations had been dispelled and with a full knowledge that they were to encounter the hardships, the perils, and the privations of protracted, inexorable war." [1]

Contrasting what might be gained by an invasion of the North with every available soldier and what certainly would be lost by squatting idly on the road to Richmond, it seems that President Davis, Congress, and people would have joined in risking the safety of every harbor and capital in order to throw their soldiers like an avalanche on the unprepared North. This would no doubt have been done but for want of guns. The truth is that the South in its unwavering adherence to its own interpretation of the Constitution had, as President Davis bluntly puts it, "gone to war without counting the cost," [2] and now, involved in blood, found itself with men enough but without the means for successful warfare.

At the opening of hostilities there were in the government armories about 610,262 small arms of diverse patterns and various degrees of inefficiency. Of these 446,456 were distributed in the North and 163,806 in the South. [3] Most of the guns in the South were old smooth-bore muskets that had been altered from flint and steel to percussion locks. The rifles

[1] Steele, *The American Conflict*, I, 167.

[2] Davis, *Rise and Fall*, I, 442.

[3] Ripley's Report of July 14, 1861. Colonel J. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate government, credits the Confederate army with a total of only 150,000 small arms, and gives their distribution at regular arsenals as follows: Richmond, 4,000 rifles; Fayetteville, North Carolina, 2,000 rifles and 25,000 muskets; Charleston, South Carolina, 2,000 rifles and 20,000 muskets; Augusta, Georgia, 3,000 rifles and 28,000 muskets; Mount Vernon, Alabama, 2,000 rifles and 20,000 muskets; Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2,000 rifles and 27,000 muskets—a total of 135,000. To these are to be added a few thousand in Arkansas, some in Texas, and the arms owned by the states—a total, he estimates, of about 150,000 available guns.

were mainly of the type known as the Mississippi rifle, but those at Richmond were the Harpers Ferry rifle. So severe were the straits for arms that several of the states bought from their citizens fowling-pieces and sporting rifles, and manufactured pikes for infantry and spears for cavalry.[1] The Confederate government actually sent an agent to travel through the states of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Tennessee to buy such private arms as individuals were willing to sell.[2] The Secretary of War accepted one North Carolina regiment which was armed only with hunting rifles.[3]

As scant as were arms, the supply of ammunition and accoutrements was even more scant. At the opening of hostilities there were, outside of the amount seized at Norfolk, only 60,000 pounds of powder in the Confederacy. Of lead there was none. The stock of percussion caps could not have exceeded a quarter of a

[1] "The impression has long prevailed among the people of the North that the Confederate States did their fighting with cannon, rifles, and muskets treacherously placed within their reach by Mr. Buchanan's secretary of war. The common belief has been that Mr. Floyd had for a long time pursued a plan of his own for distributing the arms of the United States in the South, in anticipation of a disruption of the Union at no distant day. General Scott in 1862 took up this charge in his public controversy with Mr. Buchanan, and endeavored to establish it. He signally failed. . . . The anachronisms of this assertion, when it met the eye of Mr. Buchanan in November, 1862, and its apparent ignorance of the facts, may well have amazed him. The whole subject had undergone a thorough investigation by a committee of the House of Representatives in the winter of 1860-61, in consequence of the rumors which had been set afloat after the resignation of Secretary Floyd. . . . The committee ascertained that on the 29th of December, 1859, nearly eleven months before the election of Mr. Lincoln and several months before his nomination, the Secretary of War ordered Colonel Craig to remove one-fifth of the old flint-lock and percussion muskets from the Springfield armory in Massachusetts, where they had accumulated in inconvenient numbers, to five Southern arsenals of the United States for storage." George Ticknor Curtis, *Life of Buchanan*, II, 413 *et seq.* "Of the 115,000 arms sent for storage to the Southern arsenals in the spring of 1860, 105,000 were condemned muskets, not worth over $2.50 each, and 10,000 were percussion rifles, caliber 54. The Southern States in 1860 did not apply for, nor get, their full quota of new arms. These two facts plainly appear from the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs. The report was made February 18, 1861. Stanton, the chairman, was a Republican from Ohio. . . . It is perfectly clear that before the election of Lincoln, Floyd was not a secessionist." Rhodes, III, 238.

[2] *Official Records*, 127, 423.

[3] *Ibid.*, 481.

million.[1] The complete story of destitution in military supplies is told in the answers of the secretary of war to an inquiry from the Confederate Congress as to arms and munitions on hand. The inquiry was made six days after the battle of Manassas, but not answered until August 12, 1861. The answers startled beyond measure some hitherto complacent congressmen. Walker reported that the Confederate Government had on hand 3,500 flint-lock muskets, 200,000 pounds of powder, 240 tons of saltpeter, 300 tons of sulphur, and one contract for lead.[2]

The returns as to the total number of cannon in the Confederate States at the opening of the war are very incomplete. On June 31, 1861, reports from eighteen out of thirty-five arsenals, depots, and forts reveal only 358 coast defense guns, and 192 of these were in two forts.[3] Most of these were of obsolete types—some as old as the War of 1812. If the seventeen stations, which did not report, averaged about the same number as the eighteen which did send in returns, then there were in the entire Confederacy only 716 heavy guns with which to defend 3,000 miles of coast and all rivers. This number, Gorgas estimates, was increased to 1,500 by January 1862.[4] For his spring campaign of 1862, General Lee could muster only about 175 pieces of field artillery. The caliber of these guns varied so much that it was very difficult for the Ordnance Department to keep them supplied with ammunition.[5] Harness for the artillery horses had to be ordered from France and England.

Cavalry was the natural service arm of Southerners.[6] The Confederate army would have been tremendously

[1] *Gorgas's Narrative.*
[2] *Official Records*, 127, 555.
[3] *Ibid.*, 621.
[4] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XII, 73.
[5] "A single Federal regiment, the First Connecticut Artillery, picked up, among the batteries in which it served in 1864 near Richmond, thirty-six different kind of balls fired by the Confederates." Comte de Paris, I, 313.
[6] "So great is the preference for cavalry that infantry cannot be raised where cavalry can be received." Governor Clark to Secretary Benjamin.

strengthened if the proficient horsemen offering for this branch could have been accepted and equipped. There were, however, no cavalry arms—sabres, revolvers, carbines or rifles; there were no saddles, bridles, blankets, and a constantly diminishing supply of horse-shoes. During the very time at which General Johnston, and afterwards General Lee, were urging an increase in cavalry, offers of regiment after regiment of accomplished horsemen had to be declined. After North Carolina, for instance, equipped its First Regiment of cavalry months elapsed before its second regiment, the Nineteenth, could be adequately fitted for the field. [1]

That it was the lack of arms and equipment, and not the lack of men, which upset Confederate strategic plans in the early days of the war, is evident from official communications from the first two secretaries of war. Just after his victory at Manassas, Johnston, it will be recalled, was restrained by a lack of equipped men from a vigorous pursuit into Washington of McDowell's troops. A letter from Secretary Walker to President Davis on July 24, makes it clear why Johnston had no more men. Walker writes: "From applications on file in this office there can be no doubt that if arms were only furnished no less than 200,000 additional volunteers for the war would be found in the ranks in less than two months." [2] The date of the letter, of course, discloses that most of these 200,000 had offered their services before the battle. So steady was the stream of volunteers that, in spite of discouragement about arms, Secretary Walker wrote

[1] On March 11, 1862, Governor Clark wrote to Secretary Benjamin: "Three months ago we tendered Colonel Spruill's regiment of cavalry (the Nineteenth) to the Confederacy. They were accepted. After three months efforts I was unable to obtain arms and equipments for them (from New Orleans to Richmond). We tried in vain to get swords or carbines. . . . If you can let them have sabers, they will be useful. They have been many months in your service without arms, and consequently are almost useless, though drawing pay and rations." *Official Records*, 127, 987.

[2] *Ibid.*, 497.

forty days later: "We could bring into the field and maintain there with ease 500,000 men, were arms and munitions sufficiently abundant." [1] In September, as already stated, Johnston and his officers wanted to cross the Potomac River for offensive war before General McClellan, who had mustered out all of his three months men, could get his new levies ready for the field. He was foiled in his plans by the inability of the President to furnish him 20,000 additional men. Secretary Benjamin, who succeeded Walker on September 17, again makes it plain that this inability was due to a deficiency in arms, not in men who were willing to fight for the cause of their espousal. He says: "On first entering on the duties of the Department the tenders of troops were very large, and it was not unusual for me to refuse offers of 5,000 men per day." [2] The men who were refused in such numbers were those who had volunteered in one-year organizations. The Secretary's refusal to accept these men—who certainly ought to have been secured while their warm zeal made them unusual soldiers—was based on what he calls the "vital necessity of adhering to the rule" which, in the scarcity of arms, forbade the issuing of arms to any company or regiment unless it volunteered for three years.

Not only was the Confederate Government without ordnance, but harder still, it was at first absolutely without the means or the material to manufacture the appurtenances of war. Colonel Gorgas, who was called to head the Ordnance Department and assigned the apparently hopeless task of creating the "ministers and missiles of death" out of materials which he had first to manufacture or mine, assemble over railroads burdened beyond capacity, and finally with the aid of men whose mechanical experience was largely

[1] *Official Records*, 127, 596.
[2] *Ibid.*, 795.

limited to country forge-shops, convert into cannon, muskets, projectiles, caps, gun-carriages in improvised factories, thus discloses the task confronting him in April, 1861:

> Within the limits of the Confederate States there were no arsenals at which any of the material of war was constructed. No arsenal except that at Fayetteville, North Carolina, had a single machine above a foot-lathe. Such arsenals as there were had been used only as depots. All the work of preparation of material had been carried on at the North; not an arm, not a gun, not a gun-carriage, and except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition had for fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States. There were consequently no workmen, or very few of them, skilled in these arts. No powder, save perhaps for blasting, had been made at the South; there was no saltpetre in store at any point; it was stored wholly at the North. There was no lead nor any mines of it except on the Northern limits of the Confederacy in Virginia and the situation of that made its product precarious. Only one cannon foundry existed: at Richmond. Copper, so necessary for field artillery and for percussion caps, was just being produced in East Tennessee. There was no rolling mill for bar iron south of Richmond; and but few blast furnaces and these small, and with trifling exceptions in the border states of Virginia and Tennessee.[1]

It will be impossible to understand the heroism of the Confederate struggle and North Carolina's contribution to that struggle unless we comprehend somewhat of the patience, foresight, ingenuity, organizing skill and scientific attainments of these indomitable men "behind the guns."

The first necessity after arms was, of course, powder. The three ingredients—charcoal, sulphur, and saltpetre, or niter—as well as the factories for working them up, had to be provided. The charcoal was readily obtained from the ordinary pits. An adequate supply of sulphur was secured from the sugar refiners of the far South. The scarcity of saltpetre presented

[1] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 69.

most serious difficulties. The State of Georgia had imported 240 tons. This was at once bought[1] and utilized in two small powder mills operated for the State of Tennessee and in mills at Pendleton and at Walhalla, South Carolina. Niter bearing caves were sought in all the states traversed by the Appalachian mountains. Private production was stimulated by liberal contracts and by offers of aid in financing new plants. A refinery for the crude material was established at Nashville in the summer of 1861. As the war advanced, it became evident that, owing to difficulties arising from conscription, inadequate transportation and lack of technical skill, the Government would have to undertake the production not only of ordnance but of ordnance material, even to the mining of ores.[2] Accordingly a Bureau of Niter and Mining was organized under the Ordnance Department, with Colonel I. M. St. John as chief. St. John divided the niter bearing areas into districts, with an officer in charge of each district. The technical duties of the chief and his district subalterns were only a part of their daily tasks. To keep a steady flow of material going to the manufactories, they were forced to wrangle with army officers for the detail to their works of soldiers who were artisans and for the retention of conscripts whom they had trained; they worried local commissary officers who wanted to hold their stores only for soldiers into supplying their workmen with rations and clothes; they bullied the railroads into granting them priority of deliveries; they jogged into action laggard contractors of iron, lead, copper, and

[1] *Official Records*, 127, 555.

[2] "In addition to the articles usually manufactured in a military laboratory, it has been necessary to manufacture for the use of the laboratory articles usually found in the shops. Sulphuric acid, nitric acid, different metallic salts, and a variety of chemicals can be obtained for the use of the laboratories only by our manufacturing them, while our citizens engaged in supplying niter, sulphur, and gunpowder need guidance, superintendence, and instruction to prevent the loss of labor and materials by imperfect or wasteful processes. *Ibid.*, 762.

niter; they resorted to impressment if necessary to secure rich deposits of metals or minerals; they even had in places to arm and drill their workmen to repel Federal cavalry raids. Their works in the military zones were often captured or burned. No small part of their thought had to be centered on moving their machinery and tools ahead of a Federal advance, and reëstablishing their plants at less accessible places or on the old sites after the Federals had passed.

When the Niter and Mining Bureau was formed on April 11, 1862, the total production of niter in the Confederacy did not reach 500 pounds a day.[1] The energy of the officers put in charge expanded operations with unexpected rapidity. Within three months after its establishment, the Bureau had sixteen niter caves, employing 387 men, in operation. By July 30, it had collected and refined 60,338 pounds of niter, taken over and enlarged two lead mines,[2] and erected an admirable smelting-work at Petersburg, Virginia.[3] From this humble beginning the bureau made rapid strides in production. The reports at the close of 1864 show a yearly production from government caves and supervised of 1,735,531 pounds of niter and an importation of 1,720,072—a total of 3,455,603 pounds.[4] Of this amount 238,907 pounds were produced in North Carolina at a cost of $163,983.68.[5] This supply came from scraping nitrified soil from under homes, tobacco-barns, smoke-houses, barns, and hen-coops. Many destitute women and old men added to their precarious living by the collection and sale to the government of

[1] *Official Records*, 5, 2.

[2] One of these, which became the most productive lead mine in the Confederacy, was at Wytheville, Virginia; the other at Silver Hill in Davidson County, North Carolina.

[3] *Official Records*, 129, 698.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] "It is a curious fact that the district on which we could rely for the most constant yield of niter, having the headquarters at Greensboro, North Carolina, had no niter caves in it. The niter was produced by the lixiviation of nitrous earth dug from under old houses, barns, etc." Gorgas, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 76.

this material. To provide a reserve supply thirteen nitriaries were provided at convenient places.[1] The beds in these require time for ripening and the war closed before any niter was made from them, but Colonel St. John states that 2,800,000 cubic feet of earth had been collected and was in various stages of nitrification.

In spite of the fact that in 1864 ten of the Virginia and all of the Georgia iron furnaces and the principal copper mine were captured or destroyed by the Federals, and that in the last quarter of 1864 there were no returns from Alabama, South Carolina, and Tennessee, the bureau's reports for the same two years as above show that it supplied the munition workers with 27,189 tons of iron, 823,349 pounds of copper, and 4,795,331 pounds of lead,[2] and that the sulphuric acid chambers of its chemical works at Charlotte, North Carolina, were turning out an average yield of from 4,000 to 5,000 pounds a month.

Coincident with its development of the Niter Bureau, the Ordnance Department pressed vigorously the manufacture of powder at governmental and at private mills, and the development of armories and arsenals for making cannon, small arms, ammunition, and all military equipment. Under the superintendence of Colonel George W. Rains, a most accomplished ordnance officer, the Department built at Augusta,

[1] These were located at Augusta and Columbus in Georgia; Charleston, Columbia, Ashley Ferry, and Cooper river in South Carolina; Selma, Mobile, Talladega, Tuscaloosa, and Montgomery in Alabama; and Richmond in Virginia. *Official Records*, 128, 699.

[2] *Ibid.*, 129, 990. The sources of these supplies are given as follows:

Copper:	
From Ducktown, Tennessee	746,805 pounds
Collection of scrap copper	50,336 pounds
Importation through the blockade	31,206 pounds
Lead:	
From Wytheville, Va., and Silver Hill, N. C.	1,836,624 pounds
Trans-Mississippi Department	390,587 pounds
Scrap lead	658,320 pounds
Importation through the blockade	1,909,800 pounds

Georgia, a central powder mill that Gorgas describes as "far superior to any in the United States and unsurpassed by any across the ocean." This establishment with its twelve grinders had a daily capacity of 5,000 pounds. The Richmond mills, starting later than the others, was designed to produce about 1,500 pounds. The mill at Selma, Alabama, made up 500 pounds a day. The State of North Carolina aided Waterhouse & Bowes to erect near Raleigh a mill with a daily yield of 600 pounds. The state was furnished with niter and sulphur by the Confederate government and sold the entire production to the ordnance officers. These four mills furnished, therefore, 7,600 pounds each day.[1] The Confederate navy owned an excellent mill at Columbia, South Carolina. There were a few private mills—one at Charlotte, North Carolina, and for a time one at New Orleans,[2] and a few state-aided mills. With the output from these mills, supplemented by the cargoes which came through the blockade, there was always less anxiety about powder than there was about lead and copper.

After the capture of the Ducktown copper mines and the Wytheville lead mines[3] the Ordnance Department was desperately straitened to keep the munition plants in copper and lead. From the beginning of the war the country and the battlefields had been gleaned for lead. The city of Charleston, by the sacrifice of its window-weights, water pipes, and odds and ends, contributed 200,000 pounds. Mobile digging up its pipes of a discarded water system, furnished nearly the same amount.[4] The State Ordnance office in Raleigh, which accepted only such as was offered and tried not to compete with the regular bureau

[1] *Official Records*, 129, 987.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] These mines were supplying 60,000 pounds a month. *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 92.
[4] Gorgas in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 92.

officers, bought 27,885 pounds of scrap lead in amounts varying from five to 800 pounds. The state also transferred to the Ordnance Bureau 36,017 pounds from importations through the *Advance*.

After the Confederate calamities on the Mississippi River, the three main sources of what Gorgas calls "this precious metal" were all in jeopardy; first, the supply of scrap lead was constantly diminishing; second, the importations through the blockade were seriously imperiled by the loss of Southern ports; third, the Wytheville mines, the only largely productive ones, were constantly menaced by the enlarged operations of the Federal armies.

In his annual report for the year closing September 30, 1864, Gorgas, after calling attention to the fact that his reserve of lead had been exhausted by the fierce fighting from Chancellorsville through Cold Harbor, was impelled to warn the secretary of war that he "felt more uneasiness on this point than on all others." [1]

This anxiety naturally suggests the inquiry, What amount of lead was necessary to keep the Confederate armies in ammunition? Colonel Gorgas, under whose eyes all munition reports passed, estimated that the government manufactured and used in the field 150,000,000 cartridges—an average of 150,000 each day. [2] The lead in these cartridges weighed on an average about an ounce and twenty-seven grains. Hence, without allowing for waste, an average daily supply of 9,922 pounds was required. This supply could be kept up only while the three sources already mentioned continued their deliveries. On December 31, 1864, in replying to a confidential letter from the adjutant general "as to the means of supplying munitions" for further struggle, he says: "The supply

[1] *Official Records*, 129, 733.
[2] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 91.

of lead is derived from importation and the Wytheville lead mines. The other mines are insignificant, though the whole mineral region has been explored. Should Wilmington be closed and the Wytheville mines captured, the army could not be supplied with ammunition on the present scale." [1] As the Wytheville mines were captured in December, 1864, and the port of Wilmington was practically closed in the same month, it appears that, even if the supply of men, money and provisions could have been kept up, the Confederates must have surrendered early in 1865 simply from the lack of all-essential lead.

The Ordnance Department was always confronted, too, with a shortage of copper, a metal almost as necessary to munition shops as lead. The supply was fairly sufficient as long as the Ducktown mines were held by the Confederates and as the ever-useful blockade runners could make Southern ports. When, however, the Tennessee mines passed into Union hands and the activity of the blockade traffic was checked, the ordnance officers had to resort to every sort of shift to secure copper or find substitutes for it. As the pressure for copper became greater, cities gave their clocks, churches their bells, and women stripped their homes of kettles, and iron, and candle-sticks. The country was searched with inquisitive eyes and forceful hands for the copper worms of turpentine and whiskey distilleries. [2] The turpentine distillers were paid for

[1] If the average force in the field was as Gorgas thinks, 300,000 men, then the Confederate soldiers fought four years on a daily average consumption of one-half of a cartridge to the man. This estimate is not so startling when it is recalled how intermittently serious combats occurred, and how men usually fired fewer times than was expected. "In examining the returns of ordnance officers after heavy actions, I found that the reduction of ammunition amounted to from nineteen to twenty-six rounds per man. At Gettysburg the reports of a few days before the battle and a short time after showed a difference of twenty-five or twenty-six rounds on the average. This was the heaviest consumption to which my attention was called." Gorgas, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 92.

[2] From this copper and the above chemical mixture (chlorate of potash and sulphuret of antimony used in place of mercury) all the caps were made which

their material; that of the whiskey-makers was confiscated as part of an illegal traffic. The chief of the Ordnance Bureau in his December 31, 1864, report points out the scarcity of copper and steel. He says: "These articles must be obtained chiefly from abroad, and the stock on hand is very small. The bureau is constantly making substitutes of iron in every possible way to diminish the consumption and eke out the supply." [1] Even Napoleon field guns were fabricated from iron instead of brass. When these guns were strengthened by wrought iron jackets or breech bands, their performance was so satisfactory that artillery officers "cheerfully accorded them companionship with their bronze favorites." [2]

Iron was never so scarce as lead and copper. Although the Southern people had never been widely drawn to mining, there were some well-equipped mines and furnaces. Fortunately, this ore smelted with wood had an unusually high tensile strength. This toughness of texture offset in a measure the defects which arose from the inexperience of the early gunmakers, but, until skill had been attained, frequent burstings caused a "Richmond gun" to be viewed with mingled scorn and apprehension. As the manufacture of cannon and projectiles increased, it became necessary to stimulate iron production in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. "To this end contracts were made with iron-masters in these states on liberal terms and advances of money to be refunded in products. These contracts were difficult to arrange, as so much had to be done for the contractor. He must have details from the army and the privilege of transport of provisions and other

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we used during the last year of the war, but at its close the copper stills were exhausted." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 54.

[1] *Official Records*, 129, 988.

[2] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 93.

supplies over the railroads. And then the question of the currency was always recurring." [1]

Beset as the officers of the shops, factories, arsenals, and armories were by the trials of being set to work without houses until they built them, without tools, appliances or raw products until they made, imported or mined them, these difficulties were not, after the second year of the war, comparable to the annoyances arising from lack of laborers. Between those who had volunteered and those who had been conscripted, the country had been drained of its able-bodied men. Munition plants as well as all private industries had to rely largely on detailed soldiers or retained conscripts for all skilled or even trainable workmen. Most of the men above conscript age, even if they could have acquired skill at their ages, were required on the farms. Negroes could be relied on for the rough work, and disabled soldiers and women for the clerical duties, but the army had to furnish the competent artisans. These men were, of course, subject to instant recall. Whenever a Federal raid or a general advance into the neighborhood of a mine or furnace impended, or whenever the Confederate armies were gathering for serious fray, all the detailed men and conscripts in reach would have to drop spades and hammers and take up muskets. Production, of course, dropped in proportion to the duration of their withdrawal. Many of these men, after being called into the field once or twice, would not return to the shops. The reason for this, as Gorgas saw it, was not that they were disaffected or unpatriotic, for they fought well, but that "workmen will not fight and work too." [2] In the report already quoted, he laments that "while two years ago it was difficult to get machinery, we

[1] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 93.
[2] *Official Records*, 129, 734.

have now a surplus and cannot get workmen to run it." [1]

As the Confederate armies dwindled from wounds and deaths, the demand for soldiers stripped the shops and arsenals of most of their vigorous workmen. "By General Orders No. 82," states General Gorgas, over 700 men were placed in the ranks; of these perhaps one-half were competent mechanics." [2] During the last twelve months of the contest practically only superintendents, foremen, and a few indispensable mechanics in each plant were left to stagger forward with the burden as best they could; they had to substitute boys under eighteen and such men over forty-five as could be spared from some farm.

By overcoming innumerable difficulties the Ordnance Bureau was delivering some arms and munitions from eight arsenals and four supply depots before the close of the first trying year of the war. [3] Owing to the vicissitudes of war, there were other plants added and some discontinued. Those west of the Mississippi were practically closed after the capture of New Orleans. The plant at Nashville was removed to Atlanta, and then on Sherman's approach to Columbus. The one at Mount Vernon, Alabama, was transferred to Selma. "There," says Colonel Gorgas, "it grew into a large, well-ordered arsenal of the best class. It was relied on to a great extent for the equipment of the troops and fortifications in the Southern part of the Confederacy." This arsenal was later turned over to the Confederate navy and there Commander Brooke "made many, many of his formidable banded and rifled guns." [4] The arsenal, as well as the powder mill at Augusta, was a steady

[1] *Official Records*, 129, 734.
[2] *Ibid.*, 987.
[3] These were at Augusta, Baton Rouge, Charleston, Fayetteville, Little Rock, Memphis, Montgomery, Mount Vernon, Louisiana, Nashville, Richmond, San Antonio, and Savannah.
[4] Gorgas, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 83.

contributor to Southern ordnance. The strain-resisting castings made from the tough iron of this section gave to the completed batteries of field artillery from this arsenal a special value. The shops at the Montgomery arsenal were mainly used for the repair of small arms and for the manufacture of leathern articles. A factory for harness for artillery horses was set up at Clarksville, Virginia. The arsenal at Charleston was enlarged in order that it might do varied repair work. The bureau located a combination plant, consisting of foundry, shops, and ordnance laboratory, at Salisbury, North Carolina. The private arsenal at Asheville, after being taken over by the government; was moved to Columbia for greater security.

The same vexations and expense that prevailed in preparing and distributing artillery projectiles for guns of widely different calibers, existed in the small arm ammunition. The Confederate infantry, in the first months of war, bore into battle as motley an aggregation of arms as ever distressed an ordnance train.[1] Not infrequently a regiment that had exhausted its ammunition could not borrow from a neighboring regiment nor be supplied from the nearest wagons, because of a difference in the calibration of their arms.

As early as circumstances would permit, the War Department took steps to obviate this harassment and at the same time to effect an improvement in the quality of the ammunition, which in some of the arsenals had been very unsatisfactory. The first step was to appoint Major J.W. Mallett, an accomplished chemist, superintendent of all the laboratories. By a rigid system of supervision which secured more

[1] The North Carolina ordnance ledgers record the issue of these kinds of rifles: Harpers Ferry, Springfield, Confederate, North Carolina, Mississippi, Hall, Enfield, Colt, Derringer, Austrian, British, flint and steel of 1812, sporting; of two kinds of muskets and one musketoon; of three types of carbines; of single and of double-barreled shotguns.

uniformity of processes, Mallett "produced marked improvement in the ammunition fabricated, in spite of deficient labor and materials." [1] The second step was to begin two central plants at Macon, Georgia; one under Colonel Burton, to manufacture standard rifles; the other, under Colonel Mallett, to produce standard ammunition. The machinery for both the armory, which was to have a capacity of 10,000 arms a month, and the arsenal, was bought in Europe and was in Nassau and Bermuda when the war ended. A third step was to set up factories in Europe under private names and import the output. [2]

The first two armories to begin the making of small arms were those that grew out of the arsenals at Fayetteville, North Carolina, and at Richmond. Both began operations with seized machinery. When the United States armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, [3] was set on fire by the evacuating Federal troops, the gun-making machinery was saved by the Virginia soldiers, who entered on the heels of the retiring Unionists. All the machinery used for making the Mississippi rifle (caliber 54) was sent to Fayetteville where there was a small, but well appointed arsenal with a newly-installed steam service; the other machinery was transferred to Richmond.

The Fayetteville arsenal, while waiting for its gun-making equipment was kept busy by the state. Three months after North Carolina seceded, William Bell, the supervisor of the arsenal, reported that his force of eighty-seven hands was engaged in changing flint and steel muskets to percussion, in rifling smooth-bore muskets, and in putting up ammunition. [4] After the installation of its rifle-making machinery, the

[1] *Official Records*, 128, 956.
[2] Gorgas, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 85.
[3] This armory had been built and equipped at a cost of $1,470,513, and was making a superior gun. *Official Records*, 2, 6.
[4] Clark's Letter File, August 30, 1861.

armory's production, when running full-handed, was 10,000 rifles a year;[1] it rarely ran to its capacity. The Richmond arsenal and armory, working in conjunction with the Tredegar Iron Works and with private contractors, grew into an establishment of large proportions. While its capacity output of small-arms was reckoned at only 25,000 a year, it contributed a wide variety of military necessities.[2] The small arsenal at Columbia, using the machinery removed from Asheville, was counted on for 4,000 rifles each year. The armories at Tallassee, Alabama, and at Athens, Georgia, had a productive power respectively of 6,000 carbines and 10,000 rifles. By the close of 1864 these five armories could, when provided with laborers, make up 55,000 rifles a year.[3]

The Confederate soldier began on his own responsibility a system of discards as soon as he found that his government could not supply his needs. Whenever in an advance or a not too hurried retreat he passed a dead Federal who had a better rifle or a cartridge box fuller than his own, he promptly "swapped," as he termed it, with his unprotesting foe. In this personal way, the Southern soldiers acquired better arms on every partly or entirely won field. These acquisitions, added to the rifles manufactured, bought

[1] *Official Records*, 129, 987.

[2] The following synopsis of its principal issues was, as quoted by Gorgas, prepared by Colonel Brown and published in the last issue under Confederate rule of the Richmond *Enquirer*: 341 Columbiads and siege guns (these were made at the Tredegar Works, but issued from the arsenal); 1,306 field pieces (made chiefly at the Tredegar Works or captured); 1,357 gun-carriages; 875 caissons; 152 forges: 6,852 sets of artillery harness; 921,441 rounds of field, siege and sea-coast ammunition; 1,456,190 friction primers; 1,110,966 fuses; 17,423 port-fires; 3,985 rockets; 323,231 infantry arms (most of these were turned in from the army, from battle fields (captures), and from the Richmond armory); 34,067 cavalry arms (same remarks); 44,877 swords and sabres (from army, battlefields, and contractors); 375,510 sets of infantry and cavalry accoutrements; 180,181 knapsacks; 328,977 canteens and straps; 72,413,854 small arm cartridges; 115,087 gun and carbine slings; 146,901,250 percussion caps; 69,418 cavalry saddles; 85,139 cavalry bridles; 75,611 halters; 35,464 saddle blankets; 59,624 pairs of spurs; 42,285 horse-brushes; 56,903 curry-combs."

[3] *Official Records*, 129, 987.

abroad and collected by the Ordnance Department in the orderly gleaning after successful battle,[1] enabled the Confederate infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia, to which most of the North Carolina troops were attached, to join battle with rifled muskets after the middle of 1863.[2] No such approximate parity of arms was ever attained by the Confederate cavalry. The Federal cavalrymen were generally armed during the last two years of the war with the celebrated Spencer repeating carbine, a weapon far superior to that of the Confederate horsemen.

The duties of the Ordnance Bureau included the importation as well as the manufacture of war material. Shortly after his election, President Davis selected Caleb Huse, a West Point graduate who was at that time commandant of cadets at the University of Alabama, as foreign purchasing agent for arms and munitions. Huse started on his mission in April 1861, with no money, for the coffers of the two months old government were of course still bare, and with apparently no credit, for the attitude of the business men of Europe was as yet undetermined. So confident at that time were the leaders in the Gulf States of peaceful separation, that Huse would not have been sent on such a mission but for the President's conviction of its necessity. His instructions, limited to be sure by an unestablished treasury and no apprehension that America's greatest war was impending, were to place an order for 12,000 rifles, one battery of field artillery, and one or two heavy guns as models.[3]

On the day after the battle of Manassas had brought a realization that a "war of truly gigantic proportions"[4]

[1] After three battles in 1862, the Confederates collected the following numbers of rifles: Seven Pines, 6,700; Seven Days, 31,000; Second Manassas, 20,000. *Official Records*, 16, 511, 558, 945.

[2] "After Gettysburg (July 1863), the whole army in Virginia was equipped with rifled muskets," states Alexander, Lee's chief of ordnance, *Military Memoirs*, 54.

[3] The Supplies for the Confederate Army, 19.

[4] *Official Records*, 127, 494.

was opening, hasty dispatches went to Huse "to purchase at the earliest possible moment all the arms suitable to our purpose which can be obtained, from whatever places and at whatever price." [1] Huse was a man who could accept responsibility, and he at once, says Gorgas, demonstrated his fitness by buying a good supply and by running the Ordnance Bureau in debt for half a million sterling. Loans based on cotton enabled Huse and other agents to land 113,504 excellent small-arms in Southern ports by September 30, 1863. [2] With the addition of these arms to the supplies imported by the separate states and those made and captured to that date, the Confederate army had, according to Gorgas's estimate, received by July 1, 1863, about 400,000 really serviceable weapons. [3] In all these computations no account is taken of the arms manufactured by the individual states, but these numbers were never very large.

Before the Confederate agents learned to clear their cargoes in compliance with English restrictions, they were continually delayed in getting their purchases to sea. [4] After experience taught them the art

[1] *Official Records*, 127, 494.

[2] Confederate Ordnance, 74.

[3] He estimates that, after discarding its inferior arms, the Confederates had acquired their really serviceable arms in these ways:

Good rifled arms on hand at the beginning of the war	25,000
New arms manufactured to this date	40,000
Arms received from the battlefields and put in good order—includes the arms picked up by soldiers	150,000
Imported from January 1, 1862 to July 1, 1863	185,000
Total	400,000

[4] Major Huse, writing from London on December 30, 1861, sets forth his difficulties: "I have now more than enough (goods) to load three *Bermudas* and cannot ship a package, though I have a steamer off the wharf, all ready to receive her cargo. We are literally fighting two governments here. Government watchmen guard the wharf where our goods are stowed and others in the neighborhood night and day . . . and our army must suffer for the want of blankets, overcoats, shoes, socks, field forges, arms, and ammunition, which have been collected to an amount more than double that I have received. It is miserable to have to look at the immense pile of packages in the warehouse at St. Andrews wharf, and not to be able to send anything —only read the following: 25,000 rifles; 2,000 barrels of powder; 500,000 caps; 10,000 friction tubes; 500,000 cartridges; 13,000 accoutrements; 13,000 knapsacks; 13,000 gunslings; 44,328 pairs of socks; 16,484 blankets; 226 saddles; saddler's tools, artillery harness, leather, etc. Quoted by President Davis.

of legally evading maritime regulations, they still had to wrestle with exorbitant freight rates. For the sake of economy and the regulation of sailing dates, the government bought outright four iron steamers and acquired a contract interest in quite a number of others. The business grew to such proportions that a separate department under the Ordnance Bureau was created to manage this traffic. Colonel Thomas L. Bayne, who was detailed for this duty, controlled the buying and shipping of cotton from Southern ports and the reception and distribution of all government supplies. An unusually well-appointed cotton compress was installed at Wilmington and all bales were compressed before shipment.

Accoutrements and other field equipment were scarcer even than arms. Those charged in 1861 with making these field accessories were often compelled to produce the material out of which to manufacture the articles or to find a substitute for the article or for the material. A world of ingenuity was lavished on substitutes, as well as on labor and time-saving devices in the Confederate shops and laboratories. When copper, with which Brooke and other ordnance scientists banded their guns, could no longer be secured, an excellent substitute was found in tough iron bands. When the fall of Vicksburg cut off the Mexican supply of mercury the chemists found that a mixture of chlorate of potash and sulphuret of antimony made just as good guncaps as fulminate of mercury. So now when all available leather had to be reserved for the soldiers, artillery harness, and cartridge boxes, the ingenious war manufacturers, whose imaginations were stimulated by excitement, substituted stitched and painted cloth for leather. Belts, bridle-reins, and halters, saddle-girths, saddle-skirts, haversacks, were contrived out of three or four thickness of cloth stitched together and covered with varnish or shellac.

In spite of obstacles arising from limited labor, material, transportation, machinery, tools, and markets, the Ordnance Bureau was, in September, 1863—just a little over one year after its establishment—to report surprising achievements.[1] In his summary of the service of the Ordnance Bureau, Colonel Gorgas pays this tribute to his fellow-workers:

We began in April, 1861, without an arsenal, laboratory or powder mill of any capacity, and with no foundry or rolling mill except at Richmond, and before the close of 1863, in a little over two years, we had built up, during all the harassments of war, holding our own in the field definitely and successfully against a powerful and determined enemy. Crippled as we were by a depreciated currency; throttled with a blockade that deprived us

[1] The report modestly says: At the arsenals, armories, workshops, and depots, the following are a few of the principal items produced and issued:

	Repaired	*Purchased*	*Fabricated*
Heavy artillery	0	46	31
Siege artillery, and artillery of reserve	20	3	86
Field artillery	12	173	79
Siege and coast gun carriages	0	159	91
Field carriages, caissons, battery wagons, forges, etc.	567	404	302
Cavalry saddles	1,763	30,381	6,866
Saddle-blankets	45,073	2,315	0
Artillery harness (2 horse)	373	2,729	2,453
Horse shoes (pounds)	0	108,721	120,798
Horseshoe nails (pounds)	0	16,700	6,818
Bridles	600	31,379	4,478
Halters	162	39,172	16,472
Small-arms	127,862	16,246	27,752
Sabers and swords	3,397	43,559	0
Saber-belts	0	22,159	14,054
Cartridge-boxes	2,123	126,733	34,666
Cartridge-box belts	4,046	109,352	61,766
Waist-belts	2,875	132,671	72,750
Cap-pouches	1,442	157,402	41,189
Bayonet-scabbards	1,675	114,858	15,379
Knapsacks	0	108,489	27,928
Haversacks	0	46,383	226,450
Canteens	1,278	73,422	85,291
Siege and coast ammunition	246	174,329	35,335
Field ammunition	5,638	178,111	262,970
Small-arm cartridges	940,440	81,750	36,531,466
Friction-primers	0	16,099	288,526
McEvay igniters	0	78,806	0
Percussion caps (musket)	0	472,500	46,500,099
Percussion caps (sporting)	0	979,750	3,358,300
Powder (loose) (pounds)	0	40,175	1,417,882

Official Records, 128, 958.

of nearly all means of getting material or workman; obliged to send almost every able-bodied man to the field; unable to use the slave-labor with which we were abundantly supplied, except in the most unskilled departments of production; hampered by want of transportation even of the commonest supplies of food; with no stock on hand even of the articles such as steel, copper, lead, iron, leather, which we must have to build up our establishments; and in spite of these deficiencies we persevered at home as determinedly as our troops did in the field against a more tangible opposition, and in a little over two years created almost literally out of the ground foundries and rolling mills (at Selma, Richmond, Atlanta, and Macon), smelting works (at Petersburg), chemical works (at Charlotte), a powder mill far superior to any in the United States and unsurpassed by any across the ocean, and a chain of arsenals, armories, and laboratories equal in their capacity and their improved appointments to the best of those in the United States, stretching link by link from Virginia to Alabama. Our people are justly proud of the valor and constancy of the troops who bore their banners bravely in front of the enemy, but they will also reflect that these creations of skill and labor were the monuments which represented the patience, industry, and perseverance of devoted and patriotic citizens.[1]

[1] *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 89.

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS ON THE VIRGINIA COAST

The attitude of the armies confronting each other along the Potomac during the fall and winter of 1861-1862 was a puzzle to the North and to the South. Although the people of both sections who had mobilized and were maintaining these armies at enormous cost [1] were expecting a decisive conflict, the two commanders did nothing except instruct their men and glower at each other from July 25, 1861 to March, 1862. Then each marched away from the other—Johnston shifting his troops behind the Rappahannock River, and McClellan, after advancing to Johnston's evacuated camps around Centreville, retraced his steps and took shipping for Fortress Monroe. The explanation of this inaction and separation must be sought in the headquarters of the respective commanders.

The Confederate commander, General Joseph E. Johnston, who was waiting for arms and transportation, could not take the offensive. He had, therefore, after the victory at Manassas to content himself with throwing forward an observational force consisting of Longstreet's brigade and Stuart's cavalry. These troops occupied and lightly intrenched a line of hills overlooking Washington. The Confederate flag flying over Stuart's headquarters on Munson's hill was visible in the Federal capital. In their dearth of guns the Confederates mounted painted logs and stovepipes of varying caliber on wagon wheels, and installed them

[1] "By March 1, the nation had incurred a debt of $600,000,000 for the war." Webb, *The Peninsula*, 12. On October 2, 1861, the Secretary of the Treasury wrote that the expenses of the Federal Government were $1,750,000 a day. For the three weeks ending May 8, 1861, the indirect donations for the army were estimated at $23,000,000. Nicolay and Hay, IV, 260. The Confederate governmental expenses to November 16, 1861, were $68,921,-045.58. Tyler's Report as Register of the Treasury, November 19, 1861.

in brush-covered embrasures along this line, as well as at Centreville. The projecting muzzles of these Quaker guns seemed, as Longstreet jocosely remarked, "to threaten Alexandria and even the National capitol and Executive Mansion." [1]

With the coöperation of Confederate naval officers, more penetrative batteries were erected on the lower Potomac, [2] and the navigation of the river was practically closed to Federal boats. The occupation of territory so near to Washington and the blockade of the river led the committee on the conduct of the war to fear the effect on European capitals of the unchecked activity of the Confederates. This powerful committee, speaking for the national congress, demanded the raising of the blockade. [3] General McClellan wisely, however, declined to sacrifice his men in assaulting fortifications that would have to be evacuated as soon as his army was ready to take the field. The Confederates, therefore, continued unmolested on the line of hills until Johnston drew them back and consolidated his army around Centreville. As soon as this was done, McClellan added these heights to the defenses of Washington. [4] The beautiful autumn days brought firm roads and excellent campaign conditions, and the Confederates daily expected that McClellan would throw his great army against their comparatively

[1] *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 60.

[2] These batteries were erected at Freestone, Cockpit, Evansport, Acquia Creek, and Mathias Point.

[3] President Lincoln's views on the seriousness of the "beleaguring of Washington" is shown by his General War Order No. 3, of March 8, 1862. In that order he directs that "no more than two army corps (about 50,000 troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved *en route* for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries."

[4] McClellan rejoiced over the possession of this line. "The moral effect of this advance," he wrote to his wife, "will be great and it will have a bad influence on the troops of the enemy. They can no longer say that they are flaunting their dirty little flag in my face, and I hope they have taken their last look at Washington." *McClellan's Own Story*, 92.

"Fort Ramsay was built on Upton's Hill. The enemy's works on Munson's and the adjacent hills were strengthened and a lunette built near Taylor's Tavern." *Official Records*, 5, 681.

weak force.[1] Fall, however, passed with nothing more stirring in the Federal camps than grand reviews. Johnston's men, therefore, went into winter quarters in early December. The men made themselves as comfortable as their ill-provided[2] condition would permit in the notched-end, mud-plastered, log huts that afterwards became so familiar in Virginia.[3] In August and September there was much sickness and many fatalities in the camps,[4] but the health of the men improved after the first frosts.

[1] General McClellan reported to the secretary of war on October 27, 1861, that he had "present for duty 147,695 men, with an aggregate strength of 168,318. Of this number, 4,268 cavalry were completely unarmed, 3,163 partially armed, 5,979 infantry unequipped—making 13,410 unfit for the field but leaving an effective force of 134,285. He states that he had 76,285 men disposable for an advance, but had but 228 artillery pieces ready for the field, and required 112 more. This seems to have been a rapid increase for the army in ninety days, being an addition of 40,000 per month." Webb, *The Peninsula*, 6.

General Johnston thus states his numbers at a corresponding date: "At the end of October the 'effective total' of the army (by the return in my possession) was 27,000 infantry and artillery, and 2,400 cavalry at and in front of Centreville, 2,200 at Manassas Junction, 6,700 between Dumfries and the Occoquan, and 2,700 at Leesburg—in all 41,000 capable of going into battle. According to the information given us by spies, the effective force of the Federal army opposed to us was 150,000." *Johnston's Narrative*, 80.

The *Official Records*, 5, 932, give Johnston's effectives at 44,131. At that time the intelligence department of the Confederate army must have been superior to the Federal, for if McClellan's "present for duty" figures, 147,695, are used, Johnston's estimate was astray only 2,305, while McClellan's estimate of Johnston's forces on September 8, 1861 (*Official Records*, 5, 588) at 130,000 was 89,000, and his estimate on December 10, 1861 (Swinton) was 106,495 wide of the mark.

[2] There was much suffering during the winter from an insufficient supply of warm clothing and blankets. This was partly relieved before the winter was over by contributions of civilian clothes and of comforts, blankets, and carpet-blankets from each regiment's enlistment territory. The rations of the soldiers consisted largely of flour and beef. The two small railroads were congested with war material and the neighborhood was soon drained of food. Sweet potatoes sold for $3 and $4 a bushel, milk at $1 a gallon, fowls at $5 a pair. Fresh vegetables were unprocurable.

[3] "My residence consists of the roughest log house you ever saw, without a nail in it, without shutters or doors, dirt floor, but rude and common as it is, I assure you I consider it a great luxury and think myself living in magnificent style." Letter from Captain C. C. Blacknall in Blacknall's MS.

[4] "On my last morning report the total present is 18,178; the sick amount to 4,809." Johnston to Davis, August 17. *Official Records*, 5, 790. "This morning's report shows 30 on the sick list from my company, and nearly 200 from the regiment." Captain Blacknall of the Twenty-third North Carolina on August 13, 1861. "Our whole army is suffering severely. In Kirkland's regiment (Twenty-first North Carolina), only 300 out of 1100 are present for duty." *Ibid.*, September 14, 1861.

When spring began to open, Johnston became convinced that McClellan would seek a shorter route to Richmond than the one by Centreville. He therefore called in the forces of General W. H. C. Whiting on the Occoquan River, and the advanced troops at Leesburg under General D. H. Hill, and on March 9, 1862, quietly withdrew from Manassas. In spite of horrible roads,[1] his army was within two days concentrated behind the Rappahannock River, where it could interpose between McClellan and Richmond and be in close[2] communication with General Magruder's forces at Yorktown. The reasons then for the Confederate commander's apparently singular inaction and final withdrawal from his adversary's Washington front became plain.

The Federal commander's unexpected face about at this juncture had long been premeditated. On taking command at Washington on July 27, 1861, General McClellan, as already noted, at first devoted his time to fortifying the city and to what Dodge calls the "giant task of changing a mob into an army." By October, however, the city was surrounded by a system of forts impregnable to any attack from the Confederate forces,[3] and his own army was so well-organized that Horace Greeley, the greatest editor of the generation, described it as "an army superior in numbers, in intelligence, and in the essential quality

[1] Captain Blacknall of the Twenty-third North Carolina regiment thus describes the roads around Manassas: "The weather is extremely bad and the roads worse than you can imagine. I assure you that I have never seen anything like their condition. I see at every turn horses dead on the roadside or buried in the mud, unable to extricate themselves, wagons without number stuck fast in the mud, and soldiers wading nearly up to their waists in mud." Blacknall's MS.

[2] "This movement brought the Southern army nearer to Richmond, at the same time placing it on the Urbana route, thus making a landing there impossible for us, and permitting Lee to anticipate McClellan on the Virginia Peninsula." Comte de Paris in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 167.

[3] On December 10, 1861, General Barnard, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, reported that there were 48 field forts, mounting about 480 guns, included in the defenses of the city. *Official Records*, 5, 683. These defenses included a total development of 33 miles. *Ibid.*, 10, 107.

of its material to any ever led by Napoleon, and by far the largest and most effective which had ever been seen on this continent." [1] Russell of the London *Times*, who had seen all the European armies and who was a more competent critic than Greeley, had written to his paper as early as September 7, 1861: "Never, perhaps, has a finer body of men in all respects of physique been assembled by any power in the world." Yet at the head of so impressive an army McClellan, remembering McDowell's disaster, [2] exaggerating the numbers of his antagonist, and revolving other plans in his mind, only continued his daily drills and the enlargement of his camps. "Don't let them hurry me," he implored the President in October.

The swelling numbers of the army, the grand reviews conducted with marked pomp if not veteran precision on McClellan's parade grounds, the picturesque newspaper descriptions of the "Young Napoleon," as he was flatteringly styled, [3] and his wonderful success in moulding a grand army awoke a just pride in the people. They naturally desired to see their great and costly army in action. They had begun to weary of reasons for delay. [4] They burned to have Bull Run avenged on the identical spot.

[1] *The American Conflict*, I, 620.

[2] "Secesh keep quiet. I presume he wants to draw me on to Manassas to repeat the Bull Run operation, but I shan't go until ready." Letter of October 11, 1861.

[3] "Truth to tell, from the day he came to Washington, McClellan was in danger of being smothered by adulation. The North, frantic for a general to avenge its defeats and to put down secession, believed that in McClellan it had the man. It imputed to him qualities he never possessed; it glorified his undoubted points of excellence; it sought for happy parallels and propitious signs to confirm its confidence. Napoleon was short of stature—so was 'Little Mac'; Napoleon was young and self-reliant—so was 'Little Mac'; what could be more logical than to continue the parallel until it led to a Marengo and an Austerlitz for 'Little Mac'." Thayer's *John Hay*, 121. That McClellan felt this danger is evidenced by a letter of November 3: "I pray every night and every morning that I may become neither vain nor ambitious."

[4] "First," comments Greeley, "we were waiting for reinforcements—which was most reasonable; then for the requisite drilling and fitting for service—which was just as helpful to the Rebels as to us; then for the leaves to fall—so as to facilitate military movements in a country so wooded and broken as

In its beginning this popular feeling was impatient rather than distrustful, but McClellan's failure to stir against the batteries on the Potomac and the blundering Federal disaster at Ball's Bluff aroused indignation, and provoked sharp and in some quarters bitter and unjust reproaches. Like many another commander-in-chief, McClellan had to wear a chieftain's usual crown of thorns.[1] "The consequences to McClellan himself," Ropes thinks, "were naturally and inevitably most unfortunate, for distrust of him grew day by day."[2]

Nor was the clamor for an immediate onset confined to those whom the speakers of that day so often called the "patient plain people." The soldiers, wearied by the monotonous daily routine, "were ready to obey with alacrity at any moment an order to march on Richmond."[3] The Committee on the Conduct of the War "lost no opportunity of pressing the President to force his reluctant general into action."[4] The new secretary of war "began as soon as he took charge

Virginia; then for cannon—whereof we had already more than 200 first-rate field guns in Virginia; and so the long bright autumn and the colder but still favorable December wore heavily away and saw nothing of movement attempted . . . until the daily repetition of the stereotyped bulletin, 'All quiet on the Potomac'—which had at first been received with satisfaction; afterwards with complacency; at length evoked a broad and general roar of disdainful merriment." *The American Conflict*, I, 628.

[1] Rhodes cites the following illustrations of the feeling at the beginning of 1862: "It is awful and we are endeavoring to see if there is any way in God's world to get rid of the capital besieged, while Europe is looking down on us as almost a conquered people." *Chase's Diary*, January 12, 1862. "It is no wonder," declared Lovejoy in the House, January 6, 1862, "that the people are growing impatient. . . . The whole nation is waiting for the army to go forward. They have furnished the men and the money, and why does not the army move?" Writing from the office of the *Evening Post*, New York, Parke Godwin asked Sumner, what the awful and disastrous inaction of our military men means? "People here are rapidly becoming disgusted," he added, "even the most patient are losing heart, and all see that unless some grand blows are struck, the war is gone." "When," asked John Bigelow, despairingly, from over the sea, "are we to stop hearing of the great things our army and our navy and our young Napoleon are going to do, and to begin to hear of what they have done?" Anthony Trollope read public opinion correctly when he concluded that "belief in McClellan seemed to be slipping away." *History of the United States*, III, 578.

[2] *The Story of the Civil War*, I, 220.

[3] Lossing, *The Civil War in America*, II, 130.

[4] Wood and Edmonds, *The Civil War in the United States*, 48.

of his department to ply the commander of the army with continual incitements to activity." [1] The President was in great distress, and declared that if something were not soon done the bottom would be out of the whole affair, and pathetically proposed that "if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something." [2]

General McClellan, who was bent on taking his own time to make an army that would be sure of success [3] and who had determined to "carry this thing on *en grand* and crush the rebels in one campaign," [4] anticipated [5] and ignored this popular and official clamor, and remained fixed around Washington. With an unusual knowledge of the mechanics of war and with a strategic mind of high order, he felt confident that if he were allowed to perfect his field strength and plan his own campaigns, he could end the war in a short time. After apparently twice changing a determination to throw his army against Johnston at Manassas, [6] a movement on which the President and his advisers had their hearts set, McClellan laid before Mr. Stanton shortly after his appointment as secretary of war, [7] on January 13, 1862, a plan to advance, not by Manassas,

[1] Nicolay and Hay, III, 159.

[2] General McDowell's statement in Raymond's *Life of Lincoln*, 733. General Franklin's narrative, *Annals of the War*, 76.

[3] Letter to his wife, October 6, 1861, *McClellan's Own Story*, 168.

[4] *Ibid.*, August 2, 1861.

[5] "I expect all the newspapers to abuse me for delay, but I do not mind that." *Ibid.*, October 6, 1861.

[6] In the latter part of October he wrote to Secretary Cameron: "A vigorous employment of these means will, in my opinion, enable the Army of the Potomac to assume successfully this season the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon the command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it." *Official Records*, 5, 11. "February came, and on the 13th General McClellan said to me, 'In ten days I shall be in Richmond.' A little surprised at the near approach of a consummation so devoutly to be wished, I asked, 'What is your plan, General'? 'Oh,' said he, 'I mean to cross the river, attack and carry their batteries, and push on after the enemy'." Secretary Chase's Memorandum, as quoted by Nicolay and Hay, V, 164.

[7] *Official Records*, 5, 41.

but by Urbana on the lower Rappahannock River. He proposed to transport his army by boat to Urbana and thence by a swift movement to fall on Richmond and perhaps cut off Magruder on the Peninsula.

President Lincoln seriously objected to a change of routes and sought, on January 27, 1862, to take matters in his own hands by his famous War Order No. 1. This order, which Ropes regards as "a curious specimen of puerile impatience," [1] directed that "the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces," and "that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time and be ready to obey existing orders when duly given." [2] This was followed on January 31, 1862, by a special order that "all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point on the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction." [3]

These orders were not obeyed—probably were not intended to be obeyed [4]—but they did arouse McClellan, and led to a painful and tedious discussion between the President and the army commander as to the proper line of advance. It is perhaps not too much to say that the mutual doubt and distrust engendered at this critical period between the two men on whom the

[1] *The Story of the Civil War*, I, 226.
[2] *Official Records*, 5, 40.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] "Their real purpose was probably more to allay the popular impatience than anything else." *American Campaigns*, 194. "Lincoln's war orders were probably designed as much for assuring the people that something would be done as for commands to his generals." Rhodes, III, 604. " . . . it is perfectly plain that they could not have been considered by him as the outcome of a final decision of his own mind." Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, I, 229.

gravest responsibilities rested seriously affected the fortunes of the Army of the Potomac. [1]

General McClellan, who always insisted on magnifying the forces of his adversaries, was convinced that General Johnston's numbers were so large and his works at Manassas so impregnable that he could not plunge against them with an assurance of success. He was still dreaming of carrying things *en grand* and ending the war in one campaign. Moreover, if he could attain his end by strategic maneuver, he wanted to save the bloodshed that attends assaults on fixed positions. This suggested route, if he could keep the movement secret, would, without battle and without fatigue, put him within three marches of the Confederate capital and enable him with a fresh and united army to strike a divided foe. Under pressure of these convictions, he laid his preferences for the water route before the President. [2]

President Lincoln, admittedly without any knowledge of war but supported by the opinions of Generals McDowell and Franklin, whose advice he had sought during McClellan's sickness, at first stoutly adhered to the direct route by Manassas. He believed that

[1] "There never was any question in President Lincoln's case as to his right to order and direct, but the dilemma lay here—whose plans and advice should he follow where it was necessary for him to approve and decide where he did not or would not trust his own judgment? Should he lean implicitly on the general actually in command of the armies, placed there by virtue of his presumed fitness for the position, or upon other selected advisers? We are bold to say that it was doubt and hesitation upon this point that occasioned many of the blunders of the campaign. Instead of one mind, there were many minds influencing the management of military matters." Webb, *The Peninsula*, 15.

[2] In a letter to Secretary Stanton, February 3, he thus glowingly states the supposed advantages of this route: "A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He *must* do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful gives us the capital, the communication, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass under the Caudine Forks." *McClellan's Own Story*, 234.

"his plan," as he called it, kept Washington better covered, gave a safer line of retreat if disaster occurred, and was more economical in time and money.[1]

Finally the President, after much deliberation and deep distress of mind, yielded his convictions, gave up his plan, and adopted that of General McClellan for a movement by the lower Chesapeake.[2] The order permitting this movement was, however, accompanied by some restrictions as to the number of men to be left in Washington, as to the reduction of the Potomac batteries, and as to the time of departure.[3]

The implied lack of confidence contained in these restrictions intensified the lack of harmony between the two leaders.[4]

McClellan has been severely criticized[5] for the selection of the Peninsula route, and to its choice the failure of his campaign has been ascribed. Certainly

[1] Ropes thus forcibly states Mr. Lincoln's views: "The President was naturally very averse to this plan of General McClellan. It involved necessarily a serious risk, for the Army of the Potomac was to be transported from the neighborhood of Washington to the neighborhood of Richmond before the Confederate army had been even attacked or its strength in any way impaired. That army . . . was supposed by General McClellan to be 102,500 strong, and Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley was believed to have 13,000 more.(*a*) These figures, it is true, were more than twice as large as the facts warranted. Johnston had only 47,096 men, including those on the lower Potomac; Jackson's force numbered only 10,241;(*b*) but no one in Washington seems to have suspected the truth. The estimate of General McClellan appears to have been believed not only by him, but by the President and the Secretary of War.(*c*) Hence, it could not be expected that the Administration could see without alarm the departure of its main army for parts unknown, while the victor of Bull Run, with 100,000 men at his back, was within thirty miles of the capital." *The Story of the Civil War*, I, 232.

a McClellan's Report, *Official Records*, 5, 53. Reports of Allen Pinkerton, Chief of the Secret Service Corps, *Ibid.*, 736, 733. General McClellan assumed Pinkerton's figures to be correct.

b Johnston's Narrative, 84.

c Webb, *The Peninsula*, 26.

[2] Nicolay and Hay, 5, 166.

[3] *Official Records*, 5, 50.

[4] This order, says Morse, "greatly aggravated McClellan's dissatisfaction; for it expressed the survival of the President's anxiety, it hampered the general, and by its last clause placed on him a responsibility not properly his own." *Abraham Lincoln*, 341.

[5] "Vigor half equal to his ability should months ago have enabled McClellan to crush his enemy at Centreville; for, with 50,000 men, Johnston had for eight months bidden defiance to our capital, surrounded with 180,000 men." *Bird's-eye View of the Civil War*, 51. "Everything now indicates that if McClellan had chosen to obey the President's order, and to move upon the

he was misinformed as to the character of the roads, and he knew nothing apparently of the insalubrity of the Warwick and the Chickahominy marshes, but as a strategic route to Richmond under the military conditions then existing, his decision was in accord with the judgment, not only of eight out of twelve of his division commanders, but of two of the ablest military engineers in the opposing armies. General A. A. Humphreys of the Federal army approved it at the time; General E. P. Alexander of the Confederate army, looking back after some years, deemed it the logical route. [1]

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enemy in his front in the latter part of February or the first days of March, one of the cheapest victories ever gained by a fortunate general awaited him." Nicolay and Hay, V, 164. " . . . In spite even of the contempt and almost ridicule which the President incurred at the pen of McClellan, the civilian will retain a lurking sympathy with the President's preference." Morse, *Abraham Lincoln*, 337. "To suppose that by transporting the troops to Fortress Monroe, and by acting thence against Richmond, was seizing the communications of the Rebel army in Virginia—at Centreville, for instance—is to suppose that the rebels could neither see nor think nor march." Schalk, *Principles of Strategy*, 167.

[1] General Alexander interestingly comments: "There were seven campaigns under as many different commanders.

First. McDowell set out to follow the Orange and Alexandria Railway, but was defeated at Manassas in his first battle.

Second. McClellan set out from Fortress Monroe via the York River. As we shall see, he had some success. His advance was within six miles of Richmond when he was beaten at Gaines Mill. He found refuge on the James River, but his army was soon recalled to Washington.

Third. Pope, in August, 1862, followed in McDowell's footsteps along the railroad from Alexandria, and was defeated on nearly the same ground which had witnessed McDowell's defeat.

Fourth. Burnside took the railroad via Fredericksburg, and in December, 1863, met a bloody repulse at that point, and gave up his campaign.

Fifth. Hooker also took the Fredericksburg route, but was attacked at Chancellorsville so severely that he also gave up his campaign early in May, 1863.

Sixth. Meade, after repulsing Lee at Gettysburg in July, 1863, in November essayed an advance from Alexandria upon Lee's right flank at Mine Run, almost halfway between the two railroad lines. He found Lee so strongly intrenched that he withdrew without attacking.

Seventh. On May 4, 1864, Grant, with the largest force yet assembled, set out from Alexandria on a line between Meade's Mine Run and Hooker's Spottsylvania routes. Lee attacked his columns in the Wilderness. The battle thus joined raged for over eleven months, and only ended at Appomattox on April 9, 1865.

Our only concern here is to note the advantages and disadvantages of the different lines. The overland route again proved a failure. At Spottsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, Grant found Lee across his path and was unable to drive him off. His only recourse on each occasion was to move to his left and try the next road to the eastward. And

While General McClellan was preparing in his leisurely manner to obey the President's wishes for an assault on the Confederate batteries along the Potomac, the Executive office was thrilled on Sunday, March 9, 1862, by the rapid inflow of unexpected tidings. The two secretaries of President Lincoln narrate in a graphic way the perturbation [1] caused in the morning by the news of "the havoc wrought by the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads." "Then in the afternoon astonishing tidings came to reverse the morning's depression." The hastily constructed telegraph line to Fortress Monroe vibrated the news that during the very hours of their excitement the newly-finished *Monitor*, arriving at a dramatically opportune time had "neutralized" the disconcerting *Merrimac*. [2] "The exulation of the government over this providential

now every intermediate road had been tried, and, after losing 65,000 men, he was only on James River with Fortress Monroe as his base, where his fleet might have landed him at the beginning and without losing a man. Here, at last, literally *driven* into the location in front of Petersburg, Grant found himself in a position of rare strategic advantage, certain to give him possession of Richmond if properly utilized. Indeed it seems strange that it had not been realized in 1862 that the position astraddle both rivers at the junction of the James and Appomattox was the key to Richmond.

For it would force Lee to hold an exterior line of such enormous length—from the Chickahominy River to the south of Petersburg, nearly thirty miles—that it could not long be maintained. As McClellan selected the York River before the James River was opened (by the loss of Norfolk and of the ironclad *Merrimac*), he is entitled to the credit of having selected the best route available at that time. After his retreat from Richmond, he very nearly stumbled into the key position itself." *Military Memoirs*, 60-61.

[1] Secretaries Chase, Seward, Stanton, and Welles were at the White House. Their consternation was undisguised when they learned that their powerful men-of-war had been knocked about like toys by this new monster of the sea, "which came out in its scaly armor that no one could pierce." Stanton, according to Welles's description of the conference, declared that "the *Merrimac* would change the character of the war, raise the blockade, and levy contributions on the Northern seaboard cities." Then apprehensively looking down the Potomac, he deemed it "not unlikely that we shall have from one of the guns a shell or cannon ball in the White House before we leave the room." *Annals of the War*, 24. Nor were civilians alone disturbed. General McClellan sent telegrams to the commanders of seaport towns from Fort Delaware to Portland, Maine, warning them to put their ports in order lest the Merrimac should be at their doors. *Official Records*, 9, 19.

[2] Borrowing their ideas from the English and French experiments on ironclad boats in 1858, the Confederate engineers began in July, 1861, the conversion of the *Merrimac*, a United States steam vessel sunk when the Gosport navy-yard at Norfolk was evacuated, into an ironclad. The Federal engineers, mindful of the same experiments, began in October the construction

success was changed to amazement by the receipt of the intelligence that the rebel batteries on the Potomac were already abandoned; and the tale of surprises was completed by the news which came in the evening that the Confederate army had abandoned their works at Manassas." [1]

On the receipt of the news that the Confederates had moved from Centreville and Manassas, General McClellan advanced his entire army to the abandoned works. [2] Hardly had the commander-in-chief left Washington before Mr. Lincoln, in a presidential

of an impenetrable vessel. The Confederate designers, forced to use an old hull pinned their technical faith on a sloping iron shield of four inches in thickness. The Federals adopted the John Ericsson model—a revolving armored turret on a light draught iron hull. In the yards at Norfolk and at Brooklyn the workmen knew that the boat first launched could be counted on for the greatest destruction. "The contest was as much between mechanics at the start as between seamen at the close."(*a*) The Confederate boat, christened the *Virginia*, but always called the *Merrimac*, first reached fighting waters. The "havoc wrought" that is mentioned above was a fulfillment of the engineering belief that an armored vessel would be a new war power, for in brief time the *Merrimac*, with only 10 guns, sank the *Cumberland*, carrying 24 guns, and disabled the *Congress* with her 50 guns, and the *Minnesota* with an armament of 57 guns. The *Monitor*, light and rudder-wise, appeared on the morning after this destruction, and hastened to pit her power against the cumbersome *Merrimac*. Spectators in throngs fringed the shores and watched with bated breath the first combat between ironclads—a combat that revolutionized ship construction in the navies of the world. The two dissimilar but powerful adversaries pounded each other at close range for four hours without decisive results. Finally the commander of the *Monitor* was blinded by a shot against the sight-hole of the pilot house. His vessel "sheered off" to see what damage was done. The *Merrimac*, thinking the conflict over, went to her anchorage. After the Confederates abandoned Norfolk, the *Merrimac* went up the James River. Her presence there kept General McClellan from using the James River in his advance on Richmond, and, until she was blown up in May, 1862, to prevent her falling into Federal hands, his left flank was in the air. The *Monitor* foundered in a storm off Hatteras in December, 1862.

a Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of the Civil War*, 38.

[1] Nicolay and Hay, V, 172.

[2] "On the very day of our arrival sixty thousand men had crossed the Potomac on their march towards Manassas, and almost with their first step into Virginia mud the phantasmagoria of a countless host and impregnable ramparts, before which they had so long remained quiescent, dissolved quite away. . . . The vast preparation of men and warlike material—the majestic patience and docility with which the people waited through those weary and dreary months—the martial skill, courage, and caution with which our movement was ultimately made—and, at last, the tremendous shock with which we were suddenly brought up against nothing at all! The Southerners show little sense of humor nowadays, but I think they must have meant to provoke a laugh at our expense when they planted those Quaker guns. At all events, no other artillery has played upon us with such overwhelming effect." Hawthorne, *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1862.

order, terminated the military unity of the army by restricting General McClellan's command to the Department of the Potomac. The general, on arriving at Manassas, did not deem it expedient to press after General Johnston.

There arose again, therefore, the much mooted question of routes. "To change the base," writes General Webb, "seemed at this time to be the only plan which would give to the out-generaled army a chance to gain either reputation or increase of spirit." [1] Accordingly General McClellan, with the approval of his four corps commanders, decided, not on the Urbana route, but on an advance up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe. [2] He then marched back to Washington, and with the sanction of the President prepared to take boat from Alexandria.

The embarkation began on March 17, 1862, in a fleet of transports collected by Assistant Secretary of War John Tucker. The movement of soldiers first and last continued until April 5, 1862. During that time Tucker reports that he transported, with no loss except eight mules, "121,500 men, 14,952 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude." [3]

The landing of this great army so near to Norfolk and Richmond intensified the depression then prevailing in the South. Following the auspicious opening battles at Bethel and Manassas, a succession of reverses

[1] Webb, *The Peninsula*, 27.

[2] In *Battles and Leaders*, General McClellan says: "When Manassas had been abandoned by the enemy and he had withdrawn behind the Rapidan, the Urbana movement lost much of its promise, as the enemy was now in position to reach Richmond before we could do so." In *McClellan's Own Story*, after stating that the Administration prohibited the Urbana route, he writes: "They gave me the choice between the direct route overland via Manassas, and the route with Fortress Monroe as a base. Of course I selected the latter." 227.

[3] *Official Records*, 5, 46.

had befallen Southern arms. The brilliant affair at Ball's Bluff and the first day's encounter of the *Merrimac* were almost the only exceptions to the train of misadventures. The disasters began on the seaboard and were largely due to the practically unopposed Federal navy of 212 vessels. As will be seen, the forts at Hatteras Inlet on the North Carolina coast were overcome in August, 1861. The occupation of this inlet gave to the blockading fleet the control of all inland waters from Norfolk to Beaufort. The fall of Roanoke Island in February, 1862, and of New Bern in March, extended this sway over every inlet from Norfolk to Wilmington. Federal land and naval expeditions had seized Port Royal, South Carolina, had occupied the Florida ports, had established bases at will, and were now pressing hard the vastly important city of New Orleans.

Neither did inland news bring any cheer. Marshall was defeated by Garfield at Prestonburg in western Kentucky; Zollicoffer was routed and slain at Mill Spring in central Kentucky; Fort Henry on the Tennessee went down on February 6; to the frantic joy of the North [1] the heavily garrisoned but ill-defended Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River was captured by Grant on February 16; Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Confederate western armies was, as a result of these misfortunes, compelled to retire from Nashville, and Kentucky was practically under Federal control and Tennessee seriously threatened. And even now, as the Federal troops were floating down the Potomac, there came news that the redoubtable Jackson had been sharply worsted in the battle of Kernstown, Virginia.

[1] "Never was such ecstacy," wrote Holmes to Motley, "such delirium of excitement, as last Monday, when we got the news from Fort Donelson. . . . The almost universal feeling is that the rebellion is knocked on the head."

To add to the gloom arising from the reverses in the field, economic and social conditions were disquieting. The strangle-hold of the blockade was bearing hard on government and people. Gold was at a premium of fifty per cent. The price of food was so high as to sweep every luxury from the tables of all but the wealthy. As might be expected, an ill-concealed wave of criticism and reproach was sweeping over the administration.

The strength and favorable position of their armies at the opening of the campaign of 1862 were sources of gratulation to the people of the North. McClellan, as just shown, was within seventy miles of Richmond. At his Fortress Monroe base, General Wool's command of 10,000 men were doing for McClellan what a like number of his own would have to do if that command was away.[1] To the south, and planning to coöperate with McClellan, was Burnside's expeditionary force at New Bern. General McDowell, with about 40,000 men, was near Fredericksburg, and expected to close in on McClellan's right flank for united action. Generals Banks and Fremont were holding the Shenandoah Valley opposed only by Jackson's small force. In the west General Halleck, with over 100,000 men, was facing General Albert Sidney Johnston.[2] So assured were the Federal executives of approaching victory that all recruiting for the Federal armies was stopped. In government circles it was openly predicted that by midsummer the Confederacy would be crushed.

[1] Lincoln to McClellan.

[2] "At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. . . . It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion, so nearly throttled." General Barnard, *Official Records*, 10, 129.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST INVASION OF NORTH CAROLINA

After the battle of Manassas there was no further serious fighting in Virginia during the remainder of the year. Immediately thereafter, however, North Carolina, like Virginia, was to feel the horrors of hostile invasion. The invasion began on August 28, 1861, and resulted in the capture of the forts at Hatteras by Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham's fleet. This was the first step in the loss of about one-third of the state's territory—a loss which defensive preparation should have prevented. The defense of the Confederate capital was the paramount necessity at this time, and military measures elsewhere had to be subordinated to this vital obligation. Moreover, during the months when preparations could have been most easily made, the state and the Confederacy were adjusting their new and reciprocal relations and each was often uncertain what duties it was expected to undertake.

Within three months after its secession the state had made the wonderful record of organizing and transferring to the Confederate government twenty-five regiments. To these troops, two regiments of which were cavalry and one artillery, the ordnance officers had issued 22,525 small arms. Some of these arms were made in 1842, some in 1820, and not a few were flint and steel muskets of the Revolutionary period. Most of the flint and steel muskets were changed to percussion guns at the Fayetteville armory before they were issued. The legislature had designated this arsenal as one of construction, and appropriated $200,000 for the making and repairing of

arms.[1] The arming of these troops, together with gifts and guns to other states and to the Confederacy, about exhausted North Carolina's supply.[2] The military secretary writes the ordnance officer at New Bern on August 24th: "We are nearly out of percussion guns and we are now threatened with attack on the coast."[3] Company after company that could have rendered service on the exposed coast had to be declined during the summer for lack of arms. The young men of the state were at home on horseback and would have made incomparable cavalrymen, but, after the difficulties and enormous expense of equipping the First and Second regiments of cavalry, an order was published declining all tenders of cavalry companies. Nothing was more disastrous to the South than its inability to rush its entire man power into the first year's fighting. Thirty thousand more men in camp at Manassas on July 22, 1861, would in all human probability have resulted in the successful establishment of the Confederacy; the men could have been had without doubt.

Of the twenty-two infantry regiments formed in North Carolina before August 22, sixteen, the earliest ones organized and consequently the ones better equipped and disciplined, had been transferred to Virginia—in all 20,570 men.[4] The cavalry and artillery regiments were still struggling for battle equipment. This left only six regiments to defend a coast nearly four hundred miles long. Some of these six regiments had been so recently assembled that the soldiers in them did not even know their field officers by sight.

[1] Laws, Extra Session, 1861.

[2] Governor Clark reports to the Convention, on August 22, 1861, that the state had furnished small arms to states and authorities as follows: Virginia, 10,760; Maryland, 1,000; Florida, 500; Confederate States, 925; total 13,185.

[3] Winslow to Whitford, Letter Book of Military Board, 10.

[4] Winslow's Report, Legislative Documents, No. 6, p. 3, 1861.

The coast of North Carolina is peculiar in that the mainland, with the exception of Onslow County, does not touch on the ocean. Beginning at the Virginia line and extending to the mouth of the Cape Fear River, low sand bars run parallel to the mainland and separate it from the Atlantic Ocean. Enclosed between the sand bars, or banks, as the natives call them, and the mainland are the placid waters of Currituck, Albemarle, Roanoke, Croatan, Pamlico, Bogue, and Core sounds. The waters of these sounds vary in width from one to forty miles. Navigable rivers on which the principal towns of the eastern section are situated empty into the sounds. "From Albemarle Sound, the Pasquotank River afforded navigation to Elizabeth City; the Perquimans River to Hertford; the Chowan River to Winton; and the Roanoke River to Plymouth. From the Pamlico Sound the Pamlico River extended to Washington, whence the Tar River was navigable to Tarboro; the Neuse River opened wide and deep communication with New Bern, and further up to Kinston. Beaufort and Morehead City could be reached from Pamlico through Core Sound." [1] These rivers and sounds were the great market routes for all the products of the rich agricultural counties adjacent to the sounds and their tributaries. To facilitate marketing the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal had been built from Elizabeth City to Norfolk, and the route of this canal was called the back door to Norfolk. In addition, the railroad that kept open communications between Lee's army and the armies and states to the south would be in constant danger if all these waters were held by the Federal armies. Inlets at Oregon, Hatteras, Ocracoke and Beaufort indented the sand banks. As long as these inlets and the mouth of the Cape Fear River were held by

[1] Scharf, *History of the Confederate Navy*, 368.

either state or Confederate troops, North Carolina would be safe from invasion by sea. Hence the matter of defending these gateways was of paramount importance.

On its secession the state undertook the protection of its long coast line by the erection of forts at these inlets and by the establishment of a fleet of small vessels fitted by their shallow draft to defend the waters of the sounds. To lighten the load of the governor in this time of intense activity, the legislature, not profiting by the failure of the Board of War during the Revolution, created a similar body known as the Military and Naval Board. This board, consisting of Warren Winslow, Military Secretary, and Chairman, James A. J. Bradford, and Haywood W. Guion, took over most of the military activities of the state including the coast defenses.

Under the direction of the board two departments of coast defenses were established. The northern, extending from Norfolk to New River in Onslow County, was put under command of Brigadier-General Walter Gwynn; the southern comprising the sea front from New River to South Carolina, was committed to Brigadier-General Theophilus H. Holmes,[1] who had recently resigned his commission as major in the United States Army and offered his services to North Carolina, his native state. These two officers, both of course acting at that time only under state commissions, entered on their duties on May 27, 1861. Just a month later, however, all the forts in process of building, together with all those already existing, namely, Fort Caswell and Fort Johnston near Wilmington, and Fort Macon at Beaufort Inlet, were ceded to the Confederate government, but the

[1] General Holmes was graduated from the Military Academy at West Point in 1829. He served continuously in the army until his resignation in 1861. During the Mexican war he was brevetted for gallant and meritorious conduct at Monterey.

transfer of property and troops was not completed until about the middle of August.

Few officers ever had to organize departments in the face of more obstacles than did Gwynn and Holmes. The difficulties of the northern district were especially formidable. The banks on which the forts were building were barren wastes. Everything but sand, including water, had to be hauled by boat from 30 to 90 miles. New Bern, the nearest supply depot, was ninety miles distant, and at first little except food was obtainable there. Heavy guns could be secured only from the navy yard at Norfolk, and each gun had to be transported unmounted and carriages had to be constructed wherever workmen and materials could be brought together. Demands on the organizing Confederate government for cannon, small guns, stores of all sorts were so urgent and so widespread that only occasionally could a requisition be filled. As there were no munition factories in the state at the time, ammunition was always a subject of solicitude to all commanding officers. Not unduly discouraged by obstacles, Holmes and Gwynn engaged engineers, constructors, workmen, material, and went at their tasks.

Forts were built at Hatteras, six miles from the stormy cape; at Oregon Inlet just south of Roanoke Island; at Ocracoke Inlet, about thirty miles below Hatteras Inlet; and the formidable Fort Fisher, near Wilmington, was begun. The three forts already existing—Fort Macon, guarding the harbor of Beaufort, and Forts Caswell and Johnston protecting Wilmington, were strengthened, but could not be either adequately armed or fully manned. Especially did these small forts need skillful and experienced gunners. In writing to President Davis, Winslow, military secretary, says: "We have engineer officers competent to finish the fortifications at Hatteras, Ocracoke, and

on the Cape Fear."[1] This was very true. Colonel Elwood Morris, and Major W. B. Thompson, who designed and constructed the forts, were painstaking, efficient men. After the capture of Hatteras, the Federal engineer officer, Lieutenant Francis W. Farquhar, who was sent to report on improvements to Fort Hatteras, says: "The fort is well situated, and I am not able to suggest any improvements in its construction,"[2] and he adds, with reference to its permanent occupation by his government, "with guns of long range it can successfully defend itself from any fleet."[3] Unfortunately for the state, long range guns could not be obtained in time to enable the well-constructed fort to withstand the fleet sent against it. Nor did the Confederacy, with pressure on it from every quarter for men and arms, feel able to spare garrisons of strength for the forts.

An attempt to have the state man its own seaboard fortifications was made shortly after North Carolina withdrew from the Union. R. H. Smith, of Halifax County, introduced into the convention on May 28 an ordinance to raise seven regiments of troops to be used exclusively for coastal protection. After an animated discussion the ordinance was adopted by a small majority. Subsequently, however, the convention received a reassuring communication from Governor Ellis as to the defensive power of the state's forts. In this statement Governor Ellis, then in very feeble health and probably receiving his information from the Military Board, said: "If the batteries are properly served, a fact of which I could entertain no doubt, the power of the United States navy is not sufficient to effect an entrance into any one of these forts."[4] This optimistic assurance, together with

[1] Warren Winslow to President Davis, Governor Clark's Letter Book.
[2] *Official Records*, 4, 592.
[3] *Ibid.*, 591.
[4] Letter Book, 430.

the opposition of the Military Board to the ordinance and a fear that the enlistment of these regiments might interfere with the prompt meeting of the state's quota of Confederate troops, induced the convention to rescind the ordinance. Hence, when the first invasion occurred in August, 1861, and a second more formidable one in February, 1862, the state, stripped of its more seasoned troops by their transfer to the battlefields of Virginia, had only a small number of raw levies to resist the hostile encroachments.

As a second measure of defense, the state bought and armed five small steamers of light draft. These were sent to the sounds to aid in the coast defense and instructed also to seize whatever prizes they could snatch from under the guns of the Federal blockading squadron. Of course it was understood that this diminutive fleet of canal tugboats and coastwise trading vessels, converted into travesties on war vessels, could not engage in regular combat with the well-appointed men-of-war of the Federal navy, and could hope only to keep similar light draught enemy vessels out of the rivers and sounds. In the absence of a regular supply of coal they frequently had to tie up on shore and cut green wood to keep steam in their boilers. Their crews were not gunners, but fishermen, soldiers, or farmers, hurriedly taught to fire a gun. Their fuses were uncertain and their guns liable to burst after a few rounds. Yet, in spite of these things, the officers gravely spoke and wrote of the "fleet," "the flagship," "the dipping of colors," "the battle squadron." If the stakes had not been life and the issues desperation, blood, prison, death, the laugh of the satirist would have driven the "mosquito fleet," as it was called, from the waters.

The names of the members of the state's mosquito fleet were: the *Beaufort*, the *Edwards*, the *Ellis*, the *Raleigh*, and the *Winslow*. With the exception of the

Winslow, which carried two, these vessels mounted only one small gun each.[1] The officers first commissioned to serve in the North Carolina navy were as follows: W. S. Muse, Thomas M. Crossan, W. A. Roberts, David Coleman, Robert C. Duvall, lieutenants; W. T. Moore, midshipman; John Johnson, paymaster; J. W. Parkes, chief engineer; Wyatt M. Brown and Edward Warren, surgeons; O. S. Dewey and Marshall Parks, naval agents.

Before the coast defenses and the vessels were transferred to the Confederate government, the state had spent on the two combined $259,069.04.[2] At its abolition in September, 1861, the Military Board, which had controlled these expenses, reported that the total spent under its approval for all military purposes was $2,044,522.96.[3] The little fleet was sold to the Confederacy for $61,040.[4]

There were two inducements for the Federal government to fit out an expedition against the North Carolina coast:

First, the naval authorities early saw that "Hatteras inlet was the key to Albemarle Sound. From that as a military and naval base gunboats of light draft could assail the whole coast of Virginia and North Carolina from Norfolk to Cape Lookout. The position was deemed second in importance only to Norfolk."[5] Scharf, in commenting on the strategic value of these inland waters, says: "The importance of seizing and retaining possession of the North Carolina sounds was as apparent and urgent upon the United States as their defense was to the Confederate States. There safe and commodious anchorages not only afforded protection against the storms which so often prevail

[1] Scharf, *History of the Confederate Navy*.
[2] Military Board Letter Book, 48; Letters from Judge Biggs, and naval agents.
[3] *Ibid.*, 49.
[4] *Ibid.*, 23.
[5] Abbot, *Civil War in America*, 207.

along the Atlantic coast, but they were depots from which the very control line of inland communication of the Confederates might be broken, and, moreover, they were the 'back door' to Norfolk, by which the navy-yard might be regained." [1]

Second, the dangerous character of the North Carolina coast usually kept the Federal blockading vessels standing well out to sea. This remoteness of the Federal ships, together with the safe anchorage behind the bars, rendered the coast a comparatively safe haven for Southern blockade-runners, privateers, and the North Carolina navy. From the commodious inside waters the blockade-runners, with choice of several inlets for egress and with a carefully devised system of signal lights on the shores, waited dark nights and leaden days for favorable opportunities to slip to sea with valuable cargoes of cotton, tobacco, and naval stores. Privateers, or the little war craft of the state, stationing themselves at the inlets, sped out to seize passing merchant ships of the North, and convoyed them inside without possibility of being followed by the deep-draft men-of-war who so eagerly lay in wait for them.

So rich a harvest did these ships reap that a violent outcry naturally went up from the commercial circles of the North. The state-owned *Winslow*, under Thomas M. Crossan, a daring and experienced officer, assisted by Patrick H. McCarrick, midshipman, J. M. Worth, clerk, Robert Nash and J. W. Freeman, engineers, and George Wright, pilot, and a crew of about fifteen men, was among the first to operate outside of Hatteras. The *Winslow*, in her brief career, captured and brought into the sounds for condemnation the *Hannah Balch* with molasses; the bark *Lenwood* with 6,000 bags of coffee; the schooner *Lydia French*; the brig *Gilvary* with 315 tierces of

[1] *History of the Confederate Navy*, 370.

molasses; the schooner *Gordon* with fruit; the schooner *Priscilla* with 600 bushels of salt; the brig *Itasca* with 500 hogsheads of molasses; the schooner *Henry Nut* with mahogany and logwood; the schooner *Sea Witch* with fruit, besides four unknown brigs and three schooners. [1]

A schedule of prizes taken by these small craft was captured at the fall of Hatteras. It discloses that for the six weeks preceding eight schooners, seven brigs, and one bark had fallen into Confederate hands. [2] The activity in these waters of the blockade-runners, as well as the armed craft, is revealed by the sworn statement to the New York Board of Underwriters by the master of one of these prizes. He says that when he was a prisoner at New Bern he was allowed full liberty to go about. He "saw four vessels depart loaded with rice, which had been brought up from Charleston by railroad. They were reported bound for the West Indies. Two other vessels, loaded with spirits of turpentine, sailed for Halifax. There were three more vessels loading when he left. While he was at New Bern four vessels were brought there as prizes, two schooners loaded with fruit and two brigs reported loaded with sugar and molasses. He was present at an auction sale of about 600 hogsheads of sugar, which had been taken from prizes previously brought there. When he left there were twelve vessels lying in the river at anchor, all of which were prizes." [3]

N. P. Godfrey, an agent of the state department of the Federal government, reports: "I further gather that the rebels are doing a very active business through the various inlets and sounds of North Carolina, thereby meeting the wants of the army in Virginia directly through the railroads of those states. I further find that unscrupulous New England men are engaged

[1] Scharf, *History of the Confederate Navy*, 369.
[2] *Official Records*, 4, 588.
[3] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 80.

in a lucrative business, by aiding and abetting a contraband trade along the Atlantic coast from Virginia southward; that they take out papers for the West Indies, with a show of freight for that latitude, and by collusion with the rebels are taken in as prizes, discharge such contraband goods as they have, are let off, pursue their voyage to their destined port, take in contraband again in port, run down along the coast, fall a prey again, discharge all contraband, run out and return to their New England port with the balance of their cargo with a show of honesty that is surprising." [1]

To be expected, then, were the irate outbursts of Northern merchants and ship owners and their denunciations of the feebleness of the blockading squadron at this center of destruction. Equally too was it to be expected that the Federal naval commanders off this coast would be spurred to ceaseless exertion. Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy, admonishes Flag Officer Stringham, commander of Atlantic Blockading Squadron: "There is no position off the coast which you are guarding that requires greater vigilance or where well-directed efforts and demonstrations would be more highly appreciated by the government and country than North Carolina, which has been the resort of pirates and their abettors." [2]

A month later Flag Officer L. M. Goldsborough, successor to Stringham, who, sore under official pressure and newspaper complaint, [3] had resigned, warns all his commanding officers: "On the coast of North Carolina more particularly, there is an extensive scheme of deliberately concerted measures to evade our vigilance and disregard our laws. This must be

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 111.
[2] *Ibid.*, 110.
[3] *Ibid.*, 217.

broken up and every effort is to be made to accomplish the purpose effectually." [1]

Lieutenant Thos. O. Selfridge of the United States navy appears to have first suggested an expedition to destroy the forts at Hatteras and to scour Albemarle and Pamlico sounds with shallow gunboats. In a letter to Secretary Gideon Welles, dated August 10, 1861, he gives his reasons for the suggestion. He says:

> It seems the coast of Carolina is infested with a nest of privateers that have thus far escaped capture, and in the ingenious manner of cruising, are probably likely to avoid the clutches of our cruisers. Hatteras Inlet, a little south of Cape Hatteras light, seems their principal rendezvous. Here they have a fortification that protects them from assault. A lookout at the lighthouse proclaims the coast clear and a merchantman in sight; they dash out and are back again in a day with their prize. So long as these remain it will be impossible to entirely prevent their depredations, for they do not venture out when men-of-war are in sight; and in the bad weather of the coming season, cruisers cannot always keep their stations off these inlets without great risk of going ashore. [2]

Nor was the probability of such an expedition overlooked, but it was not guarded against by the Confederates. H. W. Guion, member of the Military Board, writes from Beaufort, "As we are taking prizes, and privateers from Wilmington and Charleston are coming here, the U. S. will certainly make some efforts to break up this nest; that is, if they have not been bereft of their senses." [3]

An expedition, much better appointed and more formidable than Lieutenant Selfridge had suggested, sailed from Fortress Monroe on August 26 for Hatteras. "It was," says Victor, "mainly to break up this commerce that the expedition was organized; though

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 267.
[2] *Ibid.*, 72.
[3] Guion to Winslow, Letter File of Military Board.

the ultimate purpose of a permanent occupation of North Carolina soil had much to do in encouraging the demonstration." [1]

The expedition was devised by the United States navy, and Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham was its commander. [2] It was composed of seven war vessels, carrying in all 149 guns and crews numbering 1,972, and was accompanied by transports loaded with 880 [3] infantry under General B. F. Butler, and by necessary tugs, schooners, and surf-boats. This menacing fleet rounded Cape Hatteras on August 27 and was ready for battle on the next morning.

To oppose this fleet with its long range guns and its painstakingly drilled gun crews, the Confederates had on the day of the fleet's arrival only 350 men of the 7th North Carolina Volunteers, commanded by Colonel William F. Martin. The regiment had just been organized, and the lieutenant-colonel and major received their commissions after the battle began. [4] On the arrival of the fleet Colonel Martin sent a messenger to Portsmouth, sixteen miles distant, with orders for Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Johnston to conduct to Hatteras the forces at that point. Johnston reached Hatteras with four companies about dusk on the 28th, and had to land under fire, as the forts had been bombarded during the entire day. This addition brought the total Confederate force to a little over 700 men. Commodore Samuel Barron, commanding the Confederate naval force in those waters, Colonel J. A. G. Bradford, Chief of Ordnance for North Carolina, Major W. S. G. Andrews, com-

[1] *History of the Southern Rebellion*, II, 353.

[2] The armed vessels were the *Minnesota*, 47 guns; *Wabash*, 46 guns; *Cumberland*, 24 guns; the *Susquehanna*, 15 guns; the *Pawnee*, 9 guns; *Monticello*, 3 guns; *Harriet Lane*, 5 guns. *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, xvii.

[3] The infantry forces were: 500 of the Twentieth New York, a German regiment under Colonel Weber; 220 of the Ninth New York, Colonel Hawkins; 100 Union Coast Guard, together with 60 Second U. S. Artillerymen—in all 880 men. *Official Records*, 4, 581.

[4] Gwynn's Communication, Raleigh *Standard*, Sept. 25, 1861.

mander of the artillery defenses of Hatteras and Clark, and several naval officers accompanied Johnston. Inasmuch as Commodore Barron was the most experienced officer present, he assumed the entire command at the request of Colonel Martin and Major Andrews.

This force was crowded into two small forts—Hatteras and Clark—which stood on a bleak, sandy, storm-driven coast. Fort Hatteras, the larger of these works, was a carefully built square redoubt, constructed of sand, well revetted with sod from the neighboring marshes. It mounted, not the long range guns with which Farquhar had declared that it could successfully defend itself from any fleet, but twelve smooth-bore, [1] short range guns. Five guns, including a ten-inch Columbiad, had not been mounted. Fort Clark, an irregular redoubt mounting five guns, was situated about three-fourths of a mile from Fort Hatteras, and was nearer to the sea.

On the morning of August 28 the Federal fleet opened a terrific bombardment on Fort Clark. Under cover of this fire 318 men of Weber's German regiment and two guns were landed "without opposition from the Confederates, whose garrison was unequal to defense and only large enough to give importance to its capture." [2] The landing of more Federals was prevented by the increased rolling of the surf. The fierce fire was continued on the forts during the entire day. In this attack Commodore Stringham introduced into the American navy a new form of engagement. Instead of firing from anchor, as had been the custom, he sailed his vessels in a circling column and each fired as it passed its objective. "So far as is known," says Boynton, "this was the first trial in our navy of this movement." [3] This method of naval combat was

[1] Both Scharf in *History of the Confederate Navy*, and Hawkins in *Battles and Leaders*, erroneously say 25.
[2] Scharf, *History of the Confederate Navy*, 370.
[3] Boynton, *History of the Navy*.

adopted by Admirals DuPont and Farragut, and was later used with the utmost success by Dewey and Sampson in the Spanish-American War.

Using this system and keeping out of the range of the Confederate thirty-two pounders, Stringham's squadron, with improved Paixhan, Dahlgren, and Columbiad guns, kept up an accurate and continuous fire on the forts until a threatening gale about dusk drove the heavier ships out to sea for protection. Before midday Fort Clark had vainly exhausted its ammunition, and its commander, Captain John C. Lamb, after spiking his guns, withdrew his little force to Fort Hatteras under a hot fire. These, and the reinforcements arriving in the afternoon, crowded far more men into the fort than it had been designed to protect. After Lamb's withdrawal Fort Clark was seized by Weber's infantry, its guns unspiked and turned on Hatteras. Weber's small force remained all night without food on the island, twenty-eight of them occupying Fort Clark, the others sleeping two miles away at a spot which General Gwynn says he had designated for such men of the garrison as were not needed to man the guns.

The ineffectiveness of their guns, only three of which bore on the sea front, discouraged the Confederates. "During the first hour the shells of the ships fell short, we only firing occasionally to ascertain whether our shots would reach them, and wishing to reserve our very limited supply of ammunition until the vessels might find it necessary to come nearer; but they, after some practice, got the exact range of the 9, 10, and 11 inch guns, and did not find it necessary to alter their position, while not a shot from our battery reached them with the greatest elevation we could get." [1] Colonel Martin adds: "The firing between Fort Hatteras and the enemy continued until nightfall, or

[1] Barron's Report, *Official Records*, 4, 593.

rather the fire of the enemy upon the fort continued, for they kept so well beyond the range of our guns that we only wasted our ammunition in firing on them. Fort Hatteras submitted to their fire for some hours without returning a shot."[1] In his official report Flag Officer Stringham confirms the Confederate statement in these words: "The enemy returned our fire throughout the engagement, but with no effect, their shot falling short."[2] Admiral Ammen says the defenders saw "that their fire was wholly ineffective."[3] Only two of the Federal vessels were struck during the engagement. That the escape of these vessels was not due to careless marksmanship is shown by the fact that when the *Monticello* came in range during an attempt to force the passage of the inlet, she was struck five times before she could withdraw.

A night attack on Weber's unsheltered camp was discussed and urged by some of the officers, but Commodore Barron deferred the attack in hope of further reinforcement from New Bern. The Federal fleet, aided by a less boisterous sea, renewed the bombardment from seven to eleven on the next morning. The Confederates, finding themselves without the ability to damage their adversaries, then surrendered the forts. Some of the officers felt from the first that their resistance would necessarily be ineffective. Commodore Barron reported: "In assuming this grave responsibility (the command of the post) I was not unaware that we could be shelled out of the fort."[4] Captain Thomas Sparrow, who commanded one of the reinforcing companies from Plymouth, writes: "I anticipated the result before I left Plymouth, and wrote a letter to my wife preparing her

[1] Martin's Report, *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 142.
[2] *Ibid.*, 122.
[3] *The Navy in the Civil War*, 168.
[4] *Official Records*, 4, 593.

for the worst. I knew the enemy could shell us from the ocean and that the armament of the fort was not sufficient for successful resistance. I told the Adjutant-General this in Raleigh." [1] Yet with this knowledge these men did not hesitate to enter the fort. The total Confederate loss appears to have been seven killed and about forty wounded. The Federals did not lose a man.

The immediate effect of this misfortune to the Confederates was the capture of two expensive forts, 670 men, [2] 1,000 muskets, 25 mounted and unmounted cannon, a brig loaded with cotton, and many other stores. The ultimate effect was to give the Federals control of one of the best sea entrances to the inland waters of North Carolina, and thus open the road for invasion of the state at any time; the loss of the upper sounds as a temporary home for privateers and blockade-runners; and a serious dislocation of the routes by which supplies were sent to the armies in Virginia.

The Confederates who surrendered were recognized as prisoners of war in compliance with Stringham's agreement. [3] After some months in prison, first at

[1] Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, V, 39.

[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 140.

[3] The names of the organizations and individuals surrendered were reported by the Adjutant-General as follows:

Flag Officer Samuel Barron, Lieutenant Wm. Sharp, C. S. N., Col. Wm. F. Martin, Lieut. Col. G. W. Johnston, Maj. H. A. Gilliam, Adjutant J. M. W. Poole, Capt. L. J. Johnston, Lieut. J. T. Lasselle, all of the Seventh Regiment.

Col. Jas. A. J. Bradford, Chief N. C. Ordnance, Lieut. J. G. Carraway, of the Ordnance Department.

Major W. S. G. Andrews and Lieut. Thos. H. Allen, of the Artillery and Engineers, Surgeon Wyatt M. Brown, and Asst. Surgeon W. E. Poole.

Roanoke Guards: Capt. John C. Lamb, Lieuts. Wm. Briggs and Knight.

Washington Grays: Capt. Thos. Sparrow, Lieuts. W. Shaw and A. J. Thomas.

Tar River Boys: Lieut. M. T. Moye, commanding, Lieut. G. W. Daniel, Second Lieut. Robert Greene.

Morris Guards: Lieut. G. W. Grimes, commanding, Lieuts. Morris and L. B. Johnson.

Lenoir Braves: Capt. Sutton, Lieuts. Kinsey and A. W. Ezzell.

Independent Grays: Capt. Cohoon, Lieuts. Hay and M. W. Fatherty.

Hertford Light Infantry: Capt. Thos. H. Sharpe, Lieuts. Wise and Moore.

Governor's Island and then in Boston harbor, the officers and men were exchanged and formed into the Seventeenth Regiment.

Coming as it did shortly after the utter rout of their arms at First Manassas, this success called forth great rejoicing in the North. Secretary Welles, in a letter to the commander, declared that this brilliant achievement had carried joy and gladness to the bosom of every friend of the Union. "This was our first naval victory—indeed our first victory of any kind," writes Admiral Porter, "and great was the rejoicing throughout the United States." [1]

As is usual after a disaster, there was much criticism evoked by the loss of the forts. The Confederate authorities were charged with indifference to their fate. The engineer officers were censured for want of skill. The ordnance department was blamed for not furnishing better guns and shells. "Why," queries the Raleigh *Register*, "did not our force of seven or eight hundred men kill, drive into the sea, or capture the enemy's force of 300 or 400 men who spent the night in 600 yards of our troops?" [2] Nor were there allegations lacking that want of energy and drunkenness among some of the officers charged with preparations for the defense of the coast had interfered with sustained efforts to make the coast forts tenable. The most unanswerable reflection was that, as it was impossible with their armament to hold the forts against an organized navy, the authorities should have mitigated the loss by a timely withdrawal of the garrison. The critics were, however, aware that the Confederate government was still in its swaddling clothes, with all its officers new to their duties, and

Preston Guards: Capt. Duke, Lieuts. Dell, Lamb, Taylor.
Hamilton Guards: Capt. L. L. Clements, Lieuts. Whitley and Griffin.
N. C. Defenders: Capt. J. M. C. Luke, Lieuts. Shannon and Nor. Fayetteville *Observer*.

[1] *Naval History of the Civil War*, 147.
[2] Editorial, September 11.

that its scant supply of munitions had to be distributed among its constituent states. Hence, after an outburst of indignation over the discomfiture at their doors, they again united in efforts to forestall further calamity.

On the occupation by the Federals of Forts Hatteras and Clark, a panic spread among the inhabitants of the banks. The terror of the people was increased by the Confederate abandonment of the two other strongholds on the banks—namely, Fort Oregon, at Oregon Inlet, about 50 miles north of Hatteras, and Fort Ocracoke, about 16 miles south of the fallen forts. The entire state joined in surprise and consternation over the evacuation of these two costly and skillfully constructed forts before even a ramrod was waved in their direction. The legislature demanded a report as to the abandonment of Oregon,[1] and the department commander, General Gatlin, a court of inquiry to ascertain the facts in reference to Ocracoke.[2]

The fort at Oregon was designed and built by Chief Engineer Colonel Elwood Morris, and Assistant Engineer C. R. Barney. The manual work was done almost entirely by 150 free negroes hired by the state. Colonel Morris stated that he could not get the soldiers to swing picks and shovels as the North Carolinians in Virginia did.[3] The fort mounted 13 good guns and had a sea battery with 5 more. Commander T. T. Hunter said that the fort was a beautiful piece of engineering work, but, he thought, worthless on accout of its situation.[4] At the time of its abandonment on the first day of September, it was held by three companies of the Seventh North Carolina Volunteers under command of Captain

[1] Senate Journal, Second Extra Session, 102.
[2] Adjutant-General's Letter Book, 78.
[3] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 792.
[4] Report to Flag Officer Forrest.

D. McD. Lindsey. The three companies, including about 25 men who had escaped from Hatteras, numbered nearly 300 men. [1]

Immediately after hearing of the disaster to his regiment at Hatteras, Lindsey called a council of war to which he invited Commander T. T. Hunter of the Confederate Navy, who was then at the head of an expedition for the defense of North Carolina waters. The council, with only the dissenting votes of Chief Engineer Elwood Morris, Captain Lindsey, and Lieutenant Mercer, recommended the abandonment of the fort without battle. "The reasons given for our evacuation were the isolated situation of the island, the exposure to attack from sea and land, the scarcity of our ammunition, and the fact that it was in the power of the enemy to cut off entirely all supplies of provisions, ammunition, or men." [2]

Commander Hunter did not, of course, vote in the council meetings, but he thought the fort was so situated as to be untenable and useless and, hence, favored the evacuation. He insisted, however, that it should not be abandoned until every gun and every other articles of public property had been removed, and he left the *Raleigh* and four schooners, under Commander J. W. Alexander to transfer men and property to Roanoke Island. Hunter complains that the soldiers spiked the guns without an effort to remove them or other property and, in spite of the remonstrance of Alexander, used his vessels only to convey themselves to Roanoke. [3] Captain Lindsey says that he tried to move the cannon, but failed in the attempt.

Colonel Morris thought that the soldiers were unduly influenced by Hunter's views as to the inutility of the fort. He says: "My protest was unavailing—the evacuation was carried out with great loss and

[1] Morris to Winslow, Sept. 5, 1861, Military Board Letter File.
[2] Lindsey's report to Adjutant-General Martin, Letter File, Sept. 3, 1861.
[3] Hunter to Flag Officer Forrest.

damage to public property . . . it seems to be my duty as engineer of the post to state explicitly that this evacuation of a strong fortress just finished, just mounted with armament, and not even threatened by the enemy, was not justified by any military necessity." [1]

Governor Clark, in a memorandum sent to the Adjutant General, says: "Governor Clark disapproves both of the abandonment of Fort Oregon and the manner in which it (was) done." [2]

Fort Ocracoke, considered the most impregnable fortification on the northern section of coast, was on Beacon Island. It could not be approached within five miles by the heavy ships of the enemy, and could be attacked only by vessels of light draft and inferior power. [3] It was inspected on August 23 by Colonel James A. J. Bradford. He describes the fort as a square redoubt with epaulments, constructed of moist sods twenty-four feet thick, and capable of resist ng any bombardment directed against it. The middle of the terreplein was occupied by an earth bomb-proof mound, covering the cistern of eighteen thousand gallons capacity and two spacious galleries for the storage of munitions.

The armament of the fort at that time consisted of two eight-inch Columbiads and seven thirty-two pound cannon. The remainder of its guns—nine in all, were lying on their platforms waiting for their carriages to arrive from New Bern. Four guns were also lying on the beach near Portsmouth. Bradford found that the supply of powder, shell, shot, friction primers, fuses, was wholly inadequate [4]

As will be remembered four companies from this fort and the neighboring village of Portsmouth were

[1] Report to Military Board, Letter File, Sept. 5, 1861.
[2] Letter File, Feb. 15, 1861.
[3] Morris to Military Board, Letter File, Sept. 5, 1861.
[4] Bradford's Report, Military Board, Letter File, Aug. 23, 1861.

summoned to Hatteras during the battle of August 28. When the small forces remaining at Ocracoke under command of Captains J. H. Swindell and Jas. J. Leith heard of the capture of their comrades at Hatteras, they abandoned the fort which had been built with so much care and armed under so many difficulties, and retired to Washington.[1] As soon as the abandonment of the fort was communicated to Commander S. C. Rowan of the United States *Pawnee*, stationed at Hatteras, he sent the steamer *Fanny*, accompanied by an armed launch, to Ocracoke. Lieutenant J. G. Maxwell, commanding the *Fanny*, destroyed the guns and burned as much of the fort as was combustible.[2]

In reply to a legislative inquiry for information as to the abandonment, Governor Clark answered that his only information on the subject was that the fort was left in charge of Captains Leith and Swindell with their companies, or portions of them, and that they left the next day.[3] A court of inquiry on the conduct of these officers was ordered by General Gatlin. The findings of this court, which are not on file, were submitted to Governor Clark in December, and he suggested that the two officers should resign.[4] Captain Leith must have retained General Gatlin's confidence, for he was again elected captain on the reorganization of the regiment, and was killed while actively and bravely engaged in the battle of Newport in February, 1864.

Thus in one week all the fortifications guarding the inlets to the Albemarle and Pamlico sounds fell under Federal sway. As the Federal fleet had now absolute control of the sea and of the inlets and a safe lodgment on the banks, the way was clear for the second disastrous invasion of the state.

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 161.
[2] *Ibid.*, 223.
[3] Clark to Dortch, Sept. 7, 1861, Clark Letter File.
[4] Martin to Gatlin, Adjutant-General's Letter Book, 78.

In the weeks immediately succeeding there were two slight alleviations of the gloom occasioned by these disasters. To protect such natives as had taken an oath of allegiance to the Federal government after they were left defenseless, and to prevent surprise from a land force,[1] the Twentieth Indiana Regiment was moved up the banks to Chicamacomico, or Loggerhead Inlet, about forty miles north of Fort Hatteras. Captain W. F. Lynch, who succeeded Commodore Barron as Confederate naval commander on the sounds, and Colonel A. R. Wright, who was stationed on Roanoke Island with his Third Georgia Regiment, were informed that the Federal armed steamer *Fanny* was loading at Hatteras with supplies for Chicamacomico. The two officers determined to improvise a fleet to capture the vessel. The character of their "fleet" illustrates the hardihood of the officers as well as the travesty on preparation with which a people had gone into serious war.

Lynch selected the *Raleigh*, commanded by Lieutenant J. W. Alexander, the *Junaluska*, under Midshipman W. H. Vernon, and the *Curlew*, which was to be his flagship, as best suited for his needs. The *Raleigh* was armed with two six pound, smoothbore howitzers. The other two had no guns and no gun crews. On the *Junaluska*, a canal tug-boat, a six pound field gun was mounted. On his own vessel, which had been a passenger boat on the sound, Lynch placed a thirty-two pounder drawn from one of the forts and an old twelve pound gun on its field carriage. Crews to man these guns were selected from the Georgia regiment. Their only previous naval experience had been a journey through the Dismal Swamp canal from Norfolk to Roanoke. After drilling these men for two days and loading three companies of Colonel Wright's infantry on board, the fleet set

[1] Hawkins in *Battles and Leaders*, I, 637.

out for conquest. It came up with the *Fanny* off Chicamacomico and, after an exchange of shots, the Federal boat surrendered. [1]

The second minor success on the coast was the capture of the Federal camp at Chicamacomico. Colonel Wright, assisted by Colonel H. M. Shaw, whose regiment, the Eighth North Carolina, pitched its tents at Roanoke on September 21, were taken over to the banks by Lynch's mosquito fleet. The Georgians landed and drove the Indiana regiment down the beach at so rapid a gait that the affair was known as the Chicamacomico races. Colonel Shaw tried to land his troops so as to intercept the retreating Indiana troops, but his men, in spite of much wading, found it impossible to land at the point designated. Twenty-nine of the Indianians were taken prisoners. [2]

Colonel Rush C. Hawkins of the Ninth New York was assigned to command the captured territory around Hatteras. The banks on which his post was situated were sandy wastes, inhabited at that time by "a class of people who subsist from fishing and hunting as well as from cargoes stranded upon the stormy coast. . . . The islanders mingle but little with the world; apparently indifferent to this outside sphere, they constitute a world within themselves." In describing his relations to these people, Colonel Hawkins writes: "The people on this strip of land have been peculiarly situated. Since the secession of this state their means of subsistence have been completely taken away, and now they are mostly without food or clothing." [3] Both Hawkins and Naval Commander S. C. Rowan suggested that the

[1] The crew of the *Fanny* consisted of 49 men. Her cargo was valued at $150,000. Especially welcome to the Confederates were 250 Sawyer shells, 75,000 canister shot, 1,000 overcoats, 1,000 coats, and 1,000 pairs of shoes, which were among her stores.

[2] Snead, *Sketch of Georgia Regiment.*

[3] *Official Records*, 4, 610.

United States government should furnish supplies to the destitute among them. Some of the inhabitants, unwilling to live under officers of the Federal government abandoned their homes and escaped to the mainland. Some were already in the Confederate army.

Hawkins offered to allow these destitute people, cut off from the protection of their state, to remain in their homes if they would take an oath of allegiance to the Federal government. About 250, he reports,[1] took such an oath on his verbal assurance that he would give them whatever protection might appear necessary.[2]

Both Colonel Hawkins and Commander S. C. Rowan of the naval forces were possessed of two delusions at this time. The first was that around the sounds the sympathies of perhaps a majority of the people were with the Federal government. Rowan writes to the secretary of the navy, "I am informed that there are thousands of loyal men residing on the waters of the sound, who only want protection to make themselves heard and felt in this struggle."[3] Colonel Hawkins reports: "I am informed by some of these people that secret Union meetings have been held in several of the counties bordering on Pamlico Sound, and that they would openly avow themselves true to the United States government if they were sure that they would be protected against the violence of the secessionists. It is also thought that a Union Convention would be called at once, and that these counties would vote themselves back in the Union and take up arms to defend themselves if necessary."[4]

He, therefore, suggests that a thousand Union soldiers be scattered through one or two supposedly

[1] *Official Records*, 4, 608.

[2] A few days later Hawkins says all the people who live in the strip of land from Hatteras Inlet to Oregon Inlet have taken the oath. *Ibid.*, 609.

[3] Rowan to Welles, *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 161.

[4] Report to Wool, *Official Records*, 4, 608.

disaffected counties and that the people hold a convention under the protection of the soldiers. "Could this be done now," he is sure, "that one-third of North Carolina would be back in the Union within two weeks." [1]

The second delusion of these officers was that the disaffection to the State and to the Confederacy was among a class of people that would make themselves, as Rowan puts it, "heard and felt in this struggle."

That there was indifference and a certain amount of disloyalty to the Confederacy along the coast is undeniable. Lieutenant W. H. Parker, commanding a Confederate steamer near the mouth of the Neuse, reports that he had the names of sixty men in Craven County who were treasonably affected. [2] B. F. Havens, chairman of the committee of safety of Beaufort County, says of that county: "He [the militia colonel] informs us that in many places in the lower part of our county there is a perfect indifference to the state of our country." [3] General Gatlin, commenting on a statement as to Washington County that had been made by "two intelligent and worthy citizens" of that county, says: "If I am correctly informed, the feeling is not confined to Washington County, but has its ramifications along the sounds in many directions." [4]

It is equally undeniable, however, that this disaffection was confined largely to a class of persons who never make themselves heard or felt in any struggle. Snead, who spent some months as a soldier on Roanoke Island, illustrates the character of the "bankers" that were bargaining with Hawkins by this habit: "Their indifference or neutrality was evinced by raising white flags to their house-tops on the approach of either Confederates of Federals." W. E. DeMill

[1] Report to Wool, *Official Records*, 4, 608.
[2] Gatlin, through Riddick to Clark, Letter File, Sept. 28, 1861.
[3] Havens to Clark, Letter File, Sept. 7, 1861.
[4] *Official Records*, 4, 671.

of Beaufort County, in a letter to Governor Clark, speaks of these malcontents as "the lower class of the once so-called Unionist party." [1]

Hawkins and his associates, who had little time to learn the character of most of these people, earnestly endeavored to use them as soldiers and as framers of a reactionary state government. First, an effort deemed so important as to receive the personal consideration of the commander-in-chief of the armies, General Scott, and the President of the United States, was made to enlist the dissatisfied men in the Union army. President Lincoln writes to General Scott: "Since conversing with you I have concluded to request you to frame an order for recruiting North Carolinians at Fort Hatteras. I suggest it be so framed as for us to accept a smaller force—even a company—if we cannot get a regiment or more. What is necessary to now say about officers, you will judge. Governor Seward says he has a nephew (Clarence A. Seward, I believe) who would be willing to go and play colonel and assist in raising the force." [2] The number of whites who expressed a willingness to enlist was so small that it was not found necessary to convert young Seward into a colonel.

The next effort was to use these dissentients to expedite a convention in which "these counties would vote themselves back into the Union, and take up arms to defend themselves if necessary." [3] To pave the way with reasons for those who wanted to attend, Hawkins issued an "Address to the People of North Carolina." This was distributed by the hands of his emissaries and copies were mailed to the mayors of the leading towns. In the address he assured them that the Federals had not come to pillage and plunder.

[1] Clark's Letter File, Sept. 12, 1861.
[2] *Official Records*, 4, 613.
[3] Hawkins, *Official Records*, 4, 608.

"We come," he declares, "to give you back law, order, the Constitution, and your rights under it, and to restore peace." [1]

The address would have carried more force could the islanders among whom the Federal troops were quartered have assured their friends on the mainland that their property had not been "pil aged and plundered." Even Hawkins would not claim such exemption, for he reports to his commanding officer, "I regret to be compelled to state to you that the conduct of the men and some of the officers of the Twentieth New York Volunteers has been that of vandals. They have plundered and destroyed." After stating how they had rifled the boxes and trunks and fired the quarters of the captured Confederates, he adds, "The next day they commenced breaking open private houses and stores, and I saw party after party come in, some of them headed by commissioned officers, loaded down with the result of their plundering. This conduct continued until I was compelled to adopt the most severe and stringent measures." [2]

From the islanders, who were so destitute that two commanders wanted the Federal government to feed and clothe them, these soldiers plundered property the value of which Hawkins estimated at $5,000. [3] Lieutenant Farquhar, of the Federal engineers, foresaw in early September what Lowry, of the Federal navy, realized in October, for in September Farquhar was disturbed to find that "all the inhabitants that I conversed with unite in complaining of the vandalism of our troops, some houses being completely rifled. Such conduct on the part of our soldiers is but little calculated to conciliate those who may be useful to us." [4] This pillaging went far towards working a

[1] *Official Records*, 4, 658.
[2] *Ibid.*, 608.
[3] *Ibid.*, 616.
[4] *Ibid.*, 592.

change in the attitude of even those who had taken the oath of allegiance. A month after the Federal activities began, Lieutenant Lowry reports to Commander Stellwagen, "The idea of the Union sentiment which is thought to exist in this state is incorrect, I think. The people are now hostile, if they were not a few weeks since." [1]

Two adventurers, neither a native of the state, and each a mere self-seeker, came forward as leaders of the dissatisfied Unionists. Both, while nominally representative, were really Federally inspired. One of these, Marble Nash Taylor, a Virginian by birth, was at the time a Methodist minister, the character of whose appointments indicates that he was lacking in force of mind. It seems that on coming to North Carolina, he applied for orders in the Baptist Church, but was refused. [2] The other leader, Charles Henry Foster, was a native of Maine and a graduate of Bowdoin College. In a letter to Governor Ellis, Foster states that he had recently resigned an office in Washington City. He had, however, previously edited a warmly Southern paper in Murfreesboro. [3]

These two made their way to New York to invoke sympathy and relief for the Unionists of North Carolina. A large meeting in that city, presided over by the historian, George Bancroft, and attended by such men as William Cullen Bryant, A. T. Stewart, W. B. Astor, General Burnside, and others, was imposed on by Taylor's narrative. The Federal government was

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 304.

[2] New Bern *Progress*, Dec. 17, 1861. The difference between Taylor as painted to Seward by his co-worker Foster and as delineated to the people by an upholder of the constituted state government is manifest in two appraisals of his character. Foster writes, "Our governor will be a man of age and experience, incorruptible, and of true fidelity to the Union." *Official Records*, 122, 631. A correspondent of the Fayetteville *Observer*, Dec. 16, 1861, says: "Marble Taylor is emphatically a small man—small in stature, small in mind, small in morals. His tallow complexion resembles a whited sepulchre, and his eyes, mouth, and chin resemble dead men's bones."

[3] New Bern *Progress*, Dec. 12, 1861.

induced to transport the two back to North Carolina by Foster's representations that 60,000 Unionists, including the "great mining, railroad, and other large property interests of the state," were waiting to recognize the government that he and Taylor would initiate at Hatteras. [1]

The schemers arrived in time to induce the so-called Hatteras Convention, held on November 18, to adopt a form of government that had been proposed in New York. Although they claimed that forty-five counties were represented, only eight men attended. Proxies [2] gathered from several states supposedly represented absent delegates. The convention of eight adopted a succession of ordinances declaring all state offices vacant, Marble Nash Taylor Provisional Governor, the Federal Constitution in full force, the state ordinance of secession null and void, and providing for the election of members of Congress. Two days after the convention Taylor issued a proclamation, in which he ordered elections for congressmen and urged all good citizens to return to their allegiance to the United States government. Under this order an election, in which the voters of Hyde County alone participated, was held. Foster received all the votes cast, only a small number. [3] He thereupon presented himself to Congress with credentials which he declared "rightfully if not legally" entitled him to a seat.

[1] *Official Records*, 122, 631.

[2] The following, quoted by Hamilton in *Reconstruction in North Carolina* is one of the proxies:

LIMA, N. Y., Nov. 15, 1861

DEAR SIR: I address you this line to request you to represent the Union men of Onslow County, North Carolina, in the State Convention to organize a provincial government, having once been a resident of the county and knowing something of the feeling there existing.

I am, respectively,

Rev. M. N. Taylor. J. W. BAILEY.

[3] In spite of alarming rumors as to disaffection in Hyde County, Major E. D. Hall, who with two companies of the Seventh Regiment had been sent into the county, reported to General Gatlin that the citizens proper of Hyde were loyal and true. Gatlin to Clark, Sept. 22, Letter Book, 134.

After an investigation of the farcical proceeding and the disclosure of the fact that in a district of over nine thousand voters Foster received, according to his own admission, not over four hundred, Congress denied his claim to a seat and also refused his application for expenses incurred in the contest. With this refusal and with the arrest by state officers of some of the adherents of the movement, the provisional government, in the language of the newspapers of that date, "collapsed in the faces of those who were conjuring up illusions for the delusion of others."

CHAPTER VII

THE FEDERAL ADVANCE INTO NORTH CAROLINA

The loss of the inlets fortified to bar the way to the mainland, the occupancy by the enemy of a part of its territory, the impossibility with the means at hand of fortifying each navigable river flowing into the sounds, and the expectancy of another invading flotilla set the state aquiver with disquietude. People at that time were accustomed to look to the state for their safe-guarding. Hence, during the fall of 1861, petitions for protection poured into the governor's office from the eastern towns. Individuals as well as delegations made trips to Raleigh to invoke the state's watchful interest in their homes and property. Governor Clark had to explain even to the convention [1] that, as the state had conveyed to the Confederacy all its troops, arms, arsenals, fleet, and forts, the executive was powerless except to direct a neglected militia and such newly assembled regiments as were yet unarmed and too raw to be accepted by the inspectors for the Confederacy.

So evident was the inability of the state under these circumstances to withstand a powerful attack from a combined army and naval expedition that two weeks after the Federals occupied the country around Hatteras, Governor Clark, by the direction of the legislature, dispatched George Davis and General L. O'B. Branch to Richmond to urge on President Davis the return to North Carolina for this emergency of some of the state's most seasoned regiments. Mr. Davis, however, assured the commissioners that the Federals were making these demonstrations against

[1] Letter Book, p. 257.

Southern States for the purpose of having troops called home. If withdrawals of state troops were permitted, the armies of the Confederacy in Virginia would speedily be crushed.[1]

In a letter to the secretary of war, Judah P. Benjamin, Governor Clark points out clearly the condition of the state:

> I have received various rumors of large fleets and expeditions fitting out at New York and Fortress Monroe, supposed to be designed for our coast. I will make all preparations in my power to repel any invasion, but my resources are now restricted almost to the militia—and they are unarmed, undrilled, and some not yet organized. But with all their imperfections they have been ordered to hold themselves ready with whatever arms and ammunition they have.
>
> We feel very defenseless here without arms, and I will not again report to you that this has been effected by our generosity to others. . . . We see just over our lines in Virginia, near Suffolk, two or three North Carolina Regiments, well-armed, and well-drilled, who are not allowed to come to the defense of their homes—and two of them posted remote from any point of attack. This is not a criticism on their military position, but rather a suggestion of anxiety to have their services when we are so seriously threatened. . . .
>
> We are threatened with an expedition of 15,000 men. That [number] is just the amount of our seaboard army, extended along four hundred miles of territory, and at no point can we spare a man, and without arms we can't increase it. Our forts might resist their attack and landing, but out of reach of the forts we cannot concentrate a force of any magnitude. We have now collected in camps about three regiments without arms, and our only reliance is the slow collection of shotguns and hunting rifles, and it is difficult to buy because the people are now hugging their a ms to their own bosoms for their defense.[2]

The surrender of Southern territory also aroused the Confederate government to a closer surveillance of military conditions in North Carolina. The secretary of the navy wrote to Governor Clark, "I regret

[1] Report of Davis and Branch, Letter Book, 107.
[2] Letter Book, p. 181.

the affair at Hatteras as a serious loss, and everything within the power of this department shall be done to avert the consequences which it would seem to entail." [1] The secretary of war, in response to the governor's urgent requests, answered with promises of help but added: "Pray consider that the war has recently assumed such formidable dimensions as to make it impossible that human beings can satisfy all the exigencies of all the people at every point that may be exposed or threatened by attack. In Missouri, in Kentucky, in Western Virginia, on the Potomac, in the Peninsula, on the whole Southern seaboard, in Western Texas, everywhere, ceaseless effort and vigilance are required." [2]

To aid in organizing the defenses of the state, officers of the Confederacy were appointed to take charge. Major R. C. Gatlin, [3] who had just resigned from the United States army, was commissioned a brigadier-general on August 19, and assigned to the Department of North Carolina. Brigadier-General Joseph R. Anderson of Virginia was, on September 7, ordered to take charge of the defenses around Wilmington, and, at the twice repeated request of Governor Clark, General D. H. Hill was relieved at Yorktown and directed to assume command of the defenses between Albemarle Sound and the Neuse River and Pamlico Sound, including those waters.

Almost immediately after he established his headquarters at Goldsboro, General Gatlin wrote to the War Department that with Hatteras in the possession of the enemy, the only hope for protection to the eastern counties would be to maintain ascendancy

[1] Letter Book, Mallory to Clark, 121.

[2] Benjamin to Clark, Executive Letter File, Sept. 29, 1861.

[3] General Gatlin, a native of Perquimans County, North Carolina, was graduated from West Point in 1832. He was a veteran of both the Mexican and the Seminole wars. At the time of his resignation he was a major in the Fifth Infantry. He commanded the department of North Carolina until Sept., 1862, when he resigned. He served as adjutant general of the state from Sept., 1863, to the close of the war.

upon the sounds and rivers.[1] This could be done only by building or buying a large number of gunboats for these waters. Secretary Benjamin approved the plan and ordered its execution. He informs Governor Clark, on September 29, "Large and costly additions are now being made to the full extent of the resources of your state in ship-building, new boats are contracted for, and all boats that can be converted into war steamers have been ordered purchased."[2] The "resources of the state in ship-building" were sadly circumscribed in 1861. The arming, feeding, and clothing of twenty-five thousand soldiers, hastily assembled, absorbed almost every energy of an agricultural people. However, by the aid of detailed soldiers, supplemented by negro mechanics and laborers, a few boats were built; others, light of structure and farcically unfit for war service, were bought and improvised into gunboats. With a practical vision far in advance of their generation the officers of the Confederate navy undertook a little later to build for coastal service one hundred gunboats of identical pattern,[3] "standardized vessels" as they were called in our recent war with Germany. Contracts for similar vessels were also let to private corporations. While some ships of various types were secured and rendered excellent service, the number for the first year especially was small.

The difficulties of building anywhere in the Confederacy were almost insuperable. "The South was without any large force of skilled mechanics, and such as it had were early summoned to the army. There were only three rolling mills in the country, two of which were in Tennessee; the third in Alabama was unfitted for heavy work. There were hardly any machine shops that were prepared to supply the best

[1] *Official Records*, 4, 574.
[2] Executive Letter File, IX.
[3] Maury to Lynch, *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 634.

kind of workmanship. . . . Worst of all, there was no raw material except what was standing in the forests." [1]

Hence, General Gatlin in his endeavors to hold a coast line of about four hundred miles could count on only a few boats for interior waters. For the rest of his defenses he would have to rely on the incompleted and badly placed new forts at Roanoke Island, on the old fort at Macon, on the old and new forts around Wilmington, and on batteries scattered along the navigable rivers. The Confederates in North Carolina as well as elsewhere, as General Hill pointed out as soon as he had traversed his district, were making the mistake of trying to hold too many points with a few troops at each, instead of maintaining a few strong positions in heavy force.

Generals Anderson and Hill at once made personal surveys of their extended districts. Each was startled to find the weakness of the lines he was expected to hold and the paucity of troops with which these lines were to be either further fortified or held. Each, too, was somewhat dismayed to encounter a listlessness among the people as to the necessity of earnest effort to forestall disaster. This apathy had been engendered by a false belief as to the fighting ability and earnestness of the North and by undue confidence in what had already been done.

General Anderson had in September only [2] 4,669 men present for duty in his district. These were dispersed at eight different points, namely, Fort Caswell 404, Fort Johnston 487, Camp Wyatt 740, Confederate Point 85, Camp Davis 1,016, Wilmington 1,691, Camp Winslow 68, Camp Hopkins 103. In the weak condition of the district Anderson at once saw the ripe opportunity of the Federals with their

[1] Soley, *The Blockade and Cruisers*, Appendix.
[2] *Official Records*, 4, 662.

unopposed navy to capture Wilmington, ascend the Cape Fear, destroy or hold the railroads, and thus cut the vital communications of the state. He asked for four additional regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and three light batteries of field artillery. He also deemed it imperative for at least three regiments of reserves to be stationed at Goldsboro to be thrown against an attack against either Wilmington or New Bern. The reserves were ordered to Goldsboro, but instead of getting additional infantry and artillery at the mouth of the Cape Fear, two of his own regiments, Clingman's and Radcliffe's, and Moore's battery were, in November, dispatched to Charleston when the South Carolina coast was endangered. Wilmington, destined through the blockade runners to be a main depot of supplies for the Confederacy, would have been at any time during the summer or fall of 1862 an easy prey for such an expedition as was sent against Roanoke.

The Federals, however, having secured most excellent vantage ground at Hatteras elected to strike first at the upper coast. They had hardly repaired the damage to the captured forts before the active-minded officers on duty there were insistent in their appeals to the government to follow up their initial successes. Commander S. C. Rowan wrote to the secretary of the navy only five days after the battle, "had we an organized force of small steamers we could ere this have destroyed a great portion of the commerce and been in possession of Roanoke Island, which is the key to Norfolk." [1] Two days later he suggests to Fox, assistant secretary of the navy, the very plan of procedure afterwards followed in the Burnside expedition. He says "I wrote you a short note by the flagship urging you to hold this place [Hatteras], knowing that you would at once see its importance

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 160.

as the basis of military operations. . . . A glance at the map will show you, I think, that a dash through the sound for Beaufort would be the strategic move for naval operations, combined, of course, with a military force. Beaufort once in our possession and held, the forts would soon fall, and we should have one good port for John Bull. Then dash at New Bern and get possession of the railroad. The other strategic point is Roanoke Island, which, if taken, should be held until the canal is destroyed, when the navy men apprehend no further annoyance from Norfolk." [1] Commander Stellwagen supplements Rowan s thought by declaring, "We must have vessels enough to finish things at a dash, close the canal, and reduce the towns of New Bern, Washington, etc., and retake or burn their prizes." [2]

The army was not behind the navy in opportune sagacity. Colonel Hawkins was ordered to Washington to present its plans to the President. Mr. Lincoln invited him to appear before the Cabinet. To that body he explained the situation at Hatteras and "urged the importance of undertaking further operations to hold that position, it being the threshold to the whole inland water system of North Carolina." [3] Almost coincidently General Burnside formulated plans which were endorsed by General McClellan for a descent on the coast with an elaborately organized flotilla. His plan included a division of 12,000 or 15,000 infantry; a fleet of light draft steamers, sailing vessels, and barges to transport the division and its supplies; a lodgment somewhere on the Southern coast; a penetration to the interior to seize the main lines of transportation in the rear of the army concentrating in Virginia. [4]

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 173.
[2] *Ibid.*, 175.
[3] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 639.
[4] *Ibid.*, 660.

After the expedition was ordered the North Carolina coast was selected as its objective. "After the coast of North Carolina was occupied a column was to penetrate to Goldsboro and Raleigh, where it was to be met by General Buell at the head of the Union army for Tennessee. Meantime General Butler was to occupy New Orleans, and General W. T. Sherman, Savannah. Their movements would, it was hoped, divide the Confederate army and so occupy the attention of its generals that the Army of the Potomac would be able to move "On to Richmond." [1] The command of the expedition was committed to General A. E. Burnside and Flag Officer L. N. Goldsborough.

While this formidable fighting force was in preparation General Hill was struggling with tireless energy but in the face of insuperable obstacles to provide adequate defenses in the section against which it was aimed. Lack of transportation facilities entailed on the commander an immense personal inconvenience and slowness of travel. But, on horseback, in small boats and freighters, often on foot for miles, he made tour after tour of his extended territory. "General Hill, with all his activity," writes General Gatlin, "was never able to make a tour of his command in less than fifteen days. Such is its extent coastwise." His study of military science disclosed to him points of feebleness and positions of such strategic importance as to invite assault. In his report after his first tour he summarizes, on October 18, his impressions, as follows:

> Fort Macon has but four guns of long range, and these are badly supplied with ammunition, and are on very inferior carriages.
>
> New Bern has a tolerable battery, two 8-inch Columbiads, and two 32-pounders. It is, however, badly supplied with powder. This is also the condition of Washington. Hyde, the richest county in the state, has ten landings and only one gun—an English 9-pounder of great age and venerable aspect.

[1] Poore, *Life of Burnside*, 124.

Roanoke Island is the key of one-third of North Carolina, and whose occupancy by the enemy would enable him to reach the great railroad from Richmond to New Orleans. Four additional regiments are absolutely indispensable to the protection of this island. The batteries also need four rifled cannon of heavy caliber. I would most earnestly call the attention of the honorable Secretary of War to this island. . . . The towns of Elizabeth City, Edenton, Plymouth, and Williamston will all be taken should Roanoke be captured or passed. The inhabitants of those towns have been most criminally indifferent about efforts to fortify them.[1]

Two weeks later he writes Gatlin from Fort Macon, and points out the defects at Roanoke that made that island untenable even had it been defended by a large force. He says, "I am very much troubled about Roanoke Island. They have three formidable batteries, but badly located and without adequate infantry support. I went to Norfolk and succeeded in getting two rifled cannon for that point, shell, powder, and three carronades for Hyde and two rifled cannon for Washington, and the rifling of two more for Pungo River. I established a battery at Pungo, but could get nothing but two 24-pounders with carriages and two without. . . . I fear for Roanoke Island. That place and this are the weak points in my department. Two more regiments should immediately be sent to Roanoke Island, and one with a battery to Shackleford banks."[2]

Hoping to get the sorely needed powder, guns, and men later and knowing that only by defensive works could his small numbers escape speedy discomfiture, General Hill had a line of defenses thrown up to cover the approaches to New Bern, Washington, Hyde, and Roanoke Island. "The spade has been set agoing wherever I have been," he writes to Gatlin. He ordered the lower fort on Roanoke moved so that it

[1] *Official Records*, 4, 682.
[2] *Ibid.*, 693.

might coöperate with the other two, and directed a line of earthworks to be constructed across the island. Had these two things been accomplished the Confederates could not, as they were, have been so readily flanked out of the position. Before these changes could be accomplished and before he had been in the department long enough to more than outline what needed to be done, General Johnston called him back to Virginia to command at Leesburg. Just prior to his leaving Governor Clark wrote him, "I must add my hearty approval of the zeal and energy you have manifested in the cause, since your assumption of command, and in some degree inspired in others." [1]

On General Hill's transfer and General L. O'B. Branch's appointment as his successor, General Gatlin renewed his request that, owing to its extent, the coast be divided into three districts. He also recommended that Colonel Reuben P. Campbell of the Seventh Regiment be promoted and assigned the new district. [2] The War Department acceded to the division. The Cape Fear District remained under General Anderson. The Pamlico, including the territory around New Bern, continued under General Branch. [3] The new district, which embraced the counties around Albemarle Sound and also Roanoke Island, was intrusted, not to Colonel Campbell, but to General Henry A. Wise. This district was separated from North Carolina and incorporated in the Department

[1] Executive Letter Book, 192.

[2] *Official Records*, 4, 705.

[3] Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, an able, versatile and polished lawyer, was born at Enfield in 1820. Left an orphan, he was reared by his uncle, John Branch, who was governor of North Carolina, congressman, senator, and secretary of the navy in Jackson's Cabinet. At eighteen he was graduated from Princeton College with the honors of his class. During the Seminole War he served as aide to Governor Reid. He resigned the presidency of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad to enter Congress, where he served three terms. He was a Democrat and a secessionist. When war came he served from May to September as quartermaster and paymaster general. He was then selected as colonel of the Thirty-third North Carolina regiment. In January, 1862 President Davis appointed him a brigadier-general.

of Norfolk, then commanded by General Benjamin Huger.

As rumors of the power and completeness of the expedition which the Federals were designing to hurl against the coast of North Carolina filtered through the lines, Governor Clark sought to stir the Confederate secretaries to immediate defensive activity. He importuned the secretary of war, the secretary of the navy, and the President to meet this aggressive demonstration with a sufficient number of well-armed and seasoned troops. He urged that the conquest of the sounds would be an irreparable loss, not only to North Carolina, but to the Confederacy; for Federal ascendancy in these waters assured the abandonment of Norfolk with its navy yard and commanding position.[1] He insisted that General Gatlin, as the Confederate commander in the state, should personally visit Roanoke and report to the government its inability to withstand the coming attack.[2] In a letter to Secretary Mallory on January 13, 1862, he demanded that, if the island could not be successfully defended, transportation to relieve the troops should be maintained.[3]

The state at that time had only one regiment, the Thirty-first, Colonel J. V. Jordan, that could be moved. This regiment was so imperfectly armed that the governor hesitated to order it into active service. When, however, General Huger withdrew Colonel Wright's Georgia regiment from Roanoke, Colonel Jordan's regiment, armed in part with recently percussioned muskets and in part with sporting rifles and fowling pieces, was ordered to the island.

General Wise, the new commander of the island, was not a professional soldier, but he was a man of acute understanding. "As soon as he visited Roanoke

[1] Executive Letter Book, 120, 215, 220, 259, *et seq.*
[2] *Ibid.*, 217.
[3] *Ibid.*, 232.

Island he grasped its importance and saw that it was not only practically defenseless, but unsupplied with every adequate means of erecting fortifications. He hurried back to the headquarters of General Huger at Norfolk, and doubtless harassed that easy-going and high-living soldier with his importunities. Failing to obtain any assistance from General Huger, he repaired to Richmond, and endeavored to impress upon the secretary of war the necessity for prompt action. Mr. Benjamin was an attorney and not a soldier. He looked for instruction to his client, who in this case was General Huger. He doubtless thought the West Pointer knew more of such matters than the civilian. Then, too, Mr. Benjamin was an easy-spoken, cool, suave Jew, quiet and diplomatic in speech, never excited. It disturbed his nerves to have General Wise in his department—ardent, urgent, pressing, declaring that past neglect had been criminal and present delay was suicidal, and even guilty occasionally of some indignant swearing at the galling indifference shown to the urgent peril of the situation. The upshot of all this was a peremptory order from the War Department to General Wise to return forthwith to Roanoke Island and do the best he could with what he had in hand." [1]

"What General Wise had in hand" was little enough. Instead of complying with his request for 4,500 men—a number that could easily have been transferred for this emergency from Huger's 15,000 troops lying unemployed at near-by Norfolk, the government ordered to him at this pivotal island only his own scattered legion. Of the legion but 450 arrived in time for the battle, and these came without the legion artillery, which Wise had striven so unremittingly to have present. It is not strange therefore that

[1] Wise, *The End of an Era*, 177.

General Wise in writing to the chairman of the investigating committee, should bitingly say, "I intend to accuse General Huger of nothing! nothing!! nothing!!! This was the disease which brought disaster at Roanoke Island." [1]

"What he had," to face one of the strongest expeditions ever equipped up to that time in America, was Colonel H. M. Shaw's Eighth North Carolina Regiment (568 men), [2] Colonel J. V. Jordan's Thirty-first North Carolina Regiment (475 men), [3] and 450 men of Wise's Legion under Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Anderson [4]—in all, exclusive of the garrisons in the forts, 1,493 soldiers. Both of the North Carolina regiments were sent to Roanoke shortly after they were mustered into service. Hence, they never had a period of discipline and instruction in a regular camp. Their commanders were brave and loyal, but as inexperienced in war as were the men. General Wise said of these troops, "They were undrilled, unpaid, not sufficiently clothed and quartered, and miserably armed." [5] So wretched were the arms with which these men were sent forth to war that the Federal ordnance officer, who collected the arms after the affair was moved to surprise: "Some of the enemy's troops were armed with fowling pieces, sporting rifles, and a motley collection of arms nearly useless for military purposes." In the five little forts there were about 300 infantry serving after the briefest practice as artillery men.

The island so strategically situated that its possession bars access to Albemarle Sound and to the canals leading to Norfolk is, as Wise notes, shaped like an old-fashioned hourglass—narrowed near the center.

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 121.
[2] *Ibid.*, 172.
[3] *Ibid.*, 177.
[4] *Ibid.*, 179.
[5] *Ibid.*, 129.

All of the defenses were north of this natural constriction. Unless opposed by field forces, troops could land at will at any point on the southern half of the island. General Wise had started to construct a battery on the marshes near the lighthouse, but storms stopped the work.

The military defenses of the island consisted of five small forts. Fort Bartow, the most southern of the forts, was on the west side of the island. It was a sand fort revetted with sod, and had six 32-pounders in embrasure and three 32-pounders *en barbette*.

Two and a half miles north of Bartow and on the same side was Fort Blanchard, also a sand fort, turfed, and mounting four 32-pounders. Lieutenant Isaac Pipkin of Company G, Thirty-first Regiment, was in charge of the small detachment of forty men in this fort. Both Blanchard and Fort Huger, the largest fort on the island, were under the command of Captain John S. Taylor. Huger was about 1,200 yards north of Blanchard. It ran along the beach and was closed in the rear by breastworks. It contained twelve guns and was occupied by Captain Rufus A. Barrier's company of the Eighth Regiment.

Across the sound, west of the works, was Fort Forrest, an unfinished redoubt, carrying seven guns and garrisoned by Captain Alexander P. White's company of the Seventeenth Regiment, supported by Captain C. Godwin's company of the Thirty-first Regiment. This work, owing to its distance from the position of the Federal fleet, "fired only occasionally and without effect," and, with the *Curlew*, which had taken refuge under its guns, was abandoned and burnt.

About three miles from Bartow, on the eastern side of the island, at Midgett's there was a two-gun battery, which was held by Lieutenant William Pulley and seventeen men from the Thirty-first Regiment. This

battery was not engaged and its men crossed over to Nag's Head and escaped.

The first step in the second invasion of North Carolina was General Burnside's attack on this island, so pitiable in its weakness.

After his plans for a joint army and navy descent on the coast of North Carolina were approved, General Burnside drove officers, men, contractors, ship-repairers, supply men, into a ceaseless grind of orderly preparation. His headquarters were at Annapolis, where his land forces were concentrated into a spacious training camp. General Burnside was, however, a regular personal inspector of the repair yards and naval shops in New York where his assembling vessels were being fitted as army transports. He thus describes his finished product: "It was a motley fleet. North River barges and propellers had been strengthened from deck to keelson by heavy oak planks, and water-tight compartments had been built in them; they were so arranged that parapets of sand-bags or bales of hay could be built upon their decks, and each one carried from four to six guns. Sailing vessels formerly belonging to the coasting trade had been fitted up in the same manner. Several large passenger steamers, which were guaranteed to draw less than eight feet of water, together with tug and ferry boats, served to make up the fleet, which gave a capacity to transport 15,000 troops, with baggage, camp equipage, rations, etc. Light draft sailing vessels were also added to the fleet on which were stored building material for bridges, rafts, scows, intrenching implements, quartermasters' stores, tools, extra ordnance, stoves, etc. All of the vessels were ordered to rendezvous at Fort Monroe. Coal and water vessels were chartered in Baltimore, and ordered to rendezvous at the same place." [1]

[1] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 661.

While the ships were making ready, the soldiers who were to occupy them were being instructed and disciplined in their camp at Annapolis. General Burnside selected as brigade commanders for his division three of his old West Point comrades and trusted friends—Generals John G. Foster, Jesse L. Reno, and John G. Parke. These officers were all experienced commanders and merited as soldiers what Burnside said of them. "I was never disappointed in any reliance which I placed on their gallantry, skill and integrity." [1]

As regiments arrived from time to time they were assigned to these capable brigadiers, who, aided by skilled staff officers, soon had a thoroughly organized and disciplined camp. The men were perfected not only in regimental and brigade drill, but in addition they were instructed in target firing, camp sanitation, and endurance marching. Most of the regiments selected for this expedition were recruited in New England from the bolder spirits of the expiring three months regiments. These men, having tasted war, liked it and felt capable of enduring its hardships and safely outfacing its dangers. The commanding officers, men like Heckman, Maggi, Stevenson, Lee, Hartranft, were more or less experienced in regular or state guard service. Most of the regiments had been molded into fair soldierly form in state camps before they reached Annapolis. With these antecedent advantages and with these capable commanders, "the improvement in drill and discipline," says General Burnside, "was very rapid." [2] More important still, the men learned to know their officers and acquired confidence in their competency to meet dangers and emergencies—an invaluable acquisition to a soldier's fighting power. Hence, when on January 5, 1862, this

[1] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 661.
[2] *Ibid.*

carefully trained division[1] began to embark for Hampton Roads, it was a formidable aggregation and admirably illustrated in both its organization and its spirit what skillful leadership can make out of raw troops.

With continuous cheers, playing of bands, and blowing of whistles, the transports and gun boats serving as transports joined their heavier armed naval escorts at Norfolk, and on January 11, 1862, the mighty flotilla weighed anchor for Hatteras Inlet. In all there were about one hundred vessels. The strictly naval vessels, commanded by Flag Officer L. M. Goldsborough, numbered twenty.[2] These carried sixty-two guns, fifteen of which were the dreaded new 9-inch guns. The army division under Captain S. F. Hazard consisted of nine fighting ships carrying in all twenty-six guns, and five so-called floating batteries with twenty guns.[3] The total armament was 108. These guns varied from 9-inch to 4-inch, from 100-pounders rifled to 12-pounders rifled, and all were served by carefully trained gun-crews.

On the thirteenth the vast assemblage of war craft arrived off Hatteras bar. Before all the ships could bump their way through the shallow and tortuous inlet, the fleet was buffeted by one of those wild gales that make this coast a terror even to the stoutest mariners.

[1] The regiments comprising the division were as follows: 21st, 23d, 24th, 25th, 27th Massachusetts; 8th, 10th, 11th Connecticut; 51st, 53d (8 companies) (returned), 89th New York; 9th New Jersey; 51st Pennsylvania; 6th New Hampshire; 4th Rhode Island; 5th Rhode Island (battalion). In addition there was a detachment of the First New York Marine Artillery, and Company B, 99th New York Union Coast Guard, and Battery F, First Rhode Island Artillery.

[2] These with their number of guns were *Barney* (6), *Brinker* (1), *Ceres* (2), *Delaware* (3), *Granite* (1), *Hetzel* (2), *Hunchback* (4), *Lockwood* (3), *Louisiana* (5), *Morse* (2), *Perry* (6), *Philadelphia* (2), *Putnam* (2), *Underwriter* (4), *Seymour* (2), *Shawseen* (2), *Southfield* (4), *Stars and Stripes* (5), *Valley City* (5), *Whitehead* (1). *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 527, 536.

[3] These with their armaments were *Chasseur* (2), *Zouave* (3), *Vidette* (3), *Pioneer* (3), *Sentinel* (3), *Picket* (3), *Ranger* (3), *Lowcer* (3), *Hussar* (3). The floating batteries were *Bankhell* (4), *Grapeshot* (4), *Grenade* (4), *Rocket* (4), *Shrapnel* (4). *Ibid.*, I, 472.

For a time man's implements of death seemed destined to succumb to Nature's. On the second day, however, the storm moderated and vessel after vessel was crowded into the narrow roadstead until Burnside was ready to wish his fleet were not so large. [1] January off Hatteras is the Storm King's playtime, and "from the 14th to the 22d we had terrific weather. It required the utmost care of the commanders of vessels to prevent a general disaster. Many of the vessels were driven from their anchors and grounded on the swash and the bar. Many collisions occurred which caused great damage to the fleet. At times it seemed as if nothing could prevent general disaster." [2]

The suffering of the soldiers packed on the ships was excessive. Captain B. S. Pardee of the 10th Connecticut, writing of those long weeks on the swash says: "How can I describe them? Days of weariness and danger; no news to cheer us; disasters all around us; the skies black and unpromising; the surf beating sullenly the solemn requiem of the lost; sickness on all the vessels; epidemics rapidly extending; death frequent; no comfort for the sick; scanty food for the well; water, tainted with kerosene, served out in limited quantities; our expedition a seeming failure." [3]

After loads had been patiently transferred, landed, or in some cases cast overboard, the vessels of deepest draft were during high tides all towed over the bar and swash. Seventy-five vessels, [4] about thirty of which were fighting ships, were ready for the advance on January 5, and proceeded up the sound to attack Roanoke Island. The ability and courage shown by their officers in extricating their great fleet from so many dangers increased the confidence of the men in their commanders. They therefore approached

[1] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 6, 664.
[2] *Ibid.*, 665.
[3] *Connecticut During the Rebellion*, 164.
[4] Burnside, *Battles and Leaders*, I, 666.

the coming battle with the comfortable feeling aroused in soldiers by safe leadership.

To dispute the mastery of the sound with this carefully appointed fleet and its armament of eighty-four guns, Commodore W. F. Lynch, the Confederate naval commander, had two old side-wheel steamers and five naval tugboats.[1] The seven units of his "pasteboard" fleet mounted in all nine guns. He reported that his crews had been so depleted by constant duty as to leave him with men enough to fight only half his guns.[2] Drawing up his futile fleet, as General Wise called it, behind some piles which had been driven to narrow the channel, Lynch pluckily awaited the onset.

The Federal fleet opened fire on the morning of February 7. Being anxious to make a decided impression on the fort and fleet early in the contest, Goldsborough concentrated his 9-inch guns around the flagship. A terrific fire from these heavy guns was directed mainly against Fort Bartow, the most southerly of the forts, but the fleet and upper forts were not neglected. By noon the entire fleet was in action and the roar of the great guns was incessant.

An instant but deliberate return of fire came from Lynch's boats and the fort, for both were mindful of scant ammunition. Fort Bartow was defended by two companies of the Seventeenth (formerly Seventh) North Carolina Volunteer Infantry, serving as artillery. Company I, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas H. Gilliam and numbering 79 men[3] was from Hertford; Company L, under Captain John B. Fearing, numbering 77 men,[4] was from Elizabeth City. The fort

[1] These were the *Beaufort*, Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Parker; the *Curlew*, Commander T. T. Hunter; the *Ellis*, Lieutenant-Commander J. W. Cooke; the *Fanny*, Midshipman-Commander J. L. Taylor; the *Forrest*, Master-Commander James L. Hoole; the *Raleigh*, Lieutenant-Commander J. W. Alexander; the *Seabird*, Master-Commander Patrick McCarrick.

[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 761.

[3] *Official Records*, 9, 425.

[4] *Ibid.*, 425.

was in charge of Major Gabriel H. Hill, a former army officer and a man of courage and ability. He was assisted by Captain John S. Taylor and Lieutenant Benjamin P. Loyall, Confederate artillery officers who had been detailed a short time before to instruct the infantry garrison in the handling of heavy guns. Owing to the position of the Federal fleet only the four guns on the southern face of the fort could be brought to bear against the attackers. One of these was later masked by a shift of the gunboats, but the other three continued in action until the Federal fleet drew off at dark. The other forts tried their ranges, but finding the distance too great for their fire to be effective, they remained silent.

So inaccurate was the gunnery on both sides at that period of the war that after seven hours of constant firing little damage had been done to Northern fleet or Southern fort. A few Union vessels were struck by round shot on which, in the scarcity of shells, the Confederates had mainly to rely. The *Hetzel* had to limp out of action for a time to plug a shot hole below the water line. The *Hunchback*, after being struck eight times, was forced to fire from anchor. On the whole, however, no serious damage was done to the gunboats and only six men were killed and seventeen wounded. The wounds of six out of the seventeen were the result of the bursting of one of their own cannon. Out of two hundred and five shots fired on the first day by Fort Bartow, only twenty-two appear to have struck an enemy vessel.[1]

The fire of the Union fleet was relatively even less destructive. During the two days of action the naval vessels, exclusive of the army gunboats in action, expended 2,597 projectiles. Fort Bartow was the target for most of these missiles. Yet, although the three active guns of the fort were *en barbette* and,

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 555-78.

the gunners exposed, only one man was killed and four wounded. Moreover, the fort was practically unharmed. Commodore Lynch's prediction that the unskilled North Carolinians in the garrison would not stand to their guns [1] was amply discredited. Their adversary, Flag Officer Goldsborough, says that they used their guns "with a determination worthy of a better cause." Their commander reports that his officers and men did their duty manfully and with skill and courage. [2] Lynch himself, after their display of steadiness during the concentrated fire of so many ships, pays these troops this tribute in his official report: "The soldiers in the battery sustained their position under a terrific fire with a gallantry which won our warmest admiration." [3] The conduct of the raw troops in Fort Bartow was an illustration of the common observation, succinctly stated by a Northern participant in this battle: "A service of four years in the army convinces the author that good officers make good soldiers, and that poor officers will demoralize and render worthless the best soldier material." [4]

The Confederate fleet fared almost as well as the Federal. A well-directed heavy shell drove through the bottom of the *Curlew*, and she had to be beached and abandoned. The other vessels, with the possible exception of the *Forrest*, suffered no injuries that impaired their power to continue the battle on the second day. In spite of the missiles that hurtled against them not a man was killed and only six wounded. Lynch, however, at the close of day, found his fleet without ammunition. He therefore withdrew during the night to Elizabeth City, with the hope that he might there secure a sufficient supply to renew the battle.

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 761.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 182.
[3] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 594.
[4] Drake, *Ninth New Jersey Regiment*, preface.

While the heavy guns were still in action, General Burnside began to land his troops at Ashby's Harbor. Each of the three brigades had a light-draft steamer to which were attached some twenty surf-boats. Both steamers and boats were densely filled with soldiers. As fast as the men were unloaded the steamers returned to the fleet for another complement. So systematically were the landing plans carried out that 4,000 men were set on shore in twenty minutes.[1] Before sailing for Roanoke Burnside was convinced that he could not use all his troops to advantage on the island.[2] Consequently he left four regiments under General Williams at Hatteras. Including Hawkins's Ninth New York, which had been stationed at Hatteras, he had to transfer from the transports twelve and one-half regiments.[3] By 10 o'clock, says Hawkins, a force of 7,500 had been disembarked,[4] and by midnight, adds Flag Officer Goldsborough, 10,000 men had waded through the marsh to firm ground.[5]

General Wise, the Confederate commander of the island, was at this time seriously sick with pleurisy at Nag's Head on the beach about three miles east of Roanoke. The command of the 1,493 Confederates who were on the island at the opening of the battle devolved on Colonel Henry M. Shaw of the Eighth North Carolina Regiment.[6] On learning of the approach of Burnside's army, Colonel Shaw posted

[1] Foster's Report, *Official Records*, 9, 86.
[2] *Ibid.*, 357.
[3] *Ibid.*, 75.
[4] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 642.
[5] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 553.
[6] Colonel Shaw was educated for a physician, but his ease as a speaker and his readiness and force in debate led him into politics. He had served in the legislature and in Congress. His courage and his character always commanded respect. At this time when command was suddenly thrust on him, he was of course entirely without military experience. As the war went on, he grew into a skillful regimental commander. He was killed at Bachelor's Creek in an expedition against New Bern.

Colonel J. V. Jordan, with about 400 of the Thirty-first North Carolina Regiment and three pieces of artillery, the only field pieces on the island, near Ashby's Harbor. Jordan was ordered to resist at the water's edge any attempted Federal landing. When he saw in what force the Federals were approaching, he instantly retired. In his report he says that "fearing that the shells from the enemy's guns in the sound might confuse and disconcert the men under my command and cause the eventual loss of the field pieces, which you enjoined on me at all hazards to save, I considered it judicious to order a retreat." [1]

Commenting on this retreat, Wise remarks, "Fancy the feelings of that little band of raw North Carolinians under Colonel Jordan when, from the adjacent woods, they witnessed these landings, and not only knew that they had but one thousand comrades to assist them, but that, when the fight was lost, as lost it must be, there was no hope of escape. Verily, the first colonists were not more desperately situated. No one can blame the poor fellows for quietly withdrawing up the dark and narrow road to the earthworks." [2]

The position to which Jordan's men retreated was a line of breastworks about four and a half feet high and one hundred feet long. The line was constructed at the narrowest point on the island and across its only north and south road. The engineers who laid off the line, the scouts who tried to penetrate their jungles, and the natives who were questioned, all united in pronouncing the vine tangled cypress swamps on the right and the left of the works as absolutely impenetrable. Notwithstanding these reports, General D. H. Hill, during his brief period of command in the department, ordered that the line of works should be continued through both swamps until it terminated in

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 176.
[2] *End of an Era*, 183.

the two sounds. Unfortunately, his successors did not carry out the order, for the continued line would have prevented the successful flanking movement of the Federals which gave them an easy victory. As long as this stretch of works could be maintained, the forts, the guns of which bore only on the water front, were protected; if this line were broken all the defenses were open in reverse. South of the line there was an open, swampy field.

Behind these vital works Colonel Shaw waged his battle. His sole artillery—three pieces, a 24-pounder under Lieutenant Thos. C. Kenny, an 18-pounder under Captain Schermerhorn, with a detachment of the Thirty-first infantry as gunners, and a brass 6-pound gun served by Lieutenant W. B. Selden with ten men from the Eighth Regiment, was mounted on the intrenchments.

When the battle opened at 8 o'clock on the morning of February 8, 1862, the artillery support for these three pieces consisted only of Company B, Captain James M. Whitson, (Currituck County) of the Eighth North Carolina Regiment; Company B, Captain E. R. Liles (Anson County) of the Thirty-first North Carolina; Company F, Captain Charles W. Knight (Martin County), also of the Thirty-first Regiment. As the Federal fire grew hotter about 9:30, Companies E, Captain Dickinson, and K, Lieutenant Ray, of the Fifty-ninth Virginia Regiment, and Company E, Lieutenant J. R. Murchison (Cumberland, Chatham and Harnett counties), were called forward from the reserves and posted to the left of the other companies. In all about 400 men were crowded into the short intrenchment. These with the skirmishers were the only participants in the battle. The other troops, not detailed in the forts, were held in reserve and never thrown into the fighting.

Two companies of the Forty-sixth Virginia, under Captain Coles and Captain O. Jennings Wise, were deployed as skirmishers in the marsh on the Confederate left, and one company under Lieutenant Hazlett of the Forty-ninth Virginia, was deployed in the edge of the swamp on the right.

General Foster, who commanded the Federal advance, first made a frontal attack on the intrenchments. Six pieces of artillery under Midshipman B. H. Porter, supported by the Twenty-fifth and the Twenty-third Massachusetts regiments, were advanced to within 300 yards of the Confederate position. The guns opened with shell, shrapnel and grape. Under this fire, the infantry attempted to go forward. The Confederate return fire, however, was so steady that the New Englanders made no headway. Foiled in front, General Foster directed the Twenty-third Massachusetts, followed by the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts, to plunge into the morass on their right (the Confederate left) and break a way through the water, vines, briers, birch, and cypress to the Confederate left flank. As these two regiments moved into the swamp, the Tenth Connecticut was advanced to relieve the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts.

During this shift of regiments, General Reno arrived with the four regiments of the Second Brigade. He volunteered to make a trial of the swamp on the Confederate right. With the Twenty-first Massachusetts, the Fifty-first New York, and the Ninth New Jersey regiments, General Reno struck into a swamp so miry and matted with vines and underbrush that a native of the island remarked of it, "When one of our cows gets in there we leave her there, for we know we can't get her out." His men, however, frequently up to their waists in muddy water and torn with brambles, floundered through after two hours of heart-breaking efforts. Almost simultaneously with

Reno's appearance on the Confederate right, Foster's regiments began to emerge all bedraggled from the swamp on the Southern left. General Parke, commanding the Third Federal Brigade, was now up, and one of his regiments, the Ninth New York (Zouaves), was called to charge the Confederate front as Reno and Foster closed on their flanks. The Zouaves, after a stampede for a time, a stampede in which their men fired into the Tenth Connecticut and had to be held from retreat by presented bayonets and stern cries of "No Bull Run here!" [1] rushed up to the intrenchment just as the Twenty-first Massachusetts and Fifty-first New York passed behind it. The Confederate four hundred finding themselves enveloped on three sides began to retreat even before the Federal charges were made. A commander of more experience than Colonel Shaw then possessed would no doubt have called his reserves, standing idle just behind the intrenchments, into action on each of his flanks as soon as the Federals threatened them. If this had been done and if the reserves had fought as gamely as the first line, the Confederates would still have lost the day, for the disparity of numbers was too great, but they could have so crippled the strength of the expedition as to have saved Beaufort, New Bern, and Fort Macon.

Colonel Shaw staked his all on holding the short line of field works with one-fourth of his men. As soon as this was turned, he says, "With the very great disparity of forces, the moment the redoubt was flanked I considered the island lost. The struggle could have been protracted, and the small body of brave men which had been held in reserve might have been brought up into the open space to receive the fire of the overwhelming force on our flank, which was

[1] Emmerton, *Record of Twenty-third Massachusetts*, 50; Putnam, *Story of Company A, Twenty-fifth Massachusetts*, 77.

under cover of trees; but they would have been sacrificed without the smallest hope of a successful result." [1]

After the retreat had begun, Lieutenant-Colonel Wharton J. Green, with 700 men of the Second North Carolina Battalion, and Major H. W. Fry, with 150 men of the Forty-sixth Virginia Regiment, arrived by boat on the island. Although Colonel Green had a brief skirmish with the Twenty-first Massachusetts, both he and Fry came too late to be of service, but were included in the number of those who surrendered.

The surrender of the infantry, of course, included the giving up of the forts. When orders to join in the capitulation came to the two companies in Fort Bartow the men were just exulting that they had stood triumphantly the first day's bombardment and were then, it appeared, safely through the second day's attack. Their muskets had been burned in a fire that destroyed their barracks during the first day's shelling.

Colonel Shaw surrendered 2,488 men. [2] The difference between the number he reported as present for the engagement and the number surrendered arises from the fact that the Second North Carolina Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Wharton J. Green, and four companies of the Forty-sixth Virginia Regiment under Major H. W. Fry, arrived on the island after the main battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Green, who engaged in a slight skirmish in the afternoon with the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment, states his battalion number at 700. Major Fry, who was not engaged at all, gives his total at 150. General Wise puts it at 180.

The Federal loss was: killed 37, wounded 214, missing 13, a total of 264. [3] The Confederate casualties were

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 172.
[2] *Ibid.*, 116, 264.
[3] *Ibid.*, 9, 85.

distributed as follows: Seventh, Eighth, and Thirty-first North Carolina, 16 killed, 30 wounded, 43 missing; Forty-sixth and Forty-ninth Virginia, 6 killed, 28 wounded, 19 missing—a total of 142.[1] This total includes the missing who escaped from the island. Among the slain were some gallant officers; Captain O. Jennings Wise, Captain Roberts Coles, Lieutenant W. B. Selden, Lieutenant Neill G. Monroe, of the Eighth Regiment.

The Confederate Congress appointed a committee of investigation to report on the circumstances connected with the surrender of the island. In its report the committee adopted the following words of General Wise as to the seriousness to the Confederacy of the loss:

> It was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds; eight rivers; four canals, and two railroads. It guarded more than four-fifths of all Norfolk's supplies of corn, pork and forage, and it cut the command of General Huger off from all of its most efficient transportation. It endangers the subsistence of his whole army, threatens the navy-yard at Gosport, and to cut off Norfolk from Richmond. It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras, gives them a rendezvous, and large rich range of supplies, and command of the seaboard from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry. It should have been defended at the expense of 20,000 men and of many millions of dollars.[2]

After exonerating General Wise from blame, the committee added that General Huger and the secretary of war had timely notice of the inadequacy of defenses, the want of men and munitions, and the threatening attitude of the enemy, and that they paid no practical attention to General Wise's urgent appeals, but allowed his inconsiderable forces to meet so strong an expedition. Hence, the committee concluded that

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 173.
[2] *Ibid.*, 188.

whatever of blame and responsibility is justly attributable to any one for the defeat should attach to Major-General B. Huger and the late secretary of war, Judah P. Benjamin.[1]

The calamity at Roanoke makes three facts apparent. First, that the Confederates were not then apprised of the earnestness, capacity, and ample resources of the Northern states. Hence, they did not foresee as clearly as they should the magnitude of the blows which the Union government was about to deliver against the coast of North Carolina and other Southern states. Second, the possession of an organized and disciplined navy, of which the Confederates were destitute—a navy able almost without opposition except at one or two points to penetrate Southern waters and blockade all Southern ports, was sufficient in itself to turn the scales of victory even between more nearly balanced contestants. Third, that the irreparable deficiency of supplies which always hampered the Confederates would speedily have resulted in the destruction of their own government had it not been offset by the genius of Lee and his officers, and the almost unparalleled endurance and battle tenacity of the Confederate soldier.

After Commodore Lynch had exhausted his ammunition and withdrawn from the battle at Roanoke Island, he retired to Elizabeth City in search of powder and shells. Finding little there, he dispatched Commander Hunter in the *Raleigh* to Norfolk for as full supply as could be spared. He could have saved his diminutive fleet by a retirement on Norfolk, but he felt that to desert Elizabeth City without a battle, no matter how hopeless the chances of success, "would be unseemly and discouraging." He therefore set his fleet in order across the beautiful Pasquotank river at Cobb's Point. The *Curlew* had been sunk at

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 190.

Roanoke. The *Forrest*, on the ways for repairs, he ordered burned. The *Raleigh* had not returned from her quest of ammunition in Norfolk. Hence, Lynch had only five steam propellers—the *Appomattox*, the *Beaufort*, the *Ellis*, the *Fanny*, and the *Seabird*, and a sailing vessel, the *Black Warrior*. Lynch found the four-gun battery deserted by all but seven of its militia assignment. Feeling that a shore battery could be more deadly than a one-gun boat, Lynch called Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Parker and his crew from the *Beaufort*, which was ordered under her pilot to steam for Norfolk, to man the guns of the battery. Parker first manned three of the four guns, but, after the seven remaining militiamen took to their heels, he and his crew could manage but two of the 32-pounders. These dispositions being finished, Lynch, his officers and his crews stood by their guns. They knew that they would be blown out of the water in the coming encounter, yet with an audacity that wins the admiration of our backbones, if not of our brains, they awaited the onset.

Commander S. C. Rowan, in charge of fourteen Federal vessels, carrying forty guns, had, after hasty repairs of battle damage, set out to overhaul Lynch. When the Federal flotilla found him waiting at Elizabeth City on February 10, it pressed up the river for the combat which Lynch's sense of honor impelled him to wage. So unequal a struggle—14 ships to 5; 40 guns to 11, was of course, brief. The *Perry*, commanded by the brave Flusser, rammed and put out of action the *Seabird*, capturing the crew. The *Ellis* was boarded, and, after a determined hand encounter, in which her gallant commander, J. W. Cooke, was severely wounded, was captured. The *Black Warrior*, fatally pierced while fighting from her moorings, was burned by her own men. The *Fanny*, while in a sinking condition, was run ashore by her officers

and set on fire. The *Appomattox*, with Sims in charge, fought her way up the river after her front gun was injured, but found her width too great to allow entrance into the canal. Sims, rather than have her fall into Federal hands, destroyed the vessel. Thus, with the exception of the *Beaufort* and the *Raleigh*, Lynch's mosquito fleet was swept out of existence in the two battles. Thenceforth the Union navy held virtually uncontested supremacy in all the inland waters of North Carolina.

As the citizens of the town saw the vessels of their defenders go down one by one, they set fire to their own homes and places of business, so that they might not pass into the hands of their enemies. The rapid advance of the Federals, however, stopped their work of destruction after about two blocks had been lighted.

In the encounter the Federals had two sailors killed and seven wounded. The Confederate loss was four killed, six wounded, thirty-four captured. The men who were taken prisoners were at once paroled. Commodore Lynch and fifty of his sailors made their way overland to Norfolk. The prisoners and the wounded were treated with the utmost courtesy by their captors. In his congratulatory order to his fleet, Commodore Rowan, in keeping with the traditions of the navy, commended his men warmly for not "trespassing in the slightest degree upon the private property of defenseless people in a defenseless town." [1]

Captain John Newland Maffitt, the famous commander of the Confederate cruiser *Florida*, makes about the only comment that can be made on these ill-matched contests. He says: "The naval battles in Albemarle Sound and off Elizabeth City reflected much credit on the personal courage of all the Confederate officers therein engaged. With mere abortions for

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 622.

gunboats, badly armed and spare of ammunition, they confronted without hesitation the well-equipped and powerful vessels of the North." [1]

A Federal board of appraisement attached the following values to the captured and destroyed: *Seabird*, $30,000, *Fanny*, $23,000, *Ellis*, $18,000, *Black Warrior*, $20,000, *Forrest*, $21,500. A new Confederate steamer building at Elizabeth City and two schooners with their cargoes which were taken in the river, were valued at $27,800—a total, including $30,000 in money captured in the *Seabird*, of $170,300. [2]

In carrying out their plan "to sweep Albemarle Sound clean of defenses," General Burnside and Flag Officer Goldsborough provided for expeditions to dash against any coast points that were thought to be armed. The lightest of their gunboats, their decks at times crowded with infantry, were detailed for these swift blows. The Confederates, with no fighting ships, with few troops at any one point and these without the hardening of a single battle, and with miles of coast exposed, were much distracted by these descents on their homes. The people, too, seeing that their towns were falling as fast as the Federal boats appeared before them, and that the roar of their great guns was generally a signal for the departure of such uniformed men as were present, were greatly depressed. Those who could, fled their homes, and the coast towns were nearly depopulated. Moreover, the faith of these people in the power of their government to protect them and their property received a shock from which some of them never recovered.

The green soldiers at the exposed points are hardly to be censured for not abiding that sort of conflict. They were in the main local soldiers directed in this emergency by local officers. They had never acquired the confidence that is engendered by organization,

[1] *Reminiscences of the Confederate Navy*, United Service Magazine, October, 1880.

[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 622.

coöperation, discipline, practice in arms. Before they had ever been in even a skirmish, or drilled enough to change without confusion from flank to front, led by their neighbors whom they knew to be good citizens but unskilled soldiers, they were suddenly exposed to the fierce shelling of guns of great caliber at a distance too great for their muskets to reply. Not having yet learned that in the battle of that day the rifle ball, not the noisy shell, was Death's favorite harvester, they were not ready to stand undismayed before them.

The first of these expeditions was directed against Edenton. Lieutenant Alexander Murray led a detachment of four gunboats to search out the strength of that historic town. The small body of troops stationed there retired precipitately. The ships captured two coastwise schooners, one laden with 4,000 bushels of corn, and destroyed one schooner in process of building, and eight unplaced cannon. After retaining possession of the town for two hours they retired without inflicting further damage.

Winton was the next town against which there was a demonstration. Seven of the dreaded gunboats under Commander S. C. Rowan and bearing as a landing force the Ninth New York regiment, Colonel Rush C. Hawkins, steamed on February 18 to the mouth of the Chowan River. For some time rumors had been going to Federal headquarters that the people of Winton were inclined to the old Union. The visit of Rowan's flotilla was to encourage the whispered friends and, more tangibly, to destroy two bridges on the Seaboard and Roanoke railroad. [1]

The town was under the protection of Lieutenant-Colonel William F. Williams, in command of 400 men [2] of the First North Carolina Battalion, afterwards

[1] *Battles and Leaders*, I, 646.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 439.

organized into the Thirty-second Regiment and destined, under Williams's successor, the gallant Colonel E. C. Brabble, to be one of the staunchest regiments in Daniel's brigade of hard fighters. On the *Delaware*, the leading ship, occupied by the Federal commanders of both land and sea forces, Williams's men poured a hot fire from the woods on the bluff above the landing. When, however, on the next morning the Federal boats reappeared, shelled the river banks, and landed troops, Williams and his men, according to General Blanchard's report, disappeared from their front without reason or excuse.[1] Hawkins, securing control of the town without resistance on February 20, burned it, and his Zouaves pilfered ahead of the torch. This destruction of a helpless town in which there were no hostile troops came only two days after General Burnside and Commodore Goldsborough had issued a proclamation in which they stated the Northern people were Christians and would inflict no injury unless forced to do so.

The burning of the town, including the court-house and its records and practically all the private homes of the village, seemed to demand some justification from the commander. Hawkins, in his report, after saying, "This, I believe, is the first instance during the war, on our side, where fire has accompanied the sword," attempts to palliate the act on the grounds that a negro woman had tried to decoy the fleet into a trap and that the houses burned had been used as quarters for troops and stores.[2] Commodore Rowan, who was always merciful when in sole command, did not, if one may judge by the careful wording of his report, sympathize with Hawkins's remorseless act. He does not directly charge the negro woman with deception, but says that she stood on the wharf "apparently to assure us that no danger need be apprehended."[3]

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 439.
[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 639.
[3] *Ibid.*, 654.

Moreover, he makes no mention of the firing of the town. He simply says that the troops "meeting no opposition, entered it, and destroyed a quantity of military stores, tents, arms, etc., and the quarters occupied by the troops." [1]

General Burnside, having now dismantled practically all the fortifications on the sounds, was ready for his anticipated advance on New Bern, the second most important city on the coast. Leaving one regiment at Hatteras and a brigade of three regiments to occupy Roanoke Island, which was to continue for a time as a naval and military base, he sailed for New Bern on the morning of February 12. His transports were preceded by fourteen gunboats. [2] This fleet arrived at Slocumb's Creek landing on the Neuse River, about sixteen miles from New Bern, on the same afternoon. After the river banks had been searched by shells on the next morning, the troops were disembarked without opposition, and immediately took up a miry journey towards the town. The gunboats advancing slowly ahead of the troops, who were marching alongside the river, kept up what we now call a barrage fire.

After the Federals had splashed six miles towards New Bern, they came to the first Confederate defenses. This line, known as the Croatan works, stretched from the river to a dense swamp and was squarely across the road on which Burnside was advancing. Rifle pits on the river and Fort Dixie on its flank made it, in the judgment of General Branch, his strongest work, [3] and he was satisfied that 2,000 men and two field batteries could hold it against a very large force. [4] The Federals, on approaching this laboriously con-

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 110.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Official Records*, 9, 243.
[4] *Ibid.*, 241.

structed fortification, were surprised to find it abandoned.[1] If, says Putnam, "these works had been properly defended, we should have had a deal of trouble in getting through them."[2] Not until March 12, the day Burnside reached Slocumb's, were orders given to occupy the Croatan line. On the evening of that day Colonel James Sinclair with the Thirty-fifth North Carolina Regiment was moved down from New Bern by train under orders to prevent any Federal disembarkation at that point. On the next day the Twenty-sixth North Carolina, Colonel Z. B. Vance's regiment, and Brem's battery were directed to follow in support of the Thirty-fifth. Sinclair manned the rifle pits and so much of the line as one regiment could cover, but found that Burnside had already landed and was now approaching his front. In addition, the gunboats were bursting 9-inch shells on his left. The combination and the apparent absence of support soon convinced Colonel Sinclair that he was too far from home. Securing the approval of Colonel R. P. Campbell, who was in command of the Confederate left wing, Sinclair withdrew his regiment to the Fort Thompson line. This withdrawal necessitated the recall of Vance and Brem. Hence Burnside crossed these formidable works unmolested and that night bivouacked near the Fort Thompson line. He was, therefore in position on the next morning to assault this line with his entire land and naval force.

The closest inspection of the official records leaves some uncertainty as to the number of men thrown by General Burnside into this assault. Commodore Rowan, who directed the naval operations of the expedition and who ought to have known the numbers loaded

[1] Roe, in the *History of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts*, p. 80, says: "As the officers in command had expected a strong resistance here, they felt much relieved at not having to force them."

[2] *Story of Company A, Twenty-fifth Massachusetts*, 102.

and unloaded from his vessels, puts the total at 11,500.[1] This is perhaps a little too large. There were in the battle the three brigades of Foster, Reno, and Parke—in all thirteen regiments.[2] On January 31—the nearest field return date—these brigades reported 10,375 men as present for duty, and an aggregate present of 10,927.[3] The only change in the brigade that preceded the battle was that the Eleventh Connecticut, a larger regiment, replaced the Ninth New York in Parke's brigade. The artillery and coast guard must also be added.

The Confederate intrenchments over which the battle was to rage began with Fort Thompson, situated on the bank of the Neuse River, about six miles below New Bern. Fort Thompson, the usual type of sand and sod-revetted fort of that day, was armed with thirteen guns. The placing of its guns—ten bearing on the river and only three on the land approaches to the town, made clear the belief of the engineers that any attack on New Bern would be mainly or solely by water. This erroneous opinion as to the direction of attack led to an enormous waste of money and labor on river fortifications. Seven forts to protect the town from naval attacks had been either laid off or finished, but not a single heavy gun protected directly the railroad and the county road running alongside the river and crossing the intrenchment at right angles. The state engineers were excellent designers and erectors of forts, but their civilian lack of military insight led to many a blunder in the location of these forts. The fort nearest New Bern, about three miles south and immediately on the river bank, was called Fort Lane. Its three guns were in charge of Captain William Sutton and his company from Lenoir County.

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 118.

[2] The Fifth Rhode Island was not a full regiment.

[3] *Official Records*, 9, 358. The 53d New York is included in the organization list, but was of course not enumerated as present for duty or in aggregate.

This company, it will be recalled, had been captured at Hatteras when it was in the Seventeenth Regiment. After their return from captivity, the members were reunited in service at Fort Lane. The company later became Company A of the Fortieth Regiment, and Lieutenant A. W. Ezzell succeeded Sutton as captain.

Fort Ellis, an eight-gun battery, was situated one mile south of Lane. It was garrisoned by the Pamlico Artillery Guards, a company only two months old. Its Captain, J. M. Mayo, who was desperately wounded in blowing up the magazine of his fort, was afterwards major of the Fifty-ninth Regiment. A short distance south of Ellis there was an unfinished two-gun fort, known as Fort Allen. These two guns were served during the battle with the Federal gunboats by Company B of the First Maryland Regiment under Captain John B. Edelin. This company, while on a furlough, heard of the impending attack on New Bern, and volunteered to aid in its defense. Its members were the only men in the battle who were not North Carolinians.

Fort Thompson, five miles below New Bern, was the largest fort on the river. With its thirteen guns, ten trained on the river and three placed to sweep any approach by land, this work served as the left flank of the intrenchments behind which the Confederate land forces fought. Captain John N. Whitford's company, afterwards Company I of the Tenth Regiment, and Captain W. A. Herring's company which became Company G of the Fortieth Regiment, occupied the fort. The artillery in all the forts was under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Thos. M. Crossan, formerly a captain in the North Carolina navy. In addition to the garrisons of the forts, the detached artillery companies of Captains Henry Harding, Benjamin Leecraft, and Edward Mallett appear to have fought as infantry just east of Fort Thompson.

From Fort Thompson the Confederate breastworks ran westward for one mile to the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad. As originally planned, the intrenchments were to continue across the railroad to a supposedly impenetrable swamp near Brice's Creek. General Branch, finding it necessary to shorten his lines on account of his small force, changed the plan.[1] He dropped the line back 150 yards at the railroad. Then beginning not very far from the railroad, he constructed westward, not a continuous line of breastworks, but a series of redans just behind Bullen's Branch which flowed into Brice's Creek on his right. These redans were built by Colonel Vance's regiment, the last one being completed the night before the battle.[2] This readjustment left an unprotected gap of 150 yards in the defenses. The discovery and penetration of this break by the Federals was the immediate cause of the loss of the battle. Two heavy guns had been ordered into a position to cover this fatal exposure at Wood's brickyard alongside the railroad, but with the slowness that seemed to characterize all important operations of that year in the coast defenses, these guns were just being set on their emplacements when the opening fire of the Federals drove the laborers away and left the guns useless.

The official reports of the Confederate officers, like those of General Burnside's commanders, give few details as to the number of men engaged in this battle. General Branch reports that at no time could he place 4,000 men in the field.[3] Governor Clark states the total force at 3,800.[4] General Gatlin, commander of the department, puts it at "over 4,000 men."[5] Exclusive of the garrisons, General Branch had six

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 242.
[2] *Ibid.*, 255.
[3] *Ibid.*, 24.
[4] Letter Book, Clark to Merrimon, 286.
[5] *Official Records*, 108, 504.

regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a few detailed companies to confront the thirteen regiments of Burnside. From two causes Branch's regiments were small at that time. First, most of them had originally enlisted for six or twelve months. During the period before and after the battle they were reorganizing for three years. During this process of reorganization furloughs were granted freely in order that the men might set their private business in order for a long absence from home. Second, other regiments engaged were newly-formed and had not passed through the usual "camp sickness" period. Some of the companies had almost a third of their men in the hospitals.[1]

General Branch officially reports that in order to secure himself against errors or oversights he placed two trained and experienced officers in immediate command of the two wings of his brigade.[2] To C. C. Lee, colonel of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, he assigned his left wing; to Reuben P. Campbell, colonel of the Seventh Regiment, the right wing. His battle line was as follows: the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, under Major John A. Gilmer, in the absence of Colonel Sloan, was posted with its left on Fort Thompson. The Thirty-seventh North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Will M. Barbour, its right on the Beaufort road, joined Gilmer. Across the road the Seventh North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Ed. Graham Haywood, came next. Then the Thirty-fifth North Carolina, Colonel James Sinclair, prolonged Haywood's line. To the right of Sinclair stood Wood's brickyard on the side of the railroad. As already mentioned, there was a gap in the intrenchments at this brickyard. Naturally, it would be expected that the staunchest regiment in the brigade would have been selected to hold this weak spot. Instead, however, the local

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 421, 433.
[2] *Ibid.*, 246.

militia battalion of Colonel H. J. B. Clark was placed in this vulnerable position. These men had been drafted for service only about two weeks before. They were without uniform, and armed mainly with hunting rifles and shotguns. On the right of the railroad the redans were occupied by the Twenty-sixth Regiment, Colonel Z. B. Vance, the independent company of Captain MacRae, and two dismounted companies of cavalry commanded by Captains Geo. W. Hays and Lieutenant William A. Graham, Jr. Two guns of Captain Thos. H. Brem's battery, under Lieutenant A. B. Williams, were the only guns on that side of the railroad. On the left wing Captain A. C. Latham's six-gun battery and the remaining four pieces of Brem supported the infantry.

In spite of the hardships of the march of the 13th, General Burnside was ready on the morning of March 14 to set his battle in order. Foster's brigade, which had advanced along the Beaufort road, was ordered to attack the Confederate left. Reno, who was using the railroad track for his line of march, was directed to throw his four regiments against the Confederate right. Parke's brigade, following Foster on the country road, was instructed to brace the frontal attacks wherever needed.

Foster formed his battle line with the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Regiment on his extreme right, nearly opposite Fort Thompson. On its left the Twenty-fourth, the Twenty-seventh, the Twenty-third Massachusetts and the Tenth Connecticut regiments prolonged the front from the river to the railroad. A howitzer, which with its gun crew under Captain E. G. Dayton had been landed from the *Highlander*, was placed on the left of the Beaufort road. Six naval guns under Lieutenant R. S. McCook took position just to Dayton's left, and on the right of the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts. These guns, with the excep-

tion of a Wiard 12-pounder under Captain Bennett, which fought with Reno, were the only field pieces used by the Federals in the battle.

The alignment of Foster's brigade brought his two right wing regiments face to face with the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, Major John A. Gilmer, the Thirty-seventh North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Barbour, and Captain A. C. Latham's battery. His three left wing regiments were confronted by the Seventh North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Ed. Graham Haywood, the Thirty-fifth North Carolina, Colonel James Sinclair, 309 local militia, Colonel H. J. B. Clark, and four guns of Captain Thomas Brem's battery.

The first regiment of Reno's Federal brigade to come abreast of Foster's battle line, then engaged, was the Twenty-first Massachusetts, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Clark. It was established with its right on the railroad. Its advance would bring it directly to the unfortified breach in the Confederate works. The historian of the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts says that a spy had informed General Burnside of this opening ten days before the battle.[1] On the left of the Twenty-first New York and the Ninth New Jersey, Reno's Fourth Regiment, the Fifty-first Pennsylvania was held in reserve until the stress of the Confederate resistance called it to stiffen the front.

The Confederates had at first only one regiment, the Twenty-sixth North Carolina, Colonel Z. B. Vance, to encounter Reno's advance. This regiment was strongly posted in a series of redans and curvettes along Bullen's Branch. As the battle grew warm and Parke's regiment also joined Reno, Colonel C. M. Avery's Thirty-third North Carolina, the only Confederate infantry reserve, was hurried to Vance's aid. Two pieces of Brem's battery under Lieutenant A. B.

[1] *Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Regiment*, 85.

Williams, supported by Captain MacRae's independent company and two dismounted companies (A and K) of Spruill's Cavalry were on Vance's right, near the Weathersby road.

Parke's brigade arrived behind the battle line in the following order: Fourth Rhode Island, Eighth Connecticut, Fifth Rhode Island Battalion, and Eleventh Connecticut. One of his regiments was soon sent to take the place of one of Foster's. The other three, after seeking cover from the railroad enbankment, moved up the railroad to press an advantage gained and then lost by the Twenty-first Massachusetts.

Without waiting for Reno to establish his lines, Foster began his assault on the Confederate left about 8 o'clock. For two hours his men were fought to a standstill. Brem's and Latham's guns raked his front wickedly for such raw gunners. The three pieces in Fort Thompson, which bore on the land, joined the defense with grape and canister.[1] The infantry fire from the breastworks was, says General Foster, "incessant and very severe."[2] In addition, shells from the Federal fleet were falling thickly on his right regiment.[3] In spite of the fact that the Federal fleet commander knew that he was endangering the lines of men in his own army, he kept up a fierce shelling. He writes to Goldsborough, "I commenced throwing 5, 10, 15, second shells inshore, and, notwithstanding the risk, I determined to continue till the general sent me word [to stop]. I know the persuasive effect of a 9-inch [shell], and thought it better to kill a Union man or two than to lose the effect of my moral suasion. The effect was terrific—large pine trees were cut down like so many twigs. . . . I

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 217.
[2] *Ibid.*, 212.
[3] *Ibid.*, 218.

saw he [the enemy] was demoralized by the army [the fleet] in his rear, and if I did not push on Burnside would be defeated." [1]

It soon became clear that no material gain could be made on the Federal right even with the aid of the gunboats. The defense remained steady; the attack was crumbling. The Twenty-seventh Massachusetts, having lost severely and being nearly out of ammunition, was dropped back of the front line and replaced by the Eleventh Connecticut of Parke's brigade. [2] The Twenty-fifth Massachusetts was called in from its post on the far right to stand by the tired artillery men. Some weaker spot than the left must be found or the day was lost.

Reno's attack on the Confederate right was faring no better. For three hours and a half his three left regiments tried in vain to brush Vance's Twenty-sixth North Carolina out of their way. Colonel Heckman, of the Ninth New Jersey, reports to Governor Olden, "Several gallant charges were made by a portion of Reno's brigade, but all were repulsed with considerable loss." [3] The fiercest assaults of these regiments were directed against Vance's left, where Major A. B. Carmichael was in immediate command, and his center, where Vance had been reinforced by two companies of Avery's Thirty-third North Carolina under Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Hoke. Of these assaults Reno reports, "The battle now became general along our whole line, and raged fiercely for about three and a half hours." [4]

Colonel Ferrero, commanding the Fifty-first New York, writes, "A continuous fire was then kept up on the enemy, which they returned with great vigor,

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 220.
[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 113.
[3] *Official Records*, 9, 221.
[4] *Ibid.*, 229.

making sad havoc in our ranks." [1] Evidently, unless there was a diversion somewhere, Reno was not going to dislodge Vance's and Avery's well posted men.

This diversion was found in the center, and had started at an early hour. As already noted, Reno's right regiment, the Twenty-first Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Clark commanding, was moving straight up the railroad. Its advance was partly hidden by a cut in the railroad and the woods on its left. Its forward movement brought it, of course, to the fatal unfortified gap already described—a gap to which the Federals had been directed. No Confederate troops were in their immediate front, [2] for Vance's left did not reach to the railroad. Across the railroad they saw the flank of the militia with no works or guns protecting it. Rejoicing at his good fortune in finding what he sought, Reno formed the Twenty-first Massachusetts at right angles to his line of march, and personally led four of its companies in a charge across the railroad against the militia.

The Confederate militamen, who had been firing staunchly, were amazed to find an enemy squarely on their flank. They were further upset by the hasty flight just behind their lines of the labor details, who had been fired on as they were unloading a car of ammunition and trying to get the belated battery ready for action. "A panic seized my men," reports their Colonel. [3] This was followed by a stampede. The four companies of Massachusetts men were apparently safely lodged behind the Confederate main defenses. General Reno was quick to see his glorious

[1] Drake, *History of Ninth New Jersey Regiment*, 65.

[2] No troops were at any time stationed along the line from the extreme left of the Twenty-sixth Regiment to the brickkilns, a distance of over 200 yards until Colonel Avery ordered Major Lewis with four companies of the Thirty-third Regiment to occupy it. There were also no troops defending the line from the brickkiln to where the main breastworks (Fort Thompson line) touched the railroad. Underwood, *History of the Twenty-sixth Regiment of North Carolina Troops*, 14.

[3] *Official Records*, 9, 267.

opportunity to reinforce them and sweep down the rear of the Confederate works. Before, however, he could lead the rest of his regiment across the railroad, his movement had caught the attention of Major Carmichael of Vance's regiment. He, with two and a half companies,[1] occupied a redan to Reno's left. These opened a deliberate fire, and Avery's regiment, the Thirty-third North Carolina, was hurried to the critical spot. Two of Avery's companies, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Hoke, joined Vance's right center, four under Avery entered the redans with Carmichael. The remaining four under Major Gaston Lewis were ordered to advance to some unoccupied rifle pits near the railroad and almost in Reno's front. This they gallantly accomplished, and once settled there fought unmoved until their comrades on the Fort Thompson line were flanked out of their works.

The accurate and destructive fire of Carmichael, Avery, and Lewis stopped Reno from throwing more troops across the railroad and forced him to hurry his other regiments into line on Vance's front. These, as already noted, were kept busy as soon as they swung into battle formation, and Clark with his five companies alone in hostile territory was left in a quandary. "I was compelled," says he, "either to charge upon Captain Brem's battery or to retreat without anything to compensate for the terrible loss sustained in reaching this point."[2] He made a soldier's choice and ordered his men to charge with their faces to Fort Thompson.

The flight of the militia left the works vacant until the position of the Thirty-fifth North Carolina, Colonel James Sinclair, was reached. Sinclair, on seeing the militia flee, reported "in much excitement"

[1] These companies were those of Captain Oscar R. Rand from Wake County, Captain Andrew N. McMillan from Ashe County and 25 men from Captain William S. McLean's Chatham County company—in all 170 men. Underwood, *op. cit.*, 12.

[2] *Official Records*, 9, 227.

to Colonel Campbell that the enemy was coming up the trenches which had been vacated by the militia. Campbell promptly ordered Sinclair to change his front and charge Clark's advancing men, but, says Campbell, "he failed to form his men and left the field in confusion." The hasty and unwarranted retirement of an entire regiment when there were no reserves was a shock to the Confederates, but Campbell ordered the regiment to Sinclair's left, the Seventh North Carolina, Colonel Haywood, to carry out the order. Three companies [1] of the Seventh, led by Major E. D. Hall—not three regiments, as believed by Lieutenant-Colonel Clark—promptly drove the Massachusetts men from the trenches, and recaptured the two guns of Brem's battery lost to Clark.

This feat restored the Confederate front. It was now after eleven o'clock forenoon. The battle had been raging since eight. The Confederate right and left wings were as unmoved as at the opening gun, but the unfortified center was seriously menaced by the flight of the militia and the Thirty-fifth Regiment. For weeks Governor Clark had been entreating the Confederate government to send some of the seasoned North Carolina regiments to New Bern to reinforce Branch. Had even one of these regiments been present to step into the deserted line, the day might have been saved, but General Branch reports, "I had not a single man with whom to reoccupy it."

Immediately after Lieutenant-Colonel Clark was driven out of the Confederate intrenchments by the Seventh North Carolina, he communicated to Colonel Rodman of the Fourth Rhode Island and to Colonel Harland of the Eighth Connecticut, both of whose regiments of Parke's brigade were lying along the railroad awaiting orders, the defenseless condition of

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 250.

the Confederate center. The two regimental commanders were keen to find such an opening, for, as Harland observes of his previous front attack, "It being impossible to advance in this direction, I joined the Fourth Rhode Island, who were then on the railroad, and endeavored, if possible, to turn the enemy's right." [1] Rodman, forwarding his information to his commander, at once drove for the tempting gap. His regiment was followed by the Eighth Connecticut and the Fifth Rhode Island with General Parke, who arrived during the movement, at its head. They swept along behind the Confederate works, where Sinclair's regiment should have been, and struck the Seventh North Carolina squarely on its right flank.

Although the Seventh was reinforced by five companies [2] from the Thirty-seventh North Carolina, the flank attack, combined with an advance on their front by General Foster, who, on seeing his friends behind the works, ordered his regiments forward, broke the Seventh and its support and they retired. Only the Twenty-seventh and one-half the Thirty-seventh North Carolina now remained of the Confederate left. These were beset by Foster's brigade outside the trenches and Parke's brigade inside. Colonel Lee, the wing commander, saw how hopeless further struggle was, and he, therefore, ordered these men to fall back on New Bern. By his orders also the guns in Fort Thompson were spiked and the magazines of Forts Ellis, Allen and Lane were blown up.

After their successes on the Confederate left, both Foster and Parke turned promptly to aid the Federal left, for Reno had made no impression on Avery and Vance.

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 236.

[2] These were Company D, under Captain John B. Ashcraft, Company B, under Lieutenant Jordan Cook, Company E, under Lieutenant Paul Farthing, Company C, under Lieutenant J. R. Gillespie, and Company K, under Captain John Ross.

When the Confederates were driven from the Fort Thompson line, General Branch sent messages to Avery and Vance to retire, but these messages were never received. Entirely unaware that they were fighting alone and that Foster and Parke were about to envelop them, the two regiments clung to their battle. Foster, with the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts and three of McCook's guns, gained unobstructed a position almost parallel to the railroad and on the left of the Confederate redans. Parke pushed the Fourth Rhode Island in just to the left of Foster, and then closed the gap between his lines and Reno's with the Eighth Connecticut and the Fifth Rhode Island. A simultaneous surge forward of the forces of Reno, Parke, and Foster drove first, Lewis and Avery, and then Hoke and Vance from their defenses. Avery with about 150 men was hemmed in and captured. The others crossed Brice's Creek with difficulty and danger and escaped to Kinston.

After the Confederates abandoned their works they made no further stand, and their retreat was disorderly and at times panicky. Previous to the battle General Gatlin, while stating that he was not particularly apprehensive of a defeat at New Bern, had issued an order from his headquarters in Goldsboro that secondary lines of defense should be constructed. He gave as a reason for this precaution that the troops were not veterans and that in case they were compelled to withdraw in their first encounter, it would probably prevent a disorderly rout if they knew that defensible positions awaited them. This sensible order, like so many others that required effort, was not obeyed, and a disorderly retreat through New Bern followed. The constant fire of shells from the gunboats as they threaded their way through the obstructions on the river added to the precipitancy of

the retreat, which did not stop until Kinston had been reached.[1]

The Federals followed closely on the heels of Branch's men, who, hoping to check the Federal pursuit, set fire to the bridge over the river, but Burnside's troops were ferried over by his fleet, which reached the city in advance of the army. The river had been obstructed at much expense by underwater piles, by inclined stanchions with sharpened iron points, and by torpedoes of various kinds. The fleets, however, piloted by a man named Westervelt,[2] who had commanded a vessel plying between New Bern and New York, passed up the channel left free for Confederate shipping and reached the city with little damage. The batteries which were designed to protect the passage had been evacuated as already mentioned. Efforts were made by the retiring Confederates to burn all the military stores in the state warehouses. After ten or twelve houses had been burned the fires were put out by private citizens under direction of the Federal naval authorities.

The casualties are shown in the following tables:

CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES[3]

Regiments

	26 N. C.	33 N. C.	Unassigned	35 N. C.	7 N. C.	37 N. C.	27 N. C.	Brem	Latham	19 Cavalry	
Killed	5	32	4	5	6	1	4	1	10	------	Total 68
Wounded	10	28	7	11	15	3	8	8	11	------	Total 101
Totals	15	60	11	16	21	4	12	9	21	------	Grand total 169

[1] In Major Gilmer's report these statements are found:

Company I—The majority of this company followed the captain to Jones County.

Company K—Two commanding officers and all the company but 30 supposed to be in Goldsboro.

[2] Raleigh *Standard*, April 2, 1862.

[3] *Official Records*, 9, 247.

UNION CASUALTIES[1]
Brigades

	Foster's: 23d, 24th, 25th, 27th Mass., and 10th Conn.	Reno's: 21st Mass., 51st N.Y., 9th N. J., and 51st Pa.	Parke's: 4th R. I., 5th R. I., 8th Conn., 11th Conn.	Artillery, Naval and Unassigned troops	Total
Killed	37	30	21	4	92
Wounded	145	169	58	19	391
Grand total					483

The list of casualties show on which troops the brunt of the fighting fell. On the Confederate side the Thirty-third North Carolina lost in killed almost as many men as the other regiments combined. Its wounded numbered over one-fourth of the Confederate total. The Seventh Regiment, which was directly in the line of fire of the Federal field pieces and which was exposed to the flank movement of Parke's brigade, was the next largest sufferer. The determination with which Captain A. C. Latham's battery was served is evidenced by his losing more men than did most of the infantry regiments engaged. Latham was assisted by 30 men from the Twenty-seventh Regiment. After a large number of his gunners were disabled, he fought one gun himself until the Federals were almost at the mouth of the piece. The loss in the Twenty-sixth was third among the infantry regiments. The Federals bear testimony to the steady courage of the two regiments (Avery's and Vance's) on the Confederate right. Lieutenant-Colonel Clark of the Twenty-first Massachusetts says of them, . . . "they were the best armed and fought the most gallantly of any of the enemy's forces. Their position was almost impregnable so long as their left flank, resting on the railroad, was defended, and they kept up an incessant

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 211; *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 115.

fire for three hours until their ammunition was exhausted and the remainder of the rebel forces had retreated from that portion of the works lying between the river and the railroad." [1]

Of the Union regiments the Fifty-first New York lost most heavily. Its fatalities occurred in its exposed front attack on the redans of Avery and Vance, the fire from which, says Colonel Ferrero, "made sad havoc in our ranks." [2] The Twenty-first Massachusetts ranks second in casualties. These were mainly sustained in its expulsion from the Confederate works early in the battle. The Twenty-fourth and the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts, opposed to the guns of Brem, Latham, and Fort Thompson, were the next largest losers. The Fourth Rhode Island, falling heir to the advantage gained by the Twenty-first and virtually deciding the fate of the day, suffered less than would have been expected.

The defeat of Branch took the people of New Bern utterly by surprise. They had believed that the defenses below the city were of such a nature that unless General Burnside came with an overwhelming force he would be successfully resisted and that even if he brought his entire force the works were strong enough to hold him at bay until reinforcements arrived from Raleigh, Goldsboro, and Wilmington. There was all around a comfortable confidence that they would not be disturbed. Bets were made on the streets only a few days before the battle that New Bern would never be attacked. The people were aroused from their complacency by soldiers rushing through their streets and shouting to them to flee for their lives and by shells bursting on their water front. A panic-stricken flight at once took place. Homes were deserted. In many cases doors were neither

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 226.
[2] *Ibid.*, 229.

shut nor locked. Men, women, and children, clasping in their arms a few prized articles or a scant change of clothes, fled in carriages, buggies, wagons, carts, or on foot. The streets and roads were strewn with valuables which were discarded as they grew burdensome.

When the Federals reached the city, they found it emptied of its people. Captain Drake of the Ninth New Jersey Regiment notes in his diary, "It was not the kind of place I had expected to see. A New England town on a fast day would be a cheerful place in comparison, and as I rambled along the sand-covered streets I was forcibly reminded of Mrs. Heman's poem, 'The Silent Multitude,' descriptive of a city of the dead, where

> None spoke—none moved—none smiled.

To me it seemed as though every one had gone to a funeral or was preparing to go. The windows of the houses were darkened, and it appeared as if the destroying angel were hovering over the place." [1]

For a day or two after its capture the town with its neighboring country was pillaged without restraint. "The soldiers and sailors had free run in New Bern the first twenty-four hours," writes Putnam, a member of the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Regiment. [2] Everything that the soldiers wanted and much that they did not want [3] was taken from the defenseless homes. So far as New Bern itself was concerned, however, General Burnside soon put the city under martial law and in a large measure stopped the plundering. For the few months in which he remained in North Carolina, General Burnside endeavored to keep down vandalism. His conduct was in striking contrast to that of General Foster, who succeeded him in command.

[1] Drake, *History of Ninth New Jersey Veteran Volunteers*, 66.
[2] *Story of Company A, Twenty-fifth Massachusetts*, 114.
[3] Roe, *History of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment*, 95.

During the remaining years of the war the Federal pillaging of Eastern North Carolina was so unrestrained and so shameless and discreditable that a writer of this generation has no heart to recount its sickening details. Some commanders neither allowed it nor winked at it. Others always assumed the attitude of Colonel Charles A. Heckman, who, says the official historian of his regiment, was "one of those soldiers who believed in supplying the wants of the army from the country through which it passed." [1] Such an attitude always begets license. Let the subject be dismissed with a few illustrations drawn, not from Confederate testimony, but from eye-witnesses in the Federal army. Captain Thomas H. Parker, of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania Regiment, who declares that he writes not from hearsay but wholly from personal observation, says in reference to a raid on the farm of Captain Peter G. Evans:

> We found on the place 90 slaves, large quantities of cotton, some of which was in bales and some loose, some in the press, some in the gin; also a large number of horses and cattle, 175 hogs, 50 goats, 25 mules, 75 ploughs, a great many carts, saw mills, flouring mills, with a great quantity of flour and corn meal in them, and about 4,000 bushels of corn, all of which we took possession of. [2]

The author adds, "This Evans is a rebel captain and was in the battle last Friday. He got wounded, was taken prisoner, and died yesterday."

The same writer says:

> All the large plantations throughout the South have vaults or graveyards close to the mansion for the interment of the deceased members of the resident families. About two miles from camp, on the opposite side of Brice's Creek, was a stately plantation of five thousand acres belonging to a Colonel Hill,

[1] *History of the Ninth New Jersey Veteran Volunteers*, 67.
[2] Parker, *History of Fifty-first Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers*, 113.

who was at that time an officer in the rebel army. A vault on this place, close to the dwelling-house and within 50 yards of the Trent river, contained a large number of coffins with remains of members of the family for several generations back, but a visit to the place by members of a Connecticut and a New York regiment, soon reduced the structure to a shapeless collection of ruins, having burst the cerements of the departed and piled the bones in a confused mass. . . . All the property in this region of the country was abandoned by the legitimate owners, and the places left to the ruthless mercy of the Yankee army, but in all the destruction committed by men of the 51st P. V., vaults, tombs, graves, sarcophagi, etc., were held with too much reverence by them to either violate the sancity of the spot or allow others to do so.[1]

"On these expeditions," writes Sergeant Putnam of the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts, "soldiers took what they wanted wherever it was to be found, except from houses occupied where the soldiers were civilly treated."[2]

"Without leave some stole into the town (Hamilton) to forage upon their own account, and commenced wholesale pillage which the officers vigorously tried to restrain; but the streets soon became full of these men, many of whom, made frenzied by apple-jack, which was found in plenty, commenced to deface and destroy household articles and to carry off furniture and goods."[3]

In trying to carry out a policy of reconstruction, President Lincoln appointed Edward Stanly military governor of North Carolina. His official position and residence in New Bern gave Stanly first-hand knowledge of the conduct of the Union troops. In a letter to Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, he describes the vandalism of the army on its various expeditions:

[1] Parker, *History of the Fifty-first Regiment of Pennylvania Volunteers*, 177.
[2] Putnam, *Story of Company A, Twenty-fifth Massachusetts*, 137.
[3] *Record of Forty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 122.

Had the war in North Carolina been conducted by soldiers who were Christians and gentlemen, the state would long ago have rebelled against rebellion. But, instead of that, what was done? Thousands and thousands of dollars worth of property were conveyed North. Libraries, pianos, carpets, mirrors, family portraits, everything in short that could be removed was stolen by men abusing flagitious slaveholders and preaching liberty, justice and civilization. I was informed that one regiment of abolitionists had conveyed North more than 40,000 dollars worth of property. They literally robbed the cradle and the grave. Cases were numerous where old men were thrown into prison and after their horses and barns were destroyed by fire they were robbed. I remember one instance where several houses were burned and robbed, and among others that of a Methodist preacher, whose Bible, library, and only horse were stolen.

So serious did the growth in volume and value of articles shipped to the North become, that Commodore Rowan evidently decided to stop the unlawful practice. He stationed Renshaw in the channel below the city with these orders:

You will take a position with the *Barney* off Slocumb's Creek as an outpost to prevent small craft from passing down the river without a pass signed or endorsed by me. You will also keep a good lookout on the fleet to guard against plundering on their part. You are authorized to look into the hold of any sailing vessel leaving here that you may have reason to suspect. You can look for deserters or assign any other politic reason you choose for your visit, the object of which will be to prevent dishonest people from carrying off property that has been stolen or sold without authority. . . . When any goods are found on board, such as you have reason to suspect have been stolen or obtained without leave and not designated in the pass signed or countersigned by me, you will detain the vessel, large or small, boat or canoe, and send the person in charge to me.[1]

Inasmuch as the Federals proposed a permanent occupation of the conquered territory, New Bern naturally became their military base. Burnside began at once an elaborate system of fortifications around

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 171.

the town which, as it is situated on a peninsula between two rivers, lent itself easily to fortification. The gunboats protected the city on the water front. By the labor of hundreds of runaway slaves, who had flocked to New Bern and whose presence and idleness were an embarrassment to the commanders,[1] the town was rendered almost impregnable. North of the city a cordon of defenses was stretched clear across the peninsula from the Neuse to the Trent River. This line of earthworks was flanked by two forts on the Neuse and one very formidable one on the Trent side. To avoid the mistake made by the Confederates another fort was constructed where this line crossed the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad. To the south of the town two strong works were thrown up south of the Trent River and one on the Neuse. These forts were connected by block-houses and field fortifications.[2] General Burnside succinctly states his object in constructing works of such proportions. He explains to Stanton, "These forts are built not only with a view to hold the place with a small force, but to give occupation to the hundreds of negroes that are flocking to us. They [the works] will make our base more secure and thereby add greatly to our strength in an advance move into the interior."[3]

Whenever New Bern was thereafter threatened, the defenses were still further enlarged. With these strong works crowded with artillery and held always

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 373.

[2] The town was skillfully girdled with defenses. Both Generals Foster and Parke were military engineers, and General Burnside used their knowledge to safeguard his conquest. Fort Totten, covering the natural approach, was especially strong. It included seven acres; its parapets were 8 feet high and 12 feet thick. A parapet of earth and logs, 35 feet high, 28 feet thick, and 400 feet long, was constructed on the *terra pleine* to shelter the garrison of 1,000 men in case of bombardment. On top of this huge parapet was a series of rifle-pits for the use and protection of sharpshooters. The armament of the fort consisted of 30(*a*) guns, including two 100-pound Parrotts.(*b*) The six other forts were not so large but were skillfully designed and strategically located.

a Official Records, 9, 378.

b Derby, *Bearing Arms*, 107.

[3] *Official Records*, 9, 383.

by large garrisons and with the navy, as Rowan puts it, "surrounding three sides of the town," the recapture of the city by storm would have cost the Confederates more lives than they were able to lose.

Almost immediately after the town was secured, Burnside was disturbed to hear that small ironclad vessels armored like the *Merrimac* would soon be ready to descend from Norfolk through the canals leading to Albemarle Sound, and fall on his wooden gunboats. He resolved to forestall such danger by organizing in conjunction with Commodore Rowan a large force to land at Elizabeth City and "move up to South Mills and blow up the lock of the canal at that place and then proceed to the head of Currituck Canal and blow in its banks, thus rendering it impassable for the gunboats which are said to be building at Norfolk to come into these waters." [1]

General Reno, an able and courageous soldier, was directed to lead the expedition. With Colonel Hawkin's brigade of three regiments [2] from Roanoke Island, two of his own regiments, [3] and four guns under Colonel W. A. Howard—a total of 3,102—General Reno landed at Elizabeth City, and on the morning of April 19 took up his march for South Mills. The day was intensely warm, and, although the distance was only about twelve miles, the men suffered very much. Hawkin's brigade, guided by a negro, took the wrong road and had ten extra miles to march. Although the mistake of the guide in taking the longer instead of the shorter road was a natural one and although General Reno says that "nothing but design or negligence" [4] could have caused the mistake to go undiscovered, the

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 378.

[2] The Ninth New York, 727 men; Eighty-ninth New York, 625 men, Sixth New Hampshire, 600 men. Hawkins's Report, *Official Records*, 9, 309.

[3] The Twenty-first Massachusetts, 500 men, (Clark's Report, 9, 320) and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, estimated at 625 men, the average for regiments of this division in April. *Official Records*, 9, 581.

[4] *Ibid.*, 312.

guide "was quietly taken to a wood out of sight of the troops and shot." [1]

As Reno approached South Mills on his march to destroy the locks above that place, he found his way barred by a Confederate force under Colonel A. R. Wright of the Third Georgia Regiment. Wright was one of those stubbornly courageous men who teach a regiment how to fight and his seasoned followers were always ready to face whatever came. His own regiment of 585 men, [2] Gillett's troop of cavalry, four pieces of artillery commanded by Captain W. W. McComas, a spirit as gallant as Wright's own, and some drafted North Carolina militia from the First Brigade of Colonel D. D. Ferrebee—these, not 900 in all, made up his entire force. To protect his right rear from an anticipated advance on the road west of the Pasquotank River, he posted two companies of his own regiment at the bridge across the stream, some three miles from the battlefield. Three more of his companies and the militia were held in reserve about a mile in the rear to guard an old road parallel to the one on which Reno was approaching. His other five companies, subsequently joined by one of his companies from the reserve and, according to Ferrebee's report, by a few volunteering militia, were the only Confederate infantry actually engaged.

Wright's companies were drawn up behind the banks of a long ditch which crossed Reno's road and which was so flanked by woods that the Federals did not know how small a number confronted them. The road was too narrow for all three of McComas's guns; hence only two came into action. So fatally limited were the Confederates in 1862 in ordnance supplies and in transportation that these guns had to be withdrawn on account of empty limber-boxes before the battle was finished.

[1] Hawkins, *Battles and Leaders*, I, 655, note.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 327.

Reno's leading regiment, the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, approached Wright's position about 11:45 on the morning of April 19. McComas's guns opened so brisk and so warm a fire that the Pennsylvanians "found that it was impossible to remain in that position; consequently the line began to waver under such rapid firing and was at last ordered to get under cover of a thick woods on the far side of the cornfield. After the column had taken shelter in the wood, the men sunk down to earth from mere exhaustion, and no threats, persuasion, or any other means could induce the men to rise until they had a rest." [1]

Its breathing spell being finished, the regiment was urged into line to advance on the Confederate left; but, says the historian of that regiment, "when within about thirty yards of the concealed foe in the ditch it received a terrific volley of musketry that brought it to a sudden halt." [2] The Twenty-first Massachusetts having arrived, its colonel was ordered to march his men to the right of the Pennsylvanians and the Ninth and Eighty-ninth New York Regiments were formed on their left —all four regiments aligned obliquely to the Confederate front, and the Twenty-first and Fifty-first fairly on Wright's left flank. The Sixth New Hampshire Regiment drew up on the left of the road in support of Howard's four guns, which had come into spirited action on the Confederate front.

Wright's situation was now precarious. Under cover of woods and fences [3] the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania men were firing at close range on his flank. Reno's three other regiments and his guns were keeping up a close fire on his left center and front. The Georgians, however, were steady and the cannoneers were firing with rare calmness, but perhaps faster,

[1] Parker, *History of the Fifty-first Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers*, 140, 141.
[2] *Ibid.*, 141.
[3] Reports of Colonels Clark and Bell, *Official Records*, 9, 318, 321.

owing to the pressure, than their supply of missiles warranted. About three o'clock a lull in the firing led Colonel Hawkins on his own initiative to order his Ninth Regiment of Zouaves to charge Wright's guns. The Zouaves, however, received a galling fire from Captain McWhorter's company and "in less than two minutes lost 9 killed and 58 wounded," [1] and were thrown back in great confusion. [2] Reno, after realigning his center regiments, ordered a general advance. For a long time this concentrated attack was held in check, but, reports Huger, "just at this moment Captain McComas was killed by a minie ball and his men, who for four hours had fought with indomitable courage, became panic-stricken and left the field, taking their pieces with them." [3] Colonel Wright rallied the retreating artillerymen, and their guns aided the muskets of the resolute regiment in checking the Federal advance again. After emptying their limber-chests the artillery withdrew, but Wright's infantry still persisted until the Sixth New Hampshire in their front and the two regiments on their right were almost upon them. They then retired to some intrenchments on Joy's Creek, two miles in their rear, called in the other five companies, and awaited further battle. Reno says that his men were so completely fagged out by the intense heat and their long march that he could not pursue, [4] but the fierce determination with which the Confederates had fought, his comparatively heavy loss, and the rumor of Southern reinforcements had much to do with his decision. The Confederate loss in the battle was 6 killed and 19 wounded; [5] the Federal loss, 13 killed and 101 wounded. [6]

[1] Hawkins in *Battles and Leaders*, I, 656.
[2] Reno, *Official Records*, 9, 317.
[3] *Ibid.*, 328.
[4] *Ibid.*, 306.
[5] *Ibid.*, 329.
[6] *Ibid.*, 307.

About nine o'clock that night Reno, leaving his seriously wounded in a farm house under the care of one of his own surgeons, had his lounging or sleeping men aroused by whispered commands and noiselessly [1] formed for a wearying night-march through a heavy rain to his boats near Elizabeth City. So impressed was this usually cool soldier by rumors that the Confederates, largely reinforced, were about to spring on him in the dark that orders were issued not "to talk above a whisper and to prevent tin cups and canteens from clashing or making the least noise." [2] A detachment of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania was even required to bury a wagon-load of tools which had been brought to destroy the locks, lest their rattling in the wagon should betray the march. [3]

Military reports are generally skeleton-dry; sometimes, however, circumstances make them unconsciously humorous. General Burnside, on the receipt of the reports of General Reno and Colonel Hawkins of the success of "their late demonstration on Norfolk," issued a congratulatory address to their troops. In this address he felicitates them upon the indomitable courage with which "they attacked a large body of the enemy's best artillery, infantry and cavalry in their own chosen position, achieving a complete victory." [4] Yet, the general, writing to Secretary Stanton on April 17, stated definitely the object of this "demonstration on Norfolk." He says:

> I have organized in conjunction with Commodore Rowan an expedition against that place [Elizabeth City], and if we succeed in capturing or driving the enemy back we shall move up to South Mills and blow up the lock of the canal, and then proceed up to

[1] Scholl's Report, *Official Records*, 9, 324.
[2] Parker, *History of the Fifty-first Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers*, 145.
[3] *Ibid.*, 144.
[4] *Official Records*, 9, 307.

the head of the Currituck Canal and blow in its banks, thus rendering it impossible for the gunboats, which are said to be building at Norfolk, to come into these waters.[1]

If Reno succeeded so signally as the reports claimed, why are the locks standing even to this day? What changed a lock-destroying expedition into a "demonstration against Norfolk"? Why are Colonels Bell and Clark[2] so profuse in their explanations of why they did not carry out original intentions?

General Burnside concludes his address with these words: "The General commanding desires to express his approbation of General Reno's strict observance of orders when the temptation to follow the retreating enemy was so great." General Reno, in a letter to General Burnside gives another reason for his "strict observance of orders" in not destroying the canals. He writes: "After ascertaining that the navy could not make a junction with me at the bridge, and hearing from a variety of sources that I considered reliable that reinforcements were on the way, I deemed it for the best to retire, and no man more highly approved that course than the rascal Hawkins. In fact, it was his bad conduct in placing his regiment in a position to get whipped and demoralized that principally induced me to change my first intention, which was to remain on the field and proceed to South Mills in the morning."[3]

In his official report, addressed to General Burnside, Colonel Hawkins says, "In this enterprise you have received another evidence of the courage and enterprise of the troops under your command. Although the results of this expedition may seem disastrous on account of the loss of life, still the reconnaissance

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 271.
[2] See Bell's Report, *Ibid.*, 319; Clark's Report, *Ibid.*, 322.
[3] *Ibid.*, 317.

cannot fail to be of great value to you." [1] In a letter to General Burnside, written two days after his report of the battle on the nineteenth, the same Colonel Hawkins says:

> Doubtless the unfortunate occurence of the 19th has been brought fully to your notice. No one can regret the result more than myself. First, because of the loss of life; second, the object of the expedition not being accomplished after all the obstacles in our way had been removed. It seems that both parties were badly frightened. The enemy ran like quarter-horses toward Norfolk, and we as fast as our weary legs could carry us towards Roanoke, leaving quite a number of our wounded and destroying the bridges behind us. [2]

Before General Burnside could safely attempt to carry out his plans of moving on Goldsboro, Raleigh, Fort Caswell, and Wilmington, he felt it necessary to undertake the capture of Fort Macon, opposite the town of Beaufort. The possession of Macon would leave no Confederate stronghold to menace his rear. More important still, his forces, until Macon was in his hands, would have to be supplied by small light draft vessels which, after daring the storms of Hatteras, had to thread a tortuous way through the sounds to New Bern. Fort Macon controlled the harbor of Beaufort, the best on the North Carolina coast. By the capture of the strong old fort the Federals in North Carolina would have quick access by open sea to Fort Monroe and Washington, and their army could be supplied by the largest steamers. Moreover, the Atlantic blockading squadron would always have a convenient temporary base and a commodious refuge in time of storms. [3]

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[1] *Official Records*, 9, 317.

[2] *Ibid.*, 316.

[3] "Great as were the advantages of the previous conquests of the army and navy at Hatteras, Roanoke Island, and New Bern, there was still wanting for the fleet a naval station in North Carolina of ready access from the ocean." *The War for the Union*, II, 397.

Immediately, therefore, after the battle of New Bern, General Burnside started General Parke with portions of his brigade to take possession of Morehead City, Carolina City, and Beaufort, and to invest Macon.[1]

Fort Macon, built at an original cost of $463,790 to the United States government, was a strong, old fashioned, casemated fort with two tiers of guns—the one below in casemated bombproofs, the one above en barbette. It mounted at the time of the siege 43 guns.[2] The fort was situated on the eastern extremity of Bogue Banks, a narrow strip of wind-driven sand with the ocean on one side and Bogue Sound on the other. The inlet to the sound, a narrow passage, separates Bogue Banks from Shackleford Banks, almost due east, and guns of ordinary range could easily reach the fort from the point of Shackleford Banks just opposite. Beaufort is about two miles northeast of the fort, and Carolina City, Parke's headquarters, is about five miles northwest. Outside of the range of the guns on the land face of Macon, the fort was absolutely unprotected.

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 377.

[2] Many reckless statements have been made as to the number of guns mounted at Fort Macon. Craffut and Morris tell their Connecticut readers that there were 88;(*a*) Hawkins, who wrote with Burnside's official report accessible and hence ought to have known better, says 67;(*b*) Duyckinck says 60,(*c*) and others vary widely. Colonel J. A. J. Bradford, reporting to the Military Board of North Carolina the result of an official inspection of the fort, says that there were on the 20th of August 21 guns mounted and that the number would soon be increased to 42.(*d*) The returns of Ordnance Officer T. Coleman for the third quarter of 1861 charges the fort with one 10-inch and two 8-inch Columbiads; two rifled guns; fifteen smoothbore 32-pounders; twenty-three carronades—43 in all.(*e*) Burnside reports the capture of 54 guns in the fort.(*f*) The discrepancy between the 43 mounted guns and the 54 captured is explained in a report from Colonel J. L. Bridgers, then commandant of the fort, in which he says that 21 cannon more than would ever be mounted, were lying in the fort.(*g*) Some of these were afterwards sent to New Bern.

a Connecticut During the Rebellion, 179.
b Battles and Leaders, I, 652.
c The War for the Union, 397.
d Letter File of Military Board.
e Ordnance Ledger, 352.
f Official Records, 9, 275.
g Bridgers to Governor Clark, Letter File, April 16.

It was not for lack of repeated warnings that the Confederate government failed to realize how desperate would be the plight of Macon if it were approached by a large land force coöperating with the Federal fleet. General Walter Gwynn, when commanding the defenses of that section, urged repeatedly that both Bogue and Shackleford Banks should be occupied by artillery and infantry.[1] Before the capture of New Bern opened a possibility of a movement on Macon from that direction and only an attack by sea seemed possible, General D. H. Hill, in charge of the Pamlico Department, wrote, "I must again repeat my earnest conviction that the occupation of Shackleford Banks by a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery is essential to the defense of Fort Macon."[2] Later H. K. Burgwyn wrote President Davis entreating the stationing of infantry and well-drilled artillery on these banks.[3] General Gatlin says that he had besought the Secretary of War for men until he was ashamed to ask further.

The garrison of Fort Macon, commanded at the time of the siege by Colonel Moses J. White, consisted of four companies of the Tenth North Carolina Regiment and one company of the Twentieth North Carolina.[4] The total number of these companies as reported by Colonel White was about 400. A three month's supply of provisions was always maintained in the fort.

General Parke, accompanied by the Fourth and Fifth Rhode Island and the Eighth Connecticut regiments, reached Carolina City just west of Morehead City on March 22. There, at the terminus of

[1] *Official Records*, 108, 120.
[2] *Ibid.*, 4, 693.
[3] Clark's Letter File.
[4] The companies of the Tenth Regiment were as follows: Company B, Captain Henry T. Guion; Company F, Lieutenant Daniel Cogdell; Company G, Captain James L. Mauney; Company H, Captain Stephen D. Pool; Company F of the Fortieth Regiment was under Captain Richard H. Blount.

the railroad on the shore of Bogue Sound, he established headquarters. After the refusal by Colonel White of a summons to surrender the fort, General Parke began preparations for a regular siege, for the fort was too strong to be taken by assault. The difficulties in his way were great. War is largely a matter of organized business with soldiers for laborers—the best labor in the world for such work is a combination of patriotism and disciplined compulsion. General Burnside gives in clear detail the slow and laborious process by which the army organization had to transport everything needed for the siege from New Bern to the desolate banks. The needs varied from huge Parrott guns to tenpenny nails, from horses and wagons to kegs of drinking water. He says:

> After transporting all the batteries, ammunition, supplies, etc., 36 miles by hand-cars, they have to be transported by water some three miles and a half through a tortuous channel, with only two feet water at high tide. Flats loaded with supplies are sometimes a day and a half making this short trip. These supplies then have to be loaded on wagons and transported near four miles through deep sand to where the trenches are established. The farthest of our batteries, which consists of four 10-inch mortars, is but 1,200 yards from the fort.[1]

If the regiments of infantry so persistently asked for by Gwynn, Hill and Clark to prevent this very transportation had been granted, the fort could not have been thus invested.

In carrying out his plans for investment, Parke stationed the Sixth New Jersey as a rearguard at the Trenton bridge, which had been rebuilt by the Fifth Rhode Island after the Confederates burnt it. Carolina City was occupied by two companies under Major Allen, and Beaufort by three companies. A gunboat served to blockade Core Sound and two or

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 272.

three small boats cut off the fort from all communications through Bogue Sound. The first troops were transported to Bogue Banks on March 29. From that time until April 10 every available hour of night and day was spent in transporting men, siege trains, and supplies.[1]

In the early dusk of the day on which the Federal troops found lodgment on the banks, Colonel White, standing with Captain Pool on the parapets of Macon, saw a cordon of lights spring up from the banks to his rear, from the boats in Bogue Sound, from Carolina City, Morehead City, and Beaufort, from the gun boat in Core Sound, and from the fleet hovering around the mouth of the inlet. "What does this mean?" he asked with a sweep of his arm around the circle of lights. "It is the Federal Anaconda of which we have read so much," answered Captain Pool. "Its folds encircle Fort Macon and they must be broken or they will crush it. It means good-bye to outside friends and all news from this time until the end of the siege."[2]

In spite of encircling foes "cheerfulness and activity prevailed everywhere in the fort,"[3] and the grim fort was stripped for battle. Outside buildings were burned; boats at the docks were destroyed; wooden protections from weather were torn away; sandbags were placed to protect guns and gunners; ammunition was laid out. Stock was taken for the commanding officer. For the commissary department Captain C. W. King reported an ample supply of provisions. The returns from the ordnance officer, Lieutenant Thad Coleman, were not so pleasant. He reported a sufficiency of shot, shell, and fuses, but less than a three days supply of very inferior powder if the fire of the guns were continuous.

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 283.
[2] Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 503.
[3] *Ibid.*

This defect in the Confederate ammunition was remarked by the Federal ordnance officer. He comments, "During the enemy's fire since the commencement of operations, I have often had occasion to observe the want of effect in the explosion of their shells." [1]

Thus equipped the fort awaited the coming bombardment. There was, however, nearly a month to wait for the final ordeal. During this period General Parke dispatched to the banks eight companies of the Fourth Rhode Island Regiment, seven companies of the Eighth Connecticut Regiment, and the Fifth Rhode Island Battalion, Company C, First United States Artillery, and Company I, Third New York Artillery. Signal stations were established to communicate with the fleet and the shore towns.

After the landing of these troops the Confederate outpost of one company under Captain S. D. Pool was driven into the fort. "From this date the regular work on the approaches, trenches, batteries, rifle pits, was vigorously pushed forward by all our available force both night and day in spite of a desultory fire by the enemy." [2] Three batteries were set up behind sand knolls. These sand knolls, covered at times with stunted trees, afforded excellent cover for artillerymen and their infantry supports. The Federal engineers were delighted to find that by cutting down the natural slope of these hills to a sufficient depth to lay a platform for the guns and by revetting the interior faces with sandbags excellent epaulements were formed. [3] The first battery of four 10-inch mortars, commanded during the bombardment by Lieutenant D. W. Flagler, was located near the marsh and about 1,680 yards from the fort. Captain L. O. Morris's battery of three 30-pounder Parrotts was 200 yards in advance and to the right of the first. A battery

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 288.
[2] Parke's Report, *Ibid.*, 283.
[3] *Ibid.*, 284.

of four 8-inch mortars in charge of Lieutenant M. F. Prouty was placed another 200 yards in advance and near the sea.[1] These guns were only 1,280 yards from the fort.[2]

In addition to the batteries, rifle pits had been dug at intervals across the front to repel any sortie by the Confederates and to shelter sharpshooters who had been pushed in close to pick off gunners in the fort. These trenches received from 30 to 50 shells each day from White's forces.[3] The batteries were connected by trenches which zig-zagged around the sand hummocks. No batteries were erected on Shackleford Banks or at Beaufort as had been planned. Colonel White explains clearly why he could not, in the absence of infantry, stop these preparations. He says:

> We could only annoy the enemy by the fire of our artillery, which, fired horizontally, could do them no damage and only force them to keep behind the sand hills. Not having a mortar in the fort, we mounted six old 32-pounder carronades, which had been placed in the fort for defending the ditch, with 40° elevation and used them for throwing shells behind the enemy's coverings. Two 10-inch guns were used for the same purpose. They (the enemy) were, however, so completely concealed that we could seldom ascertain the position of their working parties, and when driven from them, we could not see when they returned, and from scarcity of shell we could not keep up a continued fire.[4]

The thirteen guns of the land batteries opened a simultaneous fire about sunrise on April 25. When the thunder of these heavy guns was heard at sea, Commander Samuel Lockwood bore down close to the breakers with his four ships[5] carrying twenty-three guns and joined in the fierce bombardment. The

[1] Flagler's Report, *Official Records*, 9, 286.
[2] Prouty's Report, *Ibid.*, 288.
[3] Rodman's Report, *Ibid.*, 291.
[4] *Ibid.*, 293.
[5] The *Daylight*, four guns and a crew of 57; the *State of Georgia*, nine guns, crew of 113 men; the *Chippewa*, four guns, crew of 80 men; the bark *Gemsbok*, six guns, crew of 103 men. *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, xv.

weight of metal converging against the isolated fort was, however, not yet completed. Apparently under General Burnside's personal direction [1] the two floating batteries of Nichols and Baxter, armed with four rifled Parrott 30-pounders and one Wiard 12-pounder, were towed into position for action, but owing to high winds, only one of these guns could be used. As soon as the fleet ran within range the heavy guns of Guion and Pool in the fort were swung seaward. "Here was game for which we were prepared and anxious to meet," says Pool. Of the accuracy with which these two companies maintained their fire, the Federal fleet commander reports, "The fire of the enemy on the vessels from guns of greater range was excellent; their shot and shell fell around us in every direction. Many good line shots passed just over and beyond us, as we successively passed their line of fire, and we were exceedingly fortunate in receiving so little damage." The squadron no doubt escaped greater damage because its officers followed in this conflict, too, the practice recently introduced into the navy by Stringham; they discharged their guns, not from anchor, but as they steamed rapidly by their objectives in a continuous circle. After an action of an hour and a quarter, Lockwood's squadron was compelled by the violence of the sea to withdraw. [2] Their retirement was a disappointment to Pool and Guion, who had set their hearts on sinking some or all of their boats.

An uninterrupted fire from the Federal land batteries continued for ten hours. No Confederate guns on the parapet facing the entrance to the harbor could be brought to bear on the land batteries nor could those on the parapet facing Beaufort. [3] Hence the fort

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 274.
[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 279.
[3] Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 510.

could use only half of its guns. The system, now so perfected, of directing the range of artillery fire by reports from observers in forward-posts, in observation ballons, or in airplanes, was then in process of development. From the Federal observation tower in Beaufort, signal officers corrected with remarkable precision errors in the ranges of their gunners on the banks. Andrews is of the opinion that "never in the history of warfare have signals been used to greater advantage," [1] than in the siege of Macon. As a result of these signals he states that "after 12 m. every shot fired from our batteries fell in or on the fort." Flagler, who examined the fort after the bombardment, adds that "of the 1,150 shots fired by our three (land) batteries about 500 took effect within the works of the enemy, not counting the shells that were exploded over the fort." [2]

The termination of the battle and the reasons for surrender are best given in Colonel White's own words:

> The attack from land was kept up with great vigor, the enemy having immense advantage from their superior force, being able to relieve their men at the guns, while our morning reports showed only 263 men for duty. Our guns were well managed, but being able to do little damage to water batteries and siege guns, firing through very narrow embrasures. The enemy kept up a very vigorous and accurate fire from both rifles and mortars, dismounting guns, disabling men, and tearing the parade, parapets, and walls of the fort. After 6:30 p.m., finding that our loss had been very great, and from the fatigue of our men being unable to keep up the fire with but two guns, a proposition was made to General Parke for the surrender of Fort Macon. . . . The fort was very much damaged and fifteen guns disabled. Two days more of such firing would have reduced the whole to a mere mass of ruins. [3]

The terms of capitulation included but two articles: first, the fort, armament and garrison to be surrendered

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 291.
[2] *Ibid.*, 288.
[3] *Ibid.*, 294.

to the forces of the United States; second, the officers and men of the garrison to be released on their parole of honor not to take up arms until properly exchanged, and to return to their homes, taking with them all their private effects, such as clothing, bedding, books, etc. The fort was garrisoned by the Federals immediately after its evacuation and occupied by them until the close of the war. The Confederate loss during the bombardment was 7 killed and 18 wounded; the Union loss was 1 killed and 3 wounded.

Two acts of bravery cheered the hearts of the lonely garrison during the long siege. The first was performed by a small boat's crew; the second by a Confederate steamer.

After Macon was invested, Colonel White was anxious to know whether there were any possibility of an attack on Parke's forces by Confederate infantry. To obtain this information he delegated to Lieutenant Thaddeus Coleman and Cicero Primrose the dangerous mission of taking a boat's crew through the investing forces. Coleman and Primrose, selecting a very dark night, managed by skill and coolness to slip through the enveloping forces and reached Confederate headquarters. Their daring feat, however, resulted only in an exhibition of devotion to duty for no succor could be sent to the doomed fort.

The success of the steamer's feat was of more importance to North Carolina and the Confederate government. The *Nashville*, a Confederate vessel mounting two small guns and commanded by Lieutenant R. B. Pegram, had eluded the Federal blockading fleet and steamed into the Beaufort harbor on February 28. She was the first armed ship to carry the Confederate flag into an English port.[1] Her appearance in English waters so upset the sailing schedules of Northern commercial craft that the

[1] Huse, *Supplies for the Confederate Army*, 33.

United States man-of-war *Tuscarora* was sent to England with the "primary object of seizing the vessel." [1] After repairs at Southampton the *Nashville* escaped the *Tuscarora*, and taking on a cargo of arms and war munitions at Nassau headed for Beaufort. The Federal blockading squadron had been especially warned to capture the *Nashville*, but, although hotly pursued, she ran safely under Macon's guns.

On finding that the Federals held the railroad over which she had expected to ship her cargo, the *Nashville* made ready for a dash for Wilmington. Her intention was known to the garrison. As she passed the fort on March 17 to run the hazardous gantlet, the men swarmed the walls and cheered as long as the vessel was in sight. Off the harbor's mouth two blockading ships, the *Gemsbok* and the *Cambridge*, caught her under their fire, but her swiftness and cool maneuvering enabled her to cross the Wilmington bar unharmed. In her cargo were 1,760 Enfield rifles [2] for North Carolina, some for Georgia, and 6,420 for the Confederacy. [3] These splendid rifles could not have come at a more opportune time, for the state and Confederate armories were swept bare.

The chagrin of the Federal naval authorities over the vessel's carrying arms into two blockaded ports, and then escaping from Wilmington with a cargo of cotton, was intense. Assistant Secretary of the Navy G. V. Fox wrote Flag Officer Goldsborough, "I have yours about the *Nashville*. It is a terrible blow to the prestige

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 1, 230.

[2] These guns were bought by Colonel John L. Peyton, who went to Europe on the *Nashville* as agent for the State of North Carolina for the purchase of arms and munitions. Although the markets of Europe at that time were being ransacked for guns, he succeeded through Caleb Huse, Confederate Agent, in buying this number from S. Isaac, Campbell & Company of London at 65 shillings each. Each gun barrel was stamped with the initials of the state. So highly prized were these new arms that only the flank companies of each regiment to which they were issued were armed with them. *Official Records*, 127, 692; Clark's Letter File, January 29, 31, 1862.

[3] *Official Records*, 11, 334; 128, 52.

of the navy and will place us all very nearly in the position we were before our victories. . . . This is not blockade. You can have no idea of the feeling here. It is Bull Run to the navy." [1] The people too were so indignant that "petitions were signed all over the country for the removal of the Secretary of the Navy." [2]

The acquisition of the excellent harbor which Macon had hitherto guarded was an incalculable boon to the Federals. "The possession of Beaufort harbor," reports General Burnside, "renders the transportation of troops to this department an easy matter." [3] It gave them a deep water base that was in quick communicating distance with their central supply depots, a safe coaling station south of Fort Monroe, a minor repair station, and a commodious refuge from the storms off a dangerous coast.

The successes of the Burnside expedition, which closed with the surrender of Fort Macon, were permanently damaging to the state and to the Confederacy. If the central government had accurately informed itself of the strength of the impending invasion and then clearly estimated its own inadequate preparation to meet the land and naval forces of Burnside, the calamitous results would no doubt have been prevented, for enough disciplined troops were hurried into North Carolina, after both of these things were realized, to have checked the invasion.

A succession of delays marked almost every step taken to encounter Burnside. At the time of the battle at Roanoke Island infantry was marching to reinforce Shaw's handful of men, but these troops came too late. A complete battery of field artillery, receiving orders at the last minute, was on its way to the island, but was prevented from getting there by

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 139.
[2] Sprague to Craven, *Ibid.*, 1, 382.
[3] *Official Records*, 9, 384.

being ordered to take a long instead of a short route. If three antiquated guns held the Federals advanceless for three hours, what could a well-equipped battery of six more guns not have done? Efforts were under way to fortify the narrow entrace at the south of the island, but they were started only in time for winter to stop them. Shaw's men made what fight there was only by virtue of an unfinished line of earthworks.

The same exasperating delays prevailed at New Bern. Lieutenant George Bryan writes his father on March 23, 1862, as follows:

> We were beaten by everything being done too late. The enemy occupied our breast works (Croatan) that we had worked on almost ever since the war began, before we reached them, after giving 16 or 17 hour's warning. Our strongest battery was so late in being mounted that the enemy fired on us before the mounting could be completed and in that way prevented it, and every other part was just of a piece.[1]

Burnside rested at Roanoke from February 8 to March 11, yet with his great flotilla actually lying in North Carolina waters for all this time measures of defense were not complete at New Bern when his guns opened the struggle for the city. The Croatan works, erected at enormous cost, were not manned until March 12, and then by one hastily withdrawn regiment. Two guns that could have taken care of the unfortunate gap in the fortifications and that ought to have been placed days before were silent because they were lying on the side of the railroad track instead of on emplacements. Two staunch regiments, Clingman's and Radcliffe's which, had they been posted as a reserve behind this gap, could no doubt have saved the day, were on their way to New Bern for the battle —ordered a day too late. Two forts that might have scored against the fleet were unfinished. The redans

[1] Bryan Papers.

behind which Avery and Vance stood so firmly were completed by Vance only the night before the battle. The Confederate commander in the state who, on account of age and infirmities, was not equal to his responsibilities, was not relieved until the disasters were accomplished.

To the Confederacy the results of these conquests were greater than the government ever anticipated. The occupation of this territory in rear of General Lee's army by a mobile force that could be safely increased by water in a few hours was a constant menace to operations in Virginia. Henceforth, whenever a strategic blow by the Army of Northern Virginia was under contemplation, it had to be thought out with the possibility of a counter-strike from the easily enlargeable army squatted behind the fortifications of New Bern and within a few hours by open sea of the Confederate capital. Moreover a large number of state and Confederate troops, urgently needed by Lee for offensive warfare, had henceforth to be detailed to hold the army at New Bern in check. In addition, the loss of army supplies from the largest corn and meat producing section of the Confederate States nearest to Virginia was irreparable—supplies, too, that had been accessible through inland waterways safe from molestation by the unopposed Federal fleet and without throwing additional traffic on the already overburdened railways of the South. Nor should the effect on the blockade business, which so largely furnished to the state and the Confederacy the necessities which were not produced in the South, be overlooked. While Beaufort and the inlets of the sounds were in Confederate hands, the daring blockade-running captains had choice of several ports on the North Carolina coast, and ran for the one least guarded at the time of their approach. Hereafter they could make only for Wilmington. Of course, too, the

Federal fleet which had been patrolling 400 miles of coast now concentrated around that port so thickly that, as one disgusted blockade-runner phrased it, "the very waves grew tired of holding up their ships."

On North Carolina there fell by these swift blows an appalling property and territorial loss. The thirteen counties henceforth practically administered by Federal officers contained 2,492,107 acres of unusually fertile land. Off their shores were nearly all of the state's fisheries. They embraced the towns of New Bern, Morehead City, Beaufort, Washington, Plymouth, Edenton, Elizabeth City, and many small places. The territory lost between January and May had a total population of 118,829. The lost acres had been tilled by 50,590 slaves. They produced annually 5,211,386 bushels of corn, and $1,998,740 worth of cotton. Moreover, in contiguous counties great quantities of cotton and naval stores were destroyed lest they should fall into the hands of Federal raiders. For illustration, the itemized report of Captain W. Jordan Walker, commanding a single company, the Clark Skirmishers, shows that in one month his company alone destroyed along the banks of Tar River from South Creek to a point six miles above Greenville, a distance of only 40 miles, $754,635.60 worth of cotton and 11,197 barrels of naval stores.[1] In the neighboring counties, too, large areas remained untilled, either because the landowners feared the loss of their crops or because the slaves had been tempted to the contraband camps at Federal bases. For the remainder of the war little taxes were collected from the subjugated section. The conscript laws were powerless. The only troops added to the army were volunteers, and these volunteered at much peril to their families. That North Carolina, notwithstanding this territorial loss, kept so large a number of men in

[1] Walker to Branch, Clark's Letter File, April 17, 1862.

the ranks and contributed so largely to the Confederate treasury, will always be a matter of wonder.

The people of the state, as we find their feelings indicated by newspapers, letters, speeches, were surprised and angered by the apparently easy conquest of so much of their territory. Especially were they distressed by the capture of the populous town of New Bern, whose intrenchments had been deemed almost impregnable. They forgot the age-old observation that only a miracle-worker can reëstablish under fire raw troops when once they are broken, and thought that Branch's troops would fight in a second and in a third line, if by some untoward stroke they were driven from their first position. Those who had been reared on the doctrine that "one Southerner could whip five Yankees" were bewildered. For several weeks fault-finding and explanations were rife. General Gatlin complained that the Confederate government had expected impossible things of him.[1] The Wilmington *Journal* shared Gatlin's opinion of Richmond's civil and military guilt.[2] Governor Clark, however, was not sure that Gatlin was free from censure.[3] Burgwyn's judgment is that Huger's absence and Gatlin's sickness were responsible.[4] The

[1] "We failed to make timely efforts to maintain the ascendancy on Pamlico Sound, and thus admitted Burnside's fleet without a contest; we failed to put a proper force on Roanoke Island, and thus lost the key to our interior coast, and we failed to furnish General Branch with a reasonable force, and this lost the important town of New Bern. What I claim is that these failures did not by right rest with me." *Official Records*, 4, 578.

[2] "There is one thing evident, the military heads of this revolution must be greatly changed and will be and the civil ones too. A concentration of forces, not less than 10,000, at each of two points on the railroad, could have saved both Roanoke Island and New Bern." Wilmington *Journal*.

[3] "I hear much complaint and criticism among the people of the absence of General Gatlin from the field of battle and his entire neglect and inattention to the coast defenses of his command for the last five months." Clark to Secretary of War, *Official Records*, 9, 445.

[4] "Indeed the whole command of our state from the Roanoke to the Atlantic in this critical period is commanded by a major-general who is at Richmond, to be tried (as we learn) and a brigadier who is sick." Burgwyn, Clark's Letter File, Feb. 22, 1862.

Fayetteville *Observer* attributed the disasters to unwise selection of leaders.[1] The Raleigh *Standard* was unwilling for Major W. B. Thompson, the state engineer, to go blameless.[2] Worth charges the Confederate want of success to the Federal gunboats.[3] General S. G. French, who was on his way to take command at New Bern when the battle was fought and joined at Kinston, wrote General Pettigrew that lack of earnestness and idleness prevailed at New Bern.[4] Even some of the Federals who took part in these battles thought that their army escaped most lightly.[5]

The fact, however, that the Confederates battled as well as they did under all the circumstances is really the surprising thing. There was little at Hatteras, Roanoke Island, or New Bern to inspire raw troops to fight with enthusiasm and almost everything to depress them. A comparison of the two armies, which no doubt every North Carolina soldier made for himself, reveals the adverse psychologic frame of mind under which the Confederates fought. Every intelligent Confederate at Roanoke Island knew that he was fighting in a ratio of about nine to one against

[1] In all the battles in this state, and in some of those elsewhere, there has been a deplorable want of men and a leader of men. At Hatteras a naval officer commanded—off his element. At Roanoke Island and at New Bern politicians who had never seen a battle commanded. In no one of the three was the best use made of even the feeble force at their command. Fayetteville *Observer*, March 24, 1862.

[2] Editorial, March 19, 1862.

[3] I suppose Wilmington will next be surrendered in pursuance of what now seems the policy of the government, to wit, to make no resistance to the capture of such places as the enemy can approach with ships. *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, 168.

[4] "The truth is that the forces at New Bern never realized that there was any war in the land. They went and came, played and danced; often at home or their families with them—the living was good and merrily went the time." Pettigrew Papers, March 24, 1862.

[5] Walcott, in *The History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment*, comments with surprise on the fact that the strong line of Confederates works "was easily carried by assault, and its defenders utterly routed in an engagement lasting in all but about three hours." He then adds what he thinks an irreconcilable fact, "Nearly all of the rebel regiments which we encountered at New Bern were in Jackson's corps (later) and fought with remarkable bravery." 73.

him, and at New Bern, of more than two to one. He was aware that in addition to this disparity in his own infantry, he had to reckon with the long-ranged, heavy guns of a well-appointed fleet. He had learned from the newspapers that his adversaries were led by four experienced professional soldiers under whose supervision they had been long enough to be mechanized into fairly good soldiers; that all of these leaders were graduates of West Point; that three of them had served through the Mexican War and their commander added field knowledge of Indian warfare; that two of them, Foster and Reno, had been twice brevetted for gallant and meritorious conduct in battle.[1]

In contrast when he remembered how, without opportunity for assembled organization the newly combined units of his army had been hurried to the coast; how infantrymen who a week before did not know a ramrod from a lanyard, were serving as gunners;[2] how some of his regiments, armed with weapons which had been characterized as "useless masses of wood and metal," were to be pitted against soldiers drilled in the use of excellent rifles;[3] how the "persuasive effect of 9-inch shells" was to augment the rifle fire, the confidence of success which a soldier ought to feel must have been chilled. Without daring to frame his own feelings he must have felt the same anxiety which Governor Clark expressed in a letter to Secretary Benjamin, "I feel some apprehension from the fact that our regiments just ordered to the coast are raw and undrilled—never had a musket in hand[4]—and

[1] Foster at Molino del Rey and Contreras; Reno at Cerro Gordo and Chapultepec.

[2] Some of Latham's gunners at New Bern had only two days drill in their positions.

[3] Burnside's report to McClellan: "These troops are all well armed, equipped, and clothed. All, with the exception of the Fifty-first New York, have rifled arms." *Official Records*, 122, 620.

[4] The Thirty-fourth and the Thirty-seventh left Raleigh for field service with only a few companies armed. Letter Book, 233.

The Thirty-seventh arrived at New Bern on January 9, with only three companies armed. Letter Book, 237.

their officers, though worthy, are equally inexperienced and are to face on unequal terms picked and drilled bands of Yankees. Under the circumstances I would suggest whether an exchange could be made with any of our older regiments in Virginia." [1]

If the thinking soldiers, waiting on the coast to take part in these battles, could have supplemented their personal observations by the intelligence possessed at headquarters of how scant were all Confederate appliances for war, their disturbance of mind would have well-nigh changed into hopelessness. If they could have read their secretary of war's message to the governor of Alabama, "I am almost in despair at the calls for arms from all parts of the Confederacy," [2] or their governor's lament to the chief of ordnance, "We have never had a supply of ammunition in this state," [3] they would have fought only because they were animated by the same feeling Clark expressed to Gatlin, "When we can do no better, we must fight with indifferent arms, with half arms, with no arms." [4]

[1] Letter Book, 234.
[2] *Official Records*, 11, 334.
[3] Letter Book, 231.
[4] *Ibid.*, 185.

CHAPTER VIII

EDWARD STANLY: MILITARY GOVERNOR

In spite of North Carolina's act of secession and in spite of the state's having furnished within twelve months after its passage 52,000 volunteers to support the act, there were many public men of the North, including President Lincoln, who insisted that there was still a strong Union sentiment in the state. These distant interpreters of internal conditions asserted that the people of North Carolina were opposed to secession and that the act of the convention of May 20 in solemnly withdrawing from the Union of their fathers was due, not to the will of the people, but to the dominance of a few secession leaders who overawed over a half million of folk. They offered as reasons for their belief the facts that the state was slow in transferring its allegiance to the Confederacy,[1] and, further, that so many of its leaders in the spring of 1861 had frankly and persistently avowed their devotion to the Union and their desire to remain in it.

They did not know, indeed had little chance to know, how sentiment in the state, already hesitating over what its people deemed President Lincoln's equivocal inaugural address and over his vacillating policy about the forts, became absolutely solidified when he violated all their states' rights convictions by calling on them to take up arms to coerce their fellow Southern States.

Inasmuch as under Holden's leadership disaffection in some form existed at a later date, it is pertinent to examine the feeling of the state at this time. If there were any dissent at the state's withdrawal from the

[1] It will be remembered that in February, 1861, the North Carolinians voted against a convention even to consider the question of secession.

Union, it would be found among the Whigs who had successfully opposed secession until Mr. Lincoln's requisition for troops. What did those who had been the leaders for the continuance of the Union think at this crisis?

Jonathan Worth, afterwards governor, had been perhaps the most unwavering opponent of secession in the state. Yet he writes on May 13, 1861: "I have been the most persevering and determined public man in my state to preserve the Union—the last to abandon the hope that the good sense of the nation would prevent a collision between the extremes, each of which I viewed with equal abhorrence. I am left no alternative but to fight for or against my section. I can not hesitate. Lincoln has made us a unit to resist until we repel our invaders or die."[1] Again, on December 7, 1861, he writes: "The state is a unit against the Lincoln government. It is a great military camp. . . . The old Union men are as determined as the Secessionists. The state is totally alienated from the Lincoln government."[2]

George E. Badger, the floor leader in the convention of the old Union men who desired to base the state's withdrawal from the Union on the right of revolution and not on the right of secession, states in a letter to John S. Ely of New York, "There is no Union feeling in North Carolina as you suppose and as is probably supposed by other Northern men. There *was* in this state a very strong Union feeling, a strong love for the Union as established by our forefathers, but, as soon as Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of April, 1861 appeared, offering us the alternative of joining an armed invasion of our sister Southern States for their subjugation, or of resisting the authorities of the United States, our position was taken without a moment's hesitation."

[1] Hamilton, ed., *The Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, 143.
[2] *Ibid.*, 159.

William A. Graham, candidate of the former Union men for president of the secession convention, concluded his Hillsboro speech with the same testimony. "The decision and the delay, therefore, have placed the government of the United States in the wrong and relieved us from any intestine divisions."

Until the date of President Lincoln's proclamation, W. W. Holden contended on the hustings and in his paper, the *North Carolina Standard*, for the state to have no fellowship with secessionists. After that date, he, as a member of the convention, signed the ordinance of separation with a gold pen bought for the purpose of being kept as an heirloom. He copied with approval the following extract from the Richmond *Dispatch*: "We trust that the result of the election will dispel all doubt from the minds of Northern skeptics and cavilers as to the Union sentiment in Virginia. The truth is that from the moment of Lincoln's Proclamation there has been but one party in Virginia, and that is the party of Southern independence," and then Holden added this comment: "What the *Dispatch* affirms to be true of the late Union men of Virginia is also to the letter true of the late Union men of North Carolina."[1]

John A. Gilmer was so entirely devoted to the Union that President Lincoln offered him a seat in his cabinet.[2] When Gilmer heard of the call for troops, he wrote, "All hope is now extinguished," and to his friend Judge George Howard added, "We are all one now."[3]

Twenty-five years after these events Zebulon B. Vance, himself an ardent Unionist, explained to a New England audience how the transition from a desire to remain in the Union to a determination to secede was made almost in the batting of an eyelid.

[1] *Standard*, May 29, 1861.
[2] Nicolay and Hay, 3, 367.
[3] Connor, *Sketch of George Davis*, 19.

The news of Lincoln's call for volunteers reached Vance while he was addressing a large audience. As he pleaded with his hearers to remain in the Union, he raised his hand in a gesture of appeal. Just as his hand was raised, the telegram containing the fatal announcement was thrust under his eyes. He describes the effect in these words: "When my hand came down from that impassioned gesticulation it fell slowly and sadly by the side of a secessionist. I immediately with altered voice and manner called on the assembled multitude to volunteer, not to fight against but for South Carolina. If war must come I preferred to be with my own people. If we had to shed blood I preferred to shed Northern rather than Southern blood." As it was with Vance so it was generally with the patriotic people of the entire state.

In the decision of the people to join their Southern brethren in the dreadful contest approaching, there were, of course, individuals and families who did not concur. Such exceptions are always encountered at the beginning of any war. They dismayed America at the opening of the Revolutionary war, in the struggles with Mexico and with Spain, and in the recent war with Germany. In North Carolina at this time they were so few as to be almost negligible. These dissentients, it is believed, were confined to these classes: First, to the pacifists generally; men like the Quakers who always refuse "to take up carnal weapons," and like the Quakers but from an entirely different motive, all those who were so fearful of sacrificing their comforts, their property, or their lives, that they favored peace at any price. Second, a few extremely conservative Union men who in the face of President Lincoln's call, still believed that somehow there would be no war, and they must persist in "a watchful waiting" policy. Third, a lawless class

who saw in the approaching absence from their communities of the volunteers an opportunity for rapine. These recreants, most of them conscript dodgers later, were augmented as the war progressed by the lowest class of deserters and became a terror to defenseless homes. Fourth, some bodies of isolated men who in the fastnesses of western mountains or the seclusion of eastern swamps had never learned to love either state or Union and whose sole thought at this time was one of self-interest.

Shortly after Burnside's army occupied New Bern, its officers began to seek diligently for Union sympathizers—men who belonged to any of the classes just mentioned. In addition to the search around the city itself, the leaders of the various expeditions which went out from New Bern were instructed to search out and protect any who were unwilling to sever their allegiance to the United States. Although little to encourage the seekers was revealed, [1] President Lincoln, who still cherished the illusion that with proper

[1] The testimony of the regimental histories of Burnside's command is interesting on this point. The following will illustrate:

"New Bern was nearly deserted, and but little of that Union sentiment said to exist South was found. The slaves alone seemed rejoiced at our coming." *History Ninth New Jersey Regiment*, 65.

"If the North Carolina people had proved to be less rebellious, our force might have been found to be sufficient to penetrate far into the interior." *History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment*, 102.

"There was not the least demonstration of loyalty or Union sentiment with the whites, but a sullen moroseness, indicative of intense disloyalty." Derby, *Bearing Army; History of the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts*, p. 96.

In describing the capture of Washington in March, Colonel Stevenson "was glad to notice considerable Union sentiment expressed by the inhabitants,"(*a*) but in May Captain Redding of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment, who with his company had been stationed there to assist in securing recruits for a North Carolina Union Regiment, and who had opportunities for judging not possessed by Colonel Stevenson, states that "he has very little confidence in the Union sentiments of the inhabitants." *History of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment*, 112.

This same writer in speaking of Washington says:

"Though it has a well defined Union element, (it) is permeated with the spirit which drove the South into secession." 132.

"There was no loyalty among the citizens except as artfully shown to defend some interest. They were in constant sympathy and collusion with the rebels." Roe, *History Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Regiment*, 104.

Burnside's own change of view is striking. He wrote to Secretary Stanton on March 19 that there was "much true loyalty here and all the people are

coaxing North Carolina would return to the national fold, appointed Edward Stanly military governor of the state. This appointment, dated March 19, 1862, was apparently made without consulting Congress, either as to the office or as to the appointee.

The new military governor, whose appointment, Charles Sumner in a resolution, introduced in the United States Senate on June 6, declared to be "without sanction in the constitution and laws," [1] was, although appointed from California, a native of North Carolina. He was born in New Bern, but moved to Beaufort County to practice law. Nature equipped him for an intellectual life. He gathered information easily and retained it without effort. In the use of his equipment he was apt, keen, thoughtful, and logical. His mercurial temper made him ready with either biting word or friendly smile, for he loved his friends as devotedly as he hated his enemies. For ten years, not, however, in succession, he represented his district as a Whig congressman. His wit, sarcasm, power of refined vituperation, and brilliance in debate won him prominence in the national House. In state politics he was twice elected speaker of the House of Commons, and served part of a term as attorney-general. In 1853 his views on national politics led to his defeat for Congress by Thomas Ruffin of Wayne County, and he moved to California. So easily in that day did men of brains transplant that five years later he was the Republican nominee for governor, but was defeated by his Democratic opponent, ex-Senator John B. Weller.

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sick of the war." (*b*) However, a stay of two months convinced him that he had overestimated this feeling, and on July 5 he writes the Secretary that the "Union sentiment in this place is remarkably limited."(*c*)

a Official Records, 9, 269.
b Ibid., 390.
c Ibid., 409.

[1] *Congressional Globe*, June 6, 1862.

None of the Stanlys ever lacked for courage, but no member of this pugnacious family [1] ever entered on an undertaking that required more courage than Stanly's governorship. The belief that he could persuade a spirited people to renounce the action of their own state authorities and make friends with a government whose army was at the time destroying their farms and homes and shooting their friends and kinsmen required unusual courage. Nothing but a prolonged absence from his native state and his failure for twelve months prior to his appointment to see a letter or even a newspaper from North Carolina [2] could account for his ignorance of the changed feelings of the people or for his willingness to undertake so hopeless and so complicated a mission.

In an address issued to his California friends when he left for his new field, he states his hopes:

> They [the people of North Carolina] have always hated secession, always were devoted to the Union, and never fully yielded to evil influences or assented to a separation until made to believe, by wicked stratagem, that their own government had declared war against them. I go to hold out the olive branch of peace on terms such as a man endorsed by you could offer and such as a brave people can honestly accept. With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, I return temporarily to my old home on a mission of love.

Stanly's instructions as to his duties were vague. In Secretary Stanton's letter of appointment he merely said:

> You are hereby appointed Military Governor of North Carolina, with authority to exercise and perform, within the limits of the

[1] While in Congress Stanly had personal encounters on the floor of the House with two of his fellow-members, Henry A. Wise and Thomas L. Clingman. He fought a duel with another, Samuel W. Inge of Alabama. His father, John Stanly, killed ex-Governor Richard Dobbs Spaight, Senior, in a duel. Several of his other near kinsmen were followers of the code.

[2] Letter to Vance, *Official Records*, 123, 847.

state, all and singular the powers, duties, and functions pertaining to the office of Military Governor (including the power to establish all necessary offices and tribunals and suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* during the pleasure of the President or until the loyal inhabitants of North Carolina shall organize a civil government in conformity of the Constitution of the United States. [1]

In his so-called letter of instruction, dated May 20, 1862, the Secretary is not more explicit. He contents himself with saying:

> It is obvious to you that the great purpose of your appointment is to reëstablish the authority of the Federal government in the state of North Carolina and provide the means of maintaining peace and security to the loyal inhabitants of that state until they shall be able to establish a civil government.
>
> Upon your wisdom and energetic action much will depend. . . . Specific instructions will be given when requested. [2]

No wonder that when the military governor found that he was expected to "reëstablish the authority of the United States government" in a state that had nearly 50,000 men under arms and was adding to the number daily, he was moved to write to the Secretary, "my difficulties are greater than you suppose." [3] General Burnside, in command when Stanly reached New Bern on May 26, welcomed his coming as a relief from many perplexities. Their first conference convinced the general that their views in reference to the course that should be adopted in the state were remarkably coincident, [4] and during Burnside's stay in the department he loyally supported Stanly, to whom he turned over the management of all civil and political matters.

Stanly in his ignorance of the altered sentiment of the people entered on his proposed mission of pacification with the usual confidence of a man of power. His

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 396.
[2] *Ibid.*, 397.
[3] *Ibid.*, 401.
[4] *Ibid.*, 394.

expectation of the large things he might do received its first shock as soon as he tried to confer with his former friends. He was amazed to find that the acceptance of his pretentious office under the Federal government had broken all bonds between him and his earlier companions and supporters. These men now regarded him personally as a traitor and his mission as an insult to their government. "The appointment of a military governor for North Carolina," writes the state's executive to General Martin, "implies its subjugation." Hence he directed that the military authorities should ignore Stanly's pretensions, and address any official communications only to General Burnside.[1] Newspapers[2] once friendly, papers that at first doubted the possibility of his acceptance of so odious a service, now joined in the general derision of his claims.

Although staggered by this first blow, Stanly pluckily undertook by speeches, letters, pamphlets, and interviews to win back men of influence, who could aid his plans. His utter failure with these men left him, as one of them points out, with "no supporters but Federal soldiers, slaves, and buffaloes."[3] The interests of

[1] Executive Letter Book, 337.

[2] Fayetteville *Observer*, Raleigh *Standard*, etc.

[3] A name at first applied to such white men of Eastern North Carolina as joined the Union army. It was afterwards extended to include all who took the oath of allegiance to the United States government after that section was occupied. The name was fixed on these people by the Northern soldiers as a mark of contempt for their recreancy to their own homes. "The Union men in Plymouth have formed a company of soldiers," writes Putnam of the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts regiment. "We call them buffaloes."

Marshall, in his sketch, *A Boy's Recollections of the Battle of New Bern*, brings out a general truth when he says, "It was a remarkable fact, at the time, that the rank and file of the Federal army had more respect for those they termed rebels than they had for those who professed to be Union men and, when a company of the latter enlisted in the Federal service, they called them buffaloes in derision and lowed and bellowed around the camp until stopped by their officers." *Carolina and the Southern Cross*, April 13, 1913, p. 18.

Why this new class was designated by this odd application of an old word is uncertain. Two suggestions have been offered. The first is that the word buffalo was at that time in current use to denote the hangers-on around fire-stations. It was a term of reproach applied to those men who for pitiful sums of worthless privileges left their duties at home to wait on firemen.

these three classes, unfortunately for Stanly's peace of soul, clashed so inevitably that any measure designed to draw to him one class always alienated another class. If the military governor sought to conciliate some hungry Confederate family by issuing the members a pass to buy necessities in a town occupied by Federals, more than likely a suspicious Federal officer would, like Colonel S. H. Mix,[1] refuse to respect the pass on the ground that the users could be spies. His speeches pleased none of the jarring interests.[2] If he tried to save the crops and animals of Union men from pillage, he offended the army who wanted to take whatever it pleased wherever it was found; if he failed to stop the plundering, he lost the favor of the buffaloes, who generally had taken the oath of allegiance merely to save their property. If he insisted that slaves who had run away from Union masters should be returned, the abolitionists in the army turned on him fiercely.[3] When he actively sought conciliatory interviews with those whom he hoped to convert, the buffaloes reported his activity to the military authorities, who became suspicious and resentful.[4]

Hardly had Stanly entered on his duties in May before these discordant interests collided. He had

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The implication, of course, was that Southern men who espoused the Northern cause would be used as menials rather than as soldiers. The second suggestion is that the name was borrowed from politics. In 1836 when many of the loco-foco secessionists returned to the regular organization, they were termed buffaloes. The North Carolinians who after their state had seceded went back to the Union would be in an analogous position.

[1] Colonel Mix says that "he will not take orders from Governor Stanly which allow well-known secessionists to come and go inside and outside of our lines." Roe, *The Twenty-fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers*, 147.

[2] While the Executive (Stanly) was not as advanced as many of his listeners from the North could wish, he was far from satisfying the slavery feelings of his Southern hearers. *Ibid.*, 129.

[3] He also was accused of returning negroes to former masters and in general of being out of keeping with his surroundings. *Ibid.*, 115.

[4] His misconception of his duties and privileges, or a want of loyalty to them, led him into acts so antagonistic and culpable as to arouse the most intense indignation in the department. Derby, *Bearing Arms*, 111.

never doubted that his mission would receive the undivided support of the North, but, before he even suspected trouble, a storm broke about his head. The outburst was led by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, aided by Senators Wade and Chandler and other radical abolitionists in Congress. It was caused by Stanly's discontinuing negro schools, and was intensified a little later by his opposition to the enrollment of negroes as soldiers in the Union army, and by his efforts to protect the slave and other property of those who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Federal government. To understand the nature of these troubles it will be necessary to glance at the conditions which led to an almost daily increase in the number of negroes in and around New Bern and to examine the relations of these runaways to the policy of the Federal government.

The Union authorities had from the beginning of the struggle been hesitant about expressing any purpose of an ultimate emancipation of the slaves. The abolitionists, it is true, were bent on the extinction of slavery at any price. President Lincoln, however, whom the extremists of his own party charged with caring little about emancipation,[1] feared that any avowed intent of freeing the slaves would align the border states against the Union and alienate the sympathies of many Northern men who did not wish to fight slavery. "The administration, therefore," says Morse, "in the early stages of the conflict declared that it was fighting simply to restore the authority of the government in the seceded states and that slavery would not be interfered with."[2]

[1] General Wadsworth, who in an official capacity was thrown constantly during the spring of 1862 with President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, is quoted as telling A. S. Hill that "the President is not with us; has no anti-slavery instincts. He never heard him speak of anti-slavery men otherwise than as 'radicals', abolitionists', and of the 'nigger question' he frequently speaks." Rhodes, 4, 64, n.

[2] Morse, *Life of Charles Sumner*, 197.

Hence for some time military commanders in Southern territory were seriously embarrassed to know what to do with the slaves who crowded to their posts. Some of these runaways belonged to secessionists; some to unionists. Should they still be regarded as property and returned to their owners? Should only those who belonged to unionists be returned or should all owners be allowed to reclaim their property? Should all be held by the soldiers and a virtual emancipation of those who came into the Federal lines assumed? These were questions that in the absence of instructions each commander had to determine for himself. Naturally they were decided in accordance with the individual views of the commander.

General B. F. Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe in Virginia, declared such of the negroes as had worked for the Confederacy to be "contraband of war," and put them to work in his own army. The secretary of war, stating that "the Department is sensible of the embarrassment which must surround officers conducting military operations in a state by the laws of which slavery is sanctioned," approved his popular course. [1]

General John C. Fremont, the erratic commander of the Department of the West, issued on August 30, 1861, an order which ran far ahead of the President's declarations and which dismayed the border states. He virtually proclaimed emancipation by ordering that "the slaves of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field, are hereby declared freemen." [2] This sweeping assumption of authority President Lincoln disallowed on September

[1] "This man Butler, in this thing, has proved himself the greatest lawyer we have between a pair of epaulettes." New York *Herald*, June 28, 1861.
[2] *Official Records*, 3, 466.

11, and directed Fremont to modify his order to correspond to the terms of the Confiscation Act.[1] Fremont's successor, General H. W. Halleck, who in his letter of instruction had been directed "to labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent states that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union,"[2] followed an entirely different course, and forbade negroes to come within his lines.

General Thomas W. Sherman had led into South Carolina an expedition similar to Burnside's. In a proclamation on November 8, 1861, General Sherman assured the people of South Carolina that his army had no desire to interfere with any of their lawful rights or their social or local institutions.[3] General David Hunter, who relieved Sherman and who was for later harshness proclaimed an outlaw by President Davis, imitated Fremont in arrogating to himself the right to free slaves. General Order Number 11 from his office on May 9, 1862, announced that "the persons in these three states, Georgia, Florida and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free."[4] President Lincoln, without even waiting to prove the authenticity of Hunter's order, fired a broadside at this remarkable proclamation on May 19:

> I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the government of the United States had no knowledge, information, or belief of an intention on the part of General Hunter to issue such a proclamation. . . . And, further, that neither General Hunter nor any other commander or person has been authorized by the government of the United States to make proclamation declaring the slaves of any state free; and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void.[5]

[1] *Official Records*, 3, 483.
[2] *Ibid.*, 568.
[3] *Ibid.*, 6, 5.
[4] *Ibid.*, 20, 341.
[5] *Ibid.*, 123, 42.

Burnside, like the other Federal commanders, was perplexed by the slave problem, and therefore the more gladly welcomed Stanly on whom he could roll the burden of settling a policy for their treatment. As soon as the negroes in the adjacent towns and plantations learned that a Federal army was established in New Bern they came flocking into the town. With the thoughtlessness of children these unfortunate victims of American policy took it for granted that they would be supported in ease and freedom. Without a thought for tomorrow they made themselves at home in the Federal lines. Only a week after his occupation of the town General Burnside reported to Secretary Stanton, "They are now a source of very great anxiety to us. The city is being overrun with fugitives from the surrounding towns and plantations."[1] "The negroes continue to come in," he writes on March 27, "and I am employing them to the best possible advantage, a principal part of them on some earth fortifications in rear of the city."[2] To reconcile them to work they were organized as a pioneer corps and marched to their assigned tasks under a battered flag and to the music of a fife.[3] Before Stanly's arrival Burnside says that he adopted the following regulations in regard to the contrabands:

> First, to allow all slaves who come to my lines to enter.
>
> Second, to organize and enroll them, taking their names, the names of their masters, and their place of residence.
>
> Third, to give them employment as far as possible and to exercise toward old and young a judicious charity.
>
> Fourth, to deliver none to their owners under any circumstances and to allow none of them to leave this department until I receive your definite instructions.[4]

[1] *Official Records*,114, 812.
[2] *Ibid.*, 813.
[3] Roe, *History of Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment*, 128.
[4] *Official Records*, 9, 390.

As expeditions, naively called "semi-predatory expeditions" by the military chronicler of one of the Northern regiments,[1] were sent out in all directions from New Bern, and as garrisons were established in other towns, opportunities were opened for an increasing number of negroes to slip into Union territory.[2] In many places their white owners had left their homes and there was no one to restrain or direct the movements of the excited negroes. General Clingman estimated in early August that each week negroes to the value of a million dollars in all were leaving or being enticed from their owners' farms.[3] Some of these, after they found that work would be required of them, returned to their homes. Many as a result of crowded quarters were swept away by disease.

As the number of negroes in the garrisoned towns increased,[4] so great was their need of oversight that Burnside appointed Vincent Colyer, an abolitionist minister, superintendent of the poor. It was his duty to care for these indigent blacks and for some equally indigent whites. After the death of Superintendent Means, who succeeded Colyer, Chaplain Horace James was installed in the office.[5] To provide house-room James built for them across the Trent river a collection of slab houses and tent shanties.[6]

[1] Roe, *History of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment*, 128.

[2] "Every expedition to the interior, securing a passage safe from rebel pursuit over all the space between our troops and New Bern, was a sign for great numbers to come in. . . . Every returning expedition was accompanied by stalwart darkies who were glad to pay for protection and rations by "toting" the arms and equipments of tired or lazy soldiers. Some remained with the troops, but more drifted into the body of laborers employed and fed by the Q. M. Department." Emmerton, *Record of the Twenty-third Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers*, 95. On this march negroes by hundreds followed us into Plymouth. Putnam, *Story of Company A, Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Regiment*, 136.

[3] *Official Records*, 9, 477.

[4] Colyer reported 7,500 at New Bern, 1,000 at Roanoke Island, and 1,500 at Washington, Hatteras, Carolina City, and Beaufort. After Plymouth and other stations were occupied the number was materially increased. Colyer's Report, 6.

[5] *Ibid.*, 30.

[6] Marshall, *A Boy's Recollection of the Battle of New Bern.*

The place, still an exclusively negro town, was named James City in honor of its founder. [1]

Most of the men in Burnside's army, which was composed largely of New Englanders, had of course read countless articles and heard innumerable speeches about the condition of the negroes in the South. They were, therefore, on their arrival at New Bern, curious to see the negroes on their native heath. They were surprised to find them so well-dressed, and to note that their manners were good and their intelligence far above the conventional Northern description. Roe comments, "Parades and all military affairs where there are music and uniforms are viewed by the colored people with the utmost interest, and in turn the soldiers look at them with amusement as they note the well-dressed bodies and bare feet of many of the Africans." [2] Emmerton of the Twenty-third Massachusetts writes: "They were, of course, of all shades of color. Mental development was as a rule in direct ratio to the proportion of white blood. I fancy the brutishness of the black field-hand of the Gulf States was rare in our part of North Carolina. On the other hand, some house-bred yellow girls had manners, and more particularly language, which for correctness and even elegance would do credit to any education." [3] The soldiers found the negroes a source of endless amusement. They kept the swarming idlers dancing, singing, and telling the quaint stories so common in their cabins. They often terrified the negroes by tossing them in blankets, but in turn delighted the more industrious by buying any eatables they had to sell.

[1] An order was issued on September 10, 1863, by General J. J. Peck, then in command of the Department of North Carolina, directing this same Chaplain James "to assume charge of the colonization of Roanoke Island with negroes." He was ordered to "take possession of all unoccupied lands on the island, to lay them out and assign them, according to his own discretion, to the families of colored soldiers, to invalids, and other blacks in the employ of the government, giving them full possession of the same until annulled by the government." *Official Records*, 49, 166.

[2] Roe, *History of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment*, 128.

[3] Emmerton, *Record of the Twenty-third Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry*, 95.

These social relations suggested the step that was the unexpected wedge of Stanly's undoing. Some of the negroes expressed a wish to learn to read. To gratify these wishes two classes of schools were opened. The first apparently was a volunteer school taught by military officers; the second, a semi-official school conducted by civilians. Captain George M. Whipple of the Twenty-third Massachusetts Regiment, while temporarily disabled from active duty, started what his regimental history calls "an early, if not the earliest attempt to educate the freedmen."[1] He opened a school with thirty pupils varying in age from ten to fifty. Captain Whipple's connection with the school was, however, brief. In the midst of an afternoon session he was notified of his detail for immediate special duty. Captain N. Willis Bumstead of the Forty-fifth Massachusetts Regiment then voluntarily assumed the principalship of the school, and some books and supplies were furnished the pupils by people living in Boston. He, however, it seems, was soon afterwards transferred to another field of duty. The removal of these two officers seems to have awakened a suspicion that the military governor had instigated the changes in order to stop the school.

The semi-official school was opened by Colyer, the official superintendent of the poor, for the negroes under his charge. This school or school system was in operation when Stanly arrived and took over the civil and political administration of the occupied zone.

Colyer reported to the military governor the establishment of his schools and asked his approval of their continuance. Stanly thus records the interview: "I approved all he had done in feeding and clothing the destitute white and black, but told him I had been sent to restore the old order of things. I thought his negro school, if approved by me, would do harm to the

[1] Emmerton, *Record of the Twenty-third Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry*, 96.

Union cause. . . . He acquiesced, I thought, cheerfully." [1] The teaching was stopped, but Colyer was far from "acquiescing cheerfully." With H. H. Helper, a native Unionist whom Stanly had just banished from the state for venturing to give him advice [2] he hurried to Washington for interviews with congressmen and for a dissemination through the more radical papers of his views that Stanly was disloyal to the Union, inimical to the negroes, and a friend of slaveowners.

The emancipation votaries in Congress, always alert to seek party advantage, took up eagerly Colyer's charges against Stanly. Resolutions on the subject were introduced in both branches on the same day, June 2, 1862. In the Senate Charles Sumner voiced his hostility to Stanly's act in a resolution that the secretary of war send to the Senate copies of any commissions or orders undertaking to appoint provisional governors in Tennessee and North Carolina, with the instructions given the governors. [3] In the House Mr. Hickman secured the adoption of the following:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to communicate to this House—

First. What powers have been conferred upon Hon. Edward Stanly, as Military Governor of North Carolina, or as the agent of the government in said state, under the appointment of the President?

Second. Whether the said Edward Stanly has interfered to prevent the education of children, white or black, in said state; and if so, by what authority, if any?

Third. If the said Edward Stanly has been instructed by the government to prevent such education, to what extent and for what purpose were such instructions given? [4]

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 400.

[2] Stanly's own version of Helper's exile illustrates his external powers. He apparently without any feeling that he was exercising despotic power, reports the occurrence to Stanton: "One person ventured to give me advice. I gave him at once permission to go to New York. The person whose impertinent meddling I rebuked is H. H. Helper." *Ibid.*

[3] *Congressional Globe*, June 2, 1862.

[4] *Ibid.*

General Burnside, declaring that Colyer was an insignificant person who "had taken decided action on the ever-agitated negro question, and then ran off to the North for the purpose of creating an excitement and thereby gaining a little temporary notoriety without thinking of the embarrassment it would cause the government," [1] upheld Stanly and urged the government to sustain him. "Governor Stanly," he assures the secretary, "is as sound on the Union question as you or I." [2]

When Stanly received a copy of the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives he answered their queries on July 12 in a straight-forward way that commands respect. He then asks for explicit instructions on six issues. He impresses on Secretary Stanton that these issues are not "cases of imagination; they have occurred and are most of them coming before me for action daily." [3]

The six cases, which clearly show how thorny his road had become, are stated as follows:

1. When slaves are taken from the possession of their loyal (Union) masters by violence offered by armed men and negroes, what redress shall be afforded to their owners and what protection for the future?

2. When persons connected with the army prevail on negroes to leave their masters, shall the loyal master or mistress have permission to prevail on them to return and be protected while doing so?

3. When steamers and vessels are almost daily leaving this state, and negroes, the property of loyal citizens, are taken on board without the consent of their owners, who are sometimes widows and orphans, will authority be given to prevent their removal?

4. In cases where aged and infirm people, who have always been loyal inhabitants and treated with cruelty by secession soldiers because of their loyalty, have had their able-bodied

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 403.
[2] *Ibid.*, 398.
[3] *Ibid.*, 402.

slaves taken away, their barns robbed and fences destroyed, themselves unable from age and infirmity to labor, shall any effort be made, either by persuasion, by the civil authority, or otherwise, to have them delivered up?

5. If the military governor shall interfere with any action which it is known will violate the long-established law of North Carolina, and a person connected with the army on the Sunday following shall make inflammatory appeals to a crowd of several hundred negroes, exhorting them to resort to violence and bloodshed, what action shall be taken by the Governor, if any, to prevent the recurrence of such conduct?

6. When the slaves of loyal citizens, who have never given aid and comfort to the rebellion and sometimes suffered because they did not, are employed by the authorities of the United States in various kinds of labor, can any steps be taken to secure a portion of what is due for their labor to their owners?[1]

These questions went to the heart of his perplexities. An answer to them, would define his relations to the slaves, to the slave-holders who had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States, and to the soldiers over whom his jurisdiction was vague. At the same time it would determine Stanly's chances of usefulness. If he could not restore the property—whether jewelry, furniture, animals, or slaves—of men who had broken allegiance with their state, and if he could not give these men some assurance of future protection, they would realize how futilely they had bartered the good will of their friends and neighbors for worthless protection tickets. If the military governor could not restrain the soldiers, who could not "keep from thinking that the war was one of emancipation sooner or later,"[2] from enticing or forcing[3] slaves to leave their homes, the

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 401.

[2] Roe, *The Twenty-fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers.*

[3] One person came to me yesterday who had four slaves taken from him by a rude soldier who cursed his wife. Stanly to Stanton, *Official Records*, 9, 400. I have just received a letter from Edenton of date the 6th instant, informing me that a band of negroes and soldiers, armed, visited the premises of a Mrs. Page of that town and carried away several negroes. Stanly to Foster, *Ibid.*, 26, 525.

submissionists had fallen on their knees to no purpose. They would simply become objects of resentment to both contestants.

So far as the official records show, no answer was ever returned to the military governor's request for instructions on these six points. In all his future attempts to win adherents to the Union cause Stanly had, therefore, as in the past, to assume, as he wrote Secretary Stanton, that the President was sincere in his various public declarations, declarations afterwards condensed into the famous sentence in his letter to Greeley of August 22: "My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery." He had to assume that Burnside was sincere when in his proclamation to the people of North Carolina on February 16, 1862, he assures them that the Union army had no "wicked or even diabolical intention to demolish your property or liberate your slaves." [1] He took for granted the sincerity of the secretary of state when he directed Mr. Dayton, minister to France, to assure foreign nations that "the condition of slavery in the Southern States will remain in all respects the same whether it (the revolution) succeed or fail." [2] If he were led by the spirit of Burnside's army to doubt the attitude of his leaders, did he not have the positive declaration of the commander-in-chief of the armies around Richmond, even after his disastrous seven-days battles, that "confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of states, nor forcible abolition of slavery should not be contemplated for a moment," [3] and his equally strong declaration to General Halleck, on August 1, 1862, "The people of the South should understand that we are not making war on the institution of slavery, but that if they submit to the

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 364.
[2] Seward to Dayton, April 22, 1861.
[3] McClellan to Lincoln, July 7, 1862.

Constitution and laws of the Union, they will be protected in their constitutional rights of every nature." [1] Stanly could hardly have stated his conception of the attitude of the United States government towards slavery and secession more exactly than Greeley, the greatest of the Republican editors, when he frankly published his view: "Our great Civil War was opened on the part of the Union, not only with an anxious desire, but with a general expectation that it would be prosecuted to a successful issue without seriously disturbing the foundations and buttresses of slavery." [2]

This was the conviction of Stanly when he accepted his office, when he closed the negro schools, when he protested against negro soldiers, when he tried in vain to save the property of those whom he had urged to turn to him for protection. He, however, is forced to admit that he is almost alone in this belief of the sincerity of these utterances. He bewails the fact that "men of irreproachable lives who denounced secession as treason down to the day when the North Carolina convention passed the ordinance of secession, have been persuaded and charge that 'the Southern country is invaded by an enemy who proposes nothing less than our entire destruction, the total desolation of our country—universal emancipation; to crush us, to wipe out the South, to involve us in irredeemable misery and hopeless ruin.' [3] If this idea, so monstrously incorrect, be in the minds of men of standing and influence, how must the large body of the people regard the action of the general Government?" [4]

Sumner was not yet content to allow Stanly to escape congressional punishment. In a resolution in the Senate on June 6, he recited that Stanly, "assum-

[1] *Official Records*, 13, 346.
[2] Greeley, *American Conflict*, II, 237.
[3] *Official Records*, 9, 401.
[4] *Ibid.*

ing to act under a letter from the Secretary of War calling him military governor of North Carolina," had undertaken by virtue of such military authority to surrender fugitive slaves, contrary to the intent and meaning of the act of Congress recently adopted; also to banish an American citizen, in violation of personal rights secured by the Constitution; and also to close and suppress schools maintained by the charity of good men for the education of colored children." He, therefore, sought by his resolution to request the "President of the United States to cancel the letter of the Secretary of War under which Edwin Stanly now assumes to act."[1] The resolution was never considered by the Senate, and no further effort was made at that time to interfere with Stanly's administration.

After General Burnside was transferred to Virginia, Stanly's difficulties thickened. General J. G. Foster, who took over the command of the Department of North Carolina, seemed unable to prevent a shameful amount of pillaging. This seizure of property and destruction of plantations and homes aroused Stanly's indignation, because the army did not spare the property of those who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Federal government and who had consequently placed themselves under his protection. Shortly after he resigned, he wrote to General Foster:

> I deeply regret to be compelled, in the last hours of my stay here, to distress you by complaints of the outrages of our forces in the last expedition to Hyde County. In numerous instances, well authenticated, they entered and robbed the houses of loyal men, destroyed furniture, insulted women, and treated with scorn the protection which by your advice I had given them. Can I give to people whose loyalty is not and has never been questioned any assurance that you can see them protected?

[1] *Congressional Globe*, June 6, 1862.

As matters now stand the loyal men and women, aged and infirm, outside of our lines, are the most unfortunate and oppressed in our country; both sides pillage and rob them. I know you have uniformly rebuked these atrocities, but your words have been treated like my protections.[1]

Accepting the assurances of Lincoln and Stanton that slavery was not to be disturbed, Stanly had from his advent in the state promised those who took protection from him that their slaves were not to be molested. Hence, of course, he was incensed when the slaves of his followers were not returned to their owners and when his protection cards were not respected by pillaging and burning soldiers. His pride revolted at the thought that his constituents would have to regard him either as a violator of pledged faith or a mere puppet in the hands of the army.

Moreover, whatever might have been his previous illusions, Stanly knew that as soon as President Lincoln, contrary to all his former declarations, proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves and authorized their enlistment in the Federal army and navy, his mission was doomed. His views on the arming of negroes are given in a letter written to General Foster after his resignation had been forwarded to the President. He says:

I am informed by several gentlemen, residents of Elizabeth City, that there are in that town about 250 negroes armed and daily drilled by officers of the army of the United States. I also learn that Captain Sanders is in command. If the President commands this, officers of the Army are expected to obey. . . . Are not instructions to be given that they are not to be sent out into the fields or allowed to go on foraging expeditions, committing pillage and robbery at discretion? My attention has been called to several instances of this kind. I have promised to and do invoke your assistance to prevent if possible the most deplorable calamities that will fall on our loyal citizens and upon

[1] *Official Records*, 26, 182. See also 470.

the negroes if superior discretion and experience do not now control them. I most earnestly solicit your attention to this matter, and that I may be authorized to inform our loyal fellow-citizens that no inexperienced subordinate shall, without your sanction, and until proper restraints are provided, incur the danger of a servile war. So abhorrent was the arming of the slaves to even the buffaloes that after it was sanctioned many of them joined the Confederate army.[1]

The army and naval officers after a few months became convinced that Stanly's reconciliative and administrative policies were antagonistic to their plans. The army complained that his "safeguards were in the hands of citizens, soldiers, and guerillas within and without Federal lines; that provost-regulations were so prostituted that immense quantities of supplies were furnished to the Confederates, and that slaves were held subject to the demand of their masters.[2]

A controversy with the naval commanders of the North Atlantic blockading squadron continued for several months. Stanly was moved to compassion by the desperate plight of those who lived within the Union territory. They could not trade with the Confederate part of the state. They were cut off by the blockading squadron from outside ports. Hence there was absolutely no market for what commodities they were able to raise, and no place at which they could buy necessities not produced at home. Stanly realized that after these people had exhausted their supply of household articles and farm tools, their condition would be lamentable. Moreover the section had been largely stripped of beeves and fowls. The only source of meat was hogs and fish. If no salt could be obtained with which to cure the hogs and fish,

[1] *Official Records*, 27, 525. Commander Murray of the United States Navy in reporting a skirmish says: "The enemy lost about 30 killed and a few prisoners; most of the killed of the enemy and some of the prisoners (taken in arms) had passes and protections signed by Governor Stanly." *Naval Official Records*, I, 8, 587.

[2] Derby, *Bearing Arms*, 111.

these people would be entirely without meat. Shrewd Northern ship owners became aware of this acute situation through the reports of their agents who navigated these waters to deliver sutlers' stores for the army. These speculators realized what enormous profits could be made from sales to these isolated people and at what cheap rates return cargoes of cotton, turpentine, lumber and other commodities could be secured. They therefore offered, if they were allowed to buy and sell in this territory, to give bond to comply with government regulations and to take whatever oaths were required for the regulation of their business. Their offer seemed to Stanly the only way by which he might ward off calamity. He therefore agreed to license the traffic.

The naval officers, although admitting with Flusser that a "great deal of suffering has no doubt been relieved,"[1] objected to the traffic. Their first objection was succinctly stated by Commander H. K. Davenport:

> I beg leave to call the attention of the department to the inordinate amount of trading—other than by sutlers—carried on in these waters under various pretexts. With all my endeavors to prevent it, I am able to effect but very little, when permits are granted by the military governor, countersigned by the general commanding, as a "military necessity." . . . With all deference but most earnestly do I suggest that no trading be allowed in these waters, as those of our citizens who are making fortunes out of the sacrifices of those who are fighting the battles of their country, have no desire to see this fratricidal war terminate as long as they can make money out of it.[2]

Commanders Murray and Flusser, who were policing the sounds, both wished the practice discontinued. Flusser saw no way of determining whether the money-loving trader would discriminate between a loyal

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 8, 247.
[2] *Ibid.*, 558.

and a disloyal buyer.[1] Murray thought it opened a big opportunity "for illicit trade with rebels."[2]

Stanly insisted that there was no other way of clothing and feeding loyal citizens.[3] He declared that "no officer had a right to decline obeying his order or permit, and least of all to seize a vessel protected by such permit, and that any officer would lay himself liable to arrest if he pursued such a course."[4] The secretary of the navy, however, finally ended the controversy by the curt order: "Governor Stanly's pass is not to be recognized, and naval officers will give no passes for trafficking."[5] Nor was Stanly any more successful in carrying out his political plans. In obedience to his directions an election for a representative for the second district was held in December, 1862. His private secretary, Jennings Pigott, a North Carolinian by birth but a resident for a good many years of Washington, District of Columbia, was selected by a small number of voters. When Pigott sought enrollment as a member of the House, he was denied a seat.

After Vance was inaugurated as governor on September 8, 1862, President Lincoln, remembering that Vance had been a decided Union man before the state seceded, and apparently unaware that he was a determined Confederate soldier, suggested to Stanly that he seek a personal interview with Vance. Accordingly in October Stanly sent a communication to the newly installed governor in which he asserted his belief that the war between the State of North Carolina and the United States government was the result of a misunderstanding, and that he himself was in a situation to confer blessings upon the people of North

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 8, 247.
[2] *Ibid.*, 559.
[3] *Ibid.*, 308.
[4] *Ibid.*, 306.
[5] *Ibid.*, 550.

Carolina if the State's leaders would aid him. He therefore earnestly solicited a personal interview with Governor Vance or any person delegated by him for the chief purpose of seeing whether some measures could be adopted that would lead to an honorable peace. [1]

Vance replied at some length to this unexpected letter. He took the position, in declining any sort of interview, that the measures Stanly proposed to discuss related either to a general peace between the Confederate government and the United States—for neither of which was a governor authorized to speak—or that Stanly's overtures had relation to a separate peace between the State of North Carolina and the United States, a still more inadmissible subject of parley between them. He then with his usual frankness set forth his ideas of the state's duty. "North Carolina," he wrote, "with great unanimity dissolved her connection with the old government and entered into a solemn compact with the new government of the Confederate States. Her obligations in this new relation are obvious, and her honor is pledged to redeem all these obligations faithfully with the last dollar and the last drop of blood for the general good. Your proposition is based on the supposition that there is baseness in North Carolina sufficient to induce her people to abandon their confederates and leave them to suffer alone all the horrors of this unnatural war for the sake of securing terms for themselves, a mistake which I could scarcely have supposed any one so well acquainted with the character of our people as yourself could have committed."

After Lincoln's emancipation proclamation and the decision to fight the South with negroes, Stanly, already pricked nerve-bare by the thorns of contention around him, saw that there was no further

[1] Vance, Letter Book, 36, 37.

chance for him to serve the Union cause in North Carolina. Fifteen days after the proclamation which he declared "crushes all hope of making peace by conciliatory measures," [1] he forwarded his resignation. As soon as he could close his office he returned to California.

Stanly may be credited perhaps with only two successful achievements during his harassed attempt at administering a factitious office. The first of these was slightly beneficial to the Union cause; the second was greatly helpful to the distressed in Eastern North Carolina. His contribution to the Federal cause was his assistance to army officers in forming the nucleus of a regiment of North Carolinians. The thought of enlisting troops in the conquered counties originated, as already noted, with Colonel Rush Hawkins. The suggestion was kept before the army by Hawkins and a beginning made in coöperation with Mr. Stanly. Two companies—one in Plymouth, the other with Washington as an enrolling center—were first formed. The conditions around Plymouth as described by John Pool, later a Republican unionist and Reconstruction office holder, help us to understand the character of these men and the reasons for their enrollment. Practically the same conditions existed around Washington. In a letter to Governor Vance in which he urged that Confederate cavalry be sent into the county and also that its citizens be exempted from conscription, Pool says:

> The military post at Plymouth is upon the very border of the county and is accessible by the waters above named. (The gunboats of the enemy are traversing these waters daily.) There is not a Confederate soldier here, and not the least show of protection extended to the citizens. . . . The people are for the most part loyal to the Confederacy and have acted with surprising prudence and faithfulness. But how long is it prudent

[1] Letter of resignation, January 15, 1863.

to suffer these people to depend entirely on the enemy for safety and feel that they are entirely neglected, if not abandoned, by their own Government? The greater part of the able-bodied men of the county have volunteered in (Confederate) companies raised in this and adjoining counties and are now in the army. Some have been taken out by the conscript law, and the attempted execution of that law has driven many of not very desirable character to the enemy at Plymouth and many more of little better character are in readiness to repair to Plymouth or to the gunboats if its futher execution is attempted. [1]

The two companies formed for the Union army numbered 86 in November 1862. As the Confederate conscription tightened, draft dodgers in considerable number slipped into the Federal lines. Some of these men, on promises of a liberal bounty and assurance that they would not have to serve outside of their own state, enlisted in the Union regiment. Its number rose to 561 by April 1863. [2] The members of this organization, as well as the negro troops enrolled, were used largely to release more reliable soldiers from garrison and guard duty. Some of these "buffalo companies," as they were called, stationed in different counties, became terrors to their own people, and the Confederate troops always sought eagerly to bring them to battle. [3] The naval officers of the United States held these new soldiers in contempt. Commander Flusser, on September 19, 1862, writes his immediate senior: "I sent to Edenton yesterday to arrest some thirty men who had formed themselves into a company to attack our home-guard thieves at Winfield." [4]

[1] *Official Records* 26, 745.
[2] *Ibid.*, 576.
[3] "I am considerably exercised just now in reference to the Union regiment forming at Washington. It seems to have attracted a great portion of the venom of the rebel forces in this section. They have determined to do all in their power to crush it." Burnside to Stanton, *Ibid.*, 116, 637.
[4] *Naval Official Records*, I, 8, 78.

Commander Thomas J. Woodward reports to Flusser on September 28:

In obedience to your order I submit to you the following report in regard to proceedings of a company of home-guards stationed at Winfield, Chowan County, N. C. On my arrival there on the 18th of September I found out of sixty-three recruits only twenty present; the others had gone to their homes or elsewhere as they chose. The captain was in a state of intoxication, threatening to shoot some of the remaining men, and conducting himself in a most disgraceful manner by taking one man's horses and making other people pay him the money to pay for them, and this, too, from people who were well-disposed to our government. He had some eight or ten horses, when I went there, gotten in this way. He has no control over his men, and the manner in which he conducts himself is doing much injury to the cause of the U. S. government. Some of the men that have gone have taken their arms or guns with them; the ammunition has all been smuggled out and sold to citizens for liquor; what remaining arms there were I took on board for safekeeping. [1]

Stanly's second successful achievement was his activity in trying to succor those who suffered from military outrages. A general military order was issued from Burnside's office on April 28, 1862, that "whoever shall, within the limits to which the Union arms may extend in this department, utter one word against the government of the United States, will be at once arrested and closely confined. It must be distinctly understood that this department is under martial law, and treason, expressed or implied, will meet with a speedy punishment." [2]

This order was construed to cover almost any hearsay evidence of sympathy with the Confederate cause. Under its expansive construction many men of respectability and social standing who were too old for

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 8, 95.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 380.

military duty and whose bonds would have amply secured their attendance at trial were arrested and thrown into the New Bern jail. The testimony of Federal officers themselves reveal the horrible condition in which this jail was kept. Federal Surgeon Isaac F. Galloupe, in an official report to the Provost-Marshal, dated November 27, 1862, eight months after the Federal army took over the building, thus describes its condition:

1. The cells and rooms occupied by the prisoners are in the most disgusting and filthy state, seriously endangering the health and lives of the prisoners; there is apparently no attempt to make the apartments either decent or healthy; no efficient means are provided for heating or ventilation; the prisoners urinate in tubs kept in the rooms; these tubs are saturated with urine and at the time of the inspection were nearly full, giving out an intolerable stench.
2. The clothing, blankets, etc., are damp, filthy and lousy; no pains are taken to sun and air these articles; the men are unwashed and untidy and many of them diseased.
3. Rations provided for the prisoners are of good quality, but not properly cooked or served.
4. The rooms least suitable for occupation are overcrowded by prisoners, while the best rooms are nearly empty. [1]

Major Jones Frankle, provost-marshal, forwarded this report with this endorsement, "I would also respectfully represent that the rooms and cells under this building are in the most deplorable condition—cold, damp, foul, and utterly unsuited for the confinement of human beings." [2]

When aged and infirm men were thrust into this building of horrors, or when charges against other prisoners were flimsy and unsupported, Stanly often intervened to secure their release on bond or on their taking the oath of allegiance. During the numerous expeditions sent out from New Bern, inexperienced,

[1] *Official Records*, 118, 7.
[2] *Ibid.*

ill-tempered, or vindictive officers often took into custody harmless men on the reports of buffaloes or slaves. Stanly did all he could to prevent this sort of cruelty. His first efforts were, of course, directed to securing proper treatment towards those who either willingly or perforce [1] swore allegiance to the Federal government. His good offices, however, were not a few times extended to those whose sympathies were antagonistic to his own. The fierce fires of war-time emotions conceded no virtues to Mr. Stanly, but fairness requires the admission that his words to President Lincoln were entirely truthful:

> That I have offended some is probable; but they were those whose schemes of plunder I defeated—whose oppression of the innocent and helpless I resisted—whose purposes seemed to have been to join or follow the troops, and to encourage and participate in the most shameful pillaging and robbery that ever disgraced an army in any civilized land.

[1] "About 60 citizens were taken prisoners, but released at Swan Quarter upon taking the oath of allegiance." Report of Colonel D. B. Morris, *Official Records*, 26, 181. "The next morning a notice was stuck up requiring every male inhabitant over sixteen years of age to take the oath of allegiance to the Lincoln government or to leave the place (Elizabeth City)." Correspondence of Raleigh *Standard*, February 4, 1863.

CHAPTER IX

THE FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA

The capture of Fort Macon completed the three definite objects of the Burnside expedition; any further objectives, he reports, were left to his discretion.[1] He was desirous of following up his successes by the seizure of Goldsboro and Raleigh before the Confederates could transfer to North Carolina enough troops to stop his enterprises. He wrote confidently that with Goldsboro and Raleigh in his hands, Wilmington and Fort Caswell would soon succumb.[2]

Shortly after he occupied New Bern his army was reinforced by four regiments of infantry.[3] He writes McClellan on April 17, "My command now consists of twenty regiments, one battalion, and a battery, making an aggregate of about 15,000 men."[4] Before the month was out the Third New York Cavalry, under Colonel S. H. Mix, and two field batteries reported for duty.[5] On the arrival of the cavalry and artillery he learned from Secretary Stanton that no more troops could be spared for his department. Not wishing to be idle, Burnside gathered his available strength for an early movement against the interior towns. Fortunately for the state, two circumstances united to hamper an immediate advance. As the Federal troops had arrived by water, Burnside was deficient in land transportation, and there had been a vexatious delay in honoring his requisition for the wagons, engines, and cars necessary to his cutting

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 383.
[2] *Ibid.*, 390.
[3] *Ibid.*, 375.
[4] *Ibid.*, 379.
[5] *Ibid.*, 380.

loose from his base. He writes to McClellan of his troubles on May 17: "I could not today muster a train of 25 wagons, which you know would not be sufficient to carry my ammunition, and, as you see, it would be almost fatal for me to make a move into the interior before they arrive." [1] Two locomotives, [2] fifty cars, and an ample wagon train reached Beaufort about June 20.

The second cause for the delay in Burnside's stroke grew out of the necessity of correlating his movements with McClellan's Peninsula campaign in Virginia. After months of thorough organization, General McClellan had determined to throw the mighty weight of the Army of the Potomac against Richmond by way of the York River. During the five weeks that Burnside had spent in the siege of Fort Macon, McClellan had begun his operations from Fort Monroe. The surrender of Macon on April 26 left Burnside free to advance as soon as transportation was furnished, and the evacuation of Yorktown by the Confederates on May 4 enabled McClellan to push on towards Richmond. His plans for Burnside's coöperation were explained in a letter of April 2: "You will readily understand that if I succeed in driving the enemy out of Richmond, I will at once throw a strong force on Raleigh and open communication with you via Goldsborough." [3] He repeats his wishes on May 22 in a private letter to Burnside: "If I thrash these rascals, we will soon be in direct communication." [4] Burnside, however, understood without the repetition, for, on May 5, he wrote, "When you start the rebels from Yorktown please let me know at once, and I'll give them a kick in the flank that will make them see stars. . . . You know as well as I that it is

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 389.
[2] Two additional locomotives were swamped off Cape Hatteras.
[3] *Official Records*, 9, 374.
[4] *Ibid.*, 392.

easier to turn a flank than force a front." [1] In spite of the stubborn fighting qualities shown by the Confederates at Williamsburg and at Seven Pines, General McClellan was still confident of carrying Richmond by assault [2] and of driving Lee's army into North Carolina. He still believed that Burnside would be needed at Goldsboro to give his fleeing adversaries the promised kick in the flank. Hence, even with a warning on June 24 that Lee had called Jackson from the Valley to brace his lines in front of Richmond, [3] he ordered Burnside, on June 25, just the day before the battle of Mechanicsville, to advance quickly on Goldsboro with all his available force. Burnside was further instructed to destroy the bridges on the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad, all railway communications in the direction of Richmond, and to threaten Raleigh. [4] Just as Burnside commenced the ordered movement, however, he was startled, on June 28, by receiving this brief message from President Lincoln himself: "I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to General McClellan." [5] Between the sending to Burnside of the order to strike at Goldsboro and its attempted execution, McClellan was driven down the Chickahominy. Burnside, instead of striking at a fleeing foe, was called to strike for a fleeing commander, and he with two of his divisions left North Carolina permanently. General John G. Foster, with a reported present and absent force of 9,434, [6] was assigned the command of the department. As soon as it was known that New Bern would for a time have to be held with fewer troops, Foster, who, as Commodore Rowan grumbled in March, "was an engineer and must build forts,"

[1] *McClellan's Own Story*, 245.
[2] Letter to his wife, June 15, 1862.
[3] *McClellan's Own Story*, 390.
[4] *Official Records*, 9, 405.
[5] *Ibid.*, 404.
[6] *Ibid.*, 414.

immediately began to strengthen all the approaches to the city. Forts, blockhouses, field intrenchments, were so multiplied by negro labor that the town could be taken only after disastrous losses to an assailant.

The Federal soldiers in New Bern had suffered much since spring with chills and fever, typhoid fever, and dysentery. To improve their condition, hospitals were established at Beaufort and at Portsmouth. Sisters of Mercy were brought from New York to minister to the sick.

During this period of impatient waiting on Burnside's part, the Confederate executives, civil and military, aroused themselves to confine their disasters to the coast. They at last realized that a succesful sweep of Burnside's army across North Carolina would divide the upper Confederacy just as the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and New Orleans was dividing the lower Confederacy. They saw what Fox, the alert-minded assistant secretary of the Federal navy, had seen when he wrote to Admiral Goldsborough on February 24, "I think that plan [the capture of New Bern and Beaufort] the best, as it gives us a fine base to push any number of troops into the interior, so that with North Carolina and Tennessee in our possession, or nearly so, we divide them." [1] A week after the battle at New Bern, General Lee informed President Davis that more Northern troops were sailing for North Carolina, and that "disaster there would be ruinous." [2]

To stop Burnside from making any further headway toward Goldsboro and dividing the Confederacy or inflicting the disaster against which Lee warned, two steps were taken by the Confederates. First, troops enough to have prevented the initial disasters were hurried into the state. The returns for March 31

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 6, 664,
[2] *Official Records*, 108, 512.

show that an "aggregate present" of 24,030 infantry and 142 pieces of artillery were on duty in various parts of the state.[1] Had one-half of the arriving forces been transferred a few weeks earlier, it seems unquestionable that the state would not have lost so largely in wealth and territory.

The second belated step taken to prevent further encroachment on the state's territory was the strengthening of its military leadership. General Gatlin was relieved on account of ill health on March 15.[2] This step was recommended by General Gatlin himself, who says in his report, "I dispatched General Anderson to Richmond on the 15th of March to represent to the President the necessity of sending a force sufficient to cope with that of the enemy, and desired him to say to the President that, not having confidence in my health or ability to command such a force, I hoped a general of superior rank would be sent with the troops."[3] In view of the impending crisis in the state General Lee recommended that one of his senior officers—and he suggested G. W. Smith or Longstreet—be entrusted with the command of the assembling troops there.[4] President Davis, however, relieved Gatlin by the temporary appointment of General Joseph R. Anderson, commanding at Wilmington, and then ordered[5] General Theophilus H. Holmes[6] to the

[1] The troops arriving after the capture of New Bern were First North Carolina Regiment, Colonel M. S. Stokes; Second North Carolina Regiment, Colonel C. C. Few; Third North Carolina Regiment, Colonel Gaston Meares; First South Carolina Regiment, Colonel D. H. Hamilton; Third Arkansas Regiment, Colonel Van H. Manning; Thirtieth Virginia Regiment, Colonel R. M. Cary; First North Carolina Cavalry, Colonel L. S. Baker; Second Georgia Battalion, Major Geo. W. Ross; Third Louisiana Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Pendleton; General Howell Cobb's Brigade; General Cadmus M. Wilcox's brigade. *Official Records*, 9, 449-55.

[2] *Ibid.*, 445.

[3] *Ibid.*, 4, 578.

[4] *Ibid.*, 108, 512.

[5] *Ibid.*, 9, 450.

[6] General Holmes, North Carolina's ranking general in the Confederacy, was a son of Governor Gabriel H. Holmes. He was born in Sampson County in 1804. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1829. As lieutenant and captain he served on the frontier for a number of

Department of North Carolina. General Samuel G. French, who on March 13, had been called to Richmond and ordered to relieve Branch at New Bern [1] but who did not reach North Carolina until the defeated troops were assembling at Kinston, was assigned first to the Pamlico District, [2] but five days later to the Wilmington District. [3] General Robert Ransom [4] was also detached from his command in Virginia and ordered to report to General Holmes. It was thought that as Holmes and Ransom were both natives of the state their personal influence would restore confidence and their military experience would create a machine not only willing but knowing how to fight. General Holmes, aided by Anderson,

years. He was in the Seminole War, and was brevetted major for gallantry at Monterey in the Mexican War. At the opening of the Civil War President Davis, who had known him "intimately in garrison and in field and had watched with pride his leadership of a storming party at Monterey," appointed him a brigadier-general. He was promoted major-general in the fall of 1861 while in command at Fredericksburg, Va., and he was transferred to North Carolina from this command. Like many officers long under orders, General Holmes shrank from independent command. He writes General Lee on March 28, "I am oppressed with the responsibility on me. The tremendous issue involved makes it necessary that a more able brain than mine should direct." He adds on April 15, "Believe me, my dear general, this is not false modesty on my part; I know my deficiencies, and I love the cause too much to permit its vital interest to be entrusted to my management. All my life has been passed in executing the orders of others; send therefore a superior to me, or else change me for another who is capable, or who has his own as well as your confidence. Do not ascribe this to want of ambition or to diffidence, but rather believe that I know myself and have the honesty to sacrifice my vanity to the interests of my country. I can execute, but I cannot originate." (*Official Records*, 9, 453 and 459). After capable service in North Carolina, Holmes was transferred as a lieutenant-general to the Trans-Mississippi Department. In 1864, on account of age, he was relieved, and returned to North Carolina in charge of the reserves.

[1] French, *Two Wars*, 143.

[2] *Official Records*, 9, 447.

[3] *Ibid.*, 450.

[4] General Robert Ransom and his brother, afterwards General M. W. Ransom, were both natives of Warren County, North Carolina. Robert Ransom, who was born in 1828, was two years younger than his brother. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1850, and appointed a lieutenant of dragoons. After several years of hard campaigning on the border, he was in 1854 detailed as instructor of cavalry at West Point, while General Lee was superintendent of the Academy. He later served in the expedition against the Sioux Indians and was among the troops sent to quell the disturbance in Kansas. At the outbreak of the war he resigned and was elected colonel of the First North Carolina Cavalry. In March 1862 he was appointed a brigadier-general, and shortly afterwards sent to North Carolina.

French and Ransom, organized their field troops into four brigades.[1] Walker kept the brigade that he had brought into the state. Branch retained five regiments and two batteries. Ransom was put in charge of the First Brigade. The Third Brigade was assigned to Anderson, who had been commanding at Wilmington, and General French took over the command on the Cape Fear. The entire force around Wilmington at that time was limited to two North Carolina regiments—Colonel Alfred Iverson's Twentieth and Colonel Frank M. Parker's Thirtieth—one Virginia regiment, and twenty companies of infantry, cavalry, and

[1] These were as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE, Brigadier General Robert Ransom—25th North Carolina, T. L. Clingman; 26th North Carolina, Z. B. Vance; 27th North Carolina, J. R. Cooke; 35th North Carolina, M. W. Ransom; 9th North Carolina (Cavalry), L. S. Baker; 19th North Carolina (Cavalry), M. W. Davis; North Carolina Battalion, Wm. Sutton;(*a*) Evans's Troop North Carolina Cavalry; Jones's North Carolina Battery; Gresham's Mississippi Battery.

SECOND BRIGADE, Brigadier General L. O'B. Branch—7th North Carolina, R. P. Campbell; 18th North Carolina, J. D. Radcliffe; 28th North Carolina, J. H. Lane; 33d North Carolina, C. M. Avery; 37th North Carolina, C. C. Lee; North Carolina Battery, J. D. Whitford;(*b*) Bunting's (S. R.) North Carolina Battery; Latham's (A. C.) North Carolina Battery.

THIRD BRIGADE, Brigadier General J. R. Anderson—34th North Carolina, C. Leventhorpe; 38th North Carolina, W. J. Hoke; 45th Georgia, Thomas Hardeman; 49th Georgia, A. J. Lane; 1st South Carolina, D. H. Hamilton; 3d Louisiana Battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Bridford; 2d Georgia Battalion; McIntosh, (D. G.) South Carolina Battery (4 guns); Bouldin's Battery, one section.

FOURTH BRIGADE, Brigadier General J. G. Walker—1st North Carolina, M. S. Stokes; 2d North Carolina, C. C. Tew; 3d North Carolina, Gaston Meares; 3d Arkansas, Van H. Manning; 30th Virginia, A. T. Harrison; 44th Georgia, Colonel R. A. Smith; French's (D. A.) Virginia Battery.

a This battalion was apparently composed of these unassigned North Carolina companies: William Sutton (Lenoir County), afterwards Company A, Fortieth Regiment; W. H. Tripp, (Beaufort County), afterwards Company B, Fortieth Regiment; W. B. Rodman, (Beaufort County), afterwards Company C, Fortieth Regiment; James S. Lane, (Pamlico County), afterwards Company D, Fortieth Regiment; C. C. Whitehurst, (Beaufort County), afterwards Company I, Fortieth Regiment; Edward Mallett, (Craven County), afterwards Company C, Sixth-first Regiment; Henry Harding, (Beaufort County), afterwards Company B, Sixty-first Regiment. *Official Records*, 9, 447.

b Under this term there seemed to be grouped four companies of so-called foot-artillery. These were: W. A. Herring's company from Carteret, Lenoir, Wayne, Duplin, Anson, and Chatham counties; afterwards Company G of the Fortieth Regiment; J. M. Mayo's company, the Pamlico Artillery Guards; Benjamin Leecroft's company from Carteret County; John N. Whitford's company, which was at one time Company I of the Tenth Regiment, but seems to have been detached and made the nucleus of his battalion. It became Company B of the Sixty-seventh Regiment.

heavy artillery. To the gratification of both Holmes and French, Branch's men, notwithstanding the loss of their first battle, were not demoralized, but, as General French declares after an official inspection, "were cheerful and seemingly not at all discouraged by their defeat." General Holmes on his arrival was assured by the colonels that the men were most anxious to advance. [1]

The troops, exclusive of the garrisons, were centralized around Goldsboro and were constantly drilled and instructed. Arms were very scarce and very poor. In a letter to General French, General Lee seriously suggested [2] an issue of pikes as an offensive weapon with which to oppose Burnside's "excellent rifles." Great was the rejoicing among the regiments when some blockade-running ship stole into Wilmington with a few cases of foreign rifles. General Holmes was delighted to receive notice on April 26 that 2,400 of the Enfield rifles brought by the *Nashville* for the Confederacy would be issued to arm six flank companies of his regiment. [3]

During this period of watchful waiting for Burnside to start up country, the volunteer regiments, not only in Holmes's command but throughout the Confederate armies, continued their task of reorganization. Most of these regiments had enlisted for twelve months and, of course, their officers were elected for that period. Now they were enlisting for three years or whatever might be the duration of the war, and were called on

[1] Holmes to Lee, March 27: "I went yesterday to examine into the position and condition of the army under General Branch. I was assured by the colonels that there was no demoralization, and that the men were tolerably well supplied and most anxious to advance." *Official Records*, 9, 460.

[2] Lee to French, April 23, 1862: "I am directed by General Lee to say that all available arms have been given to General Holmes for distribution to the troops under his command. There are none now on hand for issue save pikes. He thinks you might arm the regiment at Wilmington by placing pikes in the hands of the men at the heavy batteries and giving their muskets to the unarmed regiment, and make up deficiency by arming some of the center companies with pikes, the flanking companies having the rifles." *Ibid.*, 463.

[3] *Ibid.*, 46.

under the new conscript law[1] for a second selection of company and regimental officers.[2] In most cases the regiments were improved by the new choice of officers. The first elections were held just after the companies had been hastily thrown into regiments. The privates who selected company officers and the officers so chosen who selected field officers had to vote for their leaders with little knowledge of their personal attributes or their power to grow in an untried office. While many of the first selections were admirable, others were lamentable failures. In the new elections a few excellent officers who had proved rigid disciplinarians failed of reëlection. In a majority of the regiments, however, especially in regiments which had been under fire, officers who had proved their worth in battle and in camp were retained, and those who had been found wanting under the severe test of battle or those who had shown lack of administrative ability or fairness were dropped. After the second election, promotion was by seniority.

The presence in North Carolina of an army which in numbers and in organization could with reason hope to stop Burnside's projected advance had, of course, a tranquilizing influence on the people. As the harbors, towns, and counties of the coastal section had been snatched away from state control, the people had felt, as Gatlin phrased it, that the Confederate government had left them to fight their own battles[3] without their own troops. Just after the capture of Shaw's men at Roanoke Island, D. M. Barringer, an aide and adviser of Governor Clark, had expressed to his friend, Secretary Benjamin, the thought of the state. "I entreat

[1] All regiments, battalions, squadrons, and companies of twelve months volunteers will reorganize within 40 days from April 16 by electing all the officers which they had a right heretofore to elect on such days as the brigade commander may prescribe. Regulations of War Department.

[2] The officers of the ten regiments styled State Troops were not elective, but were appointed by the governor.

[3] Gatlin to Clark, *Official Records*, 108, 453.

you," he wrote, "to have something done soon—at once—to restore public confidence and reassure our people that everything is done for them at Richmond that can be. We have nearly forty regiments in the Confederate service but very few of them in North Carolina. Could not a portion of them or others in their place be spared for our defense? . . . I can assure you there is great uneasiness for the future, as well as much complaint against the past." [1] The subsequent loss of New Bern and Fort Macon intensified this disquietude.

Only a few days after Holmes assumed command he tells General Lee of the change wrought by the improved military situation: "The people here are to a certain extent reassured. They are loyal and true-hearted, but a deep and dangerous despondency, even among members of the Convention, had taken hold of them." [2]

Neither this temporary despondency nor an apathy of which Holmes later complains [3] held the people back, however, from a steadfast continuance in what they regarded as well-doing. Just after the loss of Hatteras, the disaster at Roanoke Island, the overwhelming of their navy at Elizabeth City, Governor Clark announces to the secretary of war, on February 17, that "our recent disaster and the invasion of our state has infused quite a spirit of volunteering for the war." [4] Just before Burnside attacked New Bern, all the North Carolina congressmen joined in an appeal to Secretary Benjamin to send North Carolina troops, or any troops, to the aid of that city. [5] The request was denied; the city had to bow the neck to the Federal yoke. Just twenty days after this serious

[1] *Official Records*, 108, 473.
[2] *Ibid.*, 9, 454.
[3] *Ibid.*, 461.
[4] *Ibid.*, 108, 474.
[5] *Ibid.*, 485.

disaster, so indomitable was the spirit of her patient people, that Governor Clark announced to President Davis, "You asked me to call for our quota of 50 companies. I called, and 100 companies—twice the number asked for—responded. In addition, ten uncompleted regiments were manned."[1]

Before the Conscript Act, approved April 16, 1862, abolished all state apportionments, the quota of volunteers asked from each state was high; namely, one-sixth of the total white population. North Carolina's white population was 631,480. If, therefore, the state furnished one-sixth of this number—37,888, its assessment would be met in full. In the letter just quoted, Governor Clark continues, "The state has now (April 23) that number in the Confederate service. There are also now in our camp of instruction (Camp Mangum) under command of Major-General Martin, ten regiments enlisted for the war. These last, with three or four additional regiments nearly ready to come to camp—say 12,000 men, I proposed (under a law passed by the legislature) to raise as an army for state service. . . . This letter was written before seeing the Conscript Act—my design was to furnish the full quota required for the Confederate States, and then have a reserve kept in the state, to be drilled and prepared and kept for state service; and also to furnish any additional quota that might hereafter be required."[2] Thus at the passage of the Conscript Act North Carolina through the loyal volunteering of her sons, had transferred to the Confederacy her complement of 37,888 men, and had as a reserve twelve, shortly increased to fifteen, regiments. In the face of the difficulties of this period no charge of military inactivity or lack of devotion to the cause which it had espoused can ever be laid at the door of a

[1] Clark to Davis, Letter Book, 299.
[2] *Ibid.*

state that, even before the President's recommendation of the Conscript Act, had voluntarily furnished to the Confederate army its full quota of troops under the first call, and exceeded its second quota by three times the number required. Moreover, Governor Clark assures the recently appointed secretary of war, Mr. George W. Randolph, on July 21, that "but for observing the provisions of the Conscript Act, I could have raised and tendered to the Confederate States at least twenty-five additional regiments by this time." [1]

As it became clear in April that General McClellan would put his army in motion for Richmond by way of the York River, the Confederate leaders began to hurry to the marshy lowgrounds of the Peninsula every available Southern regiment. At the beginning of McClellan's movement, General Joseph E. Johnson, the Confederate commander, had only 53,000, [2] subsequently increased to 63,000, [3] men. McClellans's force at first was 92,000 men, but was later increased to 105,000. This disparity of numbers demanded an immediate strengthening of Johnston's army. Johnston wrote to General Lee on May 10, "I have written to you several times on the subject of concentrating near Richmond all the troops within reach." He then adds, "If the President will direct the concentration of all the troops of North Carolina and Eastern Virginia, we may be able to hold Middle Virginia at least."

Even before this letter was written General Lee had ordered the assembling of more troops for Johnston. The brigades of Cobb and Wilcox, which made only a brief stay in North Carolina, were already back in

[1] Clark to Randolph, Letter Book, 377.
[2] *Johnston's Narrative*, 117.
[3] Steele, *American Campaigns*, 200.

Virginia. One by one Holmes's brigades began to take train for Virginia to battle for the Confederate capital. First Anderson's, then Ransom's brigade was ordered from Holmes. In acknowledging the call for Ransom's brigade, Holmes, in daily expectancy of having to confront Burnside's drive for Goldsboro, wrote on April 17, "I will send Ransom's brigade to Fredericksburg as soon as I can relieve it, unless you will be satisfied with the new brigade to be organized out of the troops at Raleigh. I shall be left with but two brigades (Walker's and Branch's) that can be relied on if Burnside advances." [1] General Lee declined to exchange, and Ransom moved, not to Fredericksburg, but, by a change of orders, to Richmond. The brigades of Walker and Branch, on which Holmes was relying, however, both preceded him to Virginia.

General Lee wrote freely to Holmes on May 13:

> I fear it will be necessary to draw still further from the troops under your command for the defense of Richmond and its neighboring approaches. You are being weakened more than is desirable, but the necessity is unavoidable. The troops which have been withdrawn from you will be replaced by the new levies now being organized in North Carolina. It is highly important that these should be brought into the field with as little delay as possible. General James G. Martin and Colonel Clingman will be appointed brigadier-generals and will report to you. Their brigades will be formed from the North Carolina regiments. [2]

General Lee knew of the regiments of state, not Confederate troops forming in Raleigh. In the emergency he appealed to Governor Clark for these troops. They were to be used, as he stated in his letter to Holmes, to replace the Confederate troops withdrawn

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 465.

[2] *Ibid.*, 472. General Holmes, on April 22, writes to Governor Clark: "I have just received orders to send another brigade with a battery to Virginia which weakens my force more than I like—the two brigades being composed of ten of my best regiments."

from the state [1]. Governor Clark replied on March 15 that six of these regiments had already been forwarded to General Holmes for Confederate service. The other regiments, so rapid had been the volunteering, were still entirely without arms, although he had bought arms in Europe, had established factories for making rifles, and had sent agents throughout the counties to buy arms from individuals. He assures General Lee that when these men are armed, the Confederacy will never need to call twice for them nor to explain where or for what purpose they were wanted. [2]

These troops were finally armed in various ways. Eight of the new regiments shared in a distribution of the 2,400 Enfield rifles brought into Wilmington by the *Nasvhille*. Some regiments received for their flank companies 1,760 state rifles, also in the cargo of the *Nashville*. The rest of their armanent was provided from private rifles and muskets bought by the state and worked over at the Fayetteville Arsenal. [3] Four regiments were largely provided by arms taken from ineffectives around Richmond. [4] For some weeks one regiment at Goldsboro and two at Wilmington were absolutely without arms, as they declined the double-barrel shotguns and pikes offered them by the governor. [5] These seem at last to have been supplied with arms captured at Seven Pines.

As fast as these regiments were armed, General Holmes was compelled to push them into active service. This was a grievous hardship, for the men were still

[1] *Official Records*, 14, 512.

[2] Clark's Letter Book, 319. The seriousness of the situation was made clear by General Holmes in a letter to Governor Clark. He says: "I am seriously apprehensive that when Burnside finds that two brigades have left here, he will think that we have fallen into his trap and attack me before I fill the vacancies, for which my only dependency is your Excellency. God grant that our united energies may keep our beloved state from further desecration." April 23, 1862.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Official Records*, 9, 473.

[5] Clark's Letter Book, 331.

weakened by the effects of the communicable diseases contracted by new soldiers, and they ought to have had a recuperative period. Governor Clark had urged the President to accept all these regiments as an organized division, with James G. Martin, the adjutant-general of the state, as major-general in command.[1] General Lee, however, answered that the President was not authorized to accept troops in larger organizations than regiments.[2] Instead, therefore, of going into Confederate service as a unit, some of these regiments were formed into brigades, some were attached to brigades leaving the state for Johnston's army, and some were sent to Virginia under their regimental commanders.

General Martin, although still adjutant general and hence engaged in organizing these troops, was in May appointed a brigadier-general of the Confederacy. While he was hesitating about accepting the commission, owing to his duties at Raleigh, President Davis requested Governor Clark by telegram to send Martin with four regiments to Petersburg,[3] for duty under Holmes. In addition to his duties as adjutant general, Martin was at the head of the state's commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance departments. Governor Clark, therefore, asked that the movement might be delayed until Martin could effect a transfer of his manifold duties.[4] Still retaining his state position, Martin took the field on June 1, and established headquarters near Kinston. His brigade consisted of four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, three batteries of light artillery, two independent companies of cavalry, and Captain Whitford's and Captain Nethercutt's companies of partisan rangers. The entire force aggregated 5,329 men on the rolls, but on

[1] Letter Book, April 3, 1862, 297.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 471.
[3] *Ibid.*, 472.
[4] Letter Book, 324.

account of much sickness only 3,928 were present for duty.[1] Before the middle of June three of these infantry regiments were ordered to Petersburg.[2]

The small body of raw troops commanded by Martin was the only available infantry force to stand between the capital and an interior movement of the Federal army at New Bern; for, after Martin took command at Kinston, Holmes moved his headquarters to Petersburg, and took with him, Governor Clark writes, the state's best armed regiments.[3] He arrived in time to take part with his troops in the terrific battles of the Chickahominy.

Just at the beginning of these battles to save the Confederate capital, Major-General John Pope was called from the West and assigned to the command of a new Federal army to be known as the "Army of Virginia." It was composed of the forces of Fremont and Banks in the Shenandoah Valley and of McDowell at Fredericksburg. The immediate purposes of this army were to defend the Federal capital, to keep control of the Valley, and to harass the Confederate line of communication around Fredericksburg.[4] After General McClellan had been driven back to Harrison's Landing, General Lee wrote to President Davis, "I fear Pope is too strong to be allowed to remain so near our communications. He ought to be suppressed if possible."[5]

To "suppress Pope" Lee on July 13 detached Jackson with Ewell's and Talliaferro's divisions and directed him to approach Pope's front at Gordonsville. Lee's purpose, of course, was not only to hold his own communications, but to frighten the Federal government into recalling McClellan from his fine strategic

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 473.
[2] *Ibid.*, 475.
[3] Letter Book, 329.
[4] Lee's Dispatches, 37, Note 2.
[5] *Ibid.*, 39.

position. This daring act of dividing a numerically inferior army while McClellan was so near to Richmond involved the calling of more troops to Virginia. McClellan would have to be contained while Jackson, later reinforced by A. P. Hill's division, pitted himself against Pope.

In view of the contemplated detachment of Jackson, Secretary Randolph had appealed to Governor Clark for any troops in North Carolina. This urgent appeal intensified the quandary already tearing the mind of the governor. The fifteen regiments which the state had organized after the oss of New Bern and Fort Macon were formed for state defense. The men had volunteered with the prime object of defending their state from further loss. The people, who, as Holmes wrote General Lee in April, felt that "North Carolina had been neglected by the government," [1] naturally expected the governor to protect their homes and property with these volunteers. Already, in answer to the entreaties of the President, he had allowed eight of these regiments to leave the state. Of the fifty regiments of infantry North Carolina had so far organized, only seven, and one of these without a musket, were left in the state at the time of this request.

The departure of Generals Holmes, French, and Ransom with their troops had alarmed the people. If Governor Clark permitted any further withdrawal of state regiments, how could he justify himself in case Burnside or Foster marched through the heart of his exposed state and seized his capital? Yet with an eye single to Confederate welfare, he determined to risk invasion at home, and in answer to Secretary Randolph's appeal, telegraphed on July 4 that Martin, his only remaining general, and his brigade would be spared. [2] At the head of a brigade composed of the

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 456.
[2] *Ibid.*, 14, 631.

reorganized Seventeenth Regiment and three of the new regiments,[1] Martin reported for duty at Petersburg, and served at Drewry's Bluff and around Petersburg. This movement swept the state bare of all its infantry regiments except two at Wilmington and two near Kinston.[2] The Second Cavalry Regiment and some independent companies that were in September joined to form a third regiment of cavalry were doing outpost duty in the eastern counties. Foster could have worked his will had he dared to advance at this time.

During the interval in which he was waiting for transportation and for an expression of McClellan's wishes, General Burnside was constantly throwing out expeditions in various directions from his fortified camps at New Bern. The object of these expeditions was to acquire a knowledge of the topography of the country, to obtain information as to the location and strength of the Confederate forces, and to induce faint-hearts, neutrals, and secret Union sympathizers to cast in their lot with the Federals. As Burnside's forces gradually strengthened their hold on the state by occupying many of the larger towns of the east with garrisons or by dominating them with their gunboats those who were not entirely wedded to the Confederate cause and those who became despondent from Federal occupation and oppression were sorely tempted to seek immunity by taking the oath of allegiance so persistently offered. Governor Clark draws for Secretary Randolph this picture of their condition: "In the eastern counties of our state where the enemy have control as in Washington and Beaufort counties, none of our laws can be enforced, no taxes collected, the conscript law silenced; for if a

[1] The Forty-fourth, Forty-seventh, and Fifty-second.

[2] The Eleventh, Colonel Leventhorpe, and the Fifty-first, Colonel Cantwell, were near Wilmington; the Fifty-fourth, Colonel McDowell, and the Fifty-fifth, Colonel Connelly, were stationed near Kinston.

man leaves as a conscript, the Yankees desolate his home, arrest and destroy everything connected with him, and his own state is impotent to help him." [1] The men in this section were mainly past middle life, for most of the younger men had entered Confederate regiments. As the lines between Confederate and Union territory were closed, these men, as already seen, had no place to sell products or buy necessities. If on the other hand, they took the oath, they were promised that their homes and farms should not be molested. They were allowed to buy from army commissaries, licensed stores, or licensed ships, and were permitted to sell their cotton to Northern traders. Stanly, during his administration, also assured them that they should not be deprived of their slave laborers. Moreover, such young men as had not been loyal enough to their state to volunteer were, of course, made secure from Confederate conscription. Had the Federals refrained from pillage, as Stanly so vigorously urged, many of these distressed people no doubt would have been won for the Union cause. However, as the news of the rapine and vandalism practiced by uncontrolled soldiers on friends and foes alike reached their ears, enmity and hatred swelled in their hearts. [2]

The first of these expeditions was bloodless. It started from New Bern for Washington, North Carolina, on March 20, nine days after the battle left the Federals secure in New Bern. Three gunboats, the *Louisiana*, the *Delaware*, and the *Commodore Perry*, commanded by Lieutenant Alexander Murray, and the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Thomas G. Stevenson, on the troopship, *Admiral*, composed the expedition. The ships were stopped at Hill's Point, about six miles below the town, by a triple row of piles which the Confederates had driven

[1] Letter Book, 375.
[2] Marshall, *A Boy's Recollection of the Battle of New Bern.*

into the bed of the river, and had sawed off below the surface of the stream. At this point batteries had been established on each bank of the river, but, after the Confederate defeat at New Bern, the guns had been removed and the defenses evacuated. There also the boats were met by Mayor Isaiah Respass, who assured the officers that the town was unoccupied by Confederate troops. Finding a channel for the *Delaware*, Stevenson loaded two of his companies on that vessel and steamed up to the town docks. The troops were landed, but called on for no more serious duty than to hoist a Union flag on a pole from which a Confederate one had fluttered and to hack to pieces a gunboat that was building on the stocks. One of the objects of the expedition was to recover the lens that the Confederates had removed from the lighthouse at Hatteras. The lens however, had been taken to Tarboro. After the Fedeals withdrew, Mayor Respass was arrested by the Confederates on a charge of collusion with the Federals. At his trial in Richmond the court, however, acquitted him of the charge.

The reports of Stevenson [1] and Murray [2] convinced Burnside of the desirability of holding Washington. Shortly, therefore, after the return of these officers to New Bern, an occupying force consisting of Company A of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment and several gunboats was stationed at Washington. These troops, under Captain W. F. Redding, began to fortify the town. Two other companies from the same regiment, and Company I under Captain G. F. Jocknick of the Third New York Cavalry, were soon afterwards added to the garrison. Redding was instructed to support the efforts of Captain E. E. Potter of General Foster's staff, who had been promoted to be military governor of the town and colonel of the

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 269.
[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 153.

North Carolina Union regiment which the Federals were trying to raise.[1] A son of Mayor Respass, General Burnside states,[2] was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the projected regiment, but the official rosters do not show that he ever acted in that capacity.

Following the expedition to Washington, there were a number of scattered minor combats in the counties around New Bern. In most of these the North Carolina soldiers who took part were getting their introduction to field hostilities. Their behavior in these initial operations, which they were fighting as independent companies or as detachments, depended almost entirely on the degree of confidence which these men had in the bravery and skill of their leaders. Some of the independent cavalry companies and companies of partisan rangers, the members of which furnished their own horses and equipment and acted largely on their own initiative, rendered most meritorious service in repelling excursions from Federal headquarters. Others were almost useless until they were incorporated into regiments and properly disciplined by competent officers. One of the earliest of these encounters occurred on April 7 at Newport.

To secure information as to the number of men in the Federal outpost at Newport, Captain John Boothe, of Company C, Second North Carolina Cavalry, was directed to press in close to that post. On his way he was joined by Captain A. B. Hill, with about fifty men of the Scotland Neck Mounted Riflemen, and Lieutenant Lot W. Humphrey, with thirty of Captain E. W. Ward's Gatlin Dragoons of Onslow County.[3] Boothe, thus reinforced, divided his men into three platoons of thirty men each. The advanced

[1] Roe, *History of the Twenty-fourth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, 111.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 285.
[3] Hill's company, then an independent company, later became Company G of the Third Cavalry, and Ward's company became Company B of the same regiment, which was officially known as the Forty-first Regiment.

platoon under Lieutenant Mills L. Eure was composed of the men who had the best horses and arms.[1] About five miles from Newport, Eure charged a part of Company B of the Ninth New Jersey Regiment, killed one man, captured nine, and from his prisoners secured the information desired.

On the same date as the skirmish at Newport, a force of 600 men from the Ninth New York and the Sixth New Hampshire, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Simon G. Griffin, afterwards a major-general, left Roanoke Island on the gunboats *Virginia*, *Putnam*, *Ceres*, and *Eagle*, to break up an encampment of the First Brigade of North Carolina militia near Elizabeth City. Four companies of the New Hampshire regiment were landed six miles above the town at dawn on April 8, and two companies of the New Yorkers were put ashore at the town docks. They surprised two companies of the militia, who, Hawkins reports, fled without firing a shot. Seventy-three of them were captured. Fifty stands of arms and 1,000 rounds of ammunition were also taken.[2]

A more serious affair took place at Gillett's farm in Onslow County on the night of April 13. With the hope of breaking up an outpost of Confederate cavalry at Swansboro, Colonel Baron Egloffstein with 200 picked men from the One Hundred and Third New York Regiment, largely a German organization, was started to that point on April 5. The detachment was to sweep through Trenton, Pollocksville, and Swansboro, and terminate at Morehead City. It was intended to so clear that section of the North Carolina cavalry patrols that the Federals would not have to guard the railroad from New Bern to Morehead City. The expedition, after capturing twenty-three prisoners and eighty horses, encamped in and around the home of Thomas Gillett on the evening of April 13.

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 295.
[2] *Ibid.*, 296.

There it was attacked by a portion of the Second North Cavalry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Robinson. His force numbered 214 badly armed men. [1] The Confederate attack was made about eleven o'clock on a bright moonlight night. Bryan's company, with smaller detachments from the other companies, was to charge down a lane leading to the front of the house. Strange's company was to throw down a fence and charge one side of the house while Turner assaulted the other side. Three separate and rather desultory charges were made on the house, from the windows of which and the fences adjoining the Federals kept a sharp fire. The last charge to the left of the house was led by Robinson with only twenty or thirty men. In this charge Robinson, who, Egloffstein reports, "exhibited much boldness and [was] deserving of being better sustained by his followers," was wounded and captured. Captain Josiah Turner was also wounded and never returned to his company. After the fall of their lieutenant-colonel, the Confederates withdrew. The total Confederate loss was two killed, five wounded, and five captured. The Federal loss was four killed and two wounded. General Holmes, commander of the department, directed General Robert Ransom to investigate charges that the engagement was not creditable to the regiment. General Ransom closed a severe report of his findings with this recommendation: "I respectfully recommend that all but one squadron of the regiment be transferred to the rear and these be placed in a school of instruction under

[1] Robinson's party was constituted as follows: Company D, Captain James W. Strange, Lieutenants Joseph Baker and J. F. T. Williams, 54 men; Company I, Captain Jesse L. Bryan, Lieutenant J. G. Blasingame, 45 men; Company K, Captain Josiah Turner, Lieutenants W. A. Graham, Jr., John P. Lockhart and James Moore, 45 men; Company B, Lieutenant R. M. Allison, 14 men; Company E, (under a sergeant), 25 men; Company F, Elisha B. King, 15 men; Company A, 4 men. *Official Records*, 9, 300.

competent officers. Ignorance, idleness, and incapacity so strongly characterize a large number of the officers that a thorough purging is necessary." [1]

This report was approved by General Holmes, but the adjutant general of the Confederacy referred the matter to General Lee. With that equity of mind that won for him the love and confidence of his army, General Lee endorsed the report of the indignant Ransom: "But it would appear from the report of the detachments engaged that but a few men from some of the companies were present. For the bad behavior of a few, it would not appear just to punish the whole. I would suggest that these men be stationed at some point, if possible, where their drill could be perfected, as it would seem that their unfortunate behavior was attributable in a large measure to lack of drill and discipline." [2]

The headquarters of this regiment were at Wise's Fork, five miles south of Kinston. To its squadrons fell the duty of picketing the three roads from Kinston to New Bern. The detachment detailed for this purpose were usually from 30 to 60 men. The tour of duty for each was ten days. The company on each road pushed in as close to New Bern as circumstances would permit, and patrolled the sector assigned. Each was expected to detect and repel any minor advance from Federal headquarters and to delay and report any more serious movement. In the performance of this arduous service the individual companies were often drawn into action.

Near Haughton's mill, about two miles from Pollocksville, Lieutenant W. P. Roberts, subsequently a brigadier-general in the Confederate army, with one of these picketing parties of 25 men of the Second Cavalry, learned on April 27 that a Federal body of troops was approaching his position. The Federals

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 302.
[2] *Ibid.*, 303.

were in charge of the same Colonel Egloffstein who had routed Robinson at Gillett's farm. Egloffstein had pushed out from New Bern with 40 men from his regiment whom he had mounted to serve as cavalry. Seventy footmen, also, from his own regiment followed the cavalry. Roberts, who did not know that he would have to encounter infantry as well as cavalry, decided to offer battle, and drew up his men behind a farm-house. Egloffstein, who describes himself as "an old Indian fighter," [1] dismounted his cavalry and combined them with his infantry for a charge on Roberts's line. After a short conflict he dislodged Roberts, but not until Egloffstein himself, two of his lieutenants, and four privates were wounded and one sergeant killed. [2] The Confederates lost one man wounded and three prisoners. [3]

With a view to driving in the cavalry videttes on the roads to Kinston and ascertaining the Confederate strength around Trenton, Colonel Thomas J. C. Amory with the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Regiments, the Third New York Cavalry, and two pieces of the Third Rhode Island battery, [4] set out for Trenton on the morning of May 15. As a support to Amory the Second Maryland Regiment, Colonel J. E. Duryee, advanced towards Pollocksville on a road south of the Trent, but parallel to the one used by Amory north of the river. [5] Duryee halted his regiment at Pollocksville as ordered and threw out three companies to Young's Cross Roads, five miles from Pollocksville. On their march and in their bivouacs at Pollocksville and at Young's, small bodies of Confederate horsemen harassed the Maryland men

[1] *Official Records*, 9, 297.
[2] *Ibid.*, 332.
[3] *Fayetteville Observer*, May 5, 1862.
[4] *Official Records*, 9, 335.
[5] *Ibid.*, 336

and kept them sleepless and excited until on Amory's retirement to New Bern they too returned to headquarters.

Amory's three regiments on the Trenton road reached the White Church a few miles southeast of Trenton without opposition. At that point sixty men from the Second North Carolina Cavalry regiment, led by Lieutenants John V. B. Rodgers and William A. Graham, Jr., decided to ascertain the composition of the Federals.[1] They wheeled into the main road and fired into the advance guard, which was composed of two companies of Mix's Third New York Cavalry. The fire halted the horsemen, and Mix at once dismounted about fifty of his men and deployed them on each side of the road. The appearance of Federal infantrymen relieving in force Mix's cavalrymen gave notice to Rodgers and Graham that it was time for them to be off. They had wounded Major Charles Fitzsimmons and two privates and captured Lieutenant John Mayes and four of his men.[2] Their own loss was 1 killed, 6 wounded, and 2 prisoners.[3] After this bold attack Colonel Amory concluded that "to surprise the enemy at Trenton was under the circumstances impossible,"[4] and, after his men burned the church and some buildings near it,[5] they returned to New Bern.[6]

Colonel E. E. Potter, commanding the Federal garrison in Washington, was informed during the last of May that Colonel George B. Singletary, with the Forty-fourth North Carolina Regiment, was hovering

[1] Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 82.
[2] *Official Records*, 9, 339.
[3] Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 83.
[4] *Official Records*, 9, 335.
[5] Raleigh *Standard*, May 28, 1862.
[6] In commenting on the conduct of the Confederates, the Raleigh *Standard* (May 28) said "This affair confirms fully what we have heretofore said that the Second North Carolina Cavalry contains some of the best fighting stock in the state, and a different course of treatment from that which it has received from the state would have rendered it as efficient as any in the Confederacy."

in the neighborhood of Pactolus, and only waiting the arrival of some artillery to storm the town of Washington. When this report was forwarded to New Bern, Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Osborn, with the remaining seven companies of the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment and three pieces of the Marine Artillery under Lieutenant W. B. Avery, were hurriedly shipped to Washington. They arrived on June 4. Colonel Osborn, who had been given a free hand [1] by General Foster, to whose division his regiment belonged, decided to act on Potter's suggestion and attack the waiting Confederates. Accordingly, after directing Captain Nichols of the gunboat *Picket* to shell the banks of the Tar River in advance of his marching column, Osborn set out towards Pactolus, about twelve miles above Washington. He left two companies of his regiment and one of Avery's guns to guard Washington. His eight companies numbered 420 men. [2] He was accompanied by two pieces of Avery's battery, manned by 12 men each, and Captain George F. Josnick's cavalry company of 40 men. [3]

After a hot march on June 5, Osborne, on reaching Myers's or Grimes's mill over Tranter's Creek, found Singletary's men drawn up across the stream behind a barricade which Singletary had built out of the timbers of the dismantled bridge. The Confederates, according to the statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Singletary, brother of the colonel commanding, numbered about 400 men. Colonel Singletary's plan of battle provided that each of his companies in turn should take its

[1] Foster wrote Colonel Osborne on July 3 that under the circumstances he ranked Potter and would be in charge of any operations. He added, "If you have a nice little chance of thrashing those scoundrels up there, do not hesitate to do it, and when you get them on the run, please remember to give them unmitigated thunder in their rear. Roe, *History of the Twenty-fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers*, 117.

[2] *Official Records*, 9, 342.

[3] Both armies were rapidly learning that a properly constituted reconnaissance should always consist of the three arms of service—infantry, cavalry, artillery. The value of such a constitution was demonstrated by the issue of this action.

place behind the barricade. As each delivered its volley it was to retire, reload, and return. In this way he expected to sweep the narrow approach to his position with consecutive yet almost continuous volleys.[1] As the Federals approached the mill, Singletary's troops opened a steady fire, which drove back the leading company and wounded its commander, Lieutenant H. D. Jarvis. Osborne then advanced his two guns and shelled the Confederates, who had no artillery, out of position. Colonel Singletary was killed early in the action. Colonel Singletary, although a lawyer by profession, had been a captain in the Mexican War. He was a man of unusual boldness and rapidity of action. Governor Clark, in notifying General Holmes of his death, said: "He was one of our best officers, and admirably adapted to the very service and position which you had assigned him."[2] The Federals made no effort to follow up their advantage, but returned rather hastily that night to Washington. Their loss was seven killed and eight wounded.[3] The Confederates had two killed and three wounded.

During this period of minor military activity in the East, political affairs in one of the western counties excited some apprehension, and led to a Confederate expedition into Madison County. We have already seen how unanimous the people were for withdrawal from the Union after President Lincoln's demand for coercive troops. It has often been asserted that the

[1] Letter from Colonel Robert Bingham.

[2] Executive Letter Book, 333.

[3] That the Federal officers of the Burnside expedition were enduring unalloyed hardships is disclosed by a letter which Colonel Osborn wrote to his home on the night of this battle. He says, "The privations and hardships of a soldier's life have at last reduced me to having my headquarters in a large, two-story house, situated on a pleasant street running to the river. The only furniture I have in my chamber is a marble-top center table, marble-top bureau with toilet glass, black walnut rocking chair, and a half a dozen chairs that do not rock; bedstead, large desk at which I am now writing; lounge and marble mantel clock. I am compelled to take my meals off china with a gilt edge, placed on a mahogany table in a large dining-room. The house contains only eight rooms besides the kitchen, and there are five of us crowded into it." Letter, July 11, 1862.

mountaineers did not share in this view. The citizens of these western counties were, at the beginning of the sectional struggle nearly to a man for the preservation of the Union, but Lincoln's call aligned them almost solidly for resistance. Moreover, their actions disprove the repeated allegation that in 1861 only slaveholders advocated or approved secession. The extreme western counties [1] would be those least affected by the views of the large eastern slave-owners. The population of ten of these counties is given in the census of 1860. These ten contained 56,313 whites and only 3,515 slaves, and one-third of the slaves were owned in three of the counties. Yet so thoroughly did those non-slave-owners of these border counties agree with the slaveholders of the central and eastern sections that they poured their sons into the Confederate army. These counties, with only one family in sixteen owning a slave, furnished sixty-six organized companies of infantry—to say nothing of the men contributed to the artillery, cavalry, and other branches of service, and also the men who joined companies not organized in these counties. Haywood County, out of a population of 5,474, showed its intense loyalty to the thought of the state by sending to the Confederacy fourteen full companies—over 1,200 men. Madison, another of these ten counties, out of its sparse homes, furnished ten companies, one out of every five of its population of men, women and children going to war.

To Madison's general loyalty to the State and Confederacy, there was, however, one exception. In a section of the Laurel Valley, known as Shelton Laurel, a section which bordered on East Tennessee, there was a settlement which contained a number of families

[1] The counties included in this computation are Alleghany, Ashe, Cherokee, Haywood, Jackson, Macon, Madison, Polk, Watauga, and Yancey. The present border counties of Mitchell, Graham, and Swain do not, of course, appear in this census, but their population was largely included in the ten given.

who were hostile to the war and to the Confederacy. Its own Union element had been augmented by fugitives from Tennessee. These men, relying on being able to escape into the secluded fastnesses of the Bald Mountain, if they were sought, were armed and banded to resist the conscript law. Encouraged by the restless ferment of the times and by the absence of so many good men in the army, the more lawless soon took advantage of their organization and began to plunder, to avenge their real or fancied grievances, and to defy both civil or military law.

General E. Kirby Smith, the Confederate commander of the Department of East Tennessee, wrote to Governor Clark as follows:[1]

> Repeated depredations having been committed on this side of the mountains, by armed parties of marauders from that quarter, the commanding general ordered about the 6th of this month a detachment of troops to proceed from Greenville in the State of Tennessee into the Laurel Valley, with instructions to put down any illegal organization of armed men that might be found there. These instructions were carried out as far as the circumstances of the case would permit, but, as it was impossible to scour the country thoroughly owing to the thickness of the underbrush, many outlaws probably remain there.
>
> The commanding officer of the expedition reports that there seems to be a regular organization among them, and that the entire population who are able to bear arms are against us. He reports killing about fifteen of them with a loss on our part of two killed and one wounded.

The troops of General Kirby Smith accomplished very little. Immediately after their virtual repulse, a "party of these same Tories came over on Rice Laurel, a settlement adjoining them, robbed a Mr. Davis, killing his cattle and mortally wounding him, and carried off a quantity of bacon and a number of guns."[2] This, coupled with other robberies and murder, was

[1] Letter File, April 16, 1862.
[2] Letter File, Marcus Erwin to Clark, April 17, 1862.

carrying outlawry "beyond the endurance of men of this part of the country." [1] Major Marcus Erwin of Asheville, at the call of the military authorities of Madison County, assembled at Marshall, the county seat, about 600 militia and volunteers. On warrants issued by magistrates, his men penetrated into the mountains and arrested about eighty men. Major Erwin, acting jointly with Dr. J. A. McDowell and N. W. Woodfin, both members of the state convention, and the magistrates of the county, found that "most of the prisoners were young and ignorant men who had been misled and deceived by a few designing persons from Tennessee and from their own county." [2] After a full discussion of the situation, the prisoners offered to enlist in the Confederate army. As their enrollment would take these men from the county, and as it was "more likely to make a change in the sentiment of those who remain behind than an arbitrary military execution," this action was permitted and the outbreak was quelled for the time.

[1] Letter File, Marcus Erwin to Clark, April 17, 1862.
[2] *Ibid.*, Erwin to Clark, April 29, 1862.

CHAPTER X

THE STATE ENGAGES IN RUNNING THE BLOCKADE

The General Assembly passed an act in September, 1861, looking to the clothing by the state of its own troops. The act also instructed the governor to collect from the Confederate government the yearly allowance due the North Carolina soldiers in lieu of clothing and "to pay the same into the public treasury to the end that the same may be expended under his direction in providing suitable clothing for the said troops, together with such additional sums as may be needed to supply the same." [1] In order that Confederate and state agents should not run up the price of supplies by bidding against one another, an agreement between them stipulated that the Confederate quartermaster general would withdraw his purchasing agents from North Carolina. [2] The Confederate government could not possibly observe such an agreement long, for its armies had to be supplied. Governor Vance was soon complaining that the "country was swarming with agents of the Confederate government, stripping bare our markets and putting enormous prices on our agents." [3]

Another complication arose. The adjutant general, J. G. Martin, on whom the duty of clothing the state troops was laid, soon found that the prices for clothing materials were steadily climbing. The quartermaster general of the Confederacy states on October 10, 1861, that "in the last forty days the prices of materials for clothing have advanced about 100 per cent." [4] Hence

[1] Public Laws of 1861, Chap. 17.
[2] Vance's Message to General Assembly of 1862, 6.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Official Records*, 127, 688.

General Martin perceived that in carrying out his contract "the commutation allowed by law would not more than pay half of the expenses of the state for clothing her troops." [1] Under the new circumstances he induced the Confederate War Department to revise the contract and agree to pay the actual cost of furnishing the clothing and shoes. This contract remained in force until the war closed.

At the approach of the first winter of the war the adjutant general realized that in spite of the activity of his officers, who had scoured the markets from Richmond to New Orleans, he could not buy supplies enough for the 36,000 men then in service. In the emergency the governor appealed to the people for such articles of clothing and camp necessities as they could spare from their homes. The response was heart-cheering as well as body-warming. Blankets, quilts, overcoats, home-knit socks and gloves, throat-scarfs, tin pans and tin plates poured into the destitute camps. When the supply of blankets and quilts gave out, the women fashioned comforts with tireless fingers. When cloth for comforts was exhausted, carpets were stripped from the floors, cut into blanket-size, and made into what were called "carpet blankets." [2] With these supplements to army issues the soldiers from North Carolina were kept fairly warm the first winter.

Even in the dog day heat of the second July of the struggle, General Martin began to shiver with apprehension lest he could not find within the Confederate States sufficient materials for making winter clothes for the North Carolina soldiers during the next winter. The number had then risen to 67,000—fifty-six infantry, six cavalry, and three artillery regiments, and

[1] Legislative Documents of 1862, 26.

[2] 4,578 woolen blankets, 1,835 carpet blankets, 3,338 quilts, and 2,249 comforts were contributed in four months. Property Book, 43, 143.

twenty unattached companies.[1] The state, it is true, had in the past year greatly improved its industrial condition. New cotton mills were going up and many existing mills enlarged their plants. Several woolen mills took on new life and added materially to their output. Shoe factories were being established at not a few convenient distributing points. State agents were traveling in every county to buy wool and hides and to hurry these products to the manufacturer.

General Martin knew, however, that the number of North Carolinians under arms had increased in a greater ratio than had the output of the factories. As he was a forward-looking man of wide thought-range, he recognized that the materials not only for clothing were far below demand, but that the supply of industrial articles would soon have to be renewed. Farm implements, mill equipment, family necessities, would have to be imported from Europe in some way. Martin therefore, in August asked Governor Clark's sanction of a plan that he had just formulated and wanted put into instant execution. His plan was to send to Europe an able and trustworthy agent, armed with such financial credits as the state could offer, buy supplies directly from the largest dealers. To secure rapid and state-controlled delivery the agent should buy an interest in several vessels to sail from Europe to Confederate ports or, better still, buy outright one or two fast ships to ply between some designated port in the West Indies and ports in the Confederacy.[2]

When Martin presented these recommendations Governor Clark's term was about to expire. The governor decided that it was too late for him to initiate so radical a departure in the state's policy. He,

[1] Legislative Documents of 1862, 24.
[2] Martin to White, October 29, 1862, Vance Letter Book.

however, urged Martin to submit the proposals to his successor, Governor-elect Z. B. Vance. Shortly after Vance was inaugurated in September, 1862, Martin startled him by his scheme to prevent the troops from suffering for clothing and the industries from stalling for lack of accessories. The scheme so bristled with financial difficulties and international complications that Vance, progressive as he was, felt the need of counsel before he adopted it. He, therefore, invited several friends to discuss with him Martin's proposals. Two of these friends, B. F. Moore, an able lawyer and an experienced publicist, and W. W. Holden, editor of the *Standard*, opposed the plan. Moore rather vehemently declared that the governor would subject himself to impeachment if he undertook to commit the state to so costly, so venturesome, and so unconstitutional an enterprise. Holden also urged the rejection of the proposals. After all objections had been stated, General Martin quietly remarked that the troops were in the field by order of the state; that it was his duty by order of the state to feed and clothe them; that it was not held to be wrong for him to buy a wagon, an ambulance, a caisson, or any other vehicle of transportation; that it was deemed proper for him to secure supplies on any possible market. Why then, he asked, was it unconstitutional for the state to buy a larger and more efficient vehicle of transportation, and load it where supplies could be obtained.

After taking a night to canvass the matter further in his own mind, the governor assumed the responsibility of sending a state agent to Europe to buy such things as could not be secured at home and also of purchasing ships if necessary. No act of his useful life was of more service to the state or brought him a greater measure of popularity with soldiers and

people.[1] After the first ship was bought and began her regular trips, the people adopted her as their own and were jubilant over her successes. Inquiries as to her coming and going and as to her cargoes were current in homes and in offices.[2]

On the recommendation of Colonel Thomas Devereux, chief quartermaster, and of Major T. D. Hogg, chief ordnance officer, John White of Warrenton was selected as special commissioner for the state. The fact that through a new and trying experience he kept the absolute confidence of those whom he represented in North Carolina and that he won and retained the trust and regard of those with whom he acted in England, is the best evidence of the fitness of the appointment.[3] Governor Vance agreed in a written covenant dated November 10, 1862, to pay all the

[1] "I have often seen a country woman receive a pair of cotton cards from a blockade cargo with tears of gratitude and a fervent 'God bless Governor Vance'." *Last Ninety Days of the War.* "I hope it sweetens your sleep to know how many poor women bless you for those cards." Mrs. Spencer to Vance, August 22, 1864. "Having heard of the arrival of another cargo of goods, I solemnly remind you of the requisition for Cooke's brigade. Many of the officers are almost naked." Captain C. H. Thomas to Vance.

[2] James Sloan to Vance, October 10, 1863. "Your telegram conveying the pleasing intelligence of the arrival of the *Advance* was received by our people one and all with expressions of joy and gratitude."

[3] Governor Vance wrote White on July 10, 1863: "I am much pleased with the result of your negotiations and approve most cordially of your whole conduct." Letter File. Alexander Collie, through whom as English agent White transacted most of his state business, wrote to Governor Vance on October 29, 1863: "For Mr. White individually I must say that one better adapted for the most difficult and arduous duty he has had to perform it would be impossible to find. During the many months when, under most trying circumstances, he had to lie idle at the request of Mr. Mason, in case the North Carolina loan might in any way damage that of the 'Confederate states,' he won the respect of all who knew him by the sound sense, the patriotic devotedness, and self-denial he then displayed; and when it was at last deemed safe to make a move Mr. White's careful prudence and sterling honesty gained more supporters to the cause and *more subscribers to the Cotton Warrants* than at one time any of us believed to be possible. 'I don't know anything about North Carolina but I believe Mr. White to be an honest man. So put me down for one thousand pounds,' was the remark made to me by more than one here whose instinctive faith thus opened his pocket. . . . I could not let him return home after all he has gone through, and accomplished, without saying to you, and through you to his friends at home, how sincerely we appreciate his strict integrity and high moral principle and how earnestly we all hope . . . that his devoted services may earn him the lasting gratitude of his country. Vance Letter File.

expenses of the undertaking and to pay White as compensation for his troublesome mission "the sum of five thousand dollars in cash, two and a half per cent commission on expenditures amounting to five hundred thousand dollars, and one and a half per cent commission on all sums between five hundred thousand and one million of dollars." [1]

White, after interviews with the governor and with the adjutant general, was given on November 1, 1862, a cautious commission based on the authority vested in the governor to clothe and equip the state's troops. [2] The legislature subsequently approved the governor's act and confirmed Mr. White's power to negotiate in the name of the state. Governor Vance wrote with evident relief to Mr. White on July 10, 1863. "You will see by the enclosed papers that the legislature have also done all that was desired. I have received full authority from the same source to run the vessel when and how I may think best, and I shall therefore keep her going until we get in the balance of the purchases." [3]

In his letter of instruction to White, Adjutant General Martin kept in mind the dangers always incurred by a blockade-running ship. He, therefore, directed that the money value of state stores consigned to any one vessel should not exceed $50,000. Owing to the expense of running such vessels, however, and the pressing need of the supplies, the value of each cargo when the ships began to run was far in excess of

[1] Vance Letter File, November 10, 1862.

[2] The Commission, found in the Adjutant General's Letter Book, 321, reads as follows: "You are hereby appointed a commissioner for and on behalf of the State of North Carolina, to visit Europe and negotiate for the sale of cotton bonds of the said state and of the Confederate States of America, by virtue of authority vested in me by the General Assembly of North Carolina to clothe and equip the troops in the armies of the Confederate States, and you are further authorized to purchase supplies with the money thus raised, or in any other way you may be able to do so. All your official acts done in pursuance of this authority will be valid and binding on the State of North Carolina."

[3] Vance Letter File, October 29, 1863.

this sum.[1] It is interesting to note from Martin's itemized list of purchases to be made what articles were most needed in a blockaded agricultural State.[2]

White sailed from Charleston on the steamer *Leopard* on November 15, 1862. He took with him North Carolina bonds to the amount of a half million dollars. Subsequently Governor Vance in reply to a request from him on May 20, 1863, sent him an additional million dollars in state bonds.[3] He was accompanied by Captain Thomas M. Crossan, a former United States naval officer, and Theodore J. Hughes, a business man of New Bern. Captain Crossan was to select for the state, if it became necessary to buy one, a ship suited for blockade-running, and was also to command the vessel on the homeward trip. Hughes was to take charge of the business affairs of the ship. The party reached Nassau on November 22, but vexatious difficulties delayed their arrival in London until January 5, 1863.

At the time of White's arrival the Confederate government was trying to float a cotton bond issue. John M. Mason, commissioner for the Confederate States, asked White to withhold the projected North Carolina cotton issue until the Confederate offerings were taken up. White, thinking that the request was

[1] In reference to the *Advance*, Mr. White writes: "You suggest that the vessel should not at any time take in more than about $50,000 worth of goods, but in consideration of the great delay we have had to encounter I have in this instance exceeded that amount by about 50 per cent, knowing the goods to be greatly needed, and hope that in future you will allow the steamer to carry a larger amount in order to complete the shipment of my purchases before cold weather." Vance Letter File, May 20, 1863.

[2] The list of articles to be shipped first includes 400,000 yards of woolen cloth for soldiers' uniforms, 25,000 yards of gray cloth for officers' uniforms, 150,000 yards of blue flannel for shirts, 60,000 pairs of shoes, 100,000 pairs of woolen socks, 40,000 blankets, 105,000 pounds of assorted leather, 2,100 gross of buttons, 500 gross of buckles for trousers, 2,000 gross of tape for drawers, 5,000 pounds of shoe thread, 2,000 dozen of spool thread, 6,000 pounds blue linen thread, 100 reams of letter paper, 25 gross of steel pens, 10 gross of pencils, tin plate for canteens, mess pans, dishes, and sheet iron for kettles. The purchases were also to include supplies for the mills—oil, belting, wire, dye-stuffs, shafting, card-cloth, bolts, files—but the amounts are not stated in the letter.

[3] Letter Book, 326.

proper and would be approved by his state, complied with Mason's wishes.[1] He was, therefore, not free until about the first of May to submit his proposals to buyers. He employed the weeks of the wearisome interval in securing agents, in seeking dealers with whom he might presently place orders, and in quietly trying to make friends for his cause and his securities.

While White was engaged in these matters Captain Crossan was searching for a swift-heeled vessel capable of outdistancing any inquisitive blockading ship; for, after a conference with friends in London, he and White decided that they could transport the state's purchases more cheaply and more quickly in a vessel owned by the state than they could by paying the exorbitant tonnage then demanded for freight into a blockaded port. Crossan at last found in the *Lord Clyde* an "iron, side-wheel passenger steamer"[2] plying between Dublin and Glasgow, a vessel that seemed admirably suited to the hard drive of blockade-running. Governor Vance in his felicitous way described the ship as "an elegant long-legged vessel."[3] Colonel James G. Burr writes that "she had engines of great power which were highly finished and her speed was good. With a pressure of twenty pounds to the square inch she easily averaged seventeen knots to the hour, and, when it was increased to thirty pounds, she reeled off twenty knots without difficulty. The only objections to her were her size and draft of water, the latter rendering it difficult for her to cross the shoals, which at that time were a great bar to the navigation of the [Cape Fear] river."[4]

White paid Louis Potter and John Key of Glasgow, Scotland, £35,000 for the ship. In addition to the purchase price, £252 were spent in extra fittings and

[1] White's MS. Report, 1.
[2] Glisson in *Naval Official Records*, I, 10, 453.
[3] Speech at White Sulphur Springs, August 18, 1875.
[4] Quoted by Dr. James Sprunt, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 5, 359.

nautical apparatus—making a total cost, according Quartermaster Devereux's statement, of $170,972.30.[1] With a nondescript crew and with Crossan as commander, the vessel slipped to Cardiff, to await the cargo which was so eagerly desired by Vance and Martin.

There has been much curiosity about the origin of the name given to this vessel. In the Naval Official Records she is wrongly called the A. D. Vance. Governor Vance in a letter to Mrs. Cornelia P. Spencer, who had just submitted to him for criticism the manuscript of her *Last Ninety Days of the War*, points out an error in regard to the name, and gives its real origin. He writes, "You say the A. D. Vance, named after the Governor's amiable wife, etc. The governor's wife is much obliged, but pleads not guilty. Her name is Harriet Newell, and you can't make that out of A. D. Vance. The fact is I had nothing to do with naming the vessel, which was done by Captain Crossan, lately deceased, poor fellow. When he bought the steamer in the Clyde, freighted her with army supplies, and pointed her prow towards Wilmington from the harbor of Cardiff, he dubbed her in a punning spirit Ad-Vance, and in confirmation thereof drank with flowing goblets, 'To Vance'."[2] Apparently the Southern people then as now objected to hyphenated words and adopted the ship as the *Advance*.

During the time in which White was forced to wait the sale of the Confederate securities, he engaged as English agents the firm of Alexander Collie & Company of London and Manchester. This was an able and well-established company, which continued to represent the state until the capture of Wilmington broke up the blockade business. To obviate complications the firm received and paid for all of Commissioner

[1] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 226. He counts the pound at $4.85.
[2] Swain Papers, November 1, 1865.

White's purchases, negotiated the sale of the cotton bonds, or warrants, as they were called in England, was consignee for the state's cotton, and eventually became a joint owner with the state of three other blockade-running ships.

White knew how imperative it was to get his clothing material to North Carolina in time for it to be made into uniforms and distributed to the soldiers before the rigor of winter. He, therefore, arranged with the Collie Company to advance, at interest, such sums as were immediately required.[1] From this loan he paid for Crossan's ship and for his first order of goods. He hurried every dealer from whom he bought to speed the material to the waiting *Advance*. In this way the ship was freighted with from 100 to 200 tons[2] of the assorted material designated by General Martin and on May 30, 1863, sailed from Cardiff for Wilmington. By July 3 her cargo, valued at $58,894.72,[3] was on its way to Raleigh on a special train and under picked guards.[4] There the cloth was greedily seized by the manufacturing department under Captain C. W. Garnett and his auxiliary circles of women, and clear ahead of nipping weather it was delivered in the shape of uniforms and underwear to those of the North Carolina soldiers who were in most urgent need.

After deducting what Crossan had taken in the *Advance* there were left of White's purchases about 150 tons of assorted merchandise.[5] The Collie Company arranged for White to forward this remainder

[1] White, in a letter of May 20, 1863, thus speaks of this matter: "After many unavoidable delays and disappointments I have at last succeeded in obtaining a loan of money for the state from Messrs. Alexander Collie & Company of London and Manchester, which has enabled Colonel Crossan to purchase a steamer and me a portion of the goods required by the state." Vance Letter File; Collie to McRae, May 14, 1864.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Bill from A. Collie & Co., Vance Letter File, September 11, 1863. This bill indicates that Crossan did not succeed in getting on board as much tonnage as White anticipated in his letter of May 30.

[4] Whitford to Vance, July 3, 1863.

[5] White to Vance, May 20, 1863.

and also later purchases to Bermuda by freight and by chartered vessels that were either allied or friendly to their house. The *Advance*, which counted on making a monthly trip to Bermuda, could, White thought, get all the cargoes from Bermuda into Wilmington in a few trips. On June 11, Collie & Company cleared the *Harkaway* for Bermuda with state stores valued at $39,225.57. The *Nebula* followed on July 1 with a cargo costing $29,352.64. The *Rover's Bride* sailed on August 3 with a $57,144.71 cargo, and on August 27 the *Jane Smith* took out the largest cargo shipped to that date, namely, $96,162.17. These four, with the *Advance's* cargo, made a total, after a few adjustments, of $280,779.81.[1] An inventory taken after the *Jane Smith* sailed showed state goods in store amounting to $45,746.00, and from the order books it appeared on September 11, 1863, that purchased goods to the amount of $97,333.33 were still undelivered.[2] Thus White's entire contracts to September 11, 1863, amounted to $423,859.14. The last week in September, the *Arbutus*, a chartered vessel, took to Bermuda of those undelivered goods a cargo valued at $136,937.43. The *Carl Emile* in two voyages delivered as part of her freight, state stores to the value of $23,024.15.[3] These two cargoes brought the total amount of deliveries up to $440,741.39.[4]

Most of the North Carolina factories at this time had agreed to let the state have their entire output for the soldiers. Hence the people could clothe themselves only by a return to hand carding, spinning, and weaving. The looms and spinning wheels of a past generation, still preserved in garrets and spinning rooms, were easily put into serviceable condition, but the

[1] Statement by Collie & Company, Vance Letter File, September 13, 1863.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Statement of values in quartermaster's files on back of undated Collie memorandum. Dates of deliveries in White to Vance, January 2, 1864.
[4] Summary of cargoes in loose sheet in quartermaster's file, statement of White, dated October 31, 1863, Vance Letter File.

more perishable hand-cards had almost disappeared. The looms and spinning wheels would, therefore, notwithstanding their readiness, have to stand idle until a supply of cards could be obtained, for carding the cotton is the first step in cloth-making. There were no machines for making them in the South and no supply of wire. Early, therefore, after White's arrival in England Governor Vance urged him to send as soon as he could have them made 50,000 pairs of cotton and 50,000 of woolen cards, and also machines for making these cards. After a succession of unavoidable delays in securing the cards and transportation for them, White relieved the anxiety at home by sending a shipment of 58,000 cotton and 15,000 woolen cards. With them he forwarded five machines for making cards, card furnishings including wire and tacks. In the same cargo there came 20,000 pairs of boots, 10,000 blankets, 160 dozen flannel shirts, 15,800 yards of woolen cloth. This cargo was billed at $122,147.46.[1] To January, 1864, the entire cost of the blockade-running business seems to have stood at these figures:

Goods bought and paid through the Collie Company	$562,888.85
Goods for which cash was paid by White	22,025.56
Cost of the ship *Advance*	170,972.20
Expenses of ship, salaries, wages, commissions, freights, cartage, etc.	135,119.10
	$891,005.71[2]

During the year's time in which White was collecting and shipping these useful cargoes the factories at home were expanding and, under the stimulus of patriotism, ready markets, high prices, and capable leadership the output of cloth and other products was increasing remarkably. The state establishments for

[1] Summary of cargoes in loose sheet in quartermaster's file.
[2] Statement of White dated October 31, 1863, Vance Letter File.

making clothes from this home-woven fabric were also going at such good speed that, on July 10, 1863, Governor Vance wrote to White: "The resources of our state and the Confederacy have developed in such a degree that we have every assurance of being able to clothe our troops with our own goods, and our vast amount of captures have given us an abundance of arms. On this account I regret Colonel MacRae's purchases, and will only continue your purchases of clothing by reason of economy. I therefore . . . desire you to buy only as I may order." [1] Again on September 3, 1863, he assured White, who did not get his July letter until September 4, that apparel for the soldiers seemed ample, and instructed him to buy no more until further ordered. He writes on that date: "The blockade-running is becoming more and more perilous. . . . In view of this danger you are instructed to make no more purchases of goods for the present. The amount received and now at Bermuda with the home supplies will keep our troops well agoing for twelve months." [2]

When Commissioner White received this information on October 31, 1863, he arranged with Collie & Company to fill any further orders from North Carolina. He then pressed for the delivery of all outstanding orders, closed the accounts as far as he could, and made ready to sail for home. He reached Hamilton, Bermuda, on December 26, 1863, and apparently arrived at Wilmington on January 18, 1864, as a passenger on the sixth trip of the vessel that he had bought.

It must be borne in mind that these English goods would have cost far more in America even if they could have been procured on our markets at all. On the receipt in Raleigh of the first blockade shiploads, the state undertook to sell at actual cost any merchantable

[1] Letter Book, 325.
[2] *Ibid.*, 354.

articles imported. As the war progressed and the risk of the blockade increased and the value of Confederate money depreciated, many of these articles sold for vastly more than they cost. Shoes, that in 1863, cost $1.82 a pair were in the latter part of 1864 bringing $10 a pair. Woolen shirts that were bought in large lots in January, 1863, for $1.15 were sold in January, 1864, for $7.50 and in October, for $10. Woolen cards that cost in England from twenty-six to fifty cents a pair in August, 1863, retailed in North Carolina in May, 1864, for $5 a pair. [1] As mentioned previously the first inward-bound cargo of the *Advance* cost $58,894.72, yet Quartermaster Devereux reports on September 30, 1863, that he had already sold from that cargo, tin, coffee, stationery, brandy, to the value of $57,652.32, and still had on hand 106 boxes of tin, 152 bales of bagging, and 113 coils of rope. [2] The sale of these articles at prices prevailing in September, 1863, would make the cargo run to about $92,000.

The greatest gain from the blockade business was, of course, not the financial profit, comfortable as that appeared. The real triumph of the feat was in keeping the state's soldiers in shoes and clothes, and later in bacon; in supplying in a measure the housewives and the garment factories with cards, thread and buttons; in furnishing the farmers with large numbers of scythes and cradles, bagging for their cotton, rope and leather for harness; dyes, and other necessities, [3] and in putting within reach of the mills, belts, oils, harness, and dyes.

The commodities that White had bought and those that Collie & Company afterwards purchased on

[1] Itemized bill from White in quartermaster's files and various scattered statements of sales.

[2] Loose sheet report (apparently for legislative committee) signed by John Devereux, Assistant Quartermaster, Vance Letter File.

[3] "Happily no serious question has been made as to the results of the adventure in furnishing means of abridging the hardships encountered by the many citizens of the State who are in military service, or in adding to the means of comfort possessed by those who are at home." S. F. Phillips, Report on Blockade Business, November 18, 1864.

orders from North Carolina continued to reach Bermuda and Nassau for some months. In them were included many of the medicines so urgently needed by the Confederate surgeons. During the last two years of the war Lee's army was dependent for such essential drugs as chloroform, morphine, quinine, blue mass, paregoric, laudanum, and digitalis almost entirely on the blockade-runners that made their perilous way into Wilmington.

The Collie Company forwarded on June 30 a statement [1] covering the shipments for the first six months of 1864. In this statement the cost of the goods alone was as follows:

Goods for January	$47,473.77	
Goods for February	68,571.60	
Goods for March	36,769.34	
Goods for April	14,562.20	
Goods for May	34,993.36	
Goods for June	1,081.41	
		$ 203,451.68
Expenses, including salaries, commissions, insurance, freight, cartage, etc., for same period		442,568.11
Purchase of an interest of one fourth in the steamers *Don*, *Hansa*, and *Annie*		72,999.99
Total for six months		$ 719,019.78

The fact that the state had to spend more than two dollars to get one dollar's worth of goods delivered at Bermuda or Nassau illustrates the lavish outlay necessary to do business when risks are incurred. The addition of the figures covering the first half of 1864 to the expenditures for 1863 brings the total Collie-White expenditures to $1,610,025.49 at the end of June 1864.

[1] Itemized collected statement, Vance Letter File. The items are separated for clearness. It should be noted that the figures in the statement vary slightly from the figures given in seriatim letters to Vance from Alexander Collie. The difference is probably due to the bookkeeper's greater accuracy.

The same immediate need of supplies that prompted the governor to post White off to England led him to make at nearly the same time another contract, the extension of which unexpectedly put two North Carolina purchasing agents on the English markets. Just a little over a month after White sailed from Charleston, November 15, 1862, Governor Vance entered into an agreement to buy from George N. Sanders, a military contractor, a supply of army material. The articles ordered were to be paid from the sale of naval store scrip which Sanders agreed to negotiate at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the merchandise was to be shipped from that port in a sailing vessel bought for the carrying out of the contract. The order included 2,000 muskets, 400 Enfield rifles, 100 Belgian telescopic guns, and 500,000 rounds of ammunition. After enumerating these articles, the contract concluded with these words: "Fill up balance of cargo with army shoes and a few bales of woolen cloth." [1] The contract further stipulated in a footnote that "this bill (except the telescopic rifles) may be duplicated to the number of 10,000 muskets and 2,000 Enfield rifles and ammunition, shoes and cloth in proportion." To see that this loosely worded contract was complied with and to inspect the articles before they were shipped, Colonel Duncan K. MacRae, who had just resigned the colonelcy of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, was delegated to accompany Sanders to Halifax. Sanders and MacRae differed as to routes. MacRae took the shorter route by Charleston and Nassau, while Sanders went by way of Matamoras. After Colonel MacRae reached Nassau and talked with friends, he decided to meet Sanders in England instead of Halifax. He, therefore, took passage for London. Sanders stopped in Halifax, where he says that he arranged for a first shipment and

[1] *Sanders's Narrative*, 8.

placed an order for a fast light-draft schooner—an order subsequently canceled at the request of Colonel MacRae. [1]

In deference to a request from Commissioner White, who had just been set free from his agreement to withhold his cotton warrants until a Confederate loan could be secured, MacRae and Sanders, in view of White's larger interest, consented to delay their negotiations for the sale of their resin warrants until White had completed his transactions. In order that they might not be unduly delayed in filling their contract, White lent them £47,500, the face value of their contract, [2] and they began their purchases.

Governor Vance was disturbed when he learned that Sanders and MacRae were negotiating, not in Halifax as he had expected, but in London where, as he wrote, he had one agent in whom he had perfect confidence. [3] He feared that Sanders and White might without knowing it be bidding against each other and that the business circles of England would not understand two separate state agencies. Before he was positively notified that Sanders and MacRae were in London he had written MacRae to curtail his purchase of arms as they were no longer so urgently needed, and also to take over as state agent the sale of the naval stores warrants. [4] When he was informed that White had secured a loan on his warrants, he wrote more explicitly to MacRae. He said in this letter of July 10, 1863: "If you have not sold the scrip for turpentine and resin, and I hope you have not, please withdraw it from the market immediately. Having

[1] *Sanders's Narrative*, 14.
[2] Vance Letter Book, 367.
[3] Letter Book, 378.
[4] His directions were as follows: "For various reasons upon reflection, I have concluded that I would prefer you to have the negotiation of the scrip instead of Mr. Sanders. I had no intention of letting Mr. S. hawk our paper about through Europe. I know you will appreciate my reasons. Should you be in Europe (and I am writing as though you were) I desire you to act with Mr. White, put your fortunes together, ship your purchases together, etc." *Ibid.* 184.

secured a loan through Mr. White amply sufficient for all possible purposes, it would be injurious in the extreme, not to say foolish, to appear further on the market. Should Mr. Sanders feel himself damaged by such a course, I pledge myself to indemnify him justly and amply. You are instructed, therefore, to close out immediately, and return home by the first steamer."[1] This letter, like so many others in that day of irregular mails, did not reach MacRae. On the very day that it was written he notified Governor Vance that the naval stores warrants were sold and that a shipment of 1,200 Enfield rifles had been made. The sale of the warrants put into MacRae's hands $231,166.60 with which to repay White the sum advanced.

Conflicting interests between Sanders as contractor and MacRae as state representative brought about a serious disagreement between the two men. Therefore, after MacRae had placed most of his orders he arranged with Major J. A. Weston a merchant of Baltimore who was then in England, to complete his transactions and inspect all goods, and he himself returned to North Carolina. His orders together with Major Weston's, after deducting all expenses, amounted to $168,195.14.[2] They included 1,200 rifles, 5,000 overcoats, 5,000 jackets, 5,000 trousers, 5,000 caps, 5,000 woolen shirts, 5,000 blankets, much cloth, and about $20,000 worth of shoes.[3] The addition of MacRae's expenditures to those of White's brings the total state purchases of goods in England to $1,778,220.63—not counting some deliveries by the Collie Company in July, August, and September. These accounts covered only the goods bought in England. They do not include commodities bought in Bermuda and Nassau. The varied shipments were all safely

[1] Letter Book, 324.
[2] MacRae letter in Vance Letter File, May 11, 1864.
[3] Letter Book; Flanner letter, March 26, 1864.

delivered either at the Bermudas or at Nassau. "Not one package was lost" declares Alexander Collie.[1] The cargoes going to Bermuda were consigned to J. L. Lemmon & Company and John T. Bourne at St. Georges, and those to Nassau to L. G. Watson, state agents at those points.[2]

The question naturally arises, How did the state manage to pay for these stores on a gold basis when there was so little gold within its borders? The answer is found in Commissioner White's declaration that "cotton is equal to gold in England." To understand how cotton was converted into gold credits with which to buy these necessities, it will be necessary to follow White's financial operations in some detail.

Auditor Samuel F. Phillips, appointed a special commissioner to prepare for the General Assembly a report on the blockade business of the state, says in his report of November 19, 1864: "The funds applied by the officers of the state to the adventure of blockade running have been derived from three sources, viz.: appropriations made directly from the treasury, sales of scrip (cotton warrants) based upon the possession of cotton, and sales of scrip based on the possession of naval stores (resin warrants)."[3] To these a fourth source, namely, the direct sale of cotton to English factors by the state must be added. As the auditor, however, points out, it must be borne in mind that these sources do not exclude one another, for a part of the state appropriation was used to pay off the scrip (warrants) held in England and a part for other purposes.

First. The money drawn directly from the treasury was part of a sum of $2,324,000 authorized to be spent for this purpose under acts of November 27, 1862, and December 14, 1863, (secret sessions). The authority

[1] Letter to White, May 16, 1864.
[2] Letter to Flanner, Letter Book, 99.
[3] Report of the Commission on Blockade Accounts, 3.

to issue the cotton scrip was explicitly confirmed, as already seen, by acts of July 6, and July 7, 1863, (secret session). Mr. Phillips also found that the part of this $2,324,000 which had been spent was expended "mainly in the purchase of cotton to be exported or to be held for our creditors on that sort of scrip, and that a portion had recently been applied to the purchase of resin as required by our engagements in issuing naval stores scrip.[1]

The second source of gold was Commissioner White's loan in England. He reached England with only £2,000 of state money,[2] for preliminary expenses. His purchasing resources were $500,000 in North Carolina bonds, worth about forty-three cents on the dollar,[3] and Governor Vance's commission pledging the state's endorsement of any loan which he might secure—a pledge not confirmed by the legislature until Mr. White had been in London for six months. It became his task to prove that "cotton was equal to gold in England." This he did by selling scrip, or warrants, based on the state's buying cotton to redeem them and by putting up state bonds, an additional million of which had been forwarded to him, as collateral.

The sale of these warrants and the resin warrants put into the hands of state agents the money for the shoes and woolen uniforms of their troops, for part of their meat ration, for most of their medicines, for the articles indispensable to the continuous activity of the state's manufacturing industries, and for the ships which transported these necessities and built up a profitable trade in cotton and tobacco. They were

[1] Report of the Commissioner upon Blockade Accounts, 4.
[2] Treasurer's Cash Account, 90.
[3] White to Vance, March 6, 1863.

issued in denominations of £100 each. Their manner of final payment was thus stated on their face:

The State of North Carolina having been paid £100 sterling (receipt of which is hereby acknowledged) sells and hereby engages to deliver to the holder hereof, on receiving 60 days notice of the port at which delivery is required, 12 bales of cotton, 400 lbs. each, ginned, packed, and in sound merchantable condition, at the port of Wilmington, Charleston, or Savannah, or if practicable at any other port in the possession of the Confederate States government, except the ports of Texas. Notice of the port selected to be sent either to the governor of the state direct, or to the agents of the state in Manchester; and delivery will be made, at the port so indicated, free of all charges and duties whatsoever, beyond the existing export duty of one-eighth of a cent per lb.

The cotton to be of the quality known as New Orleans middling, and if any of it should be of superior or inferior quality, or if the exact weight contracted for should not be delivered, the difference in value shall be adjusted at the port of shipment by two brokers, one to be appointed by the governor of this state, the other by the holder of this warrant; and if the brokers cannot agree they will choose an umpire, whose decision shall be final.

Interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum, payable half yearly in Manchester, and reckoned from the 1st of July, 1863, will be duly paid on this warrant till the cotton is claimed; but the claim must be made in writing to the agents of the state in Manchester within two months, or to the governor of the state within three months after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the present belligerents.

If the cotton be not claimed within that period, this warrant will be exchanged for a North Carolina bond, bearing eight per cent interest per annum, payable half-yearly in England.

(Signed) John White,
Special Commissioner for the State of North Carolina.[1]

Third, the resin warrants on which Colonel MacRae borrowed £47,500, simply provided that within six months after peace was declared the state would, on a notice of 30 days, deliver at the port of Wilmington,

[1] Copy of warrant preserved in Vance Letter File.

or any other port in possession of the state, to the holder 500 barrels of resin of 310 pounds gross weight. [1]

A single sheet of unsigned paper preserved in the Vance collection is the only record existing of the total number of cotton warrants issued. It bears the embossed stamp of Alexander Collie & Company and is dated "London 12 August 1865." This statement divides the warrants into two issues: A first of 744 allotted by the Manchester bank, 1 handed to Mr. White as a specimen, 205 sold by Collie & Company, and 150 issued in payment of a one-fourth interest in the steamers *Don*, *Hansa*, and *Annie*; a second issue of 750 were sold evidently after Mr. White's return to North Carolina. Leaving out the one "handed to Mr. White as a specimen," this would make a total of 1,849 warrants. As the warrants sold at par, these sales netted $899,846.66. If we add to this amount the proceeds from the resin warrants, the total amount of gold credits yielded to the state was $1,131,013.26.

As already noted, the total amount spent by White and MacRae to July 1, 1864, was $1,778,220.63. This sum was $647,207.37 greater than the sum received by the state from the cotton and resin warrants. The difference, as well as the money for rather large purchases from June 30, 1864 to January 1865, when the business was stopped by the capture of Fort Fisher, was obtained on a loan from Collie & Company and on credits for cotton and tobacco then being run through the blockade and sold on open markets.

It is now probably impossible to determine how many of these warrants were redeemed. Governor Vance, who earnestly desired to leave no "unsettled matters for his successor in office," [2] and who justly wished to see his difficult adventure close with as much financial as it had with military and social success, threw his

[1] Letter Book, 11.
[2] Vance to White, Letter Book, 221.

weight into the payment of the warrants. As soon as he had decided to cross the water for supplies, he directed the state quartermaster, Major John Devereux, to buy out of the legislative appropriation for clothing the troops ten thousand bales of cotton for future use. Devereux appointed agents [1] in the larger cotton counties with instructions to buy at a maximum price of twenty cents a pound until the ten thousand bales were secured. This was to be stored as security for any loan that might be secured. A considerable part of this cotton, however, was exchanged with manufacturers for cloth and yarns—the cloth, of course, to go into garments for the soldiers and the yarns to be traded in Virginia for shoe leather [2] and in North Carolina for bacon. Part of it, however, was delivered in Wilmington for export.

After White notified the governor of the sale of his cotton warrants and MacRae of his resin warrants, Vance again ordered the purchase of cotton [3] with which to liquidate these debts, and again the cotton was paid for by direct appropriation from the treasury. [4] Under Major Devereux's supervision W. H. Oliver of New Bern was appointed State Cotton Agent. [5] His duties were to buy, store and protect cotton for the state and to keep a constant supply going to Wilmington for the blockade runners in 1863-1864. District agents [6] with power to select their subordinates were engaged to

[1] These agents, appointed on December 1, 1862, at a salary of $3 a day and expenses were: M. Waddell for Edgecombe County; J. P. Johnston for Bertie County; J. B. Odom for Northampton County; and W. H. Smith and A. Stith for Halifax County. Quartermaster's Letter Book, 141.

[2] *Oliver's Narrative.*

[3] Order to Devereux, August 31, 1863. Hogg Papers.

[4] Act of July 7, 1863.

[5] *Oliver's Narrative*, 2.

[6] P. R. Davis of Warrenton was the district agent for the counties of Franklin, Granville, Nash and Warren, at a salary of $50 a month. Colonel William C. Smith of Wadesboro was selected at a salary of $180 a month for the counties of Anson, Montgomery, Stanly and Union. W. G. Jordan was the buyer for the counties around Wilson, and J. C. Haigh of Fayetteville bought on commission. These appointments were all made in August, 1863. Quartermaster's Letter Book, 198, 202, and 211.

scour the cotton sections of the state. Agents were also sent to South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama to buy from large planters. At the beginning of their operations all of these agents were restricted to a price of sixty cents a pound. They found that at the fixed price they could not secure cotton as rapidly as the governor desired. They were then authorized to pay as high as sixty-five cents,[1] and for large lots as much as eighty cents was authorized.[2]

As a result of the activity of these agents state cotton was soon stored at several convenient places in Georgia and in Alabama.[3] Inside the state the agents were instructed to buy first from the counties nearest the Federal lines, in order that the bales in that section might not fall into the hands of Federal raiding parties. Sheds were built for the storage of the cotton in interior towns. The largest storage depot was at Graham, but varying amounts were deposited at Charlotte, Fayetteville, Lumberton, Raleigh, and Wadesboro. So scarce had bagging become that Devereux had to furnish from a supply brought in by the *Advance* bagging for much of this cotton. Imported rope was in many cases used instead of ties. As money grew scarcer bagging was exchanged for cotton—one yard of bagging for two pounds of cotton.[4]

The railroads were so war-worn in 1864 that transportation of the cotton to central points and to Wilmington was tediously slow. Constant pressure was brought to bear on the presidents of the railroads by the state officers to get cotton to Wilmington fast enough to prevent delaying the feverishly hurried blockade runners. Freight rates were exorbitant.

[1] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 208.

[2] Devereux to R. S. Tucker, *Ibid.*, 213.

[3] On July 2, 1864, Theo. J. Hughes was sent south to report on the condition of this cotton. When started he was given receipts for the following amounts: Albany 147; Americus 527; Eufaula 309; Macon 255; Thomasville 347; Oglethorpe 35; Fort Valley 56; Laurens 142; Stephensville 7; Montezuma 28; Pulaski County 50—a total of 1,903 bales. Receipt from Hughes to Devereux.

[4] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 211.

The cotton account is charged $53,461.88 [1] for freight on the state railways alone. In the latter part of October, 1864, the quartermaster wanted to haul one lot of cotton from Macon, Georgia, to Raleigh. He found that the freight on a special train that was offered by the governor of Georgia would cost $30,000. [2]

The total sum, including freight, insurance, sheltering, and other expenses charged against the new cotton account to May 30, 1864, was $2,362,516.96. [3] Six months later, November 19, 1864, Phillips in his careful report found that the agents of the state had bought to October 30, 1864, a total of 6,438,867 pounds of upland and 20,580 pounds of sea island cotton. [4] If the cost of the upland cotton be put at 65 cents a pound (perhaps too low), and the sea island cotton at $2.50 a pound, the state owned before the close of 1863, $4,236,713.55 worth of cotton. This had been bought with Confederate money, but on the English markets it would sell in 1864 for from eighty cents to one dollar in gold. So far as can now be made out, this cotton, with some money left from the sale of the 10,000 bales bought in 1862 and with the profits from blockade cargoes sold in England, [5] was the state's sole asset in 1864 for the redemption of its warrant indebtedness, for at that date the state's finances would not permit another appropriation.

Was this sum sufficient? Had Vance been hasty, as some of his political opponents charged, in pledging the faith of the state for so large a sum when payment was dependent on the uncertainties of blockade running? The risk was great, but the necessity was

[1] Treasurer's Cash Account Book, 171.
[2] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 277.
[3] Cash Account Book, 174.
[4] Report of the Commissioner on Blockade Accounts, 12.
[5] On June 30, 1864, only five consignments of cotton had been delivered in England, but much was then stored on the islands. The five cargoes sold for $396,132.55. A part of this money had been put in bank as Governor Vance directed. A part seems to have been used for warrants and for expenses.

greater. He had either to dare the peril or leave his soldiers and his people destitute. Moreover, when the business was begun by sending a commissioner to England in November, 1862, the bockade of the Southern ports was hardly more than a paper blockade. In October, 1862, when White began to buy, only seven slow Federal blockading vessels were stationed off the Wilmington ocean front.[1] Fast, low-lying blockade breakers plied in and out almost at will, and the Northern papers were charging as they did for two years, that Wilmington was virtually an open port. Vance knew how difficult it was to blockade a port which was as admirably adapted as Wilmington was for adventurous sailors. An Ex-Confederate officer thus describes the nature of the shores:

> But owing to the configuration of the coast it is almost impossible to effect a close blocade. The Cape Fear has two mouths, Old Inlet, at the entrance of which Fort Caswell stands, and New Inlet, nine miles up the river, where Fort Fisher guards the entrance. From the station off Old Inlet, where there were usually from five to six blockaders, around to the station off New Inlet, a vessel would have to make an arc of some fifty miles, owing to the Frying Pan Shoals intervening, while from Caswell across to Fisher was only nine miles.[2]

In commenting on this peculiar topography of the coast, John Wilkinson, who as captain of the *R. E. Lee*, ran through the Federal fleet around Wilmington twenty-one times,[3] says: "These facts explain why the United States fleet was unable wholly to stop blockade running. It was indeed impossible to do so; the result to the very close of the war proves this assertion, for in spite of the vigilance of the fleet, many blockade runners were afloat when Fort Fisher was captured.[4]

[1] *Naval Official Records*, 8, 100.
[2] Quoted by Sprunt in *Chronicles of the Cape Fear River*, 488.
[3] *Chronicles of the Cape Fear River*, 388.
[4] As quoted by Dr. James Sprunt, *Derelicts*, 223.

This Confederate statement is borne out by the commander of the Federal squadron. In apologizing to Secretary Welles for evasions of the blockade at Wilmington, he says: "It was a blockade of peculiar difficulties. The port has two entrances. The extent of the shoals makes the distance by sea between the entrances near 50 miles to the blockading squadron." [1]

As the cordon of Federal vessels off Wilmington increased in number [2] and in speed, Vance seriously considered the abandonment of the perilous business, [3] but when he took thought that only through this risk could he supply the necessities of field and fireside, he was impelled to persist. He was strengthened in this determination by the knowledge that the state's vessels were still regularly making their trips [4] and that the facilities [5] at Wilmington for running the blockade were largely offsetting the increase in the number of the blockading fleet. He certainly had reason to think with Rear Admiral Lee that, "owing to the facilities afforded by the use of steam on dark nights, it was impossible to prevent violation of the blockade." [6] It seems then that no charge of a reckless contraction of debt or lack of prudence in providing means of payment can lie against a governor

[1] *Naval Official Records*, 10, 573.

[2] From seven vessels in October, 1863, the number of blockading vessels stationed between Beaufort and Wilmington increased to 34 in October, 1864. *Ibid.*, I, 10, 39.

[3] Letter to White, Letter Book, 2, 12.

[4] "The regularity of her (the *Advance*) trips was remarkable and could be forecast almost to the very day; indeed, it was common to hear upon the streets the almost stereotyped remark, Tomorrow the *Advance* will be with us, and when the morrow came she could generally be seen gliding up to her dock with the rich freight of goods and wares so greatly needed by our people." Burr in *Chronicles of Cape Fear*, 455.

[5] The ingenuity of General Whiting and Colonel Lamb in devising these facilities is set forth in a letter from Admiral Lee to Secretary Welles: "The blockade breakers have new facilities for running the blockade which they have never had before. Their vessels have great speed, and are very low in the water so that only their wake is sometimes seen on dark nights. They have now the advantage of a lighthouse for each inlet, of range lights, and of army signal lights along the coast, and each runner is understood to carry a signal officer." *Naval Official Records*, 10, 338.

[6] *Ibid.*, 10, 432.

who by a daring financial course met the needs of troops and people and who was in a fair way to pay every dollar of debt when a totally unexpected contingency—the capture by land of Fort Fisher—stopped all shipment.

After Vance had finished collecting cotton, how did the state's apparent means of paying its debts compare with its foreign liabilities? As already stated, the state had first and last sold 1,849 cotton warrants. For each of these the holder paid £100. In addition the state owed £47,500 on its resin warrants. If these warrants—cotton and resin—be valued at the sums which were paid for them, North Carolina had abroad on their account a total monetary debt of $1,131,013.32. To meet this indebtedness Vance's agents had paid for and stored 6,438,867 pounds of upland cotton. If this cotton could be safely delivered in England, it would average in 1864 at least eighty cents a pound. Its sale, therefore, would give the state $5,151,093.60. Deducting one-fourth of this amount for expenses of shipping, there would remain $3,863,320.20. This sum would have been ample, if the warrants had been payable in cash, to cover the amount borrowed on the warrants and the comparatively large purchases after July 1, 1864. The warrants, however, it will be recalled were not payable in money, but in cotton. Each of the 1,849 cotton warrants was a demand note for 4,800 pounds of cotton. To satisfy the cotton warrants alone would require 8,875,200 pounds. This was 2,436,333 pounds more than the state had bought. Moreover, it was selling for ten cents a pound cotton which had cost sixty-five cents a pound. Obviously, therefore, after the tremendous leap in the price of cotton, if the warrants could be bought for their face value in money, it would be economic to buy them at what they had cost the holders or even at a premium.

Many of the holders, alarmed at the condition of the Confederate government in 1864, were glad to sell at face value. Some offered their warrants at less than cost. Governor Vance was desirous not only to close his English operations, but he was also anxious that none of the buyers of state warrants should lose by their loan. He, therefore, instructed his agents to buy for cash all the warrants obtainable. He induced White in August, 1864, to consent to return to England as special commissioner to settle and report on all blockade accounts. In his instructions to White on August 5, 1864, he says:

> As I have given you my views in detail verbally, it will only be necessary to say generally that the main object of your mission at present will be to buy upon the best possible terms the resin and cotton warrants now outstanding in Europe; . . . and in case shipments of cotton should not arrive fast enough, you may borrow money, if you can, or use the credit of the state in any other way to secure your object. No limitation is placed upon the price which you may pay; this is left to your discretion, provided that you do not make the cost so great as the fulfillment of the face of the warrant would be to the state.[1]

In like manner the governor exerted himself to retire the resin warrants. They were payable in resin. To redeem these warrants according to the terms of their issue 228,000 barrels of resin would be required. The resin was not to be delivered until the close of the war, for the Confederate government forbade the exportation of naval stores at that time. Vance first undertook to buy the resin. Ten thousand dollars in gold was placed in the hands of Theodore J. Hughes with instructions to begin buying.[2] Experience soon proved this an impossible undertaking. His next effort was to pay cash for the warrants. The darkening of

[1] Letter Book, 221. By the "fulfillment of the face of the warrant" Vance evidently means the fulfillment in cotton. Each warrant cost the original buyer $486.66; its fulfillment in cotton at 65 cents a pound would cost $3,120.

[2] *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, 440.

Confederate prospects in 1864 led the holders of these warrants to send an agent,[1] Joseph V. Snedley, to see Vance and suggest some settlement. Snedley offered to accept 50,000 barrels at the advanced price resin was then bringing in lieu of the stipulated 228,000 barrels.[2] Vance did not accept the proposition, for, as he wrote to White on August 25, 1864, "If the consent of the department at Richmond could be obtained, even 20,000 barrels could not be put on the islands short of 30 trips of a vessel drawing as much water as the *Advance*." He, therefore, directed White "to use his utmost efforts" to redeem the warrants in cash, and authorized him to offer a hundred per cent advance on their original cost.[3]

How many of either sort of warrants were bought cannot be ascertained from available records. Indeed, after White and MacRae left England in 1863, it becomes increasingly difficult to trace the financial details of the blockade business. For obvious reasons secrecy was essential to the success of these operations. Hence these accounts were not spread on the treasurer's or the comptroller's books. Such statements as were received were filed in what Vance called "the foreign bundle" in charge of the overworked Quartermaster Department, as that department was receiving the foreign supplies. The relentless pressure on its officers to keep material moving to armies, mills, and farms left little time for systematic accounting. Details of the transactions have now to be compiled with infinite patience from a mass of ship's manifests, quarterly returns, bills, receipts, letters and other documents. Complete reports of the receipts and payments in England are especially lacking. Collie's itemized statement of June 30, 1864, is the last comprehensive accounting on record. The commission agents were

[1] Letter Book, 231.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*

at the time handling large orders from the Union government, from the Confederacy, and from separate states, and in the dispatch demanded of them deferred reports as long as permitted.

Governor Vance, of course, wanted the state's accounts kept properly balanced. As soon, therefore, as he found that his English agents were not sending monthly statements, he appointed J. H. Flanner, former purser of the *Advance*, to represent the state in White's place. He gave Flanner, who arrived in London on March 17, 1864, explicit instructions to keep him "advised by every steamer" [1] of how affairs stood. Flanner's letters throw light on many transactions, but he remained in Europe after the downfall of the Confederacy and failed to submit any definite report either of the state's accounts or his own. [2] Vance waited for a statement from Flanner until the assembling of an adjourned session of the legislature in May, 1864. He, then, smarting under the insinuations of some of his political opponents that the blockade business was a financial failure, asked "for the appointment of a committee to investigate all matters appertaining to the blockade running of the state." [3]

In compliance with this request a committee was designated. The committee through its chairman, John G. Shepherd, submitted its report on May 28,

[1] Vance's Letter Book, II, 100.

[2] State Treasurer Jonathan Worth, who in the fall of 1865, was trying to find means to pay the state's current expenses by collecting all outstanding indebtedness, wrote to ex-Governor Vance as follows: "I have a letter from John White dated August 6, 1865. He says he returned to London last December, he not only found no money but large debts claimed against the state by Collie & Co. Flanner was in Paris and in reply to a letter from White asking him to go over to London, said he had £12,000 or £13,000, but it was not then convenient for him to go over. Has remitted £5,000, but has not been over to settle—is about to make a tour of Europe, etc. We had a large amount of goods in the West Indies when the Confederacy caved in—Collie & Co. got all these—and have not yet made up their accounts. White has probably left for U. S.—A bad state of things. *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, 412.

[3] Governor's Message, May 17, 1864; *Ibid.*, November, 1864.

1864. After stating that by means of the blockade business "the soldiers of North Carolina are clothed and furnished in a manner that is the admiration of the Confederacy—giving to them a degree of comfort and efficiency that cannot be measured in dollars and cents," the committee declared that it could not find time nor material during the brief session to formulate a satisfactory report. The committee, however, asked the General Assembly to concur with it in a resolution that a "commissioner be appointed to state the account to the next General Assembly." [1] The resolution was adopted, and Samuel F. Phillips was chosen as commissioner. He was empowered to call on all officers both at home and abroad for official papers and accounts. Phillips submitted his report on November 19, 1864. He states that the accounts which the officers within the state filed with him were accurately detailed, [2] but that the officers and agents of the state who have conducted the business in foreign countries have made no such returns." [3] His observations, as he states, applied particularly to the consignments of cotton, the dealings with cotton warrants, and the shipment of goods purchased by the state. He closed this section of his report with the hope that John White, who had in August been reappointed "to represent the state in all pecuniary concerns beyond the seas," might find that "the state's adventure in blockade running," which had abridged the hardships of the soldiers in the field and of their families at home, might also show a profit to the treasury.

[1] Manuscript Report, May 28, 1864.

[2] "The transactions of the various agents who have acted within the state afford a marked contrast to those which have already been mentioned. Those especially of the gentlemen who were employed in buying cotton have been recorded . . . with great regularity and precision. Vouchers for every dollar of outlay have been filed, and their property returns exhibit the condition of every bale of cotton at successive periods from the time of its purchase until now." *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

White, however, was delayed in getting out of the country, was stricken down with yellow fever at Halifax, and was not able to assume his duties in London until December, 1864. He did not finish his work until after the state government had been dissolved by the success of the Union arms. When he returned to North Carolina in September, 1865, the governor whom he represented was a paroled prisoner only recently liberated from the Old Capitol prison in Washington. William Collie wrote to Vance from New York on August 9, 1865, that White was on his way home "with all the accounts, etc." [1] If he ever presented the results of his findings his papers are not now available. Unless, therefore, the books of the Collie Company can be discovered and examined, or the missing papers of John White be found, [2] the state will never know how many of the warrants which Vance tried so earnestly to redeem were paid, how the state's account stood with its principal creditor, Collie & Company, or what was the value of its stores in the West Indies.

A sifting of the voluminous correspondence, departmental letter books, quarterly returns, property books, and other books and papers in the possession of the Historical Commission reveals these facts:

First. That although a part of the cotton bought for the cancellation of these warrants was still in the hands of state agents when the blockade business was stopped by the capture of Fort Fisher, yet a surprisingly large amount was safely delivered at Liverpool. In Collie's statement to June 30, 1864, he credits the state with $396,132.55 on account of cotton sold by the firm. [3] This represented the first three trips of the *Advance*. Before this statement was received, Governor Vance

[1] Vance Private Papers.

[2] Since the above was written a letter from Mr. White's daughter announces that his papers were all burned when his place of business was destroyed by fire.

[3] Manuscript statement in Vance Letter File.

wrote to Collie that his agents had shipped 4,100 bales and that according to his figures the sales ought to have left a balance in favor of the state.[1] The Phillips report of November 19, 1864, is the most exhaustive statement to that date. His summary as to exportations is as follows:

	Bales	*Weight in Pounds*
Shipped by Steamer *Advance*.....	2,516	1,166,661
Shipped by Collie line.....	820	379,977
Delivered on warrants.....	2,026	912,000
	5,362	2,458,638

This amount of cotton, since every available pound was selling in England during the latter part of 1864 at 80 cents[2] and above, ought to have realized at least $1,996,910.40.

As further evidence as to the amount of foreign shipments, there has recently come to light in the papers of Major Thomas D. Hogg, of Quartermaster Devereux's office, a paper headed, "Cotton Statement, September 30, 1864." From this report it appears that of the 13,488 bales bought on the state's exportation account only 6,181 bales were at that date in the hands of state officers. The difference between the purchases and the holdings was, however, not all shipped, for from other reports we learn that 1,176 bales were used at home and that 176 bales were lost by the capture of the *Advance*. A deduction of these two amounts would leave 5,955 bales as the number of bales already exported. As the average weight of the exported bales was 450 pounds, this number would realize at 80 cents $2,143,800.00—a sum nearly double the

[1] Vance Letter Book, August 5, 1864, 220.

[2] In estimating the losses from a disastrous fire in Wilmington on April 30, 1864, the *Daily Journal* of that city reckons the price of cotton at $1,000 a bale.

original cost of the warrants. The number of pounds would, however fall far short of that required to satisfy the holders of the warrants in cotton itself.

More cotton than is thus accounted for was leaving Wilmington. In addition to the bales run out by the *Advance* and the three vessels of the State-Collie line, three other steamers owned by the Collie Company, the *Edith*, the *Constance*, and the *Pet*,[1] devoted their entire time to freighting cotton intended for the cancellation of "North Carolina and other warrants."[2] While it is true that the *Advance*, the *Don*, and the *Pet*, were captured[3] before the close of September, the *Edith* in that month was converted into the Confederate cruiser *Chickamauga*, and the *Constance* was wrecked off Charleston on October 6, yet it is also true that the *Annie*, a large boat, ran until October 30, 1864, and the *Hansa* continued to thread her dangerous way into Wilmington with regularity until the guns of Fisher and Caswell could no longer protect her. The fund abroad was, therefore, augmented by the sales of whatever cotton was freighted out by these vessels in the last quarter of 1864.

The small amount of state cotton, collected after diligent search at the close of the war, is further evidence that the exportations through the blockade were remarkably large. Treasurer Worth was forced by an empty exchequer in 1865 to seek funds for current expenses from every conceivable source. He obtained releases from the United States government for all state cotton seized by its treasury agents after Johnston's surrender near Durham. He then scoured the country to find every bale of the state's store. Of the amount in North Carolina he writes to Judge

[1] The *Pet* is credited with having carried twenty cargoes out of Wilmington. *Chronicles of the Cape Fear*, 453.

[2] Collie to Vance in Vance Letter Book, 152, 180.

[3] The dates of their capture were as follows: the *Pet* on February 16, the *Don* on March 4, the *Annie* on October 31, 1864.

Reade: "We had at the date of General Schofield's proclamation announcing to the army and people of North Carolina that peace existed about 600 bales at Graham and about 500 bales at Manson." [1] He later added that he had "good reason to hope for some 400 bales" in Anson, Bladen, and Robeson. [2] This seems to be the gleanings in the state. The comptroller's and the treasurer's records show that the sales of what was left in North Carolina, in Georgia and Alabama amounted to only about $176,806.40. [3]

In addition to the receipts from upland cotton, the sales of no inconsiderable amounts of sea island cotton and of tobacco were applied to the reduction of the English debt. The state owned 20,580 pounds of sea island cotton, which was sold for $3.75 a pound—a total of $77,175.00. On the manifest of the second trip of the *Don* tobacco to the value of $44,770 [4] is listed. The *Annie* in her second and third trips carried out $62,172.50 [5] worth of manufactured tobacco. Hardly any ships left Wilmington without some tobacco in their holds.

The foregoing facts are apparently all that can now be gathered as to the actual or possible fulfillment of the warrants. They leave the impression that none of the holders who were willing to redeem their warrants in cash suffered any direct loss, but that those who held their claims for redemption in cotton after the close of the war received no return for their outlay. Governor Vance, writing in November, 1864, when the business was nearly finished, evidently thought that neither the warrant holders nor the state would be losers. [6]

[1] *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, 306.
[2] *Ibid.*, 400.
[3] Treasurer's Cash Book, 336-48.
[4] Blockade Book, 562.
[5] *Ibid.*, 587.
[6] Message to General Assembly, November 1864, 6. This statement was, however, made while White was on his way to Europe to make a complete report.

On the other hand, William Collie, in writing to Vance from New York in August, 1865, says: "I am quite sanguine as to the ultimate result of the little cotton loan we negotiated for your state, but, as you are aware, we have come under very heavy advances to the state and it would be a good thing for us to receive now two or three thousand bales of cotton." [1] Any indebtedness to the Collie Company must have been incurred after June 29, 1864, for on that date Flanner, after personal conferences with the head of the firm, writes to Vance: "The cotton to come out per the Collie steamers (if successful) will be sufficient to arrange matters satisfactorily with Messrs. Collie & Company." [2] Treasurer Worth evidently believed that the Collie claim was largely offset by the fact that "Collie & Company got all the (state) property in the West Indies and the vessels in which the state had an interest towards a debt they claimed against the state." [3] He thought, however, that the state still owed money in England, but, as on August 21 he puts the sum at $800,000, on August 22 at $700,000, and on August 30 at $500,000, it is clear that he is right in saying, "I can give no reliable information in relation to our English debt." [4]

A second truth made clear by a sifting of the correspondence of the period is that the people were not disposed to measure the success of the blockade business in dollars. Phillips expressed the general sentiment when he said, " . . . happily no serious question had been made as to the results of that adventure in furnishing the means of abridging the hardships encountered by the many citizens of the state who are in military service, or in adding to the means of comfort possessed by those who are at home." [5] Governor

[1] Vance Private Papers, August 9, 1865.
[2] Vance Letter Files.
[3] *Correspondence of Jonathan Worth*, I, 392.
[4] *Ibid.*, 395, 397, 404.
[5] Report of Commissioner, 3.

Vance went to the heart of the entire matter when he said, "It is certainly a narrow-minded view of the subject to regard it only as a matter of dollars and cents. The saving of life and health, and the cheerfulness of spirit imparted to our soldiers, and the comfort added to our people by the introduction of indispensable articles not obtainable in the Confederacy, I regard as invaluable. No money estimate can measure these benefits." [1] He phrased his idea of the "higher economy" when he further said, "Had we been condemned to rely on our state for clothing, blankets, and shoes, the same quantity of very inferior articles could have been obtained, if at all, only by the seizure of almost every pound of wool and leather in the state, greatly enhancing the price and the public distress. It would appear, therefore to every candid mind, not only indispensable to import these articles, but also economical in every possible sense of the word." [2]

The state's next task was to dock safely at Wilmington the goods, which having been bought by warrants, as just described, were in 1864 going so steadily and so safely to Hamilton, Saint Georges, and Nassau. The *Advance* had been bought for this hazardous service. When she proved unequal to moving with requisite expedition the accumulating stores on the islands [3] and to taking out cotton as fast as it was desired, the state bought on October 18, 1863, a one-fourth interest in the three Collie steamers already

[1] Message to General Assembly, November, 1864.
[2] *Ibid.*, 6.
[3] Vance to Seddon, Letter Book, 51.

mentioned—the *Annie*,[1] the *Don*,[2] and the *Hansa*.[3] These four vessels assisted later by the *Constance*, *Edith*, *Pet*, and others, were busily plied from the islands to Wilmington after the state's freight began to arrive at the West Indian ports.

The Cape Fear town is 570 miles from Nassau and 674 from Bermuda. The ships expected to make at least one round trip a month. Sometimes they exceeded their expectancy, but often troublesome tides, contrary weather, or unusual activity among the blockading squadron slowed down their schedules. The captains would time the departure of their vessels from the islands so as to reach the blockading squadron about dusk on moonless nights. Then by stealth, boldness, strategy, or skill born of experience—whichever served the occasion—they would try to dash through the cordon of watchful foes before morning. Their usual plan on the inward voyage was "to strike the coast thirty or forty miles above or below the inlets, and then run along the coast (of course at night) until they got under the protection of the forts. Sometimes they got in or out by boldly running through the blockading fleet, but this was hazardous; for, if discovered, the ocean was alive with rockets and lights, and it was no pleasant thing to have shells and

[1] The *Annie*, commanded at the time of her capture by Captain Ronnop, was an "iron screw steamer of great speed; about 350 tons capacity and 120 horsepower; hull black; smokestack white." *Naval Official Records*, I, 9, 539. As illustrative of her outward cargoes, she was carrying when captured 540 bales of cotton, 30 tons of tobacco, and 14 casks of turpentine. *Ibid.*, 11, 36.

[2] The *Don* was also a double screw iron steamer. In her early trips she was commanded by "Captain Roberts," who in reality was Captain Hobart of the English Navy on leave of absence. He afterwards became Senior Admiral of the Turkish fleet. Roberts ran his ship into Wilmington eight or nine times before he turned the vessel over to Captain Cory, who was in charge with a cargo of state stores consisting of shoes, blankets, clothing, etc. when she was captured. *Naval Official Records*, I, 9, 524, and *Chronicles of the Cape Fear*, 289.

[3] The *Hansa*, commanded during part of her career by Captain Murray-Aynsley of the British Navy, but known in blockade circles only as Captain Murray, was a two-funnel, sidewheel steamer. Like the *Pet*, she was slow, but ran without capture.

balls whistling over you and around you. The chances were then that if you were not caught you had in spite of your speed to throw a good many bales of cotton overboard [1] to lighten your draft."

Captain M. P. Usina, whose skill and courage as a blockade runner made him famous in Bermuda and Nassau, thus pictures the men and the ships engaged in this nerve-racking traffic:

> The men who ran the blockade had to be men who could stand fire without returning it. It was a business in which every man took his life in his hands, and he so understood it. An ordinarily brave man had no business as a blockade runner. He who made a success of it was obliged to have the cunning of a fox, the patience of a Job, and the bravery of a Spartan warrior. The United States government wanted at first to treat them as pirates and was never satisfied to consider them contrabandist. The runners must not be armed and must not resist; they must simply be cool and quick and watchful, and, for the rest, trust to God and their good ship to deliver them safely to their friends. . . . At each of these ports (Wilmington and Charleston) there were three lines of ships anchored in a semicircle, so that our vessels had to run the gantlet through these three lines before they had the enemy astern and their haven ahead. Besides these, the ocean between the Confederate ports and the Bermudas and the West Indies was policed by many of the fastest ships that money could buy or build, so that we had practically to run two blockades to reach a Southern port. The swiftest of the captured blockade runners were put into this service, and I have more than once been chased by ships of which I had myself been an officer. . . . The enemy's ships were provided with powerful calcium search lights, which, if a blockade runner were in reach, would light her up about as well as an electric light would at the present time, and make her a perfect target for the enemy's fire. . . . Our ships were painted gray, to match the horizon at night; some were provided with telescopic funnels and masts hinged so that they could be lowered, and others had the masts taken out. A great source of danger, and one which was unavoidable, was the black smoke caused from our fires, and for this sign the blockaders were always on the lookout.

[1] Sprunt, *Derelicts*, 57.

On dark nights it was very difficult to discern our low hulls, and moonlight nights, as a rule, were nights of rest, few ships venturing to run the gantlet when the moon was bright. No lights were used at sea. Everything was in total silence and darkness. To speak above a whisper or to strike a match would subject the offender to immediate punishment. Orders were passed along the deck in whispers, canvas curtains were dropped to the waters edge around the paddles to deaden the noise, and men exposed to view on deck were dressed in sheets, moving about like so many phantoms on a phantom ship.

The impression always prevailed, and still prevails to a great extent that the South has no sailors, but the record of the Southern sailors during the war is second to none that the world has ever produced. . . . I do not think their services have ever been understood or appreciated from the fact that so little of their authentic history has ever found its way into the hands of the reading public. Most of them had all their relatives and friends in the Southern service, suffering untold hardships and exposing their lives daily, and they felt it their duty to risk their ships and their lives to bring food to their starving countrymen. . . .

During the first two years of the war the blockade runners were almost exclusively officered by English and Scotch,[1] but during the last two years the danger was very much increased, and, while there can be no question as to the bravery of the British sailor, it required the additional incentive of patriotism to induce men to venture into the service. It is noticeable that nearly all the officers during the last two years were Confederates.[2]

Into the perils of this sort of traffic the *Advance* and her consorts entered in 1863. The *Advance*, owned at first entirely by the state, left Cardiff on May 30, 1863, for her initial passage through the blockade. Her assorted cargo[3] was sorely needed in North Carolina.

[1] "Officers of rank in the English navy, on leave of absence, offered their services under assumed names and for large compensation—and met with distinguished success." Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, 155.

[2] Quoted in *Chronicles of the Cape Fear River*, 416-21.

[3] The cargo consisted of the following articles: 203 bales and boxes of materials for uniforms, including 9,530 yards of army cloth, 6,670 yards of gray flannel, 252 blankets, 400 pairs of shoes, 387 gross of buttons, 500 pounds of thread, 90 sacks of coffee, 21 cases of mill supplies, 2 trusses of mill equipment, 1 case of wire, 4 casks of bleaching powder, 26 boxes and 2 casks of medical supplies, 3 boxes of surgical instruments, 37 kegs of rum, 13 boxes of brandy, 2 boxes of stationery. Itemized Report of W. H. Oliver in Hogg Papers.

When, therefore, Commander Crossan brought the ship into the mouth of the Cape Fear River on June 26, 1863, he was welcomed by Governor Vance and a delegation of enthusiastic citizens. Great was the relief in the quartermaster's office when the cargo was turned into the hands of its agents at Raleigh, for, with a constant supply of material in sight, the heads of the manufacturing department felt that they could at last begin to make clothes on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the soldiers.

As soon as the *Advance* could take on a load of cotton, she cleared for Bermuda on July 19, 1864, for a second inward cargo. She expected to be back in fifteen or twenty days, but did not slip into her Wilmington dock until August 17, 1863. Her second cargo, according to a telegram from Purser Hughes, was composed of 250 packages for the state, 150 for the Confederate government, and 25 of commercial freight. The state goods were valued at $44,174.40. [1]

When the ship put to sea for her third trip on September 12, J. H. Flanner had assumed charge of her business interests as purser in place of Hughes. Her outward voyage was uneventful, but on her return trip the officers missed their reckoning and on October 10 had to run through the blockading squadron in daylight. The ship was chased in under hot fire until Colonel Lamb's men at Fort Fisher drove back the assailants by well-directed shots, and testified their approval of Crossan's skill and audacity by

[1] The state stores were as follows: 4,100 pairs of shoes, 6,404 blankets, 9,287 yards of army cloth, 6,210 yards gray flannel, 120 pieces of flannel, 500 pounds of thread, 477 gross of buttons, 10 cases of medicine, 1 cask of medicine, 12 cases of stationery, including ink, wax, pencils, pens, etc., 100 boxes of tin plate, 4 casks of powder, 6 barrels of oil, 1 roll of driving band, 1 case of wire, 2 trusses of web felt. Quartermaster Returns in Hogg Papers.

rounds of cheers.[1] The officers of the ship at this time were Thomas M. Crossan, Captain; J. Wyllie, Sailing Master; George Morrison, Chief Engineer; James Maglenn, Second Engineer; J. B. Temple, Third Engineer; J. H. Flanner, Purser; John B. Smith, Signal Officer; C. C. Morse, Pilot.[2] The loss of their cargo at this juncture when it was so much needed to outfit the soldiers for winter, would have chagrined these officers and dismayed the manufacturing department,[3] and hence Crossan was willing to take almost any risk.

On the fourth outward voyage of the *Advance*, Captain John Julius Guthrie,[4] a former officer of the United States navy, succeeded Crossan as commander. The vessel slipped through the blockaders on October 22, 1863, with 600 bales of cotton. She returned on

[1] The following description of this adventure, written by Rev. Moses D. Hoge, of Richmond, who had taken passage on the *Advance* at Bermuda for the trip, illustrates the dangers always attendant on attempts to break through the blockade:

"Colonel Crossan prepared to run up near enough to see what blockaders were within view and I supposed that he would then stand out to sea, lie off until night and then run in at his leisure, but to my astonishment, although it was about eight o'clock in the morning, the sun shining brilliantly and the sea level as a floor and three blockaders guarding the entrance, he steamed straight on toward Fort Fisher. The blockaders seemed confused for a few moments by the audacity of the movement, but presently they came about and all three struck for the shore, intending to cut us off. They came on very speedily, but finding that we were running so swiftly they opened upon us with shrapnel, shell, and solid shot. "It was a scene of intense excitement. We could see people on the shore, watching the result . . . the shells were ploughing up the water and tearing up the sand on the shore, bursting over and around us, and yet not one struck us. Clark, ed. *op. cit.*, 5, 343.

[2] Doctor Hoge, in the article just quoted, draws this character sketch of the officers whom he met: The colonel (Captain Crossan) is a noble man. Wyllie (afterwards captain) a warm-hearted Scotchman, though he looks English every inch, big, burly, red-faced, full of enthusiasm, full of poetry. Flanner has good points. I had some pleasant intercourse with young Smith, who became pious at Hampden-Sidney. Clark, ed. *op. cit.*, 5, 341.

[3] The character of the cargo shows how hard it would have been to replace it before cold weather: 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,702 single blankets, 5,040 pairs of hose, 8,638 yards of army cloth, 630 pieces of gray flannel, 960 dozen buckles, 516 dozen buttons, 1,450 yards gunny cloth, 1,161 pairs of cotton cards, 52,536 yards of cotton bagging, 7,329 pounds of rope, 38 bundles of iron, 2 cases of cast steel, 20 reams of paper, 72 dozen of pencils, 84 dozen awls, 1 cask each of borax, emory, and small files, 750,000 water-proof musket caps, 15,696 gun nipples. Dowd's Summary in Hogg Papers.

[4] Guthrie, a native of North Carolina, had previously commanded the Confederate States gunboat *Chattahoochee*.

November 6, laden almost entirely with clothing material.[1] As cold weather approached the calls for cotton cards for family use became insistent.[2] Governor Vance tried to expedite their delivery in sufficient quantities to prevent suffering by giving them first place in the priority list of shipments from the islands in the *Advance*, and then in the *Don* and *Hansa*, when these vessels began to ply for the state in December, 1863. In fact, the priority order, always an index to the needs of the state, remained fixed during November, December, and January. It was (1) cotton cards and machinery for making them, (2) shoes, hides and leather, (3) blankets, (4) factory machinery, (5) army cloth, (6) dye stuffs and findings for factories.[3] The list shows at a glance how largely the blockade business was affecting the life of the state.[4]

About the middle of November the *Advance* felt her way cautiously to sea again without a gun being turned against her. She was equally fortunate on her return trip early in December. There is no invoice

[1] Her invoices show almost the same cargo as the one delivered at Bermuda by the *Rover's Bride* in August and is a tribute to the energy with which the business was being conducted. The receiving officer receipts for these articles: 15,634 yards of uniform material, including much of the gray melton cloth used by Confederate officers; 2,532 pairs of boots; 1,088 pairs of shoes; 100 gross of buttons; 550 pairs of blankets; 1,573 hides; 100 boxes of tin plate; 30 barrels of oil, and 40 bales of cotton bagging, which was probably bought in Bermuda. Dowd's receipts in Hogg Papers.

Before the cargo was received Vance had written Editor E. J. Hale: "No accident or misfortune befalling me, I am now in condition to insure clothing for our troops to January 1865, shoes and blankets excepted. . . . 18,000 pairs of shoes and boots, a quantity of leather, and 17,500 blankets are at Bermuda and expected by steamer next week, God prospering her." Hale Papers, October 26, 1863.

[2] "Unless we get some cards," J. C. Norman writes to Governor Vance, "I fear we shall soon be shirtless and pantless." Vance Letter File, November 20, 1863. "Unless cards come soon, I'll run off." A. T. Summey to Dowd.

[3] Instructions to State Agent J. T. Bourne at Saint Georges.

[4] Quartermaster Devereux reports to Adjutant General Gatlin, on November 2, 1863, that the stationery not used by the state sold for $26,771; the coffee for $30,920; the tin for $17,000; and passage money amounted to $18,000. He then, reporting only on the stores of the Quartermaster's Department, says: "Besides the supply of rope, bagging, and stationery, the steamer has realized in above articles alone $100,796."

of this fifth cargo, but it probably consisted of at least a part of Colonel MacRae's purchases of arms, uniforms and shoes, for Lemmon & Company wrote to Vance on December 10, 1863: "We hold 270 cases of merchandise which we are instructed by Mr. Weston (Colonel MacRae's agent) to deliver to the captain of the steamer *Advance*," [1] and the vessel left Saint Georges about December 20.

The *Advance*, heavily laden with her fifth outward cargo of cotton, reached Bermuda on Christmas day without mishap. She was not so fortunate on her return trip with her sixth inward cargo. She reached the mouth of the Cape Fear during a dense fog and ran aground on the shoals a few miles from Fort Caswell. For a time it seemed that both vessel and cargo would fall a prey either to the ocean or to the blockaders. Owing, however, to thick weather and a rough sea outside and to the presence of a beach battery within a mile of the ship's position, [2] the Federal vessels made no attack. By the aid of soldiers [3] from the forts and of Colonel Crossan, who went down from Wilmington with a large working force, enough of the cargo was transferred to lighters to ease the imperiled boat off the shoals.

The vessel contained among her stores [4] a consignment of 8,000 pairs of the eagerly desired cotton cards. These with other thousands that soon followed were assigned to a commissioner selected by the county

[1] Vance Letter File.

[2] Power, Low & Company to Vance, January 18, 1864.

[3] Colonel Thos. M. Jones, in command of Fort Caswell mentions with commendations that a detachment of Coast Guards of Captain John W. Galloway's company secured at much personal risk some goods that were washed overboard. The men commended were John E. Woodside, R. M. Ruark, W. H. Fulwood, William E. Davis, H. L. Bains, Dexter Roberson, R. Standley, John S. Melvin, Joseph M. Melvin. *Official Records.*

[4] Her cargo as reported by Agent Thomas Carter and Surgeon General Edward Warren comprised 115 bales, 86 boxes, 26 bundles of leather. Among the bales and boxes were 10,000 blankets, 12,000 pairs of shoes, 8,000 pairs of cards, and sundry merchandise.

court of each county [1] for distribution to the wives and families of soldiers and to such indigent families as the commissioner deemed proper. They were sold to the county commissioner at five dollars a pair. [2] To save space on board ship only the wire teeth twisted into rolls of belting were bought. The rolls had to be cut into sections of the required length and handles and backs fixed to each pair. In some cases workmen charged as high as eighteen dollars a pair for "backing" them. [3] So scarce were tacks that they had to be furnished with the cards. Before the close of 1864 shops for "backing" and also making cards from imported wire were opened.

Just after the *Advance* was cleared on December 23 for her outward voyage, the *Hansa*, in which as already mentioned the state had bought a one-fourth interest, arrived with her first cargo of public goods. Her companion ship the *Don* reached the Wilmington slips on January 4, 1864, with another complement of state purchases. [4] These vessels were always discharged and cleared with the utmost dispatch. The *Hansa* in this first trip was unloaded and reladen with 500 bales of cotton and five tons of tobacco in four days. The *Don* was speeded down the river with 245,061 pounds of cotton and 75,000 pounds of tobacco [5] on board within five days after her arrival. The haste of the owners is easily understood. The Collie Company was realizing an enormous profit on every bale of its cotton and every pound of freight. Governor Vance, who "anticipated the closing of the port of

[1] Adjutant General's Letter Book, III, 13.

[2] "It is predicted that our five dollar bills will be reduced one-third when our cards arrive." Irby to Vance, May 13, 1864.

[3] E. A. Vogler to Dowd, May 27, 1864.

[4] The contract between the state and the Collie Company stipulated that the state should be allowed the entire inward cargo space and one-fourth of the outward space in these two vessels and in two others that were to be built. The state, of course, was to pay freight on the inward cargo above its one-fourth interest. Collie Contract.

[5] Andrea to Vance, January 8, 1864.

Wilmington in the spring,"[1] was consumed with anxiety to get all the state stores at Bermuda into Wilmington before it was too late. In protesting against the Confederate government's claiming cargo space in these vessels on the ground that they were privately owned, he set forth the large amount of military and civil necessities it was necessary for him to transfer from the islands while the door was open. He says: "I have now at Bermuda and on the way there eight or ten cargoes of supplies of the very first importance to the army and the people, consisting chiefly of some 40,000 blankets, 40,000 pairs of shoes, large quantities of army cloth, leather, 112,000 pairs of cotton cards, machinery and findings to refit twenty-six of our principal cotton and woolen factories, dye-stuffs, lubricating oils, etc. In addition, I have made large purchases of bacon."[2]

While the *Advance* was being repaired after her buffeting on the shoals, her owners stripped her of her upper cabins in order to stow more bales of cotton on her deck. She gained room by the changes for nearly 200 more bales.[3] Tightened in all her joints by her overhauling, but sunk almost to the danger point by a load of 687 bales of cotton, the *Advance* wormed through a triple row of Federal vessels unmolested on February 7, and anchored on February 10 at Saint Georges. There a part of her discharged cargo that was owned by Power, Low & Company was injured by a wharf fire. Dr. T. J. Boykin became purser on this trip, as Flanner was going to England as the state's agent.

The *Don*, *Hansa*, and *Advance* steamed triumphantly back into Wilmington before the middle of February. The *Don*, arriving from Bermuda on February 7,

[1] Vance to Seddon, Letter Book, 51.
[2] Vance to Secretary Seddon, Letter Book, 56.
[3] Power, Low & Company to Vance, February 5, 1864.

brought 280 packages on the state account.[1] The *Hansa*, forced to go to Nassau by lack of coal, came in with a cargo of bacon for the Confederate government.[2] The *Advance* passed under the guns of Caswell on February 17.[3] She was loaded with leather, stationery, hosiery, and lead from White's purchases, and with boots, shoes, blankets and suits of clothing from MacRae's,[4] a total freightage of 64,750 pounds. Moreover, the steamer *Leon*, an independent freighter, reached Wilmington just ahead of the *Don* with a cargo of state's merchandise.[5]

The safe delivery of so many widely assorted[6] cargoes, insuring as they did comforts for soldiers and their families and power to continue to so many essential industries, was an intense relief to Governor Vance, and removed, he was confident, any suspicion that the business was too venturesome or ill-advised. He wrote, on February 11, 1864, to Editor Hale, who had expressed some doubt as to the financial profits of the business:

> Don't be uneasy about my blockade running business. I assure you that I shall be able to show the most brilliant financial operation ever shown in the state. In addition to the enormous quantities of army supplies brought in, I have now about $400,000 to the credit of the state in the bank of England. I have now at Bermuda 40,000 pairs of cotton cards, machinery for making them, card clothing for twenty factories, dye-stuffs, indigo, railroad iron and fixtures in abundance, and 10,000 scythe blades, etc.,

[1] McGee telegram to Vance, February 10, 1864.
[2] Andrea to Vance.
[3] Guthrie to Vance, February 17, 1864.
[4] Flanner to Vance, from Saint Georges, February 13, 1864. Her manifest on reaching Wilmington showed: 253 cases of merchandise, 30 bales of leather, 13 bales of cloth, 5 cases of caps, 270 cases of boots, 60 pigs of lead for the state, and 15 cases of paper and 9 bales of merchandise for Sterling, Campbell & Company of Greensboro, a firm that was printing school books—167 tons in all.
[5] Galloway to Dowd.
[6] A list of supplies forwarded by the Collie Company in January, 1864, includes, railroad rails, anvils, sledge-hammers, tacks, gimlets, horse-shoes, solder, tin, screws, axes, sheet iron, military caps, cloth, boats, and scythes. Letter Book, 114.

for the farmers. All this is based on the $2,400,000 which the state gave me. There is, it is true, a considerable degree of extravagance and wasteful expenditure which is common to the reckless business of blockade running and can't be avoided, but the general results will astonish you. . . . After making five round trips I have sold half of the *Advance* for $350,000 in state bonds. I have recently sent £1,200 to our Northern prisoners to buy winter clothes, have loaned Generals Johnston and Longstreet 10,000 suits of clothes complete. I have on hand now 14,000 pairs of English shoes, 24,000 English blankets, 5,000 overcoats, and some 50,000 suits of ready-made clothes."[1]

He also wrote Collie & Company on February 18: "Our troops are better clothed and equipped than at any time since the beginning of the war."[2]

The state carriers continued to add to the governor's satisfaction during March by emptying their invaluable wares into Wilmington with persistent regularity. The capture of the *Don* on March 4 was the only drawback for a time.[3] The *Don* had taken to Nassau 487 bales of cotton and 165 boxes of tobacco,[4] and was returning "with a cargo of blankets, shoes, clothing, etc.,"[5] when the vessel and cargo, valued by her captain at $194,000, fell a prey to the United States steamer *Pequot*. The *Hansa*, after delivering in Bermuda 319 bales of upland and 92 bales of sea island cotton,[6] turned in on March 5 a return cargo of 94 bales of blankets and 15 cases of forage caps,[7] and some boxed hardware. The *Annie*, "a double screw propeller much like the *Don*,"[8] and the fourth steamer in which North Carolina had bought a share, followed the *Hansa* in on March 5 with her first cargo of state

[1] Hale Papers.
[2] Letter Book, 119.
[3] The *Pet* was captured on February 16, but the state owned no interest in her or in her cargo.
[4] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 235.
[5] *Naval Official Records*, I, 9, 524.
[6] Blockade Book, 576.
[7] Manifest in Vance Letter File.
[8] Carter to Vance, March 5, 1864.

wares. The *Advance* ought to have turned in another cargo in March, but she was delayed for repairs after her arrival in February. While the repairs were making, the vessel was further stripped of cabin space. When she at last headed down the river on March 1, Joannes Wyllie, her Scotch sailing master, had succeeded Guthrie as captain, and he continued in charge until the vessel's career was ended. Ill health detained the purser, and Dr. R. S. Primrose made the trip as temporary financial officer. The removals enabled the *Advance* to stow on board 827 bales of cotton, yet, notwithstanding this heavy lading, she cleared the distance to Nassau in 46 hours.[1] After a few days on the slips, she passed up to Bermuda for a homeward load of lead, shoes, blankets, cotton cards and card-making machinery.[2] On the night of March 31 she evaded the blockaders and the next morning was at her pier.

As the *Advance* had to be sent late in April to the shipyards in Liverpool for "thorough overhauling,"[3] deliveries would have been reduced in May and June but for the entrance into the business of two new Collie steamers—the *Edith* and the *Constance*. These vessels, as already noted, were built to "run out cotton on the cotton warrant accounts," and came primarily to secure this cotton,[4] but their inward space was largely devoted to the North Carolina supplies which their owners were accumulating on the islands.[5] The *Hansa* and the *Annie* plied as regularly as the weather and the investing fleet would permit.

[1] Power, Low & Company to Vance.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Wyllie to Vance from Nassau, April 21, 1864.
[4] Vance to Memminger, Letter Book, 171.
[5] All blockade cotton was reshipped on the islands. The reason is obvious. The blockade runners were light, fast boats, designed for the dash of the hazardous trade. After the cotton reached its English consignee on the islands, it could be shipped to England in slow, safe, and less expensively maintained freighters. In addition the transshipments better covered the transaction.

The *Hansa*, a slow boat at best and with "boilers bad," [1] lumbered her way out on March 9. She carried 371 bales of upland and 25 bales of sea island cotton, and her cargo was billed at $208,182. [2] The *Advance* was accompanied by the *Annie* down to Smithville on April 13. Both sped unharmed through their grim enemies. The *Annie* was back in Wilmington with a return cargo in time to start for Nassau on May 26 with an expensively billed load of 444 bales of cotton. The cargo was valued by Collie's agent, Theodore Andrea, at $445,919. [3] The *Advance*, burdened by a cargo of 401,034 pounds of cotton, [4] made Nassau on April 16. That port, however, offered no facilities for such an overhauling as her officers desired. Captain Wyllie, therefore, ran on to Halifax, only to have to extend his quest of mechanics to the yards of Liverpool. The vessel, therefore, did not return to Wilmington until July 29. [5] The *Edith* reported for regular duty on April 15. Her cargo, including a Whitworth gun, presented to Governor Vance by the Collie Company, was partly made up of state furnishings. [6] The *Annie* checked in a return cargo, largely bacon, during the second week in June. On June 24 she cleared for Nassau and safely docked 182,322 pounds of cotton and 7,414 pounds of tobacco. The price of cotton was advancing precipitately as the blockade became more stringent. The cotton carried by the *Annie* was billed at $2.50 and the tobacco at $2.50 a pound. The total cargo was valued at $474,340. [7] The state, it will be recalled, received a

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 9, 476.

[2] Blockade Book, 576. (The 175,497 pounds of upland was valued at $1 a pound; the 8,716 pounds of sea island cotton at $3.75 a pound.)

[3] *Ibid.*, 587. (The values ran as follows: 128,892 pounds are charged at $2.75; 24,448 pounds at $2; and 42,570 pounds at $1.)

[4] *Ibid.*, 655.

[5] Flanner to Vance from Paris.

[6] Carter reported it as follows: 40 bales of cloth; 8 casks of hardware; 12 casks of axes; 6 cases of cotton and woolen cards; seven cases of cloth.

[7] Blockade Book, 587.

return of only one-fourth from the cotton and tobacco cargoes of the *Don*, *Hansa*, and *Annie*, and of one-half from the *Advance* after February, 1864, at which time Power, Low & Company bought a one-half interest in the ship. The *Edith*, bringing for the state 9 cases of military caps, 10 bales of cloth, 1 cask of wire, and a quantity of dyes and mill furnishings,[1] was welcomed at her pier on July 28. There is no record of the lading of the *Advance* on her arrival from Liverpool on July 29, but, from Governor Vance's directions it seems to have been a further consignment of bacon, scythes and cradles, shoes, cards and card machinery. He had directed that this priority of shipment should prevail during the summer[2] in all state carriers. In August the *Edith* went down the Cape Fear River with an unreported freightage. She returned in September with 86 boxes of bacon, 17 cases of cotton cards, and 20 bales of cloth and blankets.[3] This seems her last trip as a blockade runner, for on her return she was armed with five heavy guns, and became herself a boat-chaser under commission from the Confederate government as the cruiser *Chickamauga*.[4]

As yellow fever was raging in Bermuda and New Providence in August, the destination of ships from Wilmington was changed from the ports of these islands to Halifax, Nova Scotia. The distance to Halifax was so much greater than to the islands and the danger thereby so much enhanced that fewer vessels than usual plied during the month. The *Annie*, however, after delivering an inward cargo billed on September 9 as consisting of 19 cases of cotton cards, 44 bales of clothing, 5 cases of caps, 100 bags of coffee, and 50 coils of rope,[5] managed to land 566 bales of cotton at

[1] Carter telegram to Vance, June 29, 1864.
[2] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 242.
[3] Murray, Receipt of Cargo. Hogg Papers.
[4] *Naval Official Records*, I, 11, 416, 510.
[5] Murray Receipt. Hogg Papers.

Halifax on September 12 and to escape unmolested with a cargo of provisions. Off Wilmington the vessel was grounded, and escaped destruction by the Federal fleet only by the activity of the Coast Guards and the fire of Lamb's beach batteries.[1]

The *Advance* had been considerably battered by a close chase off Wilmington on her return from England. The ship was, therefore, not ready to run the gantlet again until August 8. Meantime there had been some changes in the personnel of her officers. Thomas Carter, the efficient state agent at Wilmington, had become purser, and Eli Murray had taken over as Commissioner of Blockade Business Carter's former duties. Cyrus Neel had become signal officer, and J. S. Feilds assistant navigator. On her first attempt to lay her course from Smithville to Halifax, the *Advance* realized the truth of Whiting's assertion that "both bars were swarming with boats." After delays from August 8 to September 10, occasioned by low water, by a collision with the *Old Dominion*, and by "headings off" of the Federal interior line of gunboats, the vessel on her ninth attempt glided noiselessly out into "a sea swarming with cruisers."[2] She dodged successfully through the regular lines of investment, but just as her officers caught their breaths in apparent safety, the trailing smoke of their fires was sighted by the *Santiago de Cuba*, a fast Federal cruiser on her way to Norfolk for coal. After a chase lasting from 10:30 a.m. until 7:40 p.m., the ship that had contributed so much to the welfare of the war-harassed state and that was regarded in an affectionate personal way by a half million of people, was compelled to strike her

[1] General Whiting complains on October 11 to Secretary Seddon of the severity of the duty falling on his garrisons. He says, "My men, who ought to be at their work and at their drill, have to be transformed into boatmen and wreckers and at night have to stay on these wrecks to keep off the enemy's boats. . . . I mention this only to show what sort of work this little garrison is daily and nightly at." *Naval Official Records*, I, 10, 781.

[2] Whiting to Seddon.

colors.[1] Governor Vance in reporting the loss of the *Advance* spoke of the vessel as "the pride of the state and the benefactor of our soldiers and people."

The *Annie*, too, came to grief shortly after the *Advance*. On October 31 this ship, while making her way to Halifax, was caught between the fires of the blockaders *Niphon* and *Wilderness* and enriched the prize money of these vessels by 540 bales of cotton, 30 tons of tobacco and 14 casks of turpentine.[2]

The loss of these two ships left afloat only the *Hansa* of the state-carrying line. This fortunate vessel dodged in and out of Wilmington as often as her slow speed would permit until the storming of the protecting forts ended the business. Manifests of her later cargoes do not appear in the fragmentary files of that period. They were in the hands of the commissioner at Wilmington and apparently had not reached Raleigh when Wilmington was taken.

A number of privately owned ships were still, however, daring every risk for the sake of the fabulous

[1] "After her capture Captain Willie (Wyllie) informed me that I had captured the fastest blockade runner that they had; that his vessel had cost $175,000 in gold two years since; and that since that time the owners had put on her in repairs $15,000, and to show me how highly he valued her, he said he would give $100,000 in gold for her." Glisson's report, *Naval Official Records*, I, 10, 456.

[2] Chief Engineer Maglenn gives this account of her capture: "Although the night was not altogether favorable, we started as soon as the tide would permit. Of course smoke, sparks, and flames from the stack had to be kept down. This was very difficult to do as our last shovelful of good coal was used shortly after crossing the bar and in plain sight of some of the fleet. Those that could see us would throw rockets, indicating the direction we were going. Then the dodging on our part and the frequent change of the ship's course to keep from running into them. The excitement at this time was very great. Yet all was quiet as the grave on board and every man was at his post and doing his duty faithfully. The rocket firing and shooting were very heavy and nothing but good management on the part of our officers could have pulled us safely through the fleet that night. At sunrise there was nothing in sight, yet our black smoke was giving us away. Some of the fleet were following it, and about 8 o'clock a vessel was discovered chasing us and appeared to be gaining. . . . We were in hopes that we could evade the pursuing steamer in the darkness of the night, but in our present condition she was too fast for us and was able to throw some hot shot over us before sundown, which caused us to stop and surrender." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 5, 337.

returns [1] of the business, and these continued the delivery of state purchases. It is probably impossible to form even an approximate estimate of the amount of goods conveyed to Wilmington by the dare-devil captains of these boats or of the amount of state-owned supplies that were in Bermuda, Hamilton and Nassau when the business was stopped. Some references to the goods on the islands would indicate that the supply there was large. On October 20, 1864, Major Devereux offers a high freight rate to any vessel that would bring in 20,000 pairs of shoes and other goods stored in Bermuda [2] and in Nassau. On October 22, 1864, he sells to a Confederate agent 100,000 pounds of bacon at Nassau [3] and on December 8 he acknowledges the receipt of leather, steel, and miscellaneous boxes and casks. [4] Moreover, even as late as January, 1865, Governor Vance must have deemed the amount of value, for in that month he deputed Wilkes Morris to proceed to Nassau "to look after the goods belonging to the State of North Carolina stored there and to endeavor to have them sent into the Confederacy." [5] In pursuance of his orders Morris reported the shipment of two consignments of state goods to Charleston, [6] but the capture of that port closed all Southern communications with the islands. This is the last shipment from the islands reported among the state documents. As already noted, the Collie Company as consignors fell heir to the stores remaining in the state depots.

[1] "The Liverpool cotton merchant, who in the winter of 1861-62 had found ruin staring him in the face, suddenly awoke to the fact that the ports of the South were an Eldorado of wealth to the man who could go in and come out again in safety." Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, 154.

[2] Quartermaster's Letter Book, 274.

[3] *Ibid.*, 276.

[4] The list of receipts includes 25 packages in the cargo of the *Vulture*.

[5] Morris to Vance, February 1, 1865, Vance Private Papers.

[6] Their consignments are stated as follows: by the *Susan Beirne*, 60 boxes of bacon, 90 cases of shoes, 3 bales of leather, 2 casks of hardware; by the *Dream* on December 1, 1864, 4 bales of leather, 9 bales of cloth, 1 case of buckskins. *Ibid.*

As in all enterprises that unite risk, haste, and manifest brevity of existence, the expenses of blockade running were staggering. The round trip costs of some of the voyages from Wilmington to Bermuda are preserved. The first trip of the *Don* cost, leaving out the price of the cargo, $48,198.50.[1] The *Hansa*, cargo not included, required an outlay of $69,166.48.[2] The expenses for a round trip of the *Advance* in April 1864 were $57,756.05, and in June $38,898.00.[3] These figures for the short run to Nassau or Bermuda excite no surprise after a glance has been taken at the prices paid for service and for commodities. From the receipts on file it appears that Captain Guthrie was paid $300 in gold and $5,000 in Confederate money for each trip. Moreover he was allowed free storage for three bales of cotton for private speculation. In February 1864, Pilot C. C. Morse of the *Advance* was paid $3,000 for a round trip, and a part of this was in gold.[4] Pilotage on the river cost $200 each way. A charge of $300 was made for setting the range lights used both in going out and coming in.

The handling of the cotton was exceedingly expensive. A wag of the times remarked that it flattened a man's purse even to pronounce the word cotton. The prices exhibited by Commissioner Murray ran for each bale as follows: weighing, $.50, then $1; for

[1] Blockade Book, 526.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Receipts in the Hogg Papers.

[4] The success of a blockade running ship depended largely on the skill, coolness, and determination of its pilot. Most of the ships entering Wilmington were piloted by natives of Smithville and Wilmington. Doctor James Sprunt has, in recognition of the invaluable service of these dauntless navigators, many of whom spent months in Northern prisons, preserved the names of the following: J. M. Adkins, J. W. Anderson, James Bell, Joseph Bensel, Thomas Brinkman, E. T. Burrus, George W. Burruss, J. N. Burruss, J. T. Burruss, Thomas Burruss (?), Charles Craig, J. W. Craig, E. T. Daniels, Richard Dosher, Julius Dosher, Thomas Dyer, T. B. Garrason, R. S. Grissom, Archibald Guthrie, John Hill, Henry Howard, C. C. Morse, T. W. Newton, J. W. Potter, John Savage, C. G. Smith, Joseph Springs, William St. George, Thomas M. Thompson.

lightering to the compresses and back, $4; for compressing, $5; for bagging, if bagging had to be supplied, $40. Clerks, warehousemen, messengers were paid $15 a day. Laborers on the wharves and in the warehouses drew $8 and $9 a day. Commodities for the ship rose each month in the latter part of 1864.[1]

As an offset to these enormous expenses three advantages had been gained, as already implied in the narrative. The first advantage was promptness of delivery—an inestimable gain. The second was that the state's profit from the sale of cotton and tobacco enabled it, after paying a good interest on its warrants, to redeem them more cheaply than by satisfying them in cotton, and consequently, to spend more money for food, clothing, and industrial necessities.[2] The third advantage was that, owing to the possession of its own steamers and the establishment of its own agencies in England and on the islands, the state bought direct from the manufacturers instead of falling into the jaws of conscienceless speculators.

Some idea of the plight of the state if it had been forced to compete with commercial bidders for priority of shipment or been compelled to pay whatever rapacious traders demanded, can be formed from a glance at the profits of the firms that owned their own ships. As early as June, 1863, before prices had towered as they later did, S. C. Hawley, United States consul at Nassau, estimated that a ship of the *Ella* and *Annie* type, that is, a ship of about 1,300 bales capacity, would clear in four voyages, even if lost with a cargo on the fifth, $276,000.[3] Professor Soley of the Naval

[1] On the April trip of the *Advance* bills paid show these prices: beef, $2.50 a pound; poultry $3.50 a pound; eggs $4 a dozen; milk $3 a quart; shad, $25 a pair; wood $45 a cord. Receipts in Hogg Papers.

[2] "The blockade running that followed enriched, so the papers say, the State Treasury of North Carolina, and, I suppose, enabled her to send that extraordinary force, 100 regiments, into the field." Admiral Lee to Secretary Welles, *Naval Official Records*, I, 9, 371.

[3] *Ibid.*

Academy states that "a clear profit of £30,000 ($146,000) each way was no uncommon result" [1] for one voyage. Thomas E. Taylor, agent of an English firm and in charge of several ships, says of one trip of the *Banshee*: "So ended my first trip, a triumphant success! Besides the inward freight of £50 a ton on the war material, I had earned by the tobacco ballast alone £700, the freight for which had been paid at the rate of £70 a ton. But this was a trifle compared to the profit on the 500 odd bales of cotton we had on board, which was at least £50 per bale." [2] Taylor also asserts that the *Banshee*, lost on her ninth trip, earned her shareholders 700 per cent on her eight trips, [3] and further, that on an order from the Confederate commissary general, who disclosed to him that Lee's army was in terrible straits for food, he brought in and sold to that officer for £27,000 a cargo of provisions that cost him only £6,000. [4]

It was fortunate for the Confederates that the profits from private blockade running were tempting, for without its establishment and continuance their soldiers could not have been supplied with arms and ammunition at the opening of the war nor maintained in the field as the conflict progressed. From comparatively small importations of war munitions in 1861, the trade sprang into proportions of magnitude as soon as English capitalists saw how in this traffic "half crowns could be turned into sovereigns at a single venture." [5] It must, nevertheless, be kept in mind that the business was founded on the expectation that its greatest profits would be derived from the "running out of cheap cotton to be sold as high cotton." Hence in the earlier stages of the business, especially

[1] Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, 166.
[2] Taylor, *Running the Blockade*, 69.
[3] *Ibid.*, 85.
[4] *Ibid.*, 140.
[5] Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, 155.

as the losses of ships and cargoes in that period were infrequent, the prices of commodities to the Confederate government and to North Carolina were not excessive. Goods in that period were cheap for cash in European markets, and the Confederate agents not only asked merchants and manufacturers for no time indulgence, but "bought through men trained in their work as contractors for the English army." [1] Indeed Caleb Huse, the principal European agent of the Confederate Ordnance Department, thinks that "never before was a government at war so well supplied with arms, munitions, clothing, and medicines—everything, in short, that an army requires, with so little money as was paid by the Confederacy" [2] in the first two years of the war.

In the beginning the traffic was conducted through slow, wooden freighters or by steamers withdrawn from less remunerative routes, [3] but, as the chances for quick returns increased, specially designed swift iron vessels "furnished with all the resources of science and the mechanical skill of English shipyards" [4] were built for the money-coining service. The companies that controlled these "water-hugging fliers" diverted a large proportion of them to Wilmington as soon as they learned that a port with the shore configuration and river defenses of that town could not be effectually closed by any blockading fleet.

How important Wilmington was to the Confederacy as well as to North Carolina is shown by the testimony of the commanders-in-chief of the opposing armies. General Grant, in opening his chapter on the expedition against Fort Fisher, says: "Up to January 1865, the

[1] Huse, *Supplies for the Confederate Army*, 25.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] "Some of these steamers had been private yachts, as for example the *Merrimac*, some were engaged in trade from British ports, as the *Cornubia;* some were taken from the Channel service, as the *Eugenie*; and some were built for opium smuggling in China." *Ibid.*
[4] *Naval Official Records*, I, 10, 573.

enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the Cape Fear River and below the city of Wilmington. This port was of immense importance to the Confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade-runners, by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home." [1] General Lee, in giving directions to meet this same expedition, telegraphed to the commander at Wilmington that if Forts Fisher and Caswell were not held he would have to evacuate Richmond. [2] Admiral David D. Porter, commanding the North Atlantic Squadron, was of the same opinion. He wrote to General Sherman on January 3, 1865: "I know that a move on Wilmington is the only way to go to work. That kills Charleston without stopping on the way. In fact it kills the rebellion." [3]

These mature judgments reveal the value attached to the town on account of its blockade facilities and business. No more fatal blow than its untimely fall could have befallen the Confederacy at that time. The magnitude of the trade then going on may be judged from General Badeau's assertion that "in little more than a year before the capture of Fort Fisher the ventures of British capitalists and speculators with Wilmington alone had amounted to sixty-six million dollars in gold, and sixty-five million dollars worth of cotton in gold had been exported in return." [4] Admiral Porter, writing to Secretary Welles just after the capture of the forts, says: "I find that immense quantities of provisions, stores, and clothing have come through this port into rebeldom; I am almost

[1] *Personal Memoirs*, II, 261. In his official report, July 22, 1865, he states: "Wilmington, N. C., was the most important seacoast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad and send cotton and other products out by blockade runners."

[2] *Naval Official Records*, I, 11, 620.

[3] *Ibid.*, 408.

[4] *Life of General Grant.*

afraid to mention the amount, but enough to supply over 60,000 men."[1] Doctor James Sprunt, whose position as purser of the blockade-runner *Lilian* gave him a clear insight into the traffic and whose later researches enable him to speak with knowledge, says of the volume of blockade business:

I have not been able to obtain an approximate estimate of the value of supplies brought by blockade runners into the Confederacy during the four years, nor the amount of the losses by ship owners who failed to make a successful voyage through the Federal fleet. I have, however, carefully computed the actual sum realized by the United States government from public sales of prizes, recorded by Admiral Porter in his *Naval History of the Civil War*, which aggregates $21,759,595.05; to which may be reasonably added $10,000,000 for prizes of my knowledge not included in this report, and $10,000,000 more for valuable ships and cargoes stranded or destroyed by design or accident while attempting to escape from the blockading squadron. This total of $42,000,000 represents only a part, perhaps one-half of the capital invested. . . . It is probably within the bounds of truth to say that the blockade running traffic during the war, including the cost of the ships, amounted to about one hundred and fifty million of dollars, gold standard.[2]

The Manchester *Guardian* estimated that the average amount of capital invested by Englishmen in trading ventures with Wilmington during a period of fifteen months (October 31, 1863 to December 31, 1864) was as follows:[3]

	Entrances 203	*Clearances* 194	*Total Ventures* 397
Ships at £15,000 each . . .	£ 3,045,000	£ 2,910,000	£ 5,955,000
Cargoes:			
Inward £12,000			
Outward £25,000	2,436,000	4,850,000	7,286,000
Total	£ 5,481,000	£ 7,760,000	£13,241,000

[1] *Naval Official Records*, I, 11, 620.
[2] *North Carolina Booklet*, February 10, 1902.
[3] Secretary of Treasury's Report, Richmond *Dispatch*, January 3, 1865.

Confederate supply records add to this testimony. From these records it appears that from October 26 to December 6, 1864, 8,632,000 pounds of meat, 520,000 pounds of coffee, 2,639 packages of medicine, 1,933,000 pounds of saltpetre, 1,507,000 pounds of lead, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 blankets, 69,000 rifles, 97 packages of pistols, 43 cannon (including some Whitworth and some Armstrong guns), in addition to other articles, were imported into Wilmington and Charleston. As Wilmington was at that time more easily and more safely entered than Charleston,[1] most of this material came to its piers.

Leaving out possible losses to English warrant holders and supply furnishers, a closer approximation can perhaps be made of the financial returns of the North Carolina blockade business than of the Confederate. Attached to the governor's message of May 17, 1864, is the first balanced statement of the business. This statement was prepared by Major Devereux and is, so Vance declares, "as accurate as can be without vouchers for expenditures abroad not yet received."[2] Two balances are set up in the statement: first, one computed in English money (gold standard) of operations "outside of the Confederate States"; second, one in Confederate money of "Blockade Operations within the Confederacy."[3]

The first is as follows:

	£	s	d
This sum raised in cotton bonds.	119,700		
This sum advanced by Messrs. Collie & Company to Mr. White to pay freight on inward cargoes and disbursements on the islands.....	98,969	1	7

[1] As early as November 10, 1863, Admiral Lee, commanding the blockading squadron, writes to Secretary Welles: "That (the blockade) of Charleston is now rarely violated." *Naval Official Records*, 9, 231.

[2] Legislative Documents, Adjourned Session, May 1864.

[3] Manuscript statement, May 1, 1864 , Vance Letter File.

	£ s d	
Disbursements in Wilmington (estimated)	250	
This sum raised in resin bonds	47,500	
Cash to balance	47,248 : 18 : 15	
		£313,668
(Per contra)		
½ of steamer *Advance* on hand, original cost £35,000, ten per cent off for wear and tear one year	15,750	
¼ interest in three steamers, *Hansa*, *Annie*, and ———	15,000	
378,806 lbs. cotton at .5	78,918	
Sales of 4,080 bales cotton at £50	204,000	
		£313,668

This balance to the credit of the state, converted into gold dollars, would, of course, be $229,944.94. At the rate of exchange then prevailing this would equal $795,609.49 in Confederate money.

The second part of the statement, showing the operations within the Confederacy, is as follows:

	$	
To amount of appropriation	2,324,000.00	
Disbursements in Wilmington	112,600.13	
Cash to balance	1,554,588.99	
		$ 3,991,189.12
(Per contra)		
Sales of clothing to Confederate government	$ 1,561,648.00	
Value of stock on hand, estimated at price Confederate government is now paying	1,326,144.00	
Sales of various articles	973,250.25	
Sale of ½ interest *Advance* in bonds	130,146.87	
		$ 3,991,189.12

Thus, if the bookkeeping be correct, the state had derived to May 1, 1864, a profit "from the venture" of $2,350,198.48.

A more extended report, in which the balances are all stated in terms of Confederate money, was recently found in the Hogg Papers.[1] This statement, except in one or two specified items, uses 3.46 as a ratio of exchange. Unfortunately the statement is not dated, but internal evidence clearly establishes that it was after June and before September 10, 1864.[2] A footnote to the statement, which is signed by Major Devereux, states that "a very large quantity of goods, consisting of blankets, cloths, shoes, cotton and wool cards and machines, and hardware, are now on the way in the islands." The statement is as follows:

STATEMENT SHOWING THE RESULT OF BLOCKADE OPERATIONS BY THE STATE

Dr.

To amount of appropriation		$ 2,324,000.00	
This sum raised on cotton bonds		2,014,320.00	
This sum raised on resin bonds		798,000.00	
Loss sustained in the capture of the steamer *Don*		84,000.00	
Due Messrs. A. Collie & Company, London:			
Advanced Mr. White	$401,250.06		
Sight draft by Governor Vance	34,438.30		
Disbursements at Bermuda at 3½ (for exchange)	21,938.38	1,601,693.00	
Disbursements at Wilmington		112,606,13	
			$ 6,934,619.13
Balance carried down			8,565,478.12
			$ 15,500,097.25

[1] These papers were preserved in the home of Major Thomas D. Hogg, State Ordnance Officer, until January 28, 1921, when they were presented to the Historical Commission by his granddaughter, Miss Sally Dortch, of Raleigh.

[2] The statement accounts in full for the sales of a large amount of imported copper. These sales were not completed until June. Hence the statement must have been compiled in or after that month. A half interest in the *Advance* is carried as an asset in the statement. This vessel was captured September 10, 1864. Hence the statement antedates that event.

Cr.

By sales of quartermaster stores, etc. per Abstract "A" ..... $	226,805.97
By Ordnance stores turned over to Major T. D. Hogg, pr Abstract "B"	461,687.45
By Medical and Hospital Stores turned over to Surgeon General pr Abstract "C"	170,993.00
By Quarter Masters stores turned over to Maj. H. A. Dowd, pr Abstract "D"	6,866,225.00
By Cotton on hand at various points 7380 bales, 3,299,020 at 1.00 per pound	3,299,020.00
By sale of one half steamer *Advance* $85,486 —3½ for exchange	299,201.00
By value of one half Do. on hand $85,486—at 3½ for exchange	299,201.00
By one fourth interest in four steamers, *Don, Hansa, Annie Laurie* and———$96,000 at 3½	336,000.00
By 15,283w Spanish Copper at 5.89¼	90,055.07
By Cash in hands of Messrs. A. Collie & Co., London	3,427,200.00
By additional Ordnance Stores, say 15,000w lead at 75 cents per pound	11,475.00
By cash for freight	12,233.76
$	15,500,097.25

The sales of $226,805.97 worth of goods mentioned in the first item on the credit side were commodities brought in by the *Advance* on her three earliest trips. The ordnance stores were for the most part those bought by Colonel MacRae.[1] They, as well as all the other supplies, are listed at the prices the Confederate government was, at the date of the statement, paying in its own money. Among the items making up the $170,993 spent for medicines an original bill from Barron, Harveys, Beckett & Simpson shows[2] the usual drugs used by the Confederate surgeons in 1863.

[1] The itemized price list of these articles, as found on a sheet of paper in the quartermaster's files, differs from a statement printed in the Legislative Documents of 1864-65 only in the number of pounds of lead. It is as follows: 1,200 Enfield rifles at $300 each; 120,000 rifle cartridges at $50 per thousand; 620,000 musket caps at $25 per thousand; 2,115 pounds of lead at 75 cents per pound; 250,000 shotgun caps at $25 per thousand; 10,656 musket tubes at 55 cents; 6,048 shotgun tubes at 55 cents; 1,380 files at $4; 370 sheets of iron at $90; 1,000 pounds borax at $12; 560 pounds of emory at $6 per pound; 1,123 pounds of steel at $8. Hogg Papers.

[2] The bill includes these drugs: Ricine, magnesia, quinine, croton oil, rhubarb, tincture of iron, iodine, ipecac, ammonia, blue mass, calomel, gum acacia, silver nitrate, Dover's powders, Fowler's solution, nitre, chloroform, potassium bicarbonate, sodium bicarbonate, lead acetate, ammonia bicarbonate, copper sulphate, zinc sulphate, morphine, opium, Goulard's cerate, and many unguents, liniments and hospital stores. A good many sets of surgical instruments are also included. Hogg Papers.

Fortunately there is preserved in full, with their prices, the articles comprised in the $6,866,225 item. This enumeration illustrates the diversity of articles passing through the hands of the quartermaster. The articles issued or sold to that date by Major Dowd were:

33,018 yards of army cloth	at	$ 10.00	$ 330,180.00
34,984 pairs of shoes	at	15.00	524,760.00
28,212 blankets	at	15.00	423,180.00
14,040 pairs of socks (woolen)	at	2.00	28,080.00
5,000 flannel shirts	at	7.50	37,500.00
510 pounds of flax thread	at	10.00	5,100.00
530 dozen spool cotton	at	15.00	7,950.00
400 dozen white tape	at	6.00	2,400.00
516 gross of buttons	at	3.00	1,548.00
470 feet of belting	at	10.00	4,700.00
30 barrels of oil	at	1,000.00	30,000.00
150 calf skins	at	75.00	11,250.00
27,000 pairs of cotton cards	at	5.00	135,000.00
4,000 pounds of sole leather	at	5.00	20,000.00
			$ 1,561,648.00

The articles on hand for issue or sale by Major Dowd's division were 40,922 yards of army cloth; 3,627 pairs of shoes; 27,746 blankets; 1,947 flannel shirts; 84,063 yards of flannel (gray); 3,110 pounds of flax thread; 953 dozen spool cotton; 960 dozen white tape; 8,604 gross of buttons; 2,704 pounds of bleaching powder; 180 gross of buckles; 7 gross of cobbler's awls; 20 reams of paper; 10,000 envelopes; 8 barrels of oil; 378 calf skins; 528 pairs of boots (cavalry); 1,065 pairs of cotton cards; 5,000 forage caps; 6,000 pairs of pants; 6,000 great coats; 6,002 jackets; 10,000 needles; 30,133 pounds of leather; 5 cases of card clothing and factory findings—the total valued at $5,304,577.[1] Among the articles sold by Major Devereux's division were dye stuffs; paints; 10,020 scythe blades; copper;

[1] Statement of May, 1864 in quartermaster's files.

tacks; card machines; wood screws; wire; card wire; cloth for cards; frying pans; axes; stationery; coppers; nails; horseshoes. [1]

The last extended statement on record is for September 30, 1864. [2] Concerning this statement Major Devereux appends a note to Governor Vance in which he says that great difficulty was experienced in preparing the statement in consequence of the necessity of discriminating between transactions in gold and in Confederate notes, and that all the foreign transactions are rated as gold at $4.80 to the pound. He regrets that, owing to no advices from Mr. White, the amount in Mr. Collie's hands is only an estimate, but he thinks the sum will be larger than his estimate. The gold statement is thus given:

For this amount due abroad.....	$ 690,000.00		
For cash to balance.....	126,957.30		
		$	816,957.30
(Per contra)			
By cotton bonds paid.....	$ 96,000.00		
By ¼ of the *Hansa* on hand.....	24,000.00		
By ¼ of the *Annie* sold.....	24,000.00		
By cotton on hand, 681 bales [3]			
By cotton due from Confederate States, weighing 450 [4] per bale, 3,456,450 pounds.....			
By cotton due from Collie & Company 273,123 [5] pounds 3,729,573 @ 10 cents.....	372,957.30		
By cash in Collie's hands (estimated).....	300,000.00		
		$	816,957.30

[1] Statement of May, 1864, in quartermasters files.

[2] Legislative Documents of 1865-66, Document 7.

[3] It will be noted that no credit is taken for this cotton in the statement. If we put the weight of the bales as low as 400 pounds and the price as low as 80 cents, the sum of $217,600 should be added.

[4] This cotton was borrowed to supply ships without delay.

[5] This price of ten cents was the contract price on warrant cotton and was assumed in the negotiations only for convenience. When it was returned, much of it was sold for $1 a pound.

The second half of the statement is again in terms of Confederate notes:

For amount of appropriation....	$ 2,324,000.00	
For cash to balance.....	4,852,567.00	
		$ 7,176,567.50
(Per contra)		
By ½ of the *Advance* sold at $130,000 worth in state bonds	$ 460,000.00	
By supplies in hands of Major Dowd.....	3,074,691.00	
By cards sold.....	594,540.00	
By clothing and shoes issued....	2,078,250.00	
By supplies sold and in hands of Major Devereux.....	969,086.50[1]	
		$ 7,176,567.50

In submitting this exhibit to the legislature, Governor Vance says: "By this it will be seen that including ships, cotton, and exchange, we have a balance in our favor in specie of $126,957.30 and on the currency account a balance of $4,852,567.50.

"The following amounts have been expended for the benefit of the state, for part of which special appropriations would have otherwise been made, and which this department has the right to account for as profits, viz.:

Clothing issued to State Troops.....	$ 550,000.00
Paid into the Treasury.....	392,102.92
Ordnance and Ordnance stores.....	488,870.45
Clothing issued Surgeon General's Department....	35,000.00
State Bonds, (sale of *Ad-Vance*).....	460,000.00
Medicines furnished Surgeon General.....	170,993.00
Supplies furnished Deaf and Dumb Asylum.....	20,550.00
Stationery furnished Secretary of State.....	28,681.20
Total.....	$ 2,146,197.57

[1] These figures include the $226,805.97 in the June-September statement. Among the sales during the two periods were: scythe blades, $195,055.50; wire sold at auction, $65,360.40; paints and dyes, $10,103.20; tacks for cards, $10,171.20; screws, $55,911.40; bacon, $129,279; cloth for cards, $27,512.20; card wire $14,302.20; lead, $22,850; stationery, $28,081.20; supplies for Deaf and Dumb Institute, $20,550; leather, $200,000. Legislative Documents, 1864-65.

"There is also in the hands of and due to Major Dowd of the Clothing Department, the sum of $2,672,-990, which, if so ordered, can be made available to the Treasury for the current fiscal year. . . . This sum added to the above will, when paid into the treasury, extinguish the original appropriation of $2,324,000.00, leaving a balance of $2,495,187.57, which with the articles on hand estimated at prices paid by the Confederate government, which are far below the market price, will, I conceive, constitute the net profits realized." Still, it must be borne in mind that the exact standing of the foreign account was unknown at the time of this report, and undoubtedly some sums were left unpaid when the business was closed by the Federal triumph at Wilmington.

Only twice after Vance's November comments on the monetary results of the system do official documents afford firm ground for an investigator's feet. Major Devereux filed for September and October a monthly report of the blockade receipts and expenses so far as they passed through his department to the adjutant general's office. These two do not cover the larger operations of Major Dowd's department. On September 30, he reported a balance in favor of the state of $160,128.20. On October 30, this balance had grown to $190,254.73. Heavy drafts were made on all state supplies in the late fall of 1864 and in the spring of 1865 to equip and maintain the Junior and Senior Reserves and the Home Guards, for these state troops were almost continually in the field during that period.

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